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Summary 
The Admissibility of Shareholder Claims: Standing, Causes of 
Action, and Damages 
Gabriel Bottini 
 
This thesis addresses risks of multiple recovery, prejudice to legitimate interests of third 
parties, and inadequate consideration of the applicable law in shareholder claims in 
investment treaty arbitration. It challenges the application by investment tribunals of two 
basic premises: i) that shareholders are entitled to claim for damages vis-à-vis measures 
against the company in which they hold shares and ii) that ‘contract claims’ are to be 
distinguished from ‘treaty claims’. The central argument is that the failure to recognize 
substantive overlaps between shareholder treaty claims and contract claims risks more than 
one recovery, potentially prejudices third parties, and can lead to an incomplete application 
of the applicable law.  
The foundations of standing and the cause of action in shareholder treaty claims 
involve two complementary ideas of independence, i.e., independence of shareholder treaty 
rights vis-à-vis the local company’s contractual/national law rights and independence of 
treaty claims vis-à-vis contract claims. However, the substance of shareholder treaty claims, 
defined as the state measure and particularly the losses involved, is often identical to or at 
least overlaps considerably with related contract/national law claims. Prevailing ideas on 
shareholder standing and the cause of action in international investment law have provided 
useful conceptual tools for jurisdictional determinations. Yet they have not allowed tribunals 
and the literature to fully consider the implications of shareholder indirect claims.  
The thesis argues, first, that investment tribunals should acknowledge substantive 
overlaps between contract and treaty claims. Second, shareholder claims may be inadmissible 
when such overlap exists and there is a risk of double recovery or prejudice to third parties. 
Third, the substantive coincidence of treaty and contract claims calls for an integrated 
approach to the applicable law, where proper weight is given not only to IIA provisions but 
also to general international law and the national law governing the investment. 
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1 Introduction 
 
International investment law is a young field with inconsistent decisions on important 
aspects of jurisdiction and the merits.1 Yet investment tribunals share two central 
premises as regards shareholder claims: i) that shareholders are entitled to claim for 
damages vis-à-vis measures taken against the company2 in which they hold shares and ii) 
that ‘contract claims’ differ significantly from ‘treaty claims’. This thesis argues, 
however, that shareholder and company rights and treaty and contract claims are 
connected in important ways. Investment tribunals have generally failed to deal with the 
fact that shareholder rights under national and international law may refer to the same 
assets and damages. Fundamentally, the thesis posits that shareholder claims under 
investment treaties for harm to the company’s assets are intertwined with related 
contract/national law claims, in particular regarding the substance of the claims.  
International investment agreements (‘IIAs’)3 create international law rights and 
causes of action and provide for the creation of international arbitral tribunals to enforce 
them. Prevailing theories and most investment tribunals conceptually separate treaty 
rights and causes of action from the facts to which they apply. Yet however we 
characterize the additional protection and entitlements IIAs provide, ‘there is only one 
world’.4 The underlying realities are all kinds of assets, contracts, property rights, and so 
on, which are subject to their own legal regimes. The notion that IIA rights and causes of 
action are largely isolated from such regimes is mistaken. For example, when a contract 
is protected by an IIA, the rights and causes of action created by the treaty coexist with 
those arising from the contract. Nowhere do IIAs establish that investment tribunals 
should disregard the contract. Those other legal regimes protect rights and interests of 
                                                             
1 See Franck (2005); Reinisch (2010) 114-117; Park (2015) 443. 
2 The word company is used in this thesis broadly to refer to any legal person of a commercial character 
recognized by some national law. See Walker (1956) 380; Diallo (Jurisdiction) [61]. 
3 The most numerous type of IIAs are bilateral investment treaties (‘BITs’). While there may be 
considerable differences as to structure and scope between BITs and other kinds of IIAs (as well as among 
BITs), these differences are not always relevant for the present purposes. Thus, unless otherwise stated or 
evident from the context the acronyms IIAs and BITs are used interchangeably throughout the thesis.  
4 Crawford (2008) 352. 
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people other than the shareholders bringing IIA claims, even though the assets involved 
may be the same. If tribunals do not deal appropriately with this overlap, the ‘new source 
of rights’ created by IIAs risks ‘duplication of claims, proceedings and relief’5 and 
connected problems relating to possible harm to third-party interests, inadequate 
application of the applicable law, and contradictory decisions. 
The conceptual foundations of standing and the cause of action in shareholder 
treaty claims6 are based on two complementary ideas of independence, i.e., independence 
of shareholder treaty rights vis-à-vis the local company’s contractual and national law 
rights,7 and independence of treaty claims vis-à-vis contract claims.8 Thus, shareholders’ 
treaty right to be treated in a fair and equitable way is independent from the company’s 
contractual rights, not least because the holders of the rights and the applicable law are 
different. And, relatedly, any contract or national law claim that the company may bring 
leaves the commencement and prosecution of shareholder treaty claims unaffected. These 
ideas of independence9 reflect the current jurisdictional position with respect to 
shareholder claims. Foreign shareholders hold protected investments (i.e., their shares 
and often also other assets connected to the company) and therefore enjoy certain rights 
under IIAs. A breach of treaty provisions protecting these investments ‘will affect a 
specific right of that protected investor’,10 which shareholders have standing to directly 
enforce in international proceedings.11 Because of this treaty basis, investment tribunals 
have asserted jurisdiction regardless of any conditions or restrictions stemming from 
contractual or national law provisions or proceedings.  
                                                             
5 Cremades and Cairns (2005) 34. 
6 In the thesis, shareholder treaty claims refers to shareholder claims under IIAs and is used interchangeably 
with shareholder IIA claims. 
7 CMS (Jurisdiction) [68]. Some of the most forceful defenders of diplomatic protection of foreign 
shareholders questioned, however, the idea of complete independence between the company and its 
shareholders under international law. See De Visscher (1934) 639-640.    
8 Bayindir (Jurisdiction) [166]. 
9 The pursuit of autonomy is a recurrent theme in international arbitration. Referring to a preliminary draft 
of the ICSID Convention, in 1964 Aron Broches, then the World Bank’s General Counsel, observed that 
‘[t]he present draft was designed to establish a self-contained system as was found in judicial or arbitral 
proceedings between States under which there would be no recourse to an outside authority against 
decisions of tribunals or conciliation commissions’. History ICSID Convention, II-1, 427. 
10 Sempra (Jurisdiction) [78]; Schlemmer (2008) 83. 
11 Gas Natural [34-35]; RREEF (Jurisdiction) [123]. Here, the size of the shareholding is not relevant. See 
Alexandrov (2005) 28-30; Schlemmer (2008) 83. 
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However, the substance of shareholder treaty claims, defined here as the state 
measure or measures and particularly the losses involved,12 is often identical or at least 
overlaps considerably with contract/national law claims (actual or potential) by the 
shareholder itself or by the local subsidiary. As a rule, the source of the main rights in the 
related claims differs: a treaty in investment arbitration proceedings and a contract in 
proceedings before national courts.13 Still, the object of the claims in terms of the damages 
sought may be identical.14 In principle, there is no reason why this potential duplication 
of damages claims should affect the jurisdiction of investment tribunals.15 Provided the 
conditions attached to consent to international jurisdiction by the contracting parties to 
the IIA are present, a tribunal must uphold its competence.16 But the potential for double 
recovery17 and inconsistent decisions arising from parallel treaty and contract claims, 
among other undesirable consequences, is clear.18 The thesis argues that decisions on the 
merits of investment claims have generally failed to discuss substantive similarities 
between contract/national law and treaty claims or to seriously consider the consequences 
of any potential overlaps.  
I. SHAREHOLDER TREATY CLAIMS: INDEPENDENCE AND OVERLAP 
Shareholder claims under IIAs for measures causing harm to a company in which, directly 
or indirectly, they hold shares19 are nowadays a significant part of investment 
                                                             
12 To compare the substance of contract and treaty claims, this thesis follows the approach of the ELSI case, 
i.e., to focus on the challenged measure and principally on the losses alleged in each claim. See ELSI, 45-
46. 
13 Although the distinction between treaty and contract rights depending on the type of instrument where 
the right is contained is conceptually simple, in certain circumstances ‘maintaining the distinction… can be 
problematic’. Cremades and Cairns (2005) 14. See also Voss (2011) 160. 
14 Cremades and Cairns (2005) 14. 
15 Ampal (Jurisdiction) [329]. 
16 The terms ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘competence’ have different meanings under the ICSID Convention, at least 
in the English and Spanish language versions. Schreuer (2009) 85-86. Unless otherwise stated, however, 
they are used interchangeably throughout the thesis.  
17 When the thesis refers to the risk of double recovery it includes the risk of multiple recovery, unless 
otherwise stated. 
18 Wehland (2016) 577. As Brower and Henin note, however, risks of ‘duplicative proceedings, double 
recovery, and inconsistent awards and decisions’ also derive from ‘[t]he proliferation of international 
dispute settlement mechanisms’ with ‘[o]verlapping and competing jurisdictions’. Brower and Henin 
(2015) 54. See also generally Shany (2003). 
19 The thesis refers to this type of claims as indirect claims, regardless of whether the shareholding is direct 
or indirect. Indirect claims is preferred over other concepts such as ‘derivative claims’ or ‘claims for 
reflective loss’ mainly because these latter concepts, while perhaps more precise in certain respects, also 
appear more closely connected to specific domestic legal systems with specific features. ‘Reflective loss’ 
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arbitration.20 As a jurisdictional matter, investment tribunals have virtually unanimously 
allowed these claims.21 The theory behind this accepted position is that, regardless of who 
the direct addressee of the host state’s measures is, as protected investors shareholders 
exercise their own treaty rights and hold an ‘independent right of action’ to pursue treaty 
claims.22 From the shareholder claimant’s perspective, the independence or separation 
between its international law right of action and that of the local company may have 
considerable advantages. For example, shareholders can bring such claims irrespective of 
forum selection clauses or other jurisdiction provisions applicable to local claims or 
related local proceedings;23 due to lack of privity and differences in the causes of action, 
host states may struggle to invoke the local company’s contractual and national law 
obligations applicable to the investment project; and any compensation awarded by the 
investment tribunal is owed to the shareholder, even if the claim relates to measures 
adopted against the company. 
 The thesis argues, however, that there is a substantive interdependence as to the 
content of contract and treaty claims. Shareholder indirect claims involve the same losses 
as the ones that may be claimed by the company pursuing non-international claims. 
Notably, this thesis does not dispute that IIAs directly confer rights on shareholders. Nor 
does it deny that shareholders are entitled to bring treaty claims based on these rights.24 
Rather, this thesis challenges the orthodox view that shareholder indirect claims are 
independent vis-à-vis the company’s rights and vis-à-vis related contract/national law 
claims.25 It analyses overlaps between shareholders’ treaty rights and the local company’s 
rights and between contract and treaty claims. It is fundamentally concerned with specific 
problems deriving from such overlaps, viz. risks of multiple recovery and prejudice to the 
                                                             
means loss suffered by shareholders ‘as a result of injury to “their” company, typically a loss in value of 
the shares’. Gaukrodger (2013) 11. See also Douglas (2009) 402; Kaufmann-Kohler (2014) 5. 
20 Gaukrodger (2013) 11. For example, of the 53 arbitrations commenced against Argentina at ICSID only 
6 did not involve shareholders claiming for harm to assets owned by the local company (including 3 filed 
by holders of security entitlements over sovereign bonds). See https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/ (accessed 8 
September 2017).  
21 See Chapter 4. 
22 Dolzer and Schreuer (2012) 56-57.  
23 Siwy (2017) 220. 
24 Müller (2015) 39. 
25 Schlemmer argued that in international law ‘shareholders have a right to seek protection independent 
from the corporation’. Schlemmer (2008) 81. To the extent it refers to shareholders’ procedural right to 
bring proceedings autonomously in their own name, the statement is unobjectionable. See also Alexandrov 
(2005) 27; Müller (2015) 359.  
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interests of parties not involved in the IIA claim, as well as with connected applicable law 
problems. It further argues in favour of admissibility as a tool to address these problems, 
but subject to certain criteria that require that admissibility be applied only in appropriate 
circumstances. Admissibility is not the ‘magic wand’ to coordinate overlapping contract 
and treaty rights and claims.26 Rather, it provides a conceptual framework for investment 
tribunals to identify and deal with such overlaps. At the same time, it is complementary 
to other approaches for coordinating related claims, including through a flexible 
application of the doctrines of res judicata and lis pendens and through treaty provisions.
       
A Protection of assets under IIAs 
By definition, IIAs protect investments. This protection is broad in scope in that the term 
investment is often defined through a non-exhaustive list of protected assets,27 which 
includes concepts as general as ‘business concessions and any other rights required to 
conduct economic activity and having economic value conferred by law or under a 
contract’.28 And IIAs expressly protect both interests and rights, and directly and 
indirectly (i.e., through intermediary entities) held entitlements over the protected 
assets.29 Still, most views acknowledge national law’s relevance to investment protection, 
at least for purposes of defining property rights under IIAs.30 Thus, the same asset will 
typically receive concurrent protection under national and international rules, however 
the two protections differ and the applicable legal systems combine. This phenomenon is 
not unique to international investment law.31 The international law of human rights 
protects property rights.32 In principle, the assets in question are also protected by at least 
                                                             
26 Crivellaro (2005) 78. 
27 Schefer (2013) 60; Hobér (2014) 333; Orascom [372].  
28 Australia-Egypt BIT, Art 1.1(a)(v). 
29 See Schlemmer (2008) 56; Hobér (2014) 343.  
30 Salacuse states that how national law ‘conceives of, defines, and enforces [property and contractual 
rights] is fundamental [for] an investment project’. Salacuse (2013) 37. See also Schreuer and Reinisch 
(2002) [12]; Douglas (2003) 198-199; McLachlan, Shore and Weiniger (2017) 379-380; Tidewater [116]. 
31 Heiskanen argues that IIAs protect only ‘income-producing property’ and are thus, in this respect, 
‘narrower in scope than human rights treaties’. Heiskanen (2017) 7. But see Achmea I [261] (the concept 
of ‘investment’ in the applicable BIT was narrower than that of ‘property’ in the EU Charter on 
Fundamental Rights).  
32 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art 17; European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
Protocol No. 1, Art 1; American Convention on Human Rights, Art 21; African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, Art 14. See also Reinisch (2008) 416 (under the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights protected ‘possessions’ include ‘shareholder rights’); Heiskanen (2017) 4.  
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one national legal system (typically that under which the relevant rights were created).33 
Further, a subject of international law may hold rights under both national and 
international law.34 The fact that these rights may simultaneously refer to the same asset 
is not particularly problematic. 
Nevertheless, international investment law has three peculiar aspects. First, the 
idea of internationally protected indirect rights or interests held by investors over assets 
or rights that may belong to a different person under national law35 generally does not 
appear in other areas of international law.36 This involves not only interaction and 
possible conflict between national and international rules, but also overlapping 
rights/interests of different persons over the same assets. The potential for conflicting 
claims and parallel proceedings is apparent here, not least because most investment 
tribunals interpret IIAs as conferring protection not only on indirect, but also partial 
interests over (effectively somebody else’s) assets.37 Second, specifically in the case of 
shareholders it is argued that in international investment law ‘protection is not restricted 
to ownership in shares; it extends to the assets of the company’.38 It is also maintained 
that shareholders have a protected interest in the assets of the company.39 Third, given 
IIAs’ protection of indirect interests, more than one entity forming a sometimes long 
corporate chain may be able to claim vis-à-vis the same measure affecting the local 
company’s assets and causing the same damage.40 Thus, overlapping entitlements may 
derive not only from national and international law respectively. They may also stem 
from different IIAs protecting more than one entity at the same or different levels of the 
corporate chain.41 
                                                             
33 Dolzer and Schreuer (2012) 64; Salacuse (2013) 37. 
34 Reparation for Injuries, 179. 
35 Servier [532]; Azurix (Annulment) [94]; Müller (2015) 422.   
36 Baumgartner (2016) 48. 
37 Servier [532]. 
38 Dolzer and Schreuer (2012) 59.  
39 Alexandrov (2005) 45. 
40 See Reinisch (2004) 59; Hobér (2014) 343; Wehland (2016) 580; Baumgartner (2016) 263; Gaillard 
(2017) 17 (discussing four ‘duplicative’ IIA arbitrations against Egypt by shareholders at different levels 
of the corporate chain as well as by the local company). 
41 Bjorklund (2005) 510; CME (Final Award) [433]. 
7 
  
IIAs create international causes of action potentially for a myriad of legal entities 
by protecting their interests, even if indirect and/or partial, in assets (no matter who they 
belong to under national law). In this sense, the concept of investment appears as a 
particularly broad expression of property.42 It includes both rights and interests and not 
only the idea of ownership but also that of control, even with respect to assets that under 
national law are more generally described, from a legal perspective, as being owned rather 
than controlled by someone.43 Thus, under IIAs not only companies but also ‘contractual 
rights’, ‘tangible property’, and so on are subject to control.44 The term control appears 
wide enough to encompass not only ownership rights, but also the ‘exercise of powers or 
directions’ in respect of assets.45 The notions of indirect interests or control over assets, 
plus the idea that shares’ status as protected investments confers enforceable interests 
over the company’s assets on shareholders, considerably increase the possibilities of 
coextensive entitlements of different persons over the same assets deriving both from 
national law and as many IIAs as may be applicable. This potentially multiplies the 
number of persons with standing to claim.46 No matter how many additional persons are 
granted entitlements over an asset, however, the protected asset remains the same. At least 
under national law the asset generally has a defined owner, who in the case of shareholder 
indirect claims differs from the party claiming for damage to the asset. And not only the 
local company as the owner, but also third parties may have protected interests over the 
asset in question.  
B Problems deriving from concurrent entitlements 
This thesis focuses on the phenomenon of concurrent entitlements over the same assets 
deriving from the protection of rights or interests of shareholders under IIAs, on the one 
hand, and of the local company under national or contract law, on the other hand. Such 
                                                             
42 Lowe (2010) 1020; Venezuela Holdings (Annulment) [172]. IIA standards of treatment often provide far-
reaching protections, particularly in terms of standing and cause of action (by granting standing to persons 
with relatively loose connections to the affected asset, whose owner will typically also have a cause of 
action under national law). Yet in terms of the scope of protection, national law may provide a more 
‘comprehensive protection of property rights’ than discrete IIA standards. See Euram [402]. 
43 See Canada-Trinidad and Tobago BIT, Art I.f.vi (‘“investment” means any kind of asset owned or 
controlled either directly, or indirectly through an investor of a third State [including] rights, conferred by 
law or under contract’). 
44 See Georgia-US BIT, Art I(d).  
45 Aguas del Tunari [227]. Douglas observed that the right of ownership is the ‘strongest form of control’ 
that may be acquired over property. Douglas (2009) 300. See also Aguas del Tunari [245]. 
46 See Ampal (Jurisdiction) [10-15, 328]. 
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protected rights and interests are generally enforceable before some forum and thus 
constitute a basis for advancing claims.47 Yet two or more investors may never bring the 
different claims available and thus a problem of how to coordinate parallel or subsequent 
related proceedings may or may not arise. However, if a claim by the company is not filed 
or is partly or wholly discontinued as a result of an IIA claim by one of its shareholders, 
the company abandons certain rights. This concerns not only the company’s position, but 
may also affect the rights or interests of non-claiming shareholders and other third parties 
such as the company’s creditors. In this sense, the analysis of concurrent entitlements of 
local companies and shareholders is somewhat different than and is not limited to that of 
actual parallel or subsequent proceedings–a topic that has already been covered 
thoroughly in the literature.48 
 Conversely, the study of overlaps between shareholder rights under IIAs and the 
local company’s contract/national law rights is concerned with the relationship between 
claims before investment tribunals and claims before national courts or arbitral tribunals 
that are not treaty-based. Of course, the problem of parallel proceedings in international 
law is broader. The unsystematic creation of international courts and tribunals, which 
accelerated in recent decades, has engendered increasing possibilities of jurisdictional 
overlaps between international jurisdictions.49 Several authors have identified this 
problem since early on in the development of modern international investment law.50 
Parallel or subsequent proceedings may arise from a variety of situations.51 The most 
relevant in the IIA context are different proceedings brought under the jurisdiction 
provisions of a contract and an IIA or of two or more IIAs but based on the same facts.52  
                                                             
47 The word claim is used here in a procedural sense as referring to ‘the actual request of an act or omission 
based on a specific set of facts, presented against another person in proceedings before a judicial forum’. 
Wehland (2013) 4. 
48 See generally Shany (2003); McLachlan (2008); Wehland (2013); Salles (2014). 
49 Shany (2003) 7. 
50 See e.g. Ibid, 81; Cremades (2005) 9; Orrego Vicuña (2005) 206. 
51 The International Law Association (ILA) defined parallel proceedings broadly, as proceedings before an 
arbitral tribunal and ‘any other proceedings pending before a national court or another tribunal in which the 
parties and one or more of the issues are the same or substantially the same as the ones before [the former 
arbitral tribunal]’. ILA Lis Pendens Report, 26. 
52 Rivkin (2005) 270; Kreindler (2005) 190-191; Hobér (2005) 244. The main interest here is in the 
relationship between shareholder treaty claims and related contract/national law claims. Yet certain ideas 
advanced throughout the thesis, including the need to adopt a substantive approach that concentrates on the 
damages claimed, are also relevant in considering interactions between parallel claims under different IIAs. 
Where appropriate, aspects of this last issue are also considered. 
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Risks commonly attributed to parallel proceedings include increased delays and 
costs, ‘oppressive’ or ‘harassing’ litigation strategies, conflicting results, and multiple 
compensation.53 This work concentrates on two problems specifically linked to 
shareholder claims for damages suffered by the company in which they hold shares: 
multiple compensation risks and prejudice to parties other than the shareholder claimant. 
Yet the need to avoid conflicting decisions is also a relevant admissibility consideration. 
The substantive approach advocated here focuses on the measures and damages involved 
rather than on formal differences in the causes of action. Thus, conflicting determinations 
adopted in treaty and contract claims respectively should not be excluded. Nor are such 
conflicts an ‘unavoidable consequence of a situation where states have extended options 
to arbitrate not only to the legal entities which have made investments, but also to the 
ultimate stakeholders in such investment vehicles’.54 The adoption of conflicting 
decisions is widely seen as a threat to the effectiveness and the legitimacy of dispute 
resolution bodies.55 Investment tribunals should avoid or at least minimize the potential 
for conflicting decisions wherever possible, not least because there is no indication that 
states accepted them as a necessary cost in entering into IIAs.56 
1 Multiple recovery risks 
International law does not allow more than one recovery for the same damage.57 This 
concern already featured in Chorzów Factory. The case involved a claim by Germany 
against certain measures adopted by Poland that had resulted in the ownership over a 
factory and property rights connected to its operation passing to the Polish Treasury.58 
Germany argued that this constituted a measure of ‘liquidation’ not in conformity with 
                                                             
53 See Reinisch (2004) 72; Hobér (2005) 242-243; Cremades (2005) 9; Rivkin (2005) 270; Hobér (2014) 
250, 343; Brower and Henin (2015) 54. 
54 Söderlund (2005) 319. See also Voss (2011) 331. 
55 Reichert (1992) 239; Shany (2003) 23; Reinisch (2004) 43; Cremades (2005) 10; Rivkin (2005) 270; 
Gallagher (2006) 329; Voss (2011) 280-281. 
56 Already during the negotiations of the ICSID Convention, several states observed that ‘the possibility of 
two proceedings regarding the same facts, with the attendant risk of conflicting decisions, was undesirable’. 
History ICSID Convention, II-1, 577. To a certain extent, Söderlund’s argument about ‘unavoidable 
consequences’ may be more appropriately applied to increased costs and litigation tactics associated with 
simultaneous IIA and local proceedings. Söderlund (2005) 319. See also Shany (2003) 259. 
57 Reparation for Injuries, 175; ILC Commentaries, 104-105, 109, 124-125; Pan American [219]; EDF 
(Annulment) [258] (referring specifically to ‘claims by shareholders for wrongs done to the company’).  
58 Chorzów Factory (Jurisdiction), 9-11. 
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treaty provisions binding both countries.59 The existence of a breach of international law 
as regards these facts was res judicata due to a prior judgment.60 The Permanent Court of 
International Justice (‘PCIJ’) established the principle of ‘full reparation’,61 which entails 
that ‘reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act 
and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had 
not been committed’.62 In elaborating the applicable compensation rules, the PCIJ also 
asserted the need to avoid ‘running the risk of the same damage being compensated twice 
over’63 and ‘awarding double damages’.64 Thus, both full reparation and the need to avoid 
double recovery are included as principles of reparation in international law.65 
 Although relevant uncertainties remain as to the bases and permissible scope of 
shareholder claims under IIAs,66 it is frequently advanced that such claims may derive 
from measures affecting the local company’s assets.67 Since the company is entitled to 
claim against measures harming its own assets, there is clearly the risk of more than one 
claim for the same damage.68 And given that, as noted, indirect shareholders may claim 
for losses suffered by the company’s assets, no matter how many intermediary entities 
separate indirect shareholders from the local company, the risk of overlapping damages 
claims increases as IIAs protect more shareholders in the corporate structure.69 Aside 
from this standing aspect (i.e., the local company and its IIA-protected shareholders being 
able to claim for the same damage), the problem also has a cause of action dimension. 
Multiple recovery risks in investment arbitration often involve treaty claims by 
shareholders, on the one hand, and contract claims (or other national law claims) by the 
local company, on the other. This difference in the persons and causes of action has 
                                                             
59 Ibid. 
60 Chorzów Factory (Merits), 29. 
61 ILC Commentaries, 91. 
62 Chorzów Factory (Merits), 47. 
63 Ibid, 48.  
64 Ibid, 49. See also ibid, 58-59. 
65 ILC Commentaries, 105. 
66 See Chapter 4. 
67 See Alexandrov (2005) 57; Dolzer and Schreuer (2012) 59; Kaufmann-Kohler (2014) 5.   
68 Hobér (2005) 245-246; Azurix (Annulment) [109]. 
69 McLachlan (2008) 388; Dolzer and Schreuer (2012) 60; Baumgartner (2016) 18. 
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bolstered ideas of independence of the parallel claims.70 However, despite treaty claims 
being generally considered ‘independent’ from contract claims, several investment 
tribunals have acknowledged that both types of claims may involve the same damages.71  
2 Prejudice to third parties 
The parties to shareholder indirect claims are a foreign shareholder covered by an IIA and 
the state where the company affected by the measures is constituted. Thus, the company 
is a party to the contract in question or owns the relevant assets, but it is generally a third 
party vis-à-vis IIA claims.72 The local company is not the only third party with some 
relationship to the shareholder IIA claim, however. Some investment tribunals have 
alluded to the possibility that shareholder claims may prejudice ‘other domestic or foreign 
shareholders, creditors and employees’.73 The Urbaser tribunal mentioned potential 
conflicts between shareholder IIA claims and the company’s creditors.74 Yet this conflict 
was seen as ‘inherent in many investment disputes that also raise, directly or indirectly, a 
possible option for recovery on the purely domestic level’.75 These circumstances, 
however, did not affect the tribunal’s jurisdiction under the applicable IIA.76 
 The potential prejudice to third parties arises because shareholder indirect claims 
and claims available to the local company involve the same damage. Shareholders may 
have a stronger interest in advancing IIA claims than other available claims. They may 
also be able to prevent the local company from initiating or pursuing its own claims. 
While this may avoid double recovery for the same damage, it negatively affects the 
company’s position in that it reduces its assets (in the form of a potential claim). This 
reduction may also affect other stakeholders with actual or potential interests in the 
company’s assets, including non-claiming shareholders.77 Employees or creditors may 
                                                             
70 See Bentolila (2010) 102. 
71 See e.g. Sempra (Jurisdiction) [102]; Pan American [219]; Suez I (Jurisdiction) [51]. 
72 Under certain treaty provisions, the local company directly affected by the measures may have standing 
to bring IIA claims despite having the nationality of the host state. See e.g. ICSID Convention, Art 25(2)(b), 
second sentence. Under the definition adopted here, such claims are not indirect claims. 
73 Pan American [220]. 
74 Urbaser (Jurisdiction) [253]. 
75 Ibid. See also D’Agostino (2012) 204. 
76 Urbaser (Jurisdiction) [253]. See also Pan American [220]. Shany includes the protection of third parties 
among the criteria to distinguish between ‘legitimate and illegitimate forum shopping’. Shany (2003) 145. 
77 Wehland (2013) 8-9. 
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see the prospect of successfully bringing claims against the company diminished or even 
wiped out, depending on how important the claim not pursued was for the company’s 
wherewithal. As to cases where the company does pursue its claims, investment tribunals 
confronted with parallel local proceedings have suggested that the later-in-time tribunal 
may take into account whatever compensation has already been granted to avoid double 
recovery.78 Yet assuming a local court is willing and able as a matter of national law to 
factor in compensation previously received by the shareholder, the implication is that the 
local court should reduce the compensation to which the company is entitled. Here again, 
the upshot prejudices both the company and other third parties related to it.79   
II. ADDRESSING SUBSTANTIVE OVERLAPS 
Certain consequences of overlaps in the damages claimed in investment arbitration are 
inconsistent with important legal principles, including the one prohibiting double 
recovery, and otherwise undesirable for the correct functioning of dispute resolution 
mechanisms. However, it is not clear that they affect the jurisdiction of investment 
tribunals as such. Acknowledging these implications does not necessitate denying that 
states have, through IIAs, consented to investment tribunals’ competence over 
shareholder indirect claims. And the existence of consent is the definitive jurisdictional 
inquiry.80 Nor do such potential problems directly concern, at least as a matter of 
principle, the ultimate merits of investment claims, viz. whether IIA standards of 
treatment have been breached, or to what extent losses have been proved and may be 
linked to a specific treaty breach.81 What then are the tools available to investment 
tribunals to deal with these risks? 
A The admissibility approach 
Shareholders’ ability to bring investment claims for damages suffered by the local 
company is premised on the status of shares as a protected investment and IIAs protection 
of indirect interests over assets. However, the position under general international law, as 
                                                             
78 See e.g. Lauder [172]; CME (Final Award) [489]. 
79 To the extent shareholders perceive investment tribunals as more favourable and the proposed solution 
is simply that the subsequent tribunal factors in the first-in-time decision, the result may be a ‘race to 
judgment’ to the prejudice of national courts. The ‘race to judgment’ phenomenon is widely regarded as an 
undesirable byproduct of parallel litigation. See Reichert (1992) 239; Shany (2003) 156; Orrego Vicuña 
(2005) 211-212.   
80 See Walters (2012) 659-660; Chapter 2. 
81 However, as discussed below, admissibility decisions may be intertwined with damages considerations. 
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the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) confirmed in Diallo, is that shareholders cannot 
claim for damages suffered by the company.82 Thus, allowing shareholder indirect claims 
requires concluding that IIAs grant shareholders rights different from those that they 
derive from general international law. Investment tribunals have unanimously found that 
IIAs do precisely that,83 not least through provisions that define the protected investments 
broadly.84 The thesis does not deny that investment tribunals may have jurisdiction over 
shareholder indirect claims,85 although this ultimately depends on the construction of the 
applicable treaty provisions.86 Rather, it is concerned with the exercise of jurisdiction 
over such claims when it results in claim duplication or prejudice to parties not involved 
in the IIA arbitration. 
 Admissibility consists in a ‘legal reason’ not to hear or not to decide the ultimate 
merits of a claim, separate from the question of whether there is jurisdiction.87 The thesis’ 
central concern is that, notwithstanding differences in the parties and causes of action, 
shareholder indirect claims under IIAs involve the same damages as related 
contract/national law claims. The argument is that some of the main consequences of this 
overlap, while not affecting jurisdiction as such, may constitute grounds for a tribunal not 
to make a finding on the merits of one or more specific claims.88 Here the legal reason 
preventing a determination of the ultimate merits, either temporarily or permanently, is 
not the absence of consent but rather the effects of the full exercise of jurisdiction over a 
certain claim. It is thus ‘more naturally considered as a matter of admissibility than 
jurisdiction’.89 The problem requires assessing whether the shareholder IIA claim 
involves the same damages that may be invoked in other kinds of claims and, if so, what 
the consequences of granting the claim may be on the respondent and third parties 
                                                             
82 Diallo (Jurisdiction) [61]; Cohen Smutny (2009) 364, 369.  
83 See Chapter 4. See also e.g. Camuzzi II (Jurisdiction) [44]. But see Consorzio, § II [37(iv)]. 
84 Vandevelde explained that in the practice of the United States (‘US’) the reference to indirectly owned 
or controlled investments ‘makes clear that the BITs do not distinguish between investment owned and 
controlled directly and that owned or controlled through corporate tiers’.Vandevelde (1992) 45–6. See also 
Douglas (2009) 310. 
85 However, jurisdiction over indirect claims is not established only because shareholders have a direct right 
of action and shares as such are a protected investment, but through IIA substantive provisions granting 
shareholders rights over the company’s assets. See Müller (2015) 428-431.   
86 Cohen Smutny (2009) 376; Valasek and Dumberry (2011) 70; Azurix (Annulment) [81].  
87 Nicaragua v Colombia (2016) [48]; Venezuela Holdings (Annulment) [110]. 
88 See Walters (2012) 660-661. 
89 SGS v Philippines [154]. 
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(including the local company). Further, this assessment must be balanced against 
potentially conflicting considerations, including investment tribunals’ duty to exercise the 
jurisdiction they possess.90 
Two related objections may be raised against how this thesis proposes to use 
admissibility. First, by finding a shareholder indirect claim inadmissible, an investment 
tribunal could under some IIA provisions fail to give effect to shareholders’ right to claim 
for harm to the company’s assets. Second, against the backdrop of this right, an 
inadmissibility finding entails the tribunal not exercising its jurisdiction. It denies 
shareholders the benefit of IIAs’ ‘most essential provision’, i.e. the arbitration clause,91 
and should thus only be resorted to in extreme circumstances. With respect to the first 
objection, IIA provisions grant investors certain protections; the effect of these provisions 
is 
to create an enforceable right to damages via international arbitration in the event that investors can prove 
breaches of a few, basic and long-established international standards for the treatment of foreign 
investment.92 
Shareholders have an international cause of action to be compensated if their IIA 
protected rights or interests are affected,93 including through measures against the 
company’s assets.94 Such cause of action is not affected by any exercise by the local 
company of its national law rights.95 If an investment tribunal deems inadmissible a 
shareholder claim over which it has jurisdiction without deciding the claim’s ultimate 
merits, it fails to enforce shareholders’ treaty rights and thus to apply the law.  
However, admissibility means that even if the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction and 
the facts argued by the claimant are correct, there are nonetheless reasons why the tribunal 
should not examine or at least not determine the merits.96 Thus, neither the existence of 
                                                             
90 See e.g. Tokios Tokelès (Jurisdiction) [36]. However, an admissibility decision does involve an exercise 
of jurisdiction. See Douglas (2009) 54, 141; Chapter 2. Further, in the admissibility determinations relevant 
here the tribunal’s analysis of the claims may have to be extensive. See Lee (2001) 2688; De Brabandere 
(2012) 635. 
91 Eastern Sugar (Partial Award) [165-166]. 
92 Crawford (2004) [41]. See also Gallagher (2006) 350.   
93 Braun (2011) 115; ILA Res Judicata Final Report [36]. 
94 Alexandrov (2005) 45; Cohen Smutny (2009) 373. 
95 Alexandrov (2005) 32; Bentolila (2010) 108, 129-130; Azurix (Annulment) [107-109]. 
96 Oil Platforms (Merits) [29]; Thirlway (2000) 74; Baumgartner (2016) 304.  
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jurisdiction nor the merits of the claimant’s case (including whether it holds the rights 
invoked) preclude a finding of inadmissibility. There must be legal grounds in 
international law that justify the application of admissibility. Although these grounds may 
raise substantive issues, they are different from the ultimate merits of the case.97 The 
admissibility grounds advanced here involve an application of principles of international 
law, not least the one prohibiting double recovery.98 Admittedly, when a tribunal finds a 
shareholder claim inadmissible the rights invoked are not enforced in the proceedings in 
question (which does not prevent the shareholder from being compensated through 
another proceeding or, as discussed below, from pursuing its IIA claim again in certain 
cases). But this is a function of recognized doctrines of international law,99 which is part 
of the law applicable in investment treaty arbitration.100 Further, while in principle 
shareholders, as protected investors, do have a right to be compensated if they suffer a 
treaty breach, they do not have an enforceable right to be compensated twice for the same 
harm.101   
Secondly, finding a claim inadmissible may be described as the ‘most-far-
reaching measure’ a competent arbitral tribunal may adopt,102 which may deny 
shareholders their ability to have their treaty rights finally determined. Yet, first, this 
thesis advances admissibility only in cases where important legal principles are affected. 
And prominent among the proposed admissibility criteria is the existence of an available 
forum where the overlapping claims may effectively be heard.103 Second, as certain 
arbitral decisions show,104 admissibility determinations, including those dealing with 
                                                             
97 Fitzmaurice (1958) 12; Rosenne (2012) [2]; De Brabandere (2012) 613-614. 
98 Instances of application of admissibility in investment arbitration include cases where the claimant was 
relying ‘on a contract as the basis of its claim when the contract itself refer[red] that claim exclusively to 
another forum’ or was advancing certain claims under the IIA that had been waived in the relevant contract. 
See SGS v Philippines [154]; Hochtief (Liability) [187-194].  
99 Aside from admissibility, other recognized defenses in international law, such as ‘abuse of process, 
estoppel and waiver’, may have the effect that an otherwise valid claim cannot ‘be relied upon or enforced 
by the holder of that right’. Chevron (Interim Award 2008) [137].  
100 See Chapter 7. 
101 See Orascom [542] (IIA’s protection of indirect investments does not mean that the host state has 
accepted it can be sued multiple times for the same harm). 
102 Hobér (2014) 249. 
103 See Chapter 2. 
104 SGS v Philippines [163-177]; Bureau Veritas II [294]. 
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complexities relating to parallel proceedings, may include a stay of the arbitration.105 
Here, the shareholder’s day before the investment tribunal is preserved.106  Third, even if 
the admissibility decision is in the form of an award that puts an end to the arbitration, 
the shareholder may be able to subsequently pursue its treaty claim.  
In principle, an inadmissibility decision would not constitute res judicata 
preventing the shareholder from bringing a new arbitration.107 Thus, if for instance the 
finding of inadmissibility was premised on the availability of an alternative forum and it 
turned out that such forum was unavailable, the shareholder could then bring fresh treaty 
proceedings.108 Depending on the facts of the case, the same solution could apply if the 
shareholder claim was found inadmissible due to a risk of double recovery deriving from 
a parallel claim by the company and recovery by the latter does not eventuate. Moreover, 
in similar circumstances, subject to the requirements of the relevant arbitral rules, the 
shareholder may be able to seek a revision of the award finding its claim inadmissible. 
For example, the discovery, after the award was rendered, that no adequate alternative 
forum is available for the company to be compensated may constitute a ‘fact of such a 
nature as decisively to affect the award’.109 When justified, a revision may involve a 
‘substantive alteration’ of the award.110    
B Other possible approaches 
One fundamental goal of the thesis is to debunk ideas of independence of shareholder 
treaty claims from related contractual claims. The problem is not just conceptual: aside 
from a possible inadequate application of the applicable law, if substantive overlaps are 
not acknowledged because of a supposed independence, the risk is that their consequences 
may simply be ignored.111 The argument has a standing aspect, i.e., whether shareholder 
                                                             
105 Reichert (1992) 250; Douglas (2009) 370-371; Hobér (2014) 252; SPP (Jurisdiction I) [84]. But see 
Kreindler (2005) 193.  
106 Douglas (2009) 388; McLachlan (2008) 467. Although the admissibility decisions relevant here would 
typically be preceded by consideration and probably a hearing of the shareholder claims’ substance. 
107 Amerasinghe (1990) 354; Walters (2012) 661; De Brabandere (2012) 617; Kotuby and Egerton-Vernon 
(2015) 490; Baumgartner (2016) 301; SGS v Philippines [171]. 
108 See Waste Management II (Preliminary Objection) [36, 43]; RREEF (Jurisdiction) [225]. See also SPP 
(Jurisdiction I) [83] (referring to ‘a tribunal declining jurisdiction on the assumption, which later proves 
invalid, that another tribunal was the competent one to deal with the case’) 
109 See, e.g., ICSID Convention, Art 51 (1).    
110 Schreuer (2009) 879. 
111 The tribunal in Saur denied possible prejudices to third parties resulting from the compensation going 
to the shareholders rather than to the company. This could not be accepted because of the contractual nature 
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treaty rights are independent from the company’s ‘non-international’ rights, and a cause 
of action aspect, i.e., whether treaty claims are independent from contract claims.112 Since 
the focus is on substantive interrelationships between claims and not on whether 
conditions attached to consent to jurisdiction are present, admissibility provides a 
framework to apply some of the relevant legal principles. However, other ways to tackle 
the problems presented by overlaps between shareholder treaty claims and 
contract/national law claims are sometimes available. Yet even in cases where there are 
other possible approaches, as discussed below, admissibility often has advantages over 
the alternatives–viz. deferring the consideration of the effects of overlaps to the damages 
phase and the application of legal principles or treaty provisions on coordination of 
parallel claims. 
1 Confronting the problem at the quantum phase 
Arbitral decisions have sometimes identified potential problems linked to shareholder IIA 
claims, especially double recovery. They were often preliminary decisions denying that 
such consequences could affect jurisdiction and stating that, if necessary, they could be 
dealt with when addressing the merits or damages.113 Investment tribunals have further 
affirmed that there are ‘numerous mechanisms’ or ‘ample legal tools’ to prevent double 
recovery.114 The solution, however, has frequently been limited to the already noted 
expectation that someone else, either a court or a regulator, would later somehow take 
into account the compensation granted to the shareholder.115 Others have suggested that 
although ‘the same damage to the same assets’ may be involved, the shareholder is 
‘entitled to be compensated to the extent of its own loss’116 or only for the ‘losses suffered 
                                                             
of the claims the local company may bring–which are subject to national law–and the treaty nature of 
shareholder IIA claims. Saur (Jurisdiction) [91-92]. But see Gemplus, § 60 (despite shareholder treaty 
claims and the company’s national law claims being ‘jurisdictionally distinct and wholly separate’, tribunal 
appreciating ‘the concern that, in practical terms, [shareholders] may be seen as recovering compensation 
for the same acts through separate sets of proceedings’). 
112 The point here is not simply that investment treaty tribunals should leave contract claims to the 
contractual forum. Rather, it is to consider to what extent losses that are being claimed in the treaty claim 
are the same as losses that may be claimed under the contract and, if so, how to deal with such overlap. 
113 See Sempra (Jurisdiction) [102]; Camuzzi I (Jurisdiction) [91]; Suez I (Jurisdiction) [51]; Suez II 
(Jurisdiction) [51]; Pan American [219]; Hochtief (Jurisdiction) [122]; Urbaser (Jurisdiction) [253]; 
RREEF (Jurisdiction) [126].  
114 Camuzzi I (Jurisdiction) [91]; Daimler [155]. 
115 Gaukrodger (2013) 35. Referring to this solution, Douglas observed that ‘[t]he common refrain is no 
more sophisticated than “it is not our problem”’. Douglas (2009) 455. 
116 Azurix (Annulment) [109]. 
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in their personal capacity as shareholders’.117 It has also been argued that reducing the 
company’s compensation due to the reparation received by the shareholder would affect 
the company’s and its creditors’ rights.118 But given that ‘treaty rights are additional and 
independent of domestic rights’, the responsible state ‘should pay twice’.119  
On the one hand, however, the complexities involved in trying to reduce the 
compensation to which someone is entitled due to a previous payment under a different 
legal system (and often to a different claimant) should not be underestimated.120 On the 
other hand, if not to ‘offend against basic principles’ prohibiting double recovery one is 
able to deduct the compensation obtained by the shareholder IIA claimant from the 
company’s entitlement, the result is that such shareholder is overcompensated and the rest 
undercompensated.121 And the effect on other third parties of reducing the compensation 
owed to the company must still be considered. Further, the contract involved in the 
shareholder claim may have to be renegotiated between the host state and the company 
considering the contested measure. Both the investment arbitration and the local 
renegotiation may seek to address the measure’s effects. It may not be feasible for the 
parties to the contract to factor into the renegotiations any compensation obtained by a 
shareholder122 without, for example, affecting other shareholders or the company’s 
operations. 
 Investment tribunals have also in certain cases provided for the aggrieved investor 
(or even the local company) to relinquish its rights and claims over the investment or 
transfer it to the host state upon payment of compensation.123 The terms of these 
transactions varied in each case and their purpose was often not expressly stated. Still, 
                                                             
117 Zuleta, Saldarriaga and Vohryzek-Griest (2010) 1231-1232.  
118 Bentolila (2010) 138. 
119 Ibid.  
120 Wehland (2013) 8-9. Despite allusions to this possibility in arbitral decisions, the present author is not 
aware of any local court decision that has taken into account a compensation previously granted in an 
investment arbitration in specifying the compensation owed to the local claimant.  
121 Ferran (2001) 245-247. 
122 In Sempra, the tribunal noted that renegotiation agreements between Argentina and local companies 
‘expressly envisage[d] that the Respondent [would] be kept free of any adverse consequences arising from 
compensation that the Claimant might obtain in this arbitration or other proceedings’. Sempra (Award) 
[396]. Yet Argentina has since settled arbitral awards granting compensation for failure to increase the 
tariffs of certain public utilities and has granted tariff increases to the same public utilities. No provision 
has been adopted to address possible overlaps. See Resolutions 598/2013 (approving draft settlement 
agreement) and 3723/2016 (granting tariff increases to the public utility involved in the CMS case).   
123 See SPP (Award) [173]; AAPL [111]; Santa Elena [111(5)]; Metalclad [127]; CMS (Award) [469]. 
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one of the goals appears to have been to address multiple recovery problems connected 
to the shareholder being fully compensated and at the same time retaining an interest over 
the investment.124 Here double compensation may arise when, after the shareholder has 
been compensated through the IIA claim, the company is then fully compensated for the 
effects of the same measure (thus also indirectly benefitting the shareholder 
proportionally to its shareholding).125 In this context, doubts have been noted as to 
investment tribunals’ jurisdiction to require the investor to transfer its investment as a 
condition to receive compensation.126 The shareholder may want to retain its investment, 
however damaged, and also be compensated for the losses caused by the measure.127 
 Despite the complexities of the proposed solutions,128 IIAs do not derogate from 
the international law rule prohibiting double recovery.129 The rule has been consistently 
recognized both by investment tribunals in the IIA context and by other international 
tribunals.130 Further, the caveat that the shareholder may be compensated for the same 
damage but only for ‘its own loss’ is far from being the solution. First, no one suggests 
that the shareholder would receive more than the share of the compensation 
corresponding to its shareholding131 after certain necessary deductions are made 
(essentially related to the company’s debt). But if the damage is the same and both the 
shareholder as claimant in an IIA arbitration and the company are compensated, the result 
is double recovery by the former.132 Conversely, if only the shareholder is compensated 
the consequence is the negative effect noted above on the company and possibly also on 
other third parties. Second, to the extent the idea of losses suffered by shareholders ‘in 
                                                             
124 Rubins (2003) 489. 
125 Gaukrodger (2013) 36; Müller (2015) 83. 
126 Douglas (2009) 440-441; Gaukrodger (2013) 35. 
127 Rubins (2003) 482. Rubins argued that this may make sense from a practical point of view. In cases of 
indirect expropriation, the state will generally have no intention to retain title over the investment and will 
‘normally be ill-equipped to take over the damaged company’s day-to-day operations and restore it to 
health’. Ibid, 488-489. 
128 See Hobér (2005) 246.  
129 An ‘important principle of customary international law should [not] be held to have been tacitly 
dispensed with, in the absence of any words making clear an intention to do so’ (see ELSI [50]), which is 
the case of IIAs. IIAs sometimes contain provisions specifically designed to prevent double recovery. See 
Lee (2001) 2680 (referring to Article 1121 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)). 
130 See e.g. Panamerican [219]; Suez I (Jurisdiction) [51]. On mixed claims commissions recognizing the 
principle see Chapter 3. 
131 Müller (2015) 208. 
132 Kaufmann-Kohler (2014) 7. 
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their personal capacity’133 refers to a reduction in the share value as a result of the state 
measure affecting the company, the damage involved is still the same.134 
 Double recovery and prejudice to third party interests may be described generally 
as damages considerations. But whether they are treated as potential admissibility 
grounds or as affecting only the quantum of compensation depends on whether they may 
preclude the treatment or at least a finding on the ultimate merits of a claim.135 For 
example, the Hochtief tribunal, after adopting a first decision affirming jurisdiction over 
claims concerning a concession held by the local company,136 considered in the liability 
decision an objection to the admissibility of parts of the treaty claims the claimant had 
advanced as a company creditor (as opposed to those advanced as shareholder).137 The 
tribunal upheld the objection based on a contractual provision which excluded ‘any claim’ 
by lenders to the project.138 Arguably, the tribunal could have addressed the effect of 
matters related to claims of the local company (here, a waiver of certain contract claims) 
over the treaty claims at the quantum phase. However, the tribunal’s admissibility 
decision not only avoided a full discussion and a decision on the merits and damages 
aspects of the claims in question, which is important from a procedural economy point of 
view. It also avoided incidentally deciding the contractual aspects involved in the treaty 
claim found inadmissible, which were also before the contractual forum (thus avoiding 
not only risks of double recovery but also of contradictory decisions).139 
2 Coordination of parallel claims 
As noted above, the problem of duplication in the damages claimed in treaty and contract 
claims is related but not coterminous with that of parallel proceedings in international 
investment law (let alone in general international law). Further, one of the two main 
concerns identified here, the risk of double recovery, is relevant when considering the 
consequences of parallel proceedings. However, preventing this risk does not, as such, 
                                                             
133 Of course, shareholders may have claims based on their rights qua shareholders (such as to collect 
dividends). But those claims are not indirect claims. See Chapter 4.  
134 See Chapter 5. 
135 For a detailed analysis of the damages claimed leading to a finding of inadmissibility see Orascom [498-
518]. 
136 Hochtief (Jurisdiction) [4, 117, 125]. 
137 Hochtief (Liability) [187].   
138 Ibid [188-194]. 
139 See Hochtief (Award) [40, 55]. 
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necessarily mean preventing a party from bringing more than one claim for the same 
damage.140 That said, legal devices to coordinate parallel or subsequent related 
proceedings are briefly considered, i.e., res judicata and lis pendens, and treaty 
provisions, such as fork in the road clauses and provisions on consolidation or waiver of 
related proceedings.141 
(a) Res judicata and lis pendens 
The res judicata principle is a general principle of law, as well as a principle of 
international law, according to which decisions of international tribunals ‘are not only 
binding on the parties, but are final, in the sense that they cannot be reopened by the 
parties as regards the issues that have been determined, save by procedures, of an 
exceptional nature, specially laid down for that purpose’.142 This final and binding nature 
protects the defendant from double jeopardy and promotes judicial economy and legal 
security.143 The litispendence doctrine (lis pendens or lis alibi pendens) prevents a party 
who is already involved in legal proceedings from starting new proceedings involving the 
same parties and the same dispute.144 As to the requirements for the application of these 
principles,   
there are four preconditions for the doctrine of res judicata to apply in international law, namely proceedings 
must: (i) have been conducted before courts or tribunals in the international legal order; (ii) involve the 
same relief; (iii) involve the same grounds; and (iv) be between the same parties.145 
                                                             
140 See SPP (Jurisdiction I) [61]; Euram [230]. There may be valid reasons for a party to pursue multiple 
remedies. Shany (2003) 144; Hobér (2005) 242. 
141 Shany describes the rules of lis alibi pendens, res judicata, and electa una via (or fork-in-the-road) as 
‘jurisdictional competition regulating rules’. Shany (2003) 21-22. Detailed discussion of these mechanisms 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
142 Application Genocide Convention I [115]. See also Ralston (1926) 48-51; Cheng (1953) 337; 
Lauterpacht (1958) 325-326; McLachlan (2008) 217-218; Magnaye and Reinisch (2016) 265-266; Waste 
Management II (Preliminary Objection) [39-40]; Apotex II [7.11-7.12]. 
143 Dodge (2000) 382; Schreuer and Reinisch (2002) [201]; Shany (2003) 22. 
144 Reichert (1992) 239; Shany (2003) 22; Reinisch (2004) 43; ILA Lis Pendens Report [1.2]. 
145 ILA Res Judicata Interim Report, 56. The more common reference is to a triple identity test requiring 
‘an identity between the parties (personae), the object (petitum) and the legal ground (causa petendi)’. 
Nicaragua v Colombia (2016) [55]. See also Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Diss Op Anzilotti), 
23. But the conditions are often not described in exactly the same terms. See e.g. Schreuer and Reinisch 
(2002) [217]; Hobér (2014) 341, 360.  
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The same conditions are, mutatis mutandis, required for the application of 
litispendence.146 
In investment treaty practice, these conditions constitute significant hurdles to 
applying res judicata and lis pendens to address overlaps between treaty and contract 
claims.147 The two principles are generally deemed not applicable in relations between 
national and international courts,148 often with reference to the superiority of international 
tribunals and proceedings over their national counterparts.149 Further, contract and treaty 
claims differ at least in the grounds invoked (i.e., contract as opposed to treaty causes of 
action) and often also as to the parties involved. A few tribunals150 adopt a substantive 
approach to the requirements identified above, i.e., one concentrating on the ‘economic 
realities’ of the investors and claims ultimately involved and not on formal distinctions 
as to the persons or causes of action,151 but this approach has yet to garner widespread 
approval.152 Yet the admissibility concept is broad enough to allow investment tribunals 
to consider some of the same legal reasons behind res judicata and lis pendens when 
dealing with potential overlaps between treaty and contract claims. The reasons include 
legal certainty (when for example a final decision has previously been rendered in the 
contract claim) and avoiding substantively conflicting outcomes.153 Thus, proposals on a 
substantive approach to res judicata and lis pendens complement the thesis’ main 
arguments. 
                                                             
146 Reinisch (2004) 43-44, 50-52, 55, 61; Gallagher (2006) 339; Rivkin (2005) 294; ILA Lis Pendens 
Report, para 3.2; Magnaye and Reinisch (2016) 275-276. 
147 See Rivkin (2005) 294; Bentolila (2010) 128; Voss (2011) 289-290; Kaufmann-Kohler (2014) 8; Hobér 
(2014) 341, 360; Baumgartner (2016) 18.  
148 Reichert (1992) 249; Dodge (2000) 367-370; Schreuer and Reinisch (2002) [218]; Brownlie (2003) 50; 
Shany (2003) 242, 244, 254; Reinisch (2004) 51; Söderlund (2005) 315, 321; Rivkin (2005) 291; Voss 
(2011) 303; ILA Res Judicata Interim Report, 56; Magnaye and Reinisch (2016) 271, 286. The ILA did not 
include the same legal order requirement in its final recommendations because ‘a process of permeation 
and interaction between different legal orders is only beginning and may result in the legal community no 
longer viewing private law and public law as operating in separate legal orders’. ILA Res Judicata Final 
Report [40].   
149 See Reichert (1992) 249-250; Crivellaro (2005) 90-93. But see Douglas (2009) 381.  
150 See Grynberg and RSM (Award) [7.1.4-7.1.7]; Apotex II [7.40]; Charanne [408]; Ampal (Liability) 
[260]. But see ILA Res Judicata Final Report [49].      
151 ILA Res Judicata Interim Report, 57; Schreuer and Reinisch (2002) [222-239, 251-257]; Reinisch (2004) 
56, 77; Crivellaro (2005) 115; McLachlan (2008) 415.  
152 The res judicata and lis pendens principles’ ‘mode of application to treaty-based arbitration proceedings 
remains an open question’. Magnaye and Reinisch (2016) 275. 
153 McLachlan (2008) 413.  
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(b) Treaty provisions on coordination 
IIAs sometimes specifically address problems of coordination of related claims. The 
relevant provisions include, first, fork in the road provisions, which require the investor 
to choose among the dispute settlement procedures available under the treaty, and make 
that choice binding and definitive.154 Second, waiver provisions requiring investors to 
expressly waive any other actual or potential claim they may have against the same 
measure involved in the IIA claim.155 For example, among the ‘Conditions to the 
Submission of Claim to Arbitration’, the Free Trade Agreement (‘FTA’) between the 
European Union (‘EU’) and Singapore requires the claimant to withdraw ‘any pending 
claim submitted to a domestic court or tribunal concerning the same treatment’ and 
declare ‘that it will not submit such claim before a final award has been rendered’ 
pursuant to the treaty.156 Third, IIAs may provide for the consolidation of different 
proceedings, which entails ‘combining two or more proceedings into one proceeding’.157 
The effectiveness and scope of these devices have certain limits, however. 
 Consolidation requires the consent of all the parties to the different proceedings 
sought to be merged into one, or a treaty provision, in principle applicable to all the 
proceedings in question, providing for consolidation.158 Consent of opposing and 
otherwise different parties may not be easy to obtain and IIAs generally do not contain 
provisions on consolidation, except in certain specific contexts such as NAFTA.159 
Further, importantly for present purposes, existing IIA consolidation provisions cannot 
                                                             
154 Thus, these provisions prevent an investor from bringing a new claim before one of the fora available 
under the treaty if it has previously submitted the dispute to another forum. See e.g. US-Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic BIT, Art VI(3)(a); Chile-Venezuela BIT, Art 8(3); Ecuador-US BIT, Art VI.3(a). See also 
Olavo Baptista (2005) 137; Kreindler (2005) 167-168; Salles (2014) 245. 
155 A well-known example is Article 1121 of NAFTA. See Lee (2001) 2669-2670 (provision seeks to 
prevent ‘claimants enjoying twice the benefits on their claims for damages’ and risks of ‘conflicting 
outcomes on the same issue’). See also Waste Management II (Preliminary Objection) [27]; Rivkin (2005) 
285; McLachlan (2008) 398; Hobér (2014) 369. 
156 EU-Singapore FTA, Art 9.17. See also CETA, Art 8.22(f). 
157 Canfor (Consolidation) [77]. See also Kaufmann-Kohler (2014) 7. 
158 Orrego Vicuña (2005) 214; McLachlan, Shore and Weiniger (2017) 148. See also Rivkin (2005) 289 
and Hobér (2005) 253 (both discussing, apart from consolidation, joinder or intervention of third parties as 
means to avoid duplicative proceedings, which also require consent of the parties to the proceeding).   
159 However, consolidation may become a more widely available and used mechanism to the extent the 
investment treaty regime evolves towards more centralized or ‘institutionalized’ frameworks (such as a 
permanent investment court) and in the context of states’ increasing awareness about the effects of parallel 
proceedings. See Orrego Vicuña (2005) 214; EU Concept Paper, 3 (‘CETA prohibits parallel proceedings’, 
the aim being to ‘avoid double compensation and divergent verdicts’). 
24 
  
be applied to aggregate international and local proceedings.160 IIA provisions requiring 
waiver of local proceedings may be useful to the extent they apply to damages claims 
against the contested measure, regardless of the legal basis invoked and whether they are 
brought by the shareholder or the local company.161 However, because IIA claimants 
argue, consistent with prevailing views, that their claims are based on their own rights 
and on their own damages (rather than on the rights and damages of the local company), 
some of the existing waiver requirements in IIAs may not prevent overlapping 
proceedings in all cases.162 
 Under fork in the road provisions, arbitral tribunals have dealt with arguments on 
the impact of national proceedings pursued by the company while the shareholder treaty 
claim was pending. As to such local proceedings, since there is often no identity of the 
parties and causes of action (i.e., contract as opposed to treaty claims), the shareholder is 
considered as not having elected another forum and thus entitled to continue its IIA 
claim.163 However, the H&H tribunal observed that under the fork in the road clause in 
Article VII 3(a) of the Egypt-US BIT, the triple identity test was ‘not the relevant test as 
it would defeat the purpose’ of the provision, which was ‘to ensure that the same dispute 
is not litigated before different fora’.164 It concluded that the bases of the contract and 
treaty claims at issue coincided because they had the same factual basis.165 Thus, the 
provision was applicable regardless of differences in the causes of action and persons 
involved in the different claims.166 Here again, the effect of fork in the road, waiver, and 
similar provisions depends on their actual existence in the treaty and their terms and/or 
on the consent of the disputing parties. Still, coordination mechanisms in IIAs, not least 
a ‘substantive’ reading of them (i.e., one focusing on the measures involved in the parallel 
                                                             
160 Even the consolidation of different IIA proceedings, for example when subject to different arbitral rules, 
may present considerable legal complexities. See Kaufmann-Kohler (2014) 7-8. 
161 Wehland (2016) 582; Baumgartner (2016) 19. 
162 See Reinisch (2004) 75-76 (discussing problems of coordination even in the case of the creation of a 
single investment treaty framework). 
163 See Enron (Jurisdiction I) [97-98]; Crivellaro (2005) 102; Hobér (2014) 364, 366. 
164 H&H [367]. 
165 Ibid [378-381].     
166 Ibid [360-382]. Arguably, the decision was based on the language of the specific fork in the road clause, 
which required that ‘the dispute at hand not be submitted to other dispute resolution procedures’. Ibid [367]. 
Yet commentators have suggested similar approaches vis-à-vis fork in the road provisions generally. See 
Rivkin (2005) 288; McLachlan (2008) 396-397; Douglas (2009) 155-156. But see Schreuer (2004) 248.     
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claims), are consistent with the use of admissibility advanced in this thesis.167 And so are 
treaty provisions expressly dealing with the admissibility concerns discussed here.168  
III. SCOPE AND STRUCTURE 
This thesis analyses standing, cause of action, and damages aspects of shareholder treaty 
claims. The argument is that the failure by most investment tribunals to recognize 
substantive overlaps between shareholder treaty claims and related contract/national law 
claims results in: multiple recovery risks and potential prejudice to third party interests, 
as well as in an inadequate application of all sources of applicable law. 
The thesis proposes, first, to acknowledge substantive overlaps between 
shareholder treaty claims and related contractual and national law claims, 
notwithstanding prevailing ideas of independence of IIA rights and claims. Second, to 
assess standing, cause of action, and damages in shareholder treaty claims as potentially 
affecting their admissibility pursuant to certain criteria. Jurisdictional debates are too 
‘narrow’ to allow an examination of all the implications of substantive overlaps. This is 
particularly so in the context of investment arbitration, where the checklist for jurisdiction 
is short. And while merits considerations are not as constrained, reasons for tribunals to 
avoid a finding on a claim’s ultimate merits include procedural economy, preventing 
inconsistent decisions by investment tribunals and other fora, and the need for more 
flexible responses to the complexities of shareholder treaty claims. 
The thesis advances the use of admissibility as a tool that allows investment 
tribunals to examine, and come to grips with, substantive overlaps between shareholder 
claims under IIAs and claims under other legal regimes. The question is whether (and 
when) IIA shareholder claims are, in whole or in part, inadmissible because of such 
overlaps. Given the risks of multiple recovery or prejudice to third parties, the issue is 
whether there are reasons for all or part of the compensation to go to a party different 
                                                             
167 See Kaufmann-Kohler (2014) 11-12 (arguing that ‘there is no ready-made solution available to avoid or 
reduce multiple proceedings’ and distinguishing between ‘occasional remedies’, such as consolidation, and 
efforts by ‘arbitral tribunals where they are given some discretion’).  
168 Although they are still uncommon, for example article 8.24 of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA) provides that when there is a potential for overlapping compensation and 
issues in dispute the CETA tribunal shall ‘stay its proceedings or otherwise ensure that proceedings brought 
pursuant to another international agreement are taken into account in its decision, order or award’. CETA, 
Art 8.24. 
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from the ‘treaty’ claimant and whether the contractual forum should resolve certain 
claims even if the treaty tribunal has jurisdiction over them. 
 The thesis further advocates that the law applicable to the substance of investment 
claims has to be seen in light of the possible substantive coincidence of treaty and contract 
claims. When the substance of these claims is largely the same, investment tribunals 
should not assume an absolute separation between national and international law,169 not 
even for discrete aspects of a claim, a fortiori because national law is generally part of 
the applicable law in investment treaty arbitration. Rather, they should adopt a 
comprehensive approach to all sources of international investment law. This entails 
giving effect not only to IIA provisions, but also to all relevant provisions of national and 
general international law absent clear conflicts.   
The discussion is structured around three central concepts: shareholder standing 
in respect of measures taken against the company, the contract claims/treaty claims 
distinction, and damages. Each of these concepts is discussed in a different chapter. The 
thesis, however, draws connections between standing and cause of action in particular 
because they combine to contribute to a problematic status quo. This examination 
sometimes involves considering elements closely connected to jurisdictional debates, to 
the merits, or both. Moreover, it often requires a joint consideration of standing, cause of 
action, and damages aspects.  
This thesis contains seven substantive chapters.  
Chapter 2 discusses the concept and the main characteristics of admissibility in 
general international law and in international investment law. It offers a potential 
mechanism to address some of the consequences of substantive overlaps between treaty 
and contract claims. The chapter also advances criteria that investment tribunals could 
consider to assess the admissibility of shareholder indirect claims under IIAs. 
Chapter 3 examines the historical origins of the standing, cause of action, and 
damages ideas that are at the heart of this thesis. The focus is on decisions of ad hoc 
arbitral tribunals and ‘mixed claims commissions’ of the 19th and first half of the 20th 
centuries, in particular the Venezuelan and Mexican Commissions of 1903 and 1923-
1934 respectively. The chapter aims to understand the context and function of the 
                                                             
169 See H&H [378]. But see Noble Ventures [53]. 
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concepts from which the current position on shareholder standing and international causes 
of action evolved. It concludes that mixed claims commissions and ad hoc tribunals were 
already attentive to and dealt with the effects of overlaps between national and 
international claims. This chapter suggests that contemporary investment tribunals should 
adopt a similar approach.    
Chapter 4 analyses shareholder standing in international law, first under general 
international law and then in international investment law. From an admissibility 
perspective, it scrutinizes the difference between shareholder treaty rights, as described 
by investment tribunals, and the company’s contractual/national law rights. It shows that 
the two sets of rights overlap considerably. The chapter advocates a wider role for national 
and general international law on shareholder rights in admissibility/merits determinations, 
including principles connected to the company’s independent legal personality.  
Chapter 5 discusses damages in relation to shareholder indirect claims and the 
contract claims/treaty claims distinction. The damages dimension is key for this thesis 
because the substance of the claims is determined here based on the damages claimed. 
Using valuation methodologies, the chapter sheds light on the type of damages involved 
in shareholder treaty claims and the extent to which they differ from damages that may 
be raised in non-international claims by shareholders and companies. It shows that the 
harm is often the same, no matter how many entities in a corporate chain have standing 
to sue, whether different causes of action are available, and irrespective of the valuation 
method employed. Considering the company’s and third-party interests and other 
equitable considerations, investment tribunals must take into account this identity of harm 
when exercising their discretion to assess damages in shareholder indirect claims. 
Chapter 6 focusses on causes of action in investment arbitration, including the 
distinction between contract and treaty claims and the notion of ‘fundamental basis of the 
claim’. The chapter disputes the alleged independence between contract rights and 
obligations, on the one hand, and treaty rights and obligations, on the other. Tribunals 
need to recognize substantive overlaps between contract and treaty claims when 
addressing the substance of IIA claims. Thus, parallel local proceedings, all the provisions 
of the relevant contract (including forum selection clauses), and the conduct of both 
contractual parties are relevant factors in deciding the admissibility of treaty claims.  
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Chapter 7 discusses the law applicable to shareholder treaty claims. It argues in 
favour of an integrated approach to the applicable law, i.e., one that gives proper weight 
not only to the applicable IIA provisions but also to general international law and national 
law. The reason for this is, first, that IIA provisions, including applicable law clauses, 
commonly require the application of the three sources of law. Second, overlaps between 
international and national law claims call for consideration and application of this latter 
legal system. And thirdly, admissibility determinations are not focussed on the scope of 
treaty provisions containing consent to international jurisdiction but on the content of 
specific claims (thus often involving substantive aspects). 
Chapter 8 concludes. The failure of most investment tribunals to recognize 
substantive overlaps between shareholder treaty claims and related contract/national law 
claims risks multiple recovery, potential prejudice to third parties, and an inadequate 
application of all sources of applicable law. This failure results from the mechanical 
application of two basic ideas by investment tribunals and most of the literature: 
shareholder standing to bring indirect claims and the contract/treaty claims distinction. 
These ideas provide useful conceptual tools for jurisdictional purposes. Yet as regards 
admissibility and the merits, the orthodox approach has problematic consequences for 
shareholder treaty claims.
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2 Admissibility in International Investment Law 
 
Absent specific provisions in the jurisdictional titles, an international tribunal’s 
jurisdiction is not affected by the jurisdiction of other international tribunals over the same 
or similar claims.1 This is a by-product of international tribunals not forming a unified 
structure, let alone a hierarchical one.2 As independent entities vis-à-vis each other, there 
is no reason why the scope of an international tribunal’s jurisdiction should be curtailed 
to the extent it coincides with that of another international tribunal. There is also no 
general rule to this effect.3 This observation applies at least with equal force when the 
overlap is with a national court’s jurisdiction,4 in particular when the primacy of 
international law and international proceedings applies.5  
Yet despite international law’s apparent indifference to such overlaps as a 
jurisdictional matter,6 the concept of admissibility is broader. It includes an open list of 
reasons for a tribunal not to rule on the merits of claims.7 Thus, admissibility is a tool 
potentially available to investment tribunals to address overlap claims.8 In considering 
interactions between shareholder IIA claims and contract/national law claims, investment 
tribunals have based their findings on the observation that the two groups of claims often 
involve different persons and different legal bases. This is why the concept of 
                                                             
1 Salles (2014) 156. 
2 Rosenne (1998) 529; Shany (2003) 109; McLachlan (2008) 458; Hobér (2014) 118. Even if there were an 
international authority who could resolve problems of overlapping jurisdictions, one would still have to 
deal with the absence of clear rules on the issue. See Thirlway (2001) 11; Orrego Vicuña (2005) 206.  
3 Salles (2014) 156. As to parallel or subsequent overlapping proceedings, in international law the principles 
of res judicata and lis pendens discussed in Chapter 1 arguably do not concern international tribunals’ 
jurisdiction. See Nicaragua v Colombia (2016) [47-48] (stating that Colombia’s preliminary objection 
based on the principle of res judicata had ‘the characteristics of an objection to admissibility’). See also 
Tams (2005) 23; Walters (2012) 678-679; De Brabandere (2012) 632; ILA Res Judicata Interim Report, 
65; ILA Res Judicata Final Report [68]; ILA Lis Pendens Report [5.6].   
4 McLachlan (2008) 468. 
5 Crivellaro (2005) 91-96; Voss (2011) 303-305. In the case of investment tribunals, jurisdictional overlaps 
vis-à-vis national courts may not only be substantive, i.e., referring to the same measure or damages, but 
also formal. For example, when investment tribunals have jurisdiction over contract claims. 
6 The fact that international tribunals’ jurisdiction as such is not affected does not mean that international 
law contains no relevant rules. Gaja argued that a competent international tribunal may consider whether 
‘to avoid the exercise of overlapping jurisdictions, judicial propriety should not require [it] to refrain from 
examining the merits of the dispute’. Gaja (2006) 540. 
7 Brown (2005); Shany (2015) 12. 
8 De Brabandere (2012) 630. 
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admissibility is analysed in the thesis in relation to standing and cause of action. Of 
course, an admissibility objection may also refer to other aspects, including those more 
directly connected to judicial propriety in a strict sense.9 However, while the thesis 
provides a definition broad enough to include all admissibility objections, those other 
aspects are not discussed. 
A shareholder of a protected nationality is required to hold, directly or indirectly, 
shares in a company incorporated in the host state and allege a treaty cause of action. 
Here, consent to international jurisdiction is present. Yet shareholder indirect claims 
involve complexities that go beyond jurisdictional aspects of standing and cause of action, 
i.e., whether the shareholder is a covered investor holding a protected investment and 
whether the fundamental basis of the claim is a treaty breach. Under the orthodox view, 
risks of multiple recovery and prejudice to third parties deriving from IIA claims do not 
affect consent and are thus irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes. They may be considered, 
if at all,10 at the damages phase. However, admissibility refers to legal grounds not to hear 
a claim or reject it after hearing the evidence for reasons different from jurisdiction or the 
merits. The concept is, first, broad enough to allow meaningful consideration of the 
complexities identified above. Second, it allows tribunals to tailor admissibility decisions 
to the specific circumstances of each claim, notwithstanding general notions such as the 
existence of an investment or a claim of treaty breach which pertain to jurisdiction. This 
allows investment tribunals to decide that only part of the shareholder claims is 
inadmissible rather than the whole case, or to suspend rather than terminate the 
proceedings.  
First, this chapter provides an overview of the concept of admissibility. Second, it 
distinguishes admissibility from jurisdictional and merits determinations. Third, it adopts 
a definition of admissibility and discusses the scope of investment tribunals’ powers to 
decide on admissibility objections. Finally, the chapter argues for the adoption of 
admissibility criteria applicable to shareholder indirect claims. 
                                                             
9 Shany (2015) 48. Fitzmaurice, however, characterized the objection discussed by the ICJ in Monetary 
Gold on the absence of a necessary party to the proceedings as raising ‘essentially grounds of propriety’. 
Northern Cameroons, 102 (Sep Op, Fitzmaurice). This kind of objection relates to issues discussed here, 
such as possible prejudice to third parties stemming from shareholder indirect claims.  
10 However, multiple recovery risks stemming from shareholder IIA claims and the company’s claims are 
not always recognized, arguing that the causes of action are ‘independent’. See Schill (2010) 217. 
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I THE ADMISSIBILITY CONCEPT 
A Overview 
Admissibility is an elusive yet firmly entrenched idea in international law. The difficulty 
to define it and its continued vitality have the same origin. Admissibility refers to tribunals 
limiting the exercise of their jurisdiction or exercising it in a certain way to protect an 
open list of legal principles. Although connected in certain cases to preserving the 
legitimacy of the judicial function, admissibility is broader, first, in that it also covers 
certain specific conditions on the right to claim.11 Second, admissibility serves in some 
cases to actively enforce important rules, such as respect for third-party rights, rather than 
functioning as a limit on the exercise of the adjudicative power. Admissibility’s main goal 
is to prevent the pursuance of legal proceedings or a decision on a claim’s merits from 
affecting legally protected interests. The interests in question may be of one of the parties 
to the dispute, of third parties, or even of the international community, for example in 
seeing that international tribunals are not used for purposes different from those for which 
they were created.12   
The admissibility grounds this thesis advances are based on the substance of 
shareholder indirect claims rather than the investor’s non-compliance with procedural 
requirements. Thus, they refer to the ‘substantive admissibility of the claim’ and are 
distinguishable from jurisdictional objections, which mean that the tribunal ‘is 
incompetent to give any ruling at all’.13 Nevertheless, an admissibility objection relies on 
some ground other than the claim’s ‘ultimate merits’.14 Brownlie formulated the 
following distinction: 
                                                             
11 See Abi-Saab (1967) 146-7 (distinguishing between specific admissibility conditions and general 
admissibility considerations relating to the limits of the judicial function). See also, generally, Giuffrida 
(1995). 
12 Kolb’s suggestion that admissibility questions involving ‘matters of public interest’ are more important 
than those involving matters of ‘private interest’, i.e., those of the parties to the dispute, is questionable. 
Kolb (2013) 202-203. The same admissibility ground may involve interests of a different character. 
Whether the interests are of a ‘public’ or ‘private’ character depends not only on the facts of the case but 
also on the legal evolution of each principle involved.   
13 Fitzmaurice (1986) 438. 
14 Ibid. 
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Objections to jurisdiction, if successful, stop all proceedings in the case, since they strike at the competence 
of the Tribunal to give rulings as to the merits or admissibility of the claim. An objection to the substantive 
admissibility of a claim invites the Tribunal to reject the claim on a ground distinct from the merits...15   
In this thesis, admissibility is concerned with the potential overlaps between certain IIA 
claims by shareholders and non-international claims. It does not refer, however, to 
whether the overlapping claims have merit under the different instruments in question.16 
B Definition of admissibility 
As this section shows, neither applicable provisions nor awards of investment tribunals 
provide a definition of admissibility, let alone a widely accepted one. The considerable 
overlaps between jurisdiction, admissibility, and the merits,17 discussed below, make it 
difficult to arrive at a single definition of admissibility that can cover all scenarios. 
Further, admissibility objections are sometimes intertwined with jurisdictional or merits 
defences, as regards the case as a whole or some of the claims. 
 Admissibility is defined here as legal reasons relating to the claim or the claimant 
(or both)18  for an investment tribunal not to hear a claim or to reject it in whole or in part 
after hearing the evidence, which are different from the ultimate merits, in circumstances 
in which jurisdiction is present or assumed to be present.19 Whether the objection refers 
to the specific content of the claim or to the tribunal is a helpful indicium–in particular to 
distinguish between admissibility and jurisdiction–yet it is not decisive in all cases. Thus, 
while admissibility focuses on the claim’s and the claimant’s characteristics, the 
tribunal’s characteristics may also be relevant. For example, in a shareholder treaty claim 
deriving in whole or in part from contractual breaches, it is a relevant criterion for 
admissibility purposes that the investment tribunal is not the contractual forum. Further, 
under the definition adopted here, if an investment tribunal has found certain claim by a 
specific claimant inadmissible, it does not follow that a different forum should find the 
same claim by the same or a different claimant inadmissible.  
                                                             
15 Brownlie (1998) 479.  
16 See Nicaragua v Colombia (2012) [112]. 
17 Shany (2015) 86. 
18 In Abaclat, Abi-Saab argued that ‘admissibility conditions relate to the claim, and whether it is ripe and 
capable of being examined judicially, as well as to the claimant, and whether he or she is legally empowered 
to bring the claim to court’. Abaclat (Diss Op, Abi-Saab) [18]. 
19 Determining whether an objection goes to consent depends on the circumstances of each case, in 
particular the content of the consent instruments invoked. Kolb (2013) 206; Salles (2014) 173.   
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Yet, while the thesis advances this definition of admissibility, two clarifications 
are necessary: i) as noted, this thesis deals with the concept of substantive admissibility, 
not with the ‘correct procedural steps for bringing the dispute’ as provided in the 
applicable procedural rules.20 The latter notion, generally referred to as seisin or 
procedural admissibility,21 is of fundamental importance for a tribunal to be able to deal 
with a claim but it is not the focus here. Nor is the thesis concerned with another common 
use of the word admissibility, i.e., the admissibility of evidence into a legal proceeding. 
And ii) the concept of admissibility is applied to certain interlinked preoccupations related 
to standing, cause of action, and damages. No attempt is made to provide a comprehensive 
list of possible admissibility objections.22 
 For Paulsson, in contrast to the definition of admissibility above, a fundamental 
question to distinguish between jurisdiction and admissibility is whether the objection 
focuses on the tribunal or on the claim.23 Jurisdictional objections deny the existence of 
consent to arbitral jurisdiction, while admissibility ones advance other impediments to 
consideration of the merits without questioning ‘the investiture of the tribunal as such’.24 
A jurisdictional objection seeks a declaration that the tribunal in question cannot hear the 
claim, while admissibility pleas advance that the claim should not be heard by any forum, 
either permanently or temporarily.25 The reference to any forum is not persuasive. It is 
true that jurisdictional challenges advance a lack of consent to a specific forum and do 
not necessarily apply to other fora. But the legal reasons that make a claim inadmissible 
before a specific tribunal may not apply or be less compelling before another tribunal. 
For example, admissibility arguments connected to the existence of a contractual forum 
selection clause and the need to respect the ‘contractually-agreed process’26 may be raised 
before the investment treaty tribunal, but are not applicable before the contractual forum.    
                                                             
20 Fitzmaurice (1986) 440. 
21 Douglas (2009) 144. 
22 Whether this would be desirable or even possible is a different matter. See Witenberg (1932) 18. 
23 Paulsson (2005) 616. See also Walters (2012) 660.  
24 Paulsson (2005) 616-617. 
25 Ibid, 617. See also Walters (2012) 660; Wehland (2017) 232 
26 See SGS v Philippines [163]. 
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Arguably, jurisdiction must have been affirmed before admissibility may be 
considered,27 since if jurisdiction is not present ‘the Tribunal may not examine the case 
at all’.28 Yet the practice of international tribunals is not consistent in this respect.29 
Fitzmaurice observed that a tribunal duly seised of a case is possessed of a ‘preliminary 
competence’ to, in certain circumstances, decide on admissibility objections ‘irrespective 
of, and without deciding, the question of its competence’.30 Investment tribunals may 
exercise their inherent power to adopt admissibility decisions (discussed below) before 
affirming their jurisdiction,31 not least when the objection does not require passing upon 
the merits. In clear cases of inadmissibility, this only brings forward the decision to reject 
the claim, avoiding the jurisdictional debate. It may thus be desirable from a procedural 
economy point of view.32 However, investment tribunals should be cautious in ruling on 
admissibility before having settled their own jurisdiction. A decision rejecting 
admissibility objections, when followed by another decision denying jurisdiction, has the 
effect of unnecessarily prolonging the proceedings. 
 Further, while admissibility focusses on each claim and even on discrete elements 
of a claim, it may refer to the propriety of the arbitral procedure itself (aside from 
jurisdictional matters). Inadmissibility grounds may arise because the continuation of the 
arbitral proceedings offends against rules or principles recognized by the applicable law. 
In the decision on jurisdiction, the tribunal in Hochtief had to consider an objection based 
on the failure by the claimant to previously submit the investment dispute to local courts, 
as required by the applicable BIT.33 In deciding whether this requirement could be 
bypassed through the application of the MFN clause,34 the decision observed that ‘[a] 
tribunal might decide that a claim of which it is seised and which is within its jurisdiction 
                                                             
27 Paulsson (2005) 604; Walters (2012) 660; Baumgartner (2016) 220; Wehland (2017) 232.  
28 Micula [64]. See also Kilic Insaat (Award) [6.4.1-6.4.2, 6.6.1]; Isolux [709]; Kolb (2013) 202; 
Steingruber (2014) 680. 
29 As Fitzmaurice noted, in Interhandel the ICJ ‘upheld a plea of inadmissibility, although an objection to 
its jurisdiction was still outstanding, and was never disposed of’. Northern Cameroons, 102 (Sep Op, 
Fitzmaurice). See also Kolb (2013) 205. 
30 Northern Cameroons, 104 (Sep Op, Fitzmaurice). See also Shany (2015) 133. 
31 But see De Brabandere (2012) 613. 
32 Kolb (2013) 247. 
33 Hochtief (Jurisdiction) [12-111]. 
34 Ibid [56-111]. 
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is inadmissible’.35 But while advancing the distinction between jurisdiction and 
admissibility,36 in the jurisdictional phase the Hochtief tribunal did not define what 
admissibility is. In the decision on liability, however, it added:  
The Tribunal considers that the principles governing the admissibility of claims are rooted not only in the 
notion of a claim that is inherently ripe and properly made, but also in the proper administration of justice. 
Admissibility is concerned both with the claim itself and with the arbitral process.37 
The tribunal considered that in the jurisdictional decision it had ruled on its own 
jurisdiction, but had not wholly settled the ‘admissibility of each element of the claims’.38  
 Without defining the two concepts, Article 79 of the ICJ’s Rules of Court 
expressly distinguishes between jurisdiction and admissibility.39 The ICJ itself has 
explained that ‘[o]bjections to admissibility normally take the form of an assertion that, 
even if the Court has jurisdiction and the facts stated by the applicant State are assumed 
to be correct, nonetheless there are reasons why the Court should not proceed to an 
examination of the merits’.40 Rosenne advanced that admissibility refers to whether the 
case should be entertained, which entails granting the tribunal some discretion in deciding 
whether to hear the claim.41 Douglas refers, on the one hand, to the existence of 
jurisdiction in international investment law, which depends on the presence of consent 
and a foreign investment.42 On the other hand, ‘[a]dmissibility deals with the suitability 
of the claim for adjudication on the merits’.43 Admissibility relates to the exercise of 
jurisdiction44 and the specifics of each claim, rather than the dispute as a whole.45  
Other authors, however, have doubted the usefulness of the distinction between 
jurisdiction and admissibility in investment arbitration. Laird observed that because the 
                                                             
35 Ibid [90]. 
36 Ibid [94]. 
37 Hochtief (Liability) [206]. This decision rejected part of the claims based on an admissibility objection. 
Ibid [187-194]. 
38 Ibid [149]. 
39 Rules of Court, Art 79. 
40 Oil Platforms (Merits) [29]. 
41 Rosenne (2006) [2]. See also Shany (2015) 8. 
42 Douglas (2009) 144. 
43 Ibid, 148. 
44 Newcombe (2011) 193; Waibel (2015) 1216. 
45 Waibel (2015) 1213. 
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goal of both types of objections is to ‘avoid a merits phase’, the distinction is probably 
unnecessary.46 He also pointed to the absence of provisions granting investment tribunals 
the power to render admissibility decisions.47 Heiskanen argued that jurisdiction concerns 
the scope of the state’s consent to arbitrate, while admissibility refers to the claim’s 
temporal, personal, and substantive characteristics.48 But jurisdiction and admissibility 
are ‘one and the same concept, only viewed from a different viewpoint—one from the 
perspective of the tribunal (competence), the other from the perspective of a claim 
(admissibility)’.49  
However, as noted, the focus on the claim rather than the tribunal is a common 
yet not the defining characteristic of admissibility objections,50 inter alia because 
admissibility may be concerned with the arbitral procedure generally and thus with both 
the tribunal and the claim. Nor do all admissibility objections avoid the merits phase. 
Investment tribunals have adopted inadmissibility decisions after hearing the merits.51 
This thesis advances that investment tribunals have the power to tackle certain 
problematic consequences of shareholder indirect claims, namely risks of multiple 
recovery and prejudice to third parties, through the application of admissibility. National 
and international provisions of the law applicable in investment disputes often address 
these problems. But investment tribunals have not seen them as affecting their jurisdiction 
or even the merits of IIA claims. A few tribunals have suggested that risks of double 
recovery may be addressed at the damages phase. But to the extent concrete solutions 
have been advanced, they involve their own problems52 as well as being largely 
unexplored and untested. 
C Delimitation of admissibility vis-à-vis jurisdiction and merits 
An admissibility objection may be difficult to distinguish from a jurisdictional one, as 
even those who defend the usefulness of the distinction note.53 After all, both types of 
                                                             
46 Laird (2005-I) 222. See also Heiskanen (2014) 245. 
47 Laird (2005-I) 222. 
48 Heiskanen (2014) 242. 
49 Ibid, 243. For a specific criticism of this idea see Steingruber (2014) 680.    
50 Douglas (2009) 148. 
51 See Hochtief (Liability) [187-194].  
52 See Chapter 1. 
53 Newcombe (2011) 192; Kolb (2013) 200; Salles (2014) 145; Waibel (2015) 1213-1214; İçkale [245]. 
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objections are generally categorized as preliminary objections that, if successful, will 
bring the proceedings as regards all or part of the claims to an end for reasons that are, at 
least strictly speaking, different from the merits.54 On the other hand, it is also often 
observed that admissibility may be closely connected with the merits.55 Indeed, under 
certain definitions of admissibility–for example, ‘whether the investor’s claim can benefit 
from the substantive protection of the investment treaty’–56 the link between admissibility 
and merits is readily apparent. Thus, there may be a ‘twilight zone’57 both between 
admissibility and jurisdiction and between admissibility and the merits.   
1 Admissibility and jurisdiction 
Admissibility is concerned with whether a claim should be considered or its merits 
decided not because of want of authority, but rather because there are other legal reasons 
that require that the claim not be considered or its merits not be decided by the 
international tribunal.58 Yet, first, although the existence of consent is the jurisdictional 
enquiry par excellence, consent-related matters may play a role in admissibility 
determinations. For instance, the consent of the disputing parties (or related entities) to 
the jurisdiction of a different tribunal as regards a certain claim does not negate the 
investment tribunal’s jurisdiction over it.59 But the overlap between consent to an 
international and a contractual jurisdiction is a relevant admissibility consideration.60 
Second, while jurisdictional discussions in investment treaty arbitration tend to be 
focused on international law provisions,61 the legal reasons that affect admissibility may 
originate in any provision of the applicable law, including national law. This is important 
since the overarching admissibility consideration here refers to substantive overlaps 
between shareholder treaty claims and national law claims. 
                                                             
54 Application Genocide Convention II [120]. 
55 Brownlie (1998) 479; Shany (2015) 84; Enron (Jurisdiction I) [33]; Sempra (Jurisdiction) [109].  
56 Steingruber (2014) 688. See also Tecmed [4] (referring to the ‘substantive admissibility of claims by the 
foreign investor, i.e. its access to the substantive protection regime contemplated under the Agreement’).  
57 Paulsson (2005) 608-614; Waibel (2015) 1274.  
58 See Viñuales (2017) 358. 
59 See Cremades and Cairns (2005) 32. 
60 Walters argued that an admissibility challenge ‘does not contest that a particular tribunal is the proper 
forum to try a claim’. Walters (2012) 660. Admissibility does not challenge the tribunal’s adjudicative 
authority. Yet, that a claim was filed before a certain tribunal and not another may be germane to 
admissibility.  
61 But national law may also be relevant in such discussions. See Chapter 7. 
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In Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, the ICJ stated that 
‘in determining the scope of the consent expressed by one of the parties, the Court 
pronounces on its jurisdiction and not on the admissibility of the application’.62 Quoting 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, the ICJ added that the examination of 
conditions to which consent to its jurisdiction is subject relates to jurisdiction and not to 
admissibility.63 These conditions will comprise ratione personae, ratione materiae, and 
ratione temporis aspects, which jointly determine the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction 
accepted by the parties to the dispute.64 In principle, therefore, an objection to any of 
those aspects will be a jurisdictional objection.65 For the ICJ, the essential element of 
distinction is consent, with discussions as to its scope being jurisdictional and not 
admissibility matters. Further, jurisdiction appears more directly linked to the Court itself 
and the general limits to its operation as accepted by the disputing states, while 
admissibility relates to the contents of the specific claim.66  
 Investment tribunals’ approach to the distinction between admissibility and 
jurisdiction has been somewhat consistent.67 To varying degrees, the direct link between 
admissibility and the claim’s characteristics and particularly between jurisdiction and 
consent, features in several decisions. In categorizing a mandatory requirement of prior 
submission of the investment dispute to local courts, the ICS tribunal stressed the 
importance of the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility.68 Following the 
ICJ’s rationale, it suggested that a jurisdictional condition is one to which the consent to 
arbitrate is subject, while non-compliance with admissibility requirements does not 
impinge on such consent.69 The decision in ICS appeared to accept the Hochtief tribunal’s 
conceptualization that ‘[j]urisdiction is an attribute of a tribunal and not of a claim, 
whereas admissibility is an attribute of a claim but not of a tribunal’.70 The ICS tribunal, 
however, criticized the jurisdictional decision in Hochtief for apparently substituting ‘the 
                                                             
62 Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters [48]. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Rosenne (2006-I) [2]. 
65 Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters [49]. 
66 Walters (2012) 660. 
67 Brown (2005); Williams (2008) 919; Waibel (2015) 1274.  
68 ICS [252]. 
69 Ibid [258]. 
70 Ibid, fn 282. 
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tribunal-vs.-claim dichotomy for the question of consent instead of using it as an 
analytical tool for the determination of whether consent exists’.71 
 Other investment tribunal decisions, including Achmea72 and Micula,73 also 
appeared to endorse the ‘tribunal-vs.-claim dichotomy’ as a distinguishing criterion. 
Admissibility relates to the ability to exercise jurisdiction over a specific claim.74 Yet the 
most important factor in characterizing an objection as a jurisdictional or an admissibility 
objection is determining whether it goes to consent and its scope.75 Further, some 
tribunals have focused both on whether consent is affected and whether the condition in 
question is contained in the provision where consent is said to be found.76 The tribunal in 
Daimler stressed that ‘[a]ll BIT-based dispute resolution provisions’ are jurisdictional in 
nature.77 For the Micula tribunal, an objection is jurisdictional when it ‘relates to a 
requirement contained in the text on which consent is based’.78  
 Investment tribunals have generally opined that admissibility and jurisdiction ‘are 
two distinct legal concepts under international law’.79 Jurisdiction refers to the power of 
the tribunal to decide the dispute, in the terms defined by the parties’ consent.80 There are 
no generally agreed criteria to distinguish jurisdiction from admissibility in international 
investment law, however.81 Yet most tribunals and commentators agree that: i) 
                                                             
71 Ibid. 
72 Achmea II [115]. 
73 Micula [63]. 
74 Achmea II [115]. 
75 Ibid [116]. See also ibid [117-119]. 
76 Fitzmaurice also focused on whether the objection arose from the jurisdictional clause. Northern 
Cameroons, 102-103 (Sep Op, Fitzmaurice). 
77 Daimler [193]. 
78 Micula [64]; see also Kilic Insaat [6.2.9]; Laird (2005-I) 216. In Armed Activities (New Application), the 
ICJ stated that when consent to jurisdiction ‘is expressed in a compromissory clause in an international 
agreement, any conditions to which such consent is subject must be regarded as constituting the limits 
thereon’. Armed Activities (New Application) [88]. In Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters the Court added, however, that ‘[t]his remains true, whether the consent at issue has been expressed 
through a compromissory clause inserted in an international agreement… or through “two separate and 
successive acts”’. Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters [48]. 
79 Achmea II [114]; Goetz [72]; Unglaube [293]; Nova Scotia [133, 147, 150]; Newcombe (2011) 195. 
Some investment tribunals have doubted the usefulness of the distinction in the context of investment treaty 
arbitration, albeit without denying it altogether. See Daimler [192]; Kilic Insaat [6.3.5]; Panamerican [54]. 
80 Nova Scotia [147]; Euram [441]. 
81 Certain commentators suggest that, in contrast to international investment law, the issue is settled as 
regards the ICJ. See Williams (2008) 919. But see Waibel (2015) 1218.  
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admissibility does not speak to whether consent to arbitrate has been granted.82 It relates 
to the exercise of the tribunal’s adjudicative power and does not focus on whether this 
power exists,83 and ii) while the existence and scope of the tribunal’s adjudicative power 
depends on the basic traits of the dispute as a whole–i.e., the personal, material, and 
temporal dimensions of the dispute–admissibility may be affected by the specific contents 
of each claim.84  
Unlike jurisdiction, admissibility does not concern the ‘authority in principle’ of 
international tribunals.85 For such authority to be present, however, not only must there 
be consent to international jurisdiction in general but also the claim in question must fall 
within the consent’s scope. Otherwise, there is a jurisdictional defect, not an admissibility 
one. The fact that a condition is contained in a treaty’s dispute resolution provisions may 
point to its jurisdictional character, but ultimately what matters is whether consent to 
international jurisdiction hinges on it. The basic jurisdictional question is whether there 
is a legal basis on which an international tribunal may summon someone to appear before 
it as a party. Or, in the case of ad hoc jurisdictions, whether there is a basis on which an 
international tribunal may be formed to hear the case in question. On the other hand, an 
admissibility objection seeks to prevent the full exercise of the adjudicative power vis-à-
vis a specific claim, but does not deny the existence of this power.86  
2 Admissibility and the merits 
Admissibility includes a wide array of grounds, which evolve as the views and 
expectations vis-à-vis international tribunals change. While some admissibility grounds 
are related to, broadly speaking, procedural aspects, others involve substantive ones. 
Thus, links between admissibility and merits analyses are often inevitable.87 Fitzmaurice 
distinguished between admissibility and the ‘ultimate merits’; the term ‘ultimate’ was 
justified because an admissibility objection is frequently connected with the ‘substantive 
                                                             
82 See İçkale [242]; Grisel (1968) 74-75; Salles (2014) 168; generally Markert (2010). 
83 Newcombe (2011) 193; Shany (2015) 132; Achmea II [115]. 
84 Paulsson (2005) 616; Walters (2012) 660; Steingruber (2014) 681. 
85 Brownlie-Crawford (2012) 693. 
86 Thirlway (2001) 74. 
87 This is a fortiori the case in respect of inadmissibility grounds deriving from substantive overlaps 
between related claims. 
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merits’, often more so than jurisdictional issues.88 Rosenne went a step further by 
observing that all admissibility objections require discussing the merits.89 Jurisdictional 
objections may also be intertwined with the merits.90 This is why Article 79 of the ICJ 
Rules of Court provides, for both jurisdictional and admissibility objections, that the 
Court may ‘declare that the objection does not possess, in the circumstances of the case, 
an exclusively preliminary character’ and order the continuation of the proceedings.91 
As to investment arbitration, the Methanex tribunal–while it denied having the 
‘express or implied power to reject claims based on inadmissibility’–92 observed that the 
distinction featuring in Article 79 of the ICJ Rules of Court may give rise to ‘fine 
distinctions’ between admissibility objections and merits defences.93 The Enron tribunal 
observed that the distinction between admissibility and jurisdiction does not appear in the 
ICSID Convention.94 Yet, despite being an ICSID tribunal, it characterized an objection 
relating to shareholder standing as pertaining to admissibility and ruled on it.95 
Regardless, the tribunal added that ‘[a] successful admissibility objection would normally 
result in rejecting a claim for reasons connected with the merits’.96    
The extent to which admissibility and the merits are linked depends on the 
character of the admissibility objection.97 For example, in Methanex the admissibility 
objections filed by the US were ‘based upon the legal submission that, even assuming all 
the facts alleged by Methanex to be true, there could still never be a breach of the 
                                                             
88 Fitzmaurice (1986) 438. See also Northern Cameroons, 103 (Sep Op, Fitzmaurice); Douglas (2009) 148; 
Salles (2014) 95. In India v Pakistan, the ICJ used the terms ‘ultimate merits’ to distinguish merits from 
jurisdictional decisions, observing that the latter are also ‘substantial’ and ‘substantive’ in character. India 
v Pakistan [18]. 
89 Rosenne (2001) 83. 
90 Shany (2015) 84. 
91 Rules of Court, Art 79 [9]. National jurisdictions often grapple with the difficulty of distinguishing 
between jurisdiction and merits. The US Supreme Court recalled that ‘[a]s Justice Holmes observed more 
than a century ago, “it sometimes may be difficult to decide whether certain words in a statute are directed 
to jurisdiction or to merits”’. V. L. v E. L., 577 U. S. 6 (2016). 
92 Methanex (Jurisdiction) [126]. 
93 Ibid [125]. 
94 Enron (Jurisdiction I) [33]. 
95 Ibid [52].  
96 Ibid. 
97 The same is true regarding the link between admissibility and jurisdiction. 
42 
  
individual provisions pleaded by Methanex’.98 These objections required the 
interpretation of substantive provisions of NAFTA–including the national treatment, 
minimum standard of treatment, and expropriation provisions–and advanced that the 
alleged breach was not ‘the proximate cause of the alleged loss’, that the claimant had not 
suffered any loss, and that the measures accorded the same treatment to all investors in 
the relevant industry.99 Here, the line that separates admissibility from the merits is 
fine.100 Yet in investment treaty arbitration the claims’ ultimate merits refer to whether 
there has been a breach of any of the standards of treatment contained in IIAs101 and what 
consequences follow from any such breach. If the fundamental premise of an argument 
is that, on the facts of the case, an IIA standard of treatment102 has not been breached, it 
is a merits defence.103 However, substantive points, involving the existence, scope, or 
breach of a non-procedural right or obligation, may be involved in jurisdictional, 
admissibility, or merits decisions.104   
D Investment tribunals’ powers as regards admissibility decisions 
The idea of admissibility raises distinct aspects in relation to investment tribunals’ 
powers. First, generally as to these tribunals’ capacity to deal with and decide on 
admissibility objections. Do investment tribunals have the power to adopt admissibility 
decisions given the absence of provisions expressly conferring them such power both in 
arbitral rules and IIAs? How is a decision finding a claim inadmissible to be reconciled 
with the obligation of tribunals to exercise their jurisdiction?105 Second, assuming it 
exists, is the exercise of this power contingent on admissibility objections having been 
                                                             
98 Methanex (Jurisdiction) [109]. 
99 Ibid [84-95]. 
100 Laird (2005-I) 205. Paulsson is right that at least certain aspects of the US’s admissibility objections in 
Methanex, such as for example the one advancing that there had been no discrimination, were in fact 
defences against the merits. Paulsson (2005) 607.  
101 When the investment tribunal may include breaches of sources of law other than the IIA within its 
liability findings, determining the existence of these breaches also forms part of the ultimate merits. 
102 Typical IIA standards of treatment include provisions on expropriation, the fair and equitable treatment 
principle, and prohibitions of discrimination or arbitrariness. Except when necessary to illustrate an 
argument connected to the admissibility aspects relevant here, this thesis does not discuss the scope of IIA 
standards of treatment either generally or under any specific treaty. Generally on IIA standards of treatment 
see Dolzer and Schreuer (2012). 
103 See Witenberg (1932) 18; Shany (2015) 84. 
104 Barcelona Traction (Preliminary Objections), 164 (Diss Op, Armand-Ugon); Waste Management II 
(Award) [43]. 
105 See Vivendi I Annulment [112]; Tokios Tokelès (Jurisdiction) [39]. 
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raised by the parties? If a party has waived potential admissibility objections, may an 
investment tribunal still reject all or part of the claims for admissibility reasons? Third, to 
what extent are jurisdictional and admissibility decisions different in terms of their 
reviewability? These aspects are considered in turn. 
1 Inherent power 
Article 79 of the ICJ’s Rules of Court provides for the respondent state’s right to object 
to ‘the jurisdiction of the Court or to the admissibility of the application’ as ‘preliminary 
objections’.106 It also refers generally to the filing of any ‘other objection the decision 
upon which is requested before any further proceedings on the merits’.107 No similar 
reference to admissibility may be found in the most widely used arbitral rules in 
investment arbitration, including the ICSID Convention, the ICSID Arbitration Rules, the 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules, and the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules.108 The absence of such 
an express provision in the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules led the Methanex tribunal to conclude 
that, while it had the power to rule on jurisdictional objections, ‘no separate power to rule 
on objections to “admissibility”’ was conferred.109 Further, there was no implied power 
in that regard.110 A comparable position was adopted by Zeiler in respect of ICSID 
Arbitration Rule 41,111 which refers to challenges to ICSID’s jurisdiction or to the 
tribunal’s competence but not to the claim’s admissibility.112 
                                                             
106 Rules of Court, Art 79(1). 
107 Ibid. 
108 These arbitration rules only use the term admissibility in relation to the admittance of evidence into the 
arbitration record. See ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 34(1); ICSID Additional Facility Rules, Art 41; 
UNCITRAL Rules (1976), Art 25(6). But see Article 39(2) of the 2017 Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration 
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (including admissibility among the issues an arbitral 
tribunal may decide by way of summary procedure). 
109 Methanex (Jurisdiction) [107]. This tribunal also observed that the power to rule on admissibility 
objections could not be found in the NAFTA Treaty either. See ibid [123-124]. 
110 Ibid [123]. The Methanex tribunal’s rejection of admissibility decisions, however, was less categorical 
than it would appear at first sight. Regarding these decisions, it observed that ‘[t]he most analogous 
procedure under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules would be a partial award on a preliminary issue tried 
on assumed facts, pursuant to Article 32 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 13’, which ‘procedure, 
however, does not relate to jurisdiction; it necessarily assumes the exact opposite; and its existence confirms 
that it would be inappropriate to imply a like procedure into Article 21’. Ibid. This observation rules out 
admissibility decisions under Article 21 of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, which refers to jurisdictional 
determinations. But it does not completely exclude admissibility decisions under other provisions of the 
Rules. See Chevron (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [4.91]; Philip Morris v Australia (Bifurcation) [118]. 
111 Zeiler (2009) 90-91. 
112 ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 41. 
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 In recent years, however, investment tribunals considering the admissibility 
concept appear to have generally assumed that they had the power to render admissibility 
decisions.113 And while it is generally the respondent state who raises admissibility 
objections114–except vis-à-vis a counterclaim–for example in Micula it was noted that 
there was ‘no dispute between the Parties as to the jurisdiction of this Tribunal to decide 
the jurisdictional and admissibility challenges brought by Respondent pursuant to Article 
41 of the ICSID Convention’.115 In fact, even investment tribunals who have noted the 
absence of a distinction between admissibility and jurisdiction in the relevant arbitration 
rules116 have sometimes adopted admissibility findings.117 The Urbaser tribunal was 
sceptical about the distinction, noting that ‘the ICSID Convention does not contain a 
concept akin to “admissibility” of claims’.118 Yet it appeared to concede that admissibility 
objections may be entertained, depending on the stage at which they are raised, either 
‘within a jurisdictional framework’ or ‘merged with the merits’.119 Finally, in certain 
cases the application of the admissibility concept had a material impact on the outcome.120  
While its boundaries under international law have never been wholly precise, 
admissibility appears as a generally accepted concept in international adjudication.121 The 
distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility was already acknowledged by the ICJ 
in the Ambatielos and Nottebohm cases,122 independently from its later adoption in the 
                                                             
113 See Achmea II [114-120]; Unglaube [293]; ICS [256]; Philip Morris v Uruguay (Jurisdiction) [142]; ST-
AD [295]; Teco [628]; Rompetrol (Jurisdiction) [112]; RREEF (Jurisdiction) [225]. 
114 References by states to admissibility in investment arbitration include AMT [5.34] (Zaire); Ethyl [75] 
(Canada); Bayindir (Jurisdiction) [84-86] (Pakistan); Libananco (Preliminary Issues) [62] (Turkey); 
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international customary law formation see, e.g., Mendelson (1998) 204. 
115 Micula [58]. 
116 CMS (Jurisdiction) [41]. 
117 Ibid [35] (rejecting an admissibility objection and concluding that the claim was ‘admissible’). 
118 Urbaser (Jurisdiction) [112-125]. 
119 Ibid [126]. 
120 SGS v Philippines [154]; Hochtief (Liability) [187-194]; Abaclat (Jurisdiction) [245-248].  
121 Salles (2014) 143; Shany (2015) 49.  
122 Fitzmaurice (1986) 438-440. Fitzmaurice also notes that the PCIJ was less enthusiastic about the 
distinction. Ibid, 439. Yet even if the Rules of the PCIJ only used the concept of preliminary objection, 
without distinguishing between admissibility and jurisdictional objections, ‘already at that time it was 
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Rules of the Court. In Nottebohm, the ICJ noted that it had to exercise its powers 
‘whenever it has been regularly seised and whenever it has not been shown, on some other 
ground, that it lacks jurisdiction or that the claim is inadmissible’.123 To the extent general 
international law empowers tribunals to consider the admissibility of claims,124 there 
would seem to be no impediment for investment treaty tribunals to entertain admissibility 
objections.125 International law forms part of the applicable law tribunals operating under 
IIAs must apply, either expressly or by necessary implication.126 Several authors have 
affirmed that the ability to decide on admissibility objections is an inherent power of 
international tribunals.127 The ICJ itself appeared to acknowledge such inherent power 
when it stated in Northern Cameroons that if it ‘is satisfied, whatever the nature of the 
relief claimed, that to adjudicate on the merits of an Application would be inconsistent 
with its judicial function, it should refuse to do so’.128  
Conceptualizing international tribunals’ power to adopt admissibility decisions as 
an inherent power is the correct approach.129 Yet two refinements are important here. 
First, admissibility relates to the need for international tribunals to uphold the rule of law 
on the international plane.130 Whenever possible, international tribunals must avoid 
adopting decisions that, while involving the application of rules and principles of 
applicable law, would also go against other principles or rules recognized by such law.131 
                                                             
recognized that the provision encompassed any obstacles which might prevent the PCIJ from considering 
the merits of a case pending before it’. Tomuschat (2012) 698. 
123 Nottebohm (Preliminary Objection), 122. 
124 According to Witenberg, ‘admissibility will have custom as the essential source’. Witenberg (1932) 15. 
Further, ‘custom and international jurisprudence’ had played and would continue to play the ‘largest role’ 
in contributing to the admissibility notion. Ibid, 123. Author’s translation (original French). 
125 De Brabandere (2012) 614. 
126 See Chapter 7. 
127 Newcombe (2011) 194; Salles (2014) 140; Shany (2015) 50, 138. 
128 Northern Cameroons, 37. See also Shany (2015) 50 (arguing that both Northern Cameroons and Nuclear 
Tests support the idea of an inherent power as regards admissibility). 
129 See De Brabandere (2012) 621; Philip Morris v Australia (Bifurcation) [118]. 
130 See A/RES/67/1. Shany mentions ‘preserving legality’ as an admissibility consideration, referring to the 
PCIJ’s view in Minority Schools in Upper Silesia that it should not exercise jurisdiction when doing so 
would violate a different jurisdictional arrangement between the parties. Shany (2015) 138.  
131 In the case of investment tribunals, this is often not limited to international law and also includes some 
national law. See also Northern Cameroons, 128 (Sep Op, Fitzmaurice) (admissibility objections may stem 
from general principles of law or provisions of the applicable treaty different from the jurisdictional clause); 
Salles (2014) 140 (preliminary objections may refer to ‘any international norm binding on the relationship 
between the two disputing parties’). 
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This is why it is not possible to draw a comprehensive list of possible admissibility 
objections.132 Second, a decision rejecting a claim on admissibility grounds entails an 
exercise of jurisdiction even if not an adjudication of the merits.133 An admissibility 
decision typically says something about substantive aspects,134 in circumstances in which 
jurisdiction has already been affirmed or is assumed. In principle, this observation 
addresses possible criticisms derived from international tribunals’ duty to exercise 
jurisdiction when regularly seised and competent.135  
Still, when a tribunal decides on admissibility without hearing the merits, the 
parties will not have had the chance to fully present their case. The difference between 
this kind of decision and one denying jurisdiction is subtle, both in terms of process and 
outcome. As the Hochtief tribunal observed, when the admissibility objection is ‘bound 
up’ with the merits of the claim and the tribunal has jurisdiction, in principle it should 
hear the case before deciding on admissibility.136 Shareholder standing and the contract 
claims/treaty claims distinction–the two main issues to which the admissibility discussion 
refers here–although related to jurisdiction, will often require a thorough understanding 
of the facts of the case.137 As to their admissibility aspects, such issues will thus frequently 
be best decided after having heard the merits of the claim. Even in this case, however, the 
tribunal will still be resolving a preliminary question,138 in that it will not be pronouncing 
on the ultimate merits of the claim. This preliminary character is independent from the 
stage of the proceedings at which the admissibility objection is decided and indeed from 
whether there is a preliminary phase at all.139 
                                                             
132 The ICJ stated that an admissibility objection ‘consists in the contention that there exists a legal reason, 
even when there is jurisdiction, why the Court should decline to hear the case’. Application Genocide 
Convention II [120]. 
133 Northern Cameroons, 101 (Sep Op, Fitzmaurice); Newcombe (2011) 193; Salles (2014) 156. But see 
Alemanni [318]; Shany (2015) 1, 47, 52, 131. 
134 Kolb (2013) 247. 
135 See Northern Cameroons, 101-102 (Sep Op, Fitzmaurice); Rompetrol (Jurisdiction) [115]; Iberdrola 
(Annulment) [80]. 
136 Hochtief (Liability) [206]. 
137 Witenberg observed that most admissibility objections may require a consideration of the facts. 
Witenberg (1932) 105. 
138 Hochtief (Liability) [178]. Paulsson categorises matters of admissibility as ‘threshold issues’. Paulsson 
(2005) 617.  
139 Salles (2014) 82. 
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2 Tribunals’ powers and party autonomy 
It is sometimes observed that while an investment tribunal ‘must, if necessary, examine 
issues of jurisdiction of its own volition, questions of admissibility may only be examined 
if they are raised by the Parties’.140 Disputing parties are entitled but not bound to raise 
admissibility objections.141 An investment tribunal may find that a party who has failed 
to raise these objections has ‘acquiesced in any breach of the requirements of 
admissibility’.142 Admissibility objections are said to be subject to waiver and 
acquiescence because ‘no strict jurisdictional system’ is being affected and thus, different 
from the case of jurisdictional objections, ‘party autonomy should normally prevail over 
systemic considerations’.143 Others, however, have doubted some of the proposed criteria 
to distinguish between jurisdiction and admissibility relating to party autonomy.144 For 
example as to curability, certain jurisdictional flaws ‘may also be cured through party 
consent’.145 
However, the suggestion that it would, in every case, be inappropriate for the 
investment tribunal itself to raise admissibility questions is questionable.146 A tribunal 
should have the power to decline admissibility without the parties raising admissibility 
objections when its ‘judicial function’ is at stake. As the ICJ confirmed, quoting Northern 
Cameroons, ‘[t]here are inherent limitations on the exercise of the judicial function which 
the Court, as a court of justice, can never ignore’.147 These limitations must be enforced 
even against both disputing parties’ wishes.148 If a tribunal hears the merits of a claim 
involving an illegal investment, it may affect its judicial function, even if jurisdiction is 
unaffected and the parties have not raised the issue.149 Another instance in which a sua 
                                                             
140 Achmea II [120]. See also Douglas (2009) 141. Waibel is more cautious (‘objections to admissibility 
can generally be waived’). Waibel (2015) 1274.  
141 Hochtief (Jurisdiction) [94].  
142 Ibid. See also ibid [95]. 
143 Salles (2014) 152, 154-155. 
144 Shany (2015) 132-133. 
145 Ibid, 133. See also ibid, 146. On the other hand, Fitzmaurice argued that ‘some pleas of inadmissibility’, 
i.e., not all, ‘relate to defects that may be cured by the subsequent action of the party concerned’. Northern 
Cameroons, 101 (Sep Op, Fitzmaurice). 
146 See Thirlway (2001) 157. But see Douglas (2009) 141. 
147 Frontier Dispute [45]. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Newcombe (2011) 198-200. 
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sponte admissibility examination may be justified is when legitimate third party interests 
may be affected by the decision, even if the parties have not filed an objection in that 
regard.  
On the other hand, while investment tribunals may be deemed to possess the 
inherent power to consider a claim’s admissibility even proprio motu, admissibility 
questions are not at the discretion of investment tribunals.150 When the parties have raised 
admissibility objections, an investment tribunal may not ‘simply disregard the 
requirement that has not been fulfilled’, although it ‘enjoys some discretion as to how to 
deal with its non-fulfillment’.151  
In contrast to jurisdiction, tribunals enjoy a ‘degree of flexibility’ in addressing 
admissibility problems to fashion an appropriate response in light of the circumstances of 
an inadmissible claim.152 By contrast, jurisdictional decisions are ‘binary’ in that 
jurisdiction is either affirmed or denied.153 That said, investment tribunals are not free to 
grant claims that they have found inadmissible or even to decide on their ultimate 
merits.154 Further, unlike jurisdiction, which depends on a limited list of relatively 
objective factors, admissibility may involve a variety of different reasons often 
interwoven with substantive aspects. This often facilitates dissecting the claim into 
different elements for purposes of an admissibility analysis and a finding that parts of the 
claim (rather than the whole claim, let alone the whole case) are inadmissible.155 
3 Reviewability of decisions 
Authors often observe that there is a difference in the extent to which arbitral tribunals’ 
decisions on jurisdiction, on the one hand, and on admissibility, on the other, may be 
reviewed by another forum.156 Paulsson argued that distinguishing between jurisdiction 
                                                             
150 De Brabandere (2012) 613; Abaclat (Diss Op, Abi-Saab) [18].  
151 ICS [256]. 
152 For example, through suspending the proceedings for a certain period while the inadmissibility ground 
is present. See SGS v Philippines [163-177]; Bureau Veritas II [294]. 
153 Newcombe (2011) 199. 
154 Steingruber states that ‘in the case of an inadmissible claim/counterclaim the competent Tribunal will 
dismiss it due to inadmissibility, i.e. the Tribunal will not enter into the merits’. Steingruber (2014) 680. 
However, since admissibility is often connected to the merits the better view is that tribunals will not decide 
the merits of inadmissible claims but may consider such merits precisely to render an admissibility decision. 
155 See Application Genocide Convention II [120] (an admissibility objection may target the whole case or 
‘more usually, a specific claim therein’). 
156 Walters (2012) 661; Waibel (2015) 1277.  
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and admissibility is important precisely because of reviewability.157 Arbitral decisions 
involving an excess of jurisdiction may be invalidated by a reviewing authority.158 
Conversely, admissibility determinations by a competent tribunal should not be 
disturbed.159 However, while certain distinctions may be made in light of the different 
grounds for review in arbitral rules and the kind of issues typically involved in 
jurisdictional and admissibility decisions respectively,160 the difference between the two 
as concerns reviewability is not fundamental.    
 Regarding review of arbitral decisions, a distinction must be made between ICSID 
awards, which are subject to the ICSID annulment process, and non-ICSID awards, which 
are generally subject to (limited) control by local courts.161 As to the latter case, the 
precise scope of local courts’ power to review arbitral awards depends on the relevant 
national law provisions and the effect of any applicable treaty in each domestic legal 
system. International instruments typically include jurisdictional issues as possible 
grounds for refusing to recognize and enforce arbitral awards,162 while admissibility or 
similar concepts are not expressly mentioned. Yet, the possibility that admissibility 
decisions may fall in some of the other grounds provided for in these instruments or in 
national laws cannot be completely excluded.163  
A similar observation applies with respect to Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, 
which contains the grounds for annulment of an award rendered by an ICSID tribunal.164 
These grounds include ‘that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is 
based’.165 This defect can be present in jurisdictional, admissibility, or merits decisions 
alike. Further, the ground of manifest excess of powers166–some of the most obvious 
                                                             
157 Paulsson (2005) 605. 
158 Ibid, 601. 
159 Ibid. But see Walters (2012) 676.   
160 See Venezuela Holdings (Annulment) [110] (‘questions of admissibility may require to be approached 
in a different way from questions of jurisdiction’ under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention).  
161 Markert and Bubrowski (2015) 1461; Bohmer (2016) 237. 
162 New York Convention, Art V.1(c). 
163 An admissibility decision could, for example, be regarded as ‘contrary to the public policy’ of the 
country where recognition and enforcement is sought. Ibid, Art V.2(b). See Walters (2012) 677-678. 
164 ICSID Convention, Art 52(1). 
165 Ibid, Art 52(1)(e). 
166 Ibid, Art 52(1)(b). 
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examples of this ground being jurisdictional findings167–includes a failure by the tribunal 
to apply the applicable law.168 Again, such failure can occur in the context of an 
admissibility decision and thus the decision be subject to review under Article 52 of the 
ICSID Convention.169 
II ADMISSIBILITY CRITERIA RELATING TO STANDING AND THE CAUSE OF ACTION IN 
SHAREHOLDER CLAIMS 
In international investment law, admissibility covers matters such as procedural 
preconditions,170 abuse of the treaty regime,171 or the investor’s lack of good faith or 
failure to comply with the host state’s law in making the investment.172 Admissibility has 
also been applied or discussed in relation to matters which are the focus here including: 
i) the interplay between contract claims/contractual remedies and treaty claims/treaty 
remedies,173 and ii) shareholder standing to claim for measures taken against the 
company.174 Standing refers to the ability to claim in respect of a measure,175 which 
depends on whether the claimant’s legally protected entitlements have been affected.176 
While standing objections often raise issues different from lack of consent to the forum 
and thus go to admissibility,177 when a party does not comply with requirements 
established in the relevant IIA as to who may claim (for instance, nationality 
requirements) the defect is jurisdictional.178 By the same token, if the claim’s basis or 
                                                             
167 Schreuer (2009) 943. 
168 Shin (2016) 708; Updated ICSID Background Paper, [92-93]. 
169 But see Baumgartner (2016) 302 (arguing, without providing reasons, that Article 52 is inapplicable 
when the claim is dismissed on inadmissibility grounds). See also Wehland (2017) 233-234. De 
Brabandere, on whom Baumgartner relies, is less categorical. De Brabandere (2012) 618 (admissibility 
decisions ‘are, even under the ICSID Convention, unlikely to be subjected to annulment’). 
170 ICS [252-262]; Daimler, [184-194]. 
171 Tidewater (Jurisdiction) [198]; Philip Morris v Australia [588]. But see Transglobal [118] (finding that 
an abuse of the investment treaty system affects jurisdiction). 
172 Newcombe (2011) 198; De Brabandere (2012) 614; Vanessa (Award) [125]. 
173 Gaffney and Loftis (2007) 29; SGS v Philippines [154, 160-164]; Hochtief (Liability) [187-194]. 
174 Douglas (2009) Ch 11; Waibel (2015) 1273; Enron (Jurisdiction I) [52]; HICEE [147]. 
175 In international law, the term ‘measure’ includes ‘any act, step or proceeding’ with ‘no particular limit 
on their material content or on the aim pursued thereby’. Fisheries Jurisdiction [66]. 
176 Tams (2005) 29. 
177 Waibel (2015) 1284-1286; Wehland (2017) 239. 
178 Paulsson (2005) 616; Georgia v Russia [115-184]. 
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cause of action, i.e., the rights whose breach the claim alleges,179 is not included in the 
IIA’s jurisdiction provision, the problem is also jurisdictional.180 
 Yet the thesis does not focus on whether shareholders’ IIA rights or interests may 
have been affected and whether, consequently, shareholders can bring treaty claims.181 
Rather, the admissibility question here is how to reconcile shareholder treaty claims and 
company claims involving the same damages, in circumstances in which all jurisdictional 
requirements are assumed to be present (including that the shareholder is invoking its own 
treaty rights and advancing a genuine treaty claim). However, discussion of the standing 
and cause of action aspects of shareholder treaty claims is necessary, on the one hand, to 
consider to what extent current ideas on independence of shareholder rights and treaty 
claims have prevented us from acknowledging claim duplication. On the other hand, it is 
necessary because one may acknowledge both the existence of overlaps and the fact that 
different persons, relying on rights with a different legal basis, are often involved in 
related treaty and contract claims. Indeed, the thesis deals with the coexistence in 
international investment law of different holders of rights and interests over the same 
assets and of ensuing claims arising under national and international legal regimes. 
Standing, cause of action, and damages aspects of overlapping claims are the 
subject of Chapters 4, 5, and 6. For now, criteria relevant to the admissibility of 
shareholder IIA claims are advanced here. The criteria are not meant to be exhaustive as 
to the factors investment tribunals may take into account. Nor do these criteria provide, 
either singly or in combination, a priori definitive answers.182 Yet they are meant to 
provide a toolbox for investment tribunals to determine the admissibility of shareholder 
claims for measures against the company or its assets. The main purpose is to avoid or 
minimize risks of multiple recovery and prejudice to third parties (as well as connected 
problems of inconsistent decisions and inadequate application of the applicable law). The 
seven admissibility criteria (the first two being the most important) are: 
                                                             
179 Cremades and Cairns (2005) 14; Hobér (2014) 368. The cause of action includes the rights invoked and 
the facts constituting the alleged breach. See The Tatry [39]; Mærsk Olie & Gas [38]. 
180 See Paulsson (2005) 616; Chapter 7. 
181 In the sense of the ‘definitive activation of an arbitration procedure’. Apotex I [301] (quoting Feldman 
v Mexico). 
182 This is essentially because deciding on matters such as ‘the relationship between the BIT-related 
arbitration agreement and the local dispute resolution mechanism’ is necessarily fact-specific. Kreindler 
(2005) 191.   
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i) Is there a substantive overlap between the shareholder treaty claim and contract/national 
law claims, in that the damages are the same?183 This is the first criterion and the basic 
question.184 If there is no actual or potential duplication of damages, shareholder claims 
may still risk contradictory decisions through related proceedings. But the risk of multiple 
recovery and prejudice to third parties as identified above will not be present. The 
remaining six criteria are premised on such duplication. 
ii) Are both the shareholder and the company able to effectively claim for the damages? 
The answer depends, first, on whether there is a non-IIA venue with jurisdiction over the 
company’s claim,185 which constitutes an adequate alternative forum in terms of the 
availability of meaningful relief, respect for due process, and freedom from interference 
by the host state.186 Secondly, on whether the company is legally and factually able to 
pursue its claim.187 If the answer to either of these questions is no, either the chances of 
double recovery range from low to non-existent or the alternative forum does not 
otherwise call into question the admissibility of the shareholder claim.188 
iii) Have the company or shareholders advanced claims before a non-IIA jurisdiction, 
even if under national law, involving the same damages as the shareholder IIA claim? 
This is not to suggest a ‘rigid first-in-time rule’,189 particularly if the non-IIA proceedings 
                                                             
183 Another relevant criterion to establish substantive duplication is whether the claims derive from the same 
measures. Crivellaro (2005) 116; Waste Management I, 235-236. However, the ultimate test should focus 
on the damages because the same measure may harm different parties separately. For example, an 
expropriated asset may be owned jointly by the company and a shareholder and thus the expropriation affect 
both directly. 
184 Determining whether a shareholder IIA claim involves the same damages that may be claimed by the 
company is not always a straightforward question. See Chapter 5. 
185 The absence of an alternative forum is advanced here as an admissibility consideration. Whether this 
factor may be taken into account to decide whether an investment tribunal has jurisdiction is a different 
question. See Urbaser (Jurisdiction) [202]. 
186 See Hobér (2014) 243; Wehland (2016) 584; Resolution IDI (2003), [2(a)]; ILA Lis Pendens Report 
[5.13.5].  
187 In Barcelona Traction, the ICJ required that the company had legally ceased to exist for the shareholders 
to be able to claim for injury to the company. Barcelona Traction (Second Phase) [66]. See also ILC Draft 
Articles on Diplomatic Protection, Art 11(a). But this was in the context of general international law, where 
the principle was and remains that shareholders cannot claim for harm to the company. As an admissibility 
criterion for shareholder IIA claims, the test should be less stringent since, under certain IIA provisions, 
shareholders may be able to claim for damage to the company’s assets. See Chapter 4. 
188 An international tribunal should not ‘allow its own competency to give way’ when there is ‘a danger of 
a denial of justice’. Chorzów Factory (Jurisdiction), 30. Paulsson termed a refusal of the right of access to 
courts ‘the most obvious form of denial of justice’. Paulsson (2005-II) fn 134.  
189 McLachlan opposes a strict ‘first seised’ requirement because it may promote a race to commence 
proceedings and instances of abuse of right in forum selection. But while in cases of litispendence both 
courts should take account of the parallel proceedings, when one court is considering a stay ‘there must be 
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were lodged to frustrate or otherwise affect the IIA claim,190 but that the investment 
tribunal take the existence of prior overlapping proceedings into account.191 However, 
here certain additional factors are also relevant: (1) Does the first seized court constitute 
an adequate alternative forum in the terms described in criterion ii)?; (2) Was the 
shareholder in a position to influence the bringing or prosecution of the preceding non-
IIA claim in that, for example, it controls the company who is the claimant in such claim? 
If so, did the company have a legal obligation or some other compelling reason to file the 
non-IIA claim?  
iv) Do the treaty claims advanced rely, expressly or impliedly, on contract breaches and 
involve the same damages as those that may be claimed in respect of such breaches? If 
the answer is yes, have the parties to the contract chosen a specific jurisdiction to deal 
with the contract breaches in question that differs from the IIA tribunal and constitutes an 
adequate alternative forum as described above? 
v) Notwithstanding the existence of prior overlapping proceedings or an exclusive forum 
selection clause applicable to the same damages, is the investment tribunal in a position 
to adopt measures to effectively address the risk of multiple recovery that may stem from 
granting compensation to the shareholder? Otherwise, is it realistic in the circumstances 
to expect that the non IIA-forum192 will take into account whatever compensation the IIA 
tribunal grants, particularly in light of the powers such forum may have under its 
applicable law? 
vi) If there are reasonable prospects that the non-IIA forum can avoid double recovery 
through deducting the compensation granted to the shareholder, will the interests of 
                                                             
a prior pending proceeding actually on foot before another tribunal. Otherwise, the grant of a stay may 
perpetrate a denial of justice.’ McLachlan (2008) 334, 467, 500. See also Ampal (Jurisdiction) [333]. 
190 See Resolution IDI (2003), [4]. 
191 Orrego Vicuña (2005) 211; ILA Lis Pendens Report [5.10]. In Prince von Pless Administration, 
Germany alleged violations of the Geneva Convention of 15 May 1922 through Poland’s application of its 
tax laws to the Prince Von Pless. The PCIJ stated it would be advantageous ‘as regards the points which 
[had] to be established in the case, to be acquainted with the final decisions of the Supreme Polish 
Administrative Tribunal upon the appeals brought by the Prince von Pless’. The PCIJ then ‘arrange[d] its 
procedure so as to ensure that this [would] be possible’, although the case was later withdrawn before the 
Court ruled on jurisdiction, admissibility, and merits (which had all been joined). Prince von Pless 
Administration (Order of 4 February 1933), 11-12, 16. 
192 While this expectation generally alludes to a subsequent judicial decision, investment tribunals have also 
referred to government negotiators or regulators as the ones left to deal with possible double recovery 
effects. See Chapter 5. 
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parties not involved in the IIA claim be negatively affected as a consequence?193 If so, 
can the investment tribunal adopt measures to address possible impacts on third parties? 
vii) Have the non-IIA claims involving the same damages as the shareholder IIA claims 
been waived or settled, either by the company or the shareholder itself? If the company 
granted the waiver or reached a settlement, did the shareholder have any say in the 
decision194 or otherwise accept the waiver or settlement (for example, because the waiver 
was already included in provisions applicable to the investment before the shareholder 
invested)? 
In principle, the first two criteria are conclusive. If there is no overlap in the 
damages claimed or if there is an overlap but no alternative adequate forum, shareholder 
IIA claims are admissible. This is because there is either no risk of double recovery or the 
alternative forum presents certain defects (such as absence of effective remedies or due 
process) that would make a finding of inadmissibility unjustified and unfair.195 Similarly, 
a settlement or waiver that the shareholder granted or accepted should weigh heavily 
against the admissibility of a shareholder claim based on damages covered by the 
settlement or waiver. As in Hochtief, waivers in contracts (or settlements) may be broad 
enough to cover both contract and treaty claims.196 If the settlement or waiver expressly 
refers only to claims under the contract, shareholder treaty claims may well be 
admissible.197 Still, allowing the shareholder to bypass the effects of a settlement or 
waiver, which was part of the contractual bargain, simply by claiming for the same 
damages through a treaty claim is problematic.  
On the other hand, the existence of previously commenced overlapping non-IIA 
proceedings or exclusive forum selection clauses in contracts are advanced as relevant 
but not decisive considerations. The requirement that the non-IIA proceedings precede 
                                                             
193 See Douglas (2009) 457 (advancing as admissibility considerations applicable to shareholder indirect 
claims whether the claim will prejudice third parties or ‘interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery 
among all interested parties’). 
194 See Orascom [523]. 
195 Brower and Henin stressed the need for investment tribunals to reach a ‘substantively fair outcome’. 
Brower and Henin (2015) 65. 
196 Hochtief (Liability) [189-192]. 
197 A similar reasoning applies when there has been a settlement of a claim under an IIA and then the same 
damages are invoked against the host state under a different IIA. Orascom [525]. Admittedly, however, the 
application of principles on abandonment of claims through unilateral acts of waiver or acquiescence 
implied from conduct, or by agreement in the field of investment arbitration, is ‘an open question’. 
Crawford-Brownlie (2012) 700. 
55 
  
the filing of the shareholder IIA claim is consistent with general principles on lis 
pendens.198 By contrast, the relevance of whether a contractual choice of forum precedes 
the entry into force of the relevant IIA is less clear. As such, ‘the lex posterior principle 
only applies as between instruments of the same legal character’.199 For admissibility 
purposes, however, when the different instruments were concluded, coupled with 
arguments about lex specialis relationships between such instruments,200 may be relevant 
to determine, for example, that the investor agreed to a non-IIA forum when the IIA one 
was already available. Further, the effect of overlapping non-IIA proceedings and 
contractual forum selection clauses as admissibility grounds should not be assessed in 
isolation. Rather, these factors should be weighed against the actual prospects of double 
recovery and prejudice to third parties and of the investment tribunal’s ability to adopt 
measures to exclude or mitigate these risks. 
III CONCLUSION 
Admissibility of claims is an established idea in international law.201 Yet, even if featuring 
in the ICJ’s Rules of Court, there is no precise and generally accepted definition of 
admissibility.202 Its limits vis-à-vis jurisdiction and the merits of international claims are 
not fixed or easy to draw.203 In international investment law, the concept of admissibility 
of claims is no more precise than in general international law.204 To this one should add 
the general absence of provisions either in arbitral rules or in IIAs referring to substantive 
                                                             
198 Certain German Interests (Preliminary Objections), 19-20; Shany (2003) 157; Reinisch (2004) 43-44. 
Wehland argues that ‘an application of the principles of lis pendens and res judicata would not be 
appropriate [as regards treaty and contract proceedings] since the treaty tribunal is hierarchically superior 
to the contractual forum’. Wehland (2016) 585. Yet this reasoning would not prevent an investment tribunal 
from taking into account, for admissibility purposes, that the non-IIA proceedings were commenced first.   
199 SGS v Philippines [142]. But see Kreindler (2005) 193. 
200 The SGS v Philippines tribunal itself stated, quoting Schreuer, that it should not be presumed that a 
general provision in a treaty ‘has the effect of overriding specific provisions of particular contracts, freely 
negotiated between the parties’. SGS v Philippines [141]. See also SPP (Jurisdiction II) [83]. 
201 Collier and Lowe (1999) 155-6. 
202 Shany (2015) 1-2. 
203 Thirlway (2001) 73; Newcombe and Paradell (2009) 221. 
204 Waibel (2015) 1214. 
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admissibility.205 Notwithstanding, investment tribunals increasingly make admissibility 
determinations.206  
A condition is jurisdictional whenever consent to arbitration hinges on it. While 
this may vary in each case, depending on the consent instruments in question, under IIAs 
the power to decide essentially depends on the existence of a covered investor, with a 
protected investment and a prima facie claim of treaty breach.207 Thus, investment 
tribunals’ ability to weigh considerations not related to the existence of state consent in 
affirming or denying jurisdiction is questionable.208 By contrast, admissibility conditions 
do not refer to consent or its scope.209 Rather, admissibility includes a wide variety of 
grounds that provide reasons for a tribunal not to hear a claim or to hear it but refrain 
from adopting a finding on its ultimate merits.210 Admissibility determinations may, 
however, involve a consideration of the merits. Yet aside from procedural economy 
reasons, avoiding a decision on whether the applicable IIA has been breached–and 
perhaps also, as an incidental matter, whether there has been any violation of a relevant 
contract–on admissibility grounds, may have other consequences. The chance of 
inconsistent outcomes vis-à-vis other fora declines. 
The admissibility grounds that this thesis proposes principally address two 
problems that may arise in shareholder IIA claims: the avoidance of multiple recovery 
and prejudice to third parties. These consequences affect rights and interests protected by 
the applicable law, which in the case of investment arbitration includes both international 
and national law.211 Investment tribunals have the inherent power to find that certain 
claims are inadmissible, where a finding on the ultimate merits would go against 
recognized legal principles that aim to ensure no multiple recovery and prejudice to third 
parties.  
                                                             
205 But see e.g. Canada-Peru BIT, Art 37; CETA, Art 8.21(6). After the 2006 amendment, ICSID Arbitration 
Rule 41(5) regulates an expedited procedure for the parties to raise, as a preliminary objection, that ‘a claim 
is manifestly without legal merit’. This language is broad enough to include admissibility objections. Salles 
(2014) 104. 
206 See e.g. Bosh International [136]; Teco [628]; Flughafen Zürich [391]; İçkale [239-246]; Kiliç 
(Annulment) [166]. 
207 Douglas (2009) 143.  
208 Abaclat (Diss Op, Abi-Saab) [16]. 
209 Ibid [18-19]. 
210 Waibel (2015) 1219. 
211 LG&E (Liability) [96].  
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The application of admissibility to shareholder claims depends, first, on the 
existence of a duplication of damages claims (either actual or potential), and second, on 
the existence of an adequate alternative forum where the overlapping claims are being 
heard or may be heard. And even then, the thesis advances additional admissibility 
considerations, related to whether there are real prospects of double recovery and/or 
prejudice to third parties and whether investment tribunals are in a position to at least 
reduce these risks. All in all, this requires factoring in both shareholders’ IIA rights to be 
compensated in certain cases and other important considerations, not least preventing the 
shareholder from being compensated twice for the same damage.      
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3 Mixed Claims Commissions and the Origins of 
Central Concepts 
 
Clearly the high contracting parties had in view the substance and not the shadow of 
justice.1 
 
In applying international law, contemporary investment tribunals regularly consider both 
treaty provisions and general international law. The origins of customary rules dealing 
with the protection of foreigners can be traced back to the beginnings of modern 
international law or even before.2 But as to certain matters of particular interest here,3 
decisions of ad hoc arbitral tribunals and ‘mixed claims commissions’ of the 19th and 
first half of the 20th centuries have exerted a distinctive influence. This is not surprising. 
After the ‘renaissance’ of international arbitration with the Jay Treaty of 1794,4 the main 
preoccupation of these tribunals and commissions during the 19th century was the 
diplomatic protection of nationals for damages suffered in a foreign country.5 
Many claims commissions considered issues directly connected to the standing of 
shareholders, causes of action under national law (including prominently contracts) and 
international law, and the entitlement to damages. The opinions of these precursors of 
modern investment tribunals, however, have to be approached with some caution. Mixed 
claims commissions and arbitral tribunals operated under specific treaty arrangements, 
which often differed in significant respects from current IIAs that confer jurisdiction to 
                                                             
1 Orinoco Steamship Company (Commissioner Bainbridge), 183. 
2 See Paparinskis (2013) 11 (mentioning the discussion on the rules on the treatment of aliens in Giovanni 
da Legnano’s 1360 treatise). The idea that foreigners may deserve special legal protection is even older. 
See Plato, The Laws 193 (‘As to foreigners, one should regard agreements made with them as particularly 
sacrosanct. Practically all offences committed as between or against foreigners are quicker to attract the 
vengeance of God than offences as between fellow-citizens.’). 
3 See Vivendi I Annulment [98-101] (citing the decision of the 1903 United States-Venezuela Commission 
in Woodruff for the concept of ‘fundamental basis of the claim’). 
4 Georges Pinson, 335; Virally (1987) 82; Hobér (2014) 109. The Jay Treaty is the Treaty of Amity, 
Commerce and Navigation–the first of its type–concluded on 19 November 1794 between Great Britain 
and the United States, which sought to maintain peace between the two countries. Ziegler (2013) [1-2]. 
5 Biens Britanniques, 636. 
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arbitral tribunals, such as the applicable law.6 Further, some of the understandings on 
basic background notions–such as the position of the individual in international law7–
have evolved significantly since the 19th century. 
This chapter discusses findings mainly of the Commissions created between 
Venezuela and ten other countries in 1903 (‘Venezuelan Commissions’) and of the 
Commissions constituted by Mexico with France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, 
and the US and that functioned between 1923 and 1934 (‘Mexican Commissions’).8 These 
two groups of Commissions in particular have influenced modern investment tribunals.9 
Decisions of other claims commissions and ad hoc tribunals are incidentally discussed, 
when necessary to refer to the position preceding the Venezuelan and Mexican 
Commissions or to consider legal developments contemporaneous to these Commissions. 
The focus here is on early antecedents of current ideas on shareholder standing, causes of 
action, and damages.10 A consideration of these concepts’ original scope contributes to a 
critical appraisal of their current functions,11 allowing for the (sometimes important) 
differences in context. This chapter argues that, when applying them, past commissions 
were more concerned with the fairness of the ultimate outcome than with formal 
                                                             
6 The difference as to the applicable law should not be overstated, however. Regarding the 1923 Mexico-
United States Special Claims Convention’s reference that Mexico’s responsibility would not ‘be fixed 
according to the generally accepted rules and principles of international law’, Feller noted that ‘the 
Commissions proceeded on the view that “equity” was to be restricted to the decisions of the question of 
Mexico’s responsibility, and that as to all other questions the rules of international law were to be applied’. 
Feller (1935) 223. Those ‘other questions’ included ‘the admissibility of corporate claims’. Ibid. See also 
Phillips (1933) 228; Percival (1937) 99-100. But see Schwarzenberger (1957) 201. 
7 In 1932, Witenberg argued that admissibility grounds could not result from a contract because the only 
possible source of these grounds was international law. Witenberg (1932) 62. However, this would be 
different if ‘the individual would acquire international personality’. Ibid. Author’s translation (original 
French). See also Borchard (1915) 16; Verdross (1931) 328-329. 
8 Ibid, vii, 23. Both Mexico and Venezuela were parties to several other treaties constituting claims 
commissions, in particular during the 19th century. Dolzer (2011) [6-7]. 
9 Modern references to the Venezuelan Commissions’ decisions include Santa Elena [98], Vivendi II Award 
[7.5.18], and Micula, fn 13. As to the Mexican Commissions, a well-known example is the influence of the 
decision in Neer on current debates on the international minimum standard of treatment. See ADF [179]; 
Gami [95]; Glamis [22]; Azurix (Award) [365-368]; El Paso [347]; Railroad [216-218]; Gold Reserve 
[567]; Sharpe (2016) 279. See also Saur (Liability) [493]; OI [486] (arguing that the relevant decision on 
the minimum standard is not Neer but Roberts); Arif [431] (citing the Chattin case); Garibaldi (2015) (for 
a critical discussion of the current influence of the Mexico-US General Claims Commission’s decision in 
North American Dredging Company). 
10 The thesis does not discuss historical references to admissibility because modern investment tribunals 
have not relied on the case law/documents of claims commissions or old ad hoc arbitral tribunals in this 
regard. Further, certain early discussions, such as Witenberg’s monograph, conflated jurisdictional and 
admissibility objections. Witenberg (1932) 86. Before claims commissions, the terms jurisdiction and 
admissibility were also often used to refer to the same objections. See e.g. Selwyn, 380.    
11 See Miles (2013) 16. 
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categories. It contends that the decisions, for the most part, tried to avoid certain 
undesirable consequences such as the potential for double compensation or prejudice to 
third parties. While the Commissions did not regard these factors as affecting their 
jurisdiction, they took them into account as an admissibility consideration in deciding 
whether to accept claims. 
Section I discusses basic features of mixed claims commissions in general and of 
the Venezuelan and Mexican Commissions. Section II considers, first, the Commissions’ 
reasoning with respect to the relationship between shareholders, on the one hand, and the 
company and its assets and rights, on the other. The purpose is to distil some general 
notions on the admissibility of shareholder claims. This section then addresses the 
relationship between contract claims and claims under international law. It looks at the 
contract claims/treaty claims distinction in its original context, to reflect on its early 
functions. Finally, the chapter discusses damages concepts connected to standing and the 
cause of action and that have a bearing on the admissibility of shareholder claims.  
I MIXED CLAIMS COMMISSIONS 
Some of the principal ideas discussed in this thesis, including the contract claims/treaty 
claims distinction and notions related to shareholder standing in international law, started 
to develop in the decisions of mixed claims commissions. The context and purposes for 
which they were used, however, differed from their modern application. First, only states 
had standing before the commissions. International claims were subject to virtually 
complete government control. Conversely, investment claims nowadays are generally 
pursued directly by the investor, with home state intervention foreseen only in exceptional 
circumstances.12 Second, the distinction as to the basis of claims mostly concerned claims 
under contracts and claims under general international law. Currently, the distinction is 
between contract claims and claims under IIAs. In this light, is mixed claims 
commissions’ jurisprudence still relevant in relation to international investment law? Or 
has the increased protection provided by IIAs to foreign investments, including their 
jurisdictional innovations, rendered mixed claims commissions’ decisions largely 
irrelevant, except perhaps for discrete issues such as the minimum standard of treatment? 
                                                             
12 See e.g. ICSID Convention, Art 27(1) (excluding diplomatic protection in respect of an ICSID arbitration, 
except when a ‘Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award’). 
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 The problem the thesis explores is the failure to recognize substantive overlaps 
between shareholder indirect claims and contract/national law claims and whether this is 
justified by the new legal landscape created by IIAs. By contrast, mixed claims 
commissions operated in a world of state-owned claims where, for example, the status of 
individuals (let alone other private actors) as subjects of international law was doubtful 
at best.13 Yet, on the one hand, the commissions also drew a distinction between contract 
and international law claims. On the other hand, they did not fail to recognize the private 
interest underlying the state claims and the overlaps between these claims and claims 
available under contracts. The commissions’ jurisdiction, as established by the relevant 
treaties, was not affected. However, the overlaps and their potential consequences, such 
as double recovery risks,14 were an important consideration in resolving the claims’ 
substance. For present purposes, the recognition of overlaps between national and 
international claims and their potential impact on the decisions of international 
jurisdictions demonstrates the continued relevance of mixed claims commissions.    
A Mixed claims commissions in general 
The terms ‘mixed claims commissions’ or ‘mixed commissions’ have been used to refer 
to a variety of different entities. ‘Mixed commissions’ can refer to commissions of a very 
varied nature, ranging from ‘diplomatic’ commissions with fact-finding or conciliation 
roles through commissions of a ‘judicial’ or ‘quasi-judicial’ nature.15 The term ‘mixed 
claims commissions’ also defies easy definition. Even the institutions to which they are 
most commonly applied had notable differences among them. Mixed claims commissions 
also evolved considerably throughout the period in which they were most frequently used, 
during the 19th and early 20th centuries.16 They were created by treaties with a view to 
settling a defined category of disputes,17 often within a specific timeframe.18  
                                                             
13 In International Fisheries, Nielsen quoted approvingly Oppenheim’s view that international law was ‘a 
law for the intercourse of States with one another, not a law for individuals’. International Fisheries (Diss 
Op Nielsen), 722. See also Anzilotti (1906) 8; Rundstein (1928) 340. But see Oppenheim (9th ed) 16-22.   
14 Douglas (2009) 419-420. 
15 Boisson de Chazournes and Campanelli (2006) [8-14].  
16 Miles (2013) 67. 
17 Dolzer (2011) [1]. 
18 See e.g. Mexico-US Convention of 8 September 1923, Art VI (Commission, in principle, ‘bound to hear, 
examine and decide, within three years from the date of its first meeting, all the claims filed’). RIAA IV, 
13. This term was later extended on three occasions. Ibid, 325-326, 549-550, 751-752.  
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Although the main interest here is in claims for damages suffered by an individual 
or company at the hands of a foreign country, mixed claims commissions would 
sometimes resolve other types of disputes, including between the states parties to the 
treaty.19 Mixed claims commissions or tribunals20 were generally set up to deal with a 
high number of claims arising from traumatic events, such as revolutions or national and 
international armed conflicts. Measures taken in these circumstances by the state in 
question were often alleged to constitute expropriations of alien property.21 Well-known 
examples of events leading to the creation of claims commissions include the Venezuelan 
Civil War of 1898-1902, the Mexican Revolution starting in 1910 and lasting around a 
decade, and the First World War.22 Losses to foreigners resulting from these events 
caused significant tensions among states; the creation of ad hoc bodies was seen as an 
inexpensive and effective way to process the resulting claims.23 Leaving aside the dispute 
settlement arrangements following the First and Second World Wars, the majority of the 
claims referred to damages suffered by a national of a more or less powerful state and 
allegedly attributable to a weaker state, within whose territory the damaging event had 
taken place.24  
B The Venezuelan and Mexican Commissions 
1 Overview 
The mixed claims commissions ‘between Venezuela and ten of the principal nations of 
the world’, which sat at Caracas from 1903, were described at the time as ‘the most 
notable instance of international arbitration in the history of the world’.25 These 
commissions, whose constitutive instruments were concluded after a blockade of the 
                                                             
19 Dolzer (2011) [1]. 
20 During the 20th century and in particular following the First World War, some ad hoc processes for the 
resolution of international disputes were called mixed tribunals. Shaw (2008) 1056. 
21 Miles (2013) 67. 
22 Boisson de Chazournes and Campanelli (2006) [10]; Dolzer (2011) [6-7].  
23 Shaw (2008) 1056. 
24 Brownlie-Crawford (2012) 611. The Commissions’ jurisdiction sometimes expressly included only the 
claims of the more powerful state against the weaker one. See Mexico-United States Special Claims 
Commission, RIAA IV, 779 (covering only claims of US citizens against Mexico). 
25 Kummerow, 392. 
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Venezuelan ports by Great Britain, Germany, and Italy,26 were formed to deal with claims 
of nationals of these three countries and of the US, Mexico, Spain, France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and the Kingdom of Sweden and Norway.27 All the commissions had the 
same structure, with Venezuela appointing one member, the other state party appointing 
another one, and an umpire appointed by a third state.28 The task of naming the umpire 
was entrusted to the Queen of the Netherlands (Commissions with the US, Belgium, and 
France), the President of the US (Commissions with Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and 
the Netherlands), the King of Spain (Commissions with Mexico and Sweden-Norway), 
and the President of Mexico (Spain-Venezuela Commission).29      
 The Mexican Commissions were set up essentially to deal with claims arising 
from the Mexican revolutionary period of 1910 to 1920,30 between Mexico and France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, and the US.31 In the case of the US, aside from the 
commission dealing with ‘revolutionary claims’–named the ‘Special Claims 
Commission’–another commission was set up to deal with all other claims of citizens of 
both Mexico and the US corresponding to the period 1868 to 1927 (‘General Claims 
Commission’).32 The arrangement on the selection of the members of all these 
commissions was identical. Mexico and the other state each appointed one member and 
the third member, who would preside over the commission, was selected by mutual 
agreement.33 In the absence of agreement, the third member would be designated by an 
organ of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.34 
                                                             
26 Drago (1907) 692, 703-704. Germany, Great Britain, and Italy enjoyed a privileged position as regards 
the payment of their claims vis-à-vis the other states with claims against Venezuela. See The Venezuelan 
Preferential Case. 
27 RIAA IX, 103. 
28 RIAA IX, 115 (US); RIAA IX, 321 (Belgium); RIAA X, 3 (France); RIAA X, 360 (Germany); RIAA 
IX, 351 (Great Britain); RIAA X, 480 (Italy); RIAA X, 695 (Mexico); RIAA X, 709 (Netherlands); RIAA 
X, 737 (Spain); RIAA X, 763 (Sweden and Norway). 
29 Ibid. 
30 RIAA IV, 3. 
31 Feller (1935) 23 (also mentioning a convention of a ‘different character’ concluded with Belgium). 
32 Ibid. See also Percival (1937) 98-99. 
33 RIAA V, 567 (Germany); RIAA V, 313 (France); RIAA V, 7 (Great Britain); RIAA IV, 12 (US General 
Claims Commission); RIAA IV, 779 (US Special Claims Commission).  
34 Ibid.    
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 The decisions of both the Venezuelan and Mexican Commissions were definitive 
and binding.35 The Mexican Commissions, however, constitute a more impartial dispute 
settlement mechanism than the Venezuelan Commissions.36 While in the case of the latter 
the umpire was always appointed by one of the states that had formed commissions with 
Venezuela, in the case of the Mexican Commissions, failing agreement, the president was 
chosen by an authority of an international organization. Further, the umpire model of the 
Venezuelan Commissions meant that the Umpire decided the case when there was 
disagreement between the other two members. It had ‘the disadvantage of emphasizing 
the national character of the national commissioners, often resulting in reducing them to 
the position of mere advocates for their governments’.37  
2 Government claims and underlying private rights 
Even in the case of claims derived from a loss suffered by a natural or legal person, before 
mixed claims commissions it was usually only the state of the nationality of these persons 
who had standing. In the case of the Venezuelan Commissions, only the governments 
could appear before the Commissions,38 although provision was sometimes made for the 
injured person or his/her representatives to attend the hearings.39 Before the Mexican 
Commissions, it was also exclusively the governments who presented the claims.40 Yet 
both the Venezuelan and Mexican Commissions referred to the relationship between the 
claim–presented by the government–and the underlying rights of the injured national.  
                                                             
35 See, e.g., RIAA IX, 115 (US-Venezuela Mixed Claims Commission); RIAA V, 570 (Germany-Mexico 
Claims Commission). Unlike arbitral tribunals, international commissions not always render binding 
decisions and are often entrusted to issue non-binding pronouncements. Boisson de Chazournes and 
Campanelli (2006) [6]. 
36 This is so even considering only the formal arrangements and leaving aside the extraordinary historical 
circumstances in which the Venezuelan Commissions were set up. Cf contention of the British agent in De 
Lemos, 369 (‘This treaty was made under pressure of a blockade. Under such circumstances what is more 
natural than to find that the blockading power has insisted on its own standard of right?’). See also Miles 
(2013) 69. 
37 Feller (1933) 40. 
38 RIAA IX, 116 (US), 321-322 (Belgium), 354 (Great Britain); RIAA X, 3 (France), 361 (Germany), 482 
(Italy), 695 (Mexico), 710 (Netherlands), 713 (Spain), 764 (Sweden and Norway). 
39 See Rules of the British-Venezuelan Commission, Article XV, RIAA IX, 356; Rules of the Netherlands-
Venezuelan Commission, Article XI, RIAA X, 713. 
40 RIAA IV, 12, 780-781, (US); RIAA V, 9 (Great Britain), 314-315 (France), 569 (Germany). This was 
also true of other claims commissions. See e.g. Tripartite Claims Commission US-Austria-Hungary, RIAA 
VI, 200; General Claims Commission US-Panama, RIAA VI, 303; Mixed Claims Commission US-
Germany, RIAA VII, 14.     
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In the Orinoco Steamship Company case, the US-Venezuela Commission 
considered a claim for damages arising from the annulment of a concession contract, 
certain unpaid debts, and losses sustained during the revolution.41 Venezuela questioned 
the Commission’s jurisdiction because the loss had been suffered by a British corporation, 
which only later assigned the claim to a US company.42 The Umpire, who decided the 
case because the two Commissioners disagreed, rejected the objection essentially based 
on the language of the treaty.43 He observed, however, that ‘a state is not a claim agent, 
but only, as the infliction of a wrong upon its citizens in [sic] an injury to the state itself, 
it may secure redress for the injury done to its citizens, and not for the injury done to the 
citizens of another state’.44 The US Commissioner stated that a wrong on a state’s citizen 
injured the state itself.45 In all cases ‘[t]he vital question [was] whether and to what extent 
citizens of the United States of America [had] suffered loss or injury’.46 He and the 
Umpire agreed that jurisdiction was present. The latter added, however, that the 
Commission’s jurisdiction over claims owned by US citizens had to be recognized, 
without prejudice to its ‘judicial power’ to rule on the merits considering the effect certain 
issues–in the case, the claim’s assignment–could have on the parties’ rights.47 
 In the Metzger case of the Germany-Venezuela Commission, the Commissioner 
for Venezuela argued that the claim for damages could not be accepted inter alia on the 
grounds that ‘the right of action does not survive and pass to the heirs of Metzger’.48 This 
was opposed by the German Commissioner, who took the position that the case was not 
between an individual and Venezuela but involved a claim being put forward by 
                                                             
41 Orinoco Steamship Company, 191-192. 
42 Ibid, 182. 
43 Ibid, 192-193. 
44 Ibid, 192. 
45 Ibid, 182. 
46 Ibid, 183. 
47 Ibid, 193. 
48 Metzger, 418. 
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Germany.49 The Umpire found this latter position untenable.50 The claim before the 
Commission was ‘not a claim of the German Nation but a claim of an individual’.51 
In Parker, the Mexico-US General Claims Commission was confronted with a 
claim for debts arising from services rendered to the Mexican Government.52 In 
considering a challenge against the nationality of the claim,53 the Commission held that 
its 1923 constitutive treaty did not deal with claims owned by the espousing states but by 
private parties.54 The treaty even provided for the restitution of properties or rights to such 
parties in certain cases.55 Yet, on the one hand, the Commission found that the state’s 
control over the claim was ‘complete’ and ‘exclusive’, in that the government was at 
liberty to pursue it or not.56 On the other hand, however, the Commission affirmed that 
‘the private nature of the claim inhere[ed] in it and [was] not lost or destroyed so as to 
make it the property of the nation’.57 
 This aspect of the claims–i.e., procedural control by the government but with an 
underlying private interest always present–was also observed by the Mexico-Great 
Britain Commission. In Mexican Union Railway, this Commission had to determine the 
effect of a Calvo Clause58–purporting to subject the company in question and all its 
activities in Mexico exclusively to Mexican jurisdiction–on its competence.59 In this 
context, the Commission stated that the claims before it bore 
                                                             
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid, 419. After stating that it was ‘the claim of an individual’, the Umpire found that the laws of 
Venezuela were applicable. Ibid. 
52 Parker, 36. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid, 37. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Borchard described Calvo Clauses as ‘the incorporation in contracts between the local government and 
a foreigner of a stipulation by which the foreigner agrees to bring his disputes and differences arising out 
of the contract before the local courts exclusively, with the further express or implied agreement that he 
renounces his right to call upon his own government for protection in all matters arising out of the contract’. 
Borchard (1915) 792. See also Feller (1933) 185; Phillips (1933) 234; Percival (1937) 102.  
59 Mexican Union Railway, 117-118.   
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a mixed character. They [were] public claims in so far as they [were] presented by one Government to 
another Government. But they [were] private in so far as they aim[ed] at the granting of a financial award 
to an individual or to a company.’60 
Similarly, in discussing the Mexico-US Commission’s decisions, Borchard had already 
noted the mixed character of the claims.61 Thus, the suggestion that the private character 
of the claim disappeared was not accurate.62 
 The Venezuelan and Mexican Commissions’ views on the nature of the claims 
and the precise relationship between the state’s rights and those of its injured national 
appear not wholly articulated or consistent.63 This is not surprising given the complexity 
of the issue and the doubts that remain even today on closely related aspects. For present 
purposes, however, it may be noted that despite the absolute procedural control by 
governments and the idea of an injury to the latter’s rights,64 the Commissions did not fail 
to acknowledge the presence of an underlying private interest.65 This meant looking at 
the substance of the claims, even though the private person did not directly appear before 
the Commissions. Preponderant considerations in this regard included that the private 
party was the one who had suffered the damage and was the potential beneficiary of any 
compensation or restitution. Furthermore, the Conventions creating the Mexican 
Commissions explicitly regarded ‘the result of the proceedings of the Commission as a 
full, perfect and final settlement’ of each claim, which were owned by natural and legal 
persons.66    
3 Relationship to national proceedings 
Neither the treaties creating the Venezuelan Commissions nor those creating the Mexican 
Commissions contained detailed provisions governing the relationship between the 
                                                             
60 Ibid, 120.  
61 Borchard (1926) 540. 
62 Ibid. Borchard’s views on this issue seem to have evolved however. See Borchard (1915) 360. 
63 See Fabiani, 127 (‘The right to intervene exists in the indignity to France through her national. 
Thenceforward it is national interests, not private interests, that are to be safeguarded’). 
64 See Feller (1933) 87. 
65 See the opinion of the US Commissioner in Rudloff, 245 (‘[T]he arbitration is between nations and the 
submission concerns a private claim. Only the Government of the claimant, acting in his behalf, enters into 
the agreement for arbitration.’). 
66 RIAA IV, 11, 13 (US-Mexico General Claims Commission); RIAA IV, 779, 781 (US-Mexico Special 
Claims Commission); RIAA V, 568, 570 (Germany); RIAA V, 314-316 (France); RIAA V, 8, 10 (Great 
Britain).   
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Commissions and national tribunals having jurisdiction over the same or related claims. 
In the case of the Mexican Commissions, however, it was expressly provided that claims 
would not ‘be disallowed or rejected by the Commission by the application of the general 
principle of international law that the legal remedies must be exhausted as a condition 
precedent to the validity or allowance of any claim’.67 The reason for this was the desire 
to effect ‘an equitable settlement of the claims’ and to grant the affected foreigners ‘just 
and adequate compensation for their losses or damages’.68 
 One of the leading pronouncements on the jurisdictional relationship between 
international arbitral tribunals and national courts was rendered by the Umpire of the 
United Kingdom-Venezuela Commission in Selwyn. The claim related to a deprivation 
of ‘valuable rights, of moneys, properties, property, and rights of property’ by 
Venezuela.69 Venezuela objected to the Commission’s jurisdiction on the ground that if 
the claim was ‘admissible otherwise, it [was] barred by the fact that a suit [was] pending 
in the local courts, wherein the claimant [was] the plaintiff and Venezuela [was] the 
defendant, based upon the same right of action’.70 The Umpire observed: 
International arbitration is not affected jurisdictionally by the fact that the same question is in the courts of 
one of the nations. Such international tribunal has power to act without reference thereto, and if judgment 
has been pronounced by such court, to disregard the same so far as it affects the indemnity to the individual, 
and has power to make an award in addition thereto or in aid thereof as in the given case justice may require. 
Within the limits prescribed by the convention constituting it the parties have created a tribunal superior to 
the local courts.71 
The international tribunal will have jurisdiction over a claim even if the same claim is 
pending before a national court or has already been decided by it.72 
The idea that even if the ‘same claim’ is already before a national court the 
international body’s jurisdiction–if warranted under the applicable treaty–is not affected 
                                                             
67 RIAA IV, 13, 781, (US); RIAA V, 9 (Great Britain), 315 (France), 569 (Germany). 
68 Ibid. 
69 Selwyn, 383.  
70 Ibid, 380. 
71 Ibid, 381. On the primacy of international jurisdictions over domestic courts see also Différend S.A.I.M.I., 
45; Schreuer (1976) 508-509; Reichert (1992) 250; Crivellaro (2005) 95 (citing Socaciu v Austria); Voss 
(2011) 303. 
72 Selwyn, 381.  
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was also advanced by the US-Venezuela Commission in Rudloff.73 Here, as in Selwyn,74 
the Commission emphasized the need to fulfil the jurisdictional mandate contained in the 
applicable treaty, notwithstanding competing national jurisdictions.75 The Italy-
Venezuela Commission went further by stating, in Martini, that Italy and Venezuela had 
agreed to substitute ‘for national forums, which, with or without contract between the 
parties, may have had jurisdiction over the subject-matter, an international forum, to 
whose determination they fully agree[d] to bow’.76 The position that when a claim is 
submitted to arbitration all other competent jurisdictions are ‘set aside and superseded by 
the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal’ was also advanced by the British agent in De 
Lemos77 and Aroa Mines78 and by the US Commissioner in Orinoco Steamship 
Company.79 The latter added that in relation to every claim covered by the treaty the role 
of the US-Venezuela Commission was ‘not fulfilled until to its careful examination there 
is added an impartial decision upon its merits’.80 
 In Caire, the France-Mexico Commission’s Presiding Commissioner decided on 
a claim derived from the murder of Jean-Baptiste Caire in 1914 by members of armed 
forces then in control of Mexican territory.81 Mexico objected to the Commission 
entertaining the claim until the claimants had withdrawn their claim before national 
organs.82 The Presiding Commissioner rejected the objection essentially on the ground 
that ‘international law does not require an international tribunal to abstain… from 
entertaining an international dispute, because the same dispute is pending before another 
                                                             
73 Rudloff, 254-255. 
74 Selwyn, 381. Based on the language of one of its constitutive treaties, the United Kingdom-Venezuela 
Commission observed that ‘[i]t would seem that the claim being otherwise admissible at the time of the 
making of the treaty, it is not to be affected by anything save its subsequent payment or satisfaction.’ Ibid.  
75 Rudloff, 255. 
76 Martini, 663. 
77 De Lemos, 370. 
78 Aroa Mines, 405. 
79 Orinoco Steamship Company, 183. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Caire, 517-518. 
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tribunal’.83 Mexico’s litispendence objection84 related to the claim’s admissibility, which 
the Commission could only decide once it had affirmed its jurisdiction based on the 
claimant’s French nationality.85 In rejecting the objection and affirming the admissibility 
of the claim, the Presiding Commissioner noted the promise by France to withdraw any 
claim before the national forum.86 
 In cases where the relevant international commission’s jurisdiction was seen as 
displacing that of the competent national courts,87 local proceedings involving the same 
claims as the international proceedings are hard to reconcile with the applicable treaties.88 
More importantly, the leading case states that national proceedings on the same questions 
do not affect international arbitration ‘jurisdictionally’.89 An international jurisdiction is 
‘superior to local courts’ and its competence is in any case not affected by the existence 
or the outcome of national proceedings. But an arbitral tribunal is not barred from taking 
into account a national decision on the same question and from ‘mak[ing] an award in 
addition thereto or in aid thereof as in the given case justice may require’.90 Other aspects, 
such as whether local proceedings involving the same claim will be continued or have 
resulted in an award of compensation,91 may be relevant considerations in deciding on 
the admissibility of the claim.92 
                                                             
83 Ibid. Author’s translation (original French). The Presiding Commissioner, however, expressly reserved 
cases where there were preliminary questions of national law pending before national courts which 
resolution would be of decisive importance for the claim before the international commission (such as 
whether the claimant owned a certain asset). Ibid, 525. 
84 See Reichert (1992) 250; Reinisch (2004) 49.   
85 Ibid, 521. Author’s translation (original French). 
86 Ibid, 525. 
87 In many cases, however, this is far from obvious. Schreuer (1976) 518-519. 
88 See Orinoco Steamship Company II, 239 (stating that ‘the maintenance of Venezuelan Jurisdiction with 
regard to [the claims submitted to the US-Venezuela Commission] would have been incompatible and 
irreconcilable with the arbitration which had been instituted’).  
89 Selwyn, 381. 
90 Ibid. 
91 While not expressly referring to admissibility, the Mexico-United Kingdom Commission in The Santa 
Rosa noted that one of the claims before it had been lodged with a national commission but ‘no award ha[d] 
been made in favour of the Company, nor ha[d] the Company received compensation from any other 
source’. The Santa Rosa, 253. 
92 Caire, 525. 
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4 Applicable law 
In the case of the Venezuelan Commissions, the commissioners and the umpire were to 
‘examine and impartially decide, according to justice and the provisions of [the applicable 
treaty], all claims submitted to them’.93 It was further provided that all claims would be 
decided ‘upon a basis of absolute equity, without regard to objections of a technical 
nature, or of the provisions of local legislation’.94 As regards the Mexican Commissions, 
the Mexico-US General Claims Commission was to decide the claims ‘in accordance with 
the principles of international law, justice and equity’.95 But in the case of the special 
commissions dealing with the ‘revolutionary claims’, Mexico expressed the desire that 
its responsibility not ‘be fixed according to the generally accepted rules and principles of 
international law’, although it felt ‘morally bound to make full indemnification’.96 Thus, 
these special commissions were to base their decisions on ‘principles of justice and 
equity’97 or simply ‘principles of equity’.98 
The decisions of the Venezuelan and Mexican Commissions generally did not 
contain a detailed discussion of the applicable law. In Aroa Mines, however, the Umpire 
of the Great Britain-Venezuela Commission stated that, although the constitutive treaties 
did not refer to international law,99 the latter was the law of the tribunal and regulated 
every act under the treaties.100 It was then 
scarcely necessary to say that the protocols [were] to be interpreted and this tribunal governed by 
[international law], for there is no other; and that justice and equity are invoked and are to be paramount is 
not in conflict with this position, for international law is assumed to conform to justice and to be inspired 
by the principles of equity.101 
                                                             
93 RIAA IX, 115 (US), 321 (Belgium), 353 (Great Britain); RIAA X, 3 (France), 361 (Germany), 481-482 
(Italy), 695 (Mexico), 709 (Netherlands), 737 (Spain), 763 (Sweden and Norway).  
94 Ibid. In the case of Great Britain and Germany, Venezuela recognized ‘in principle the justice of the 
claims’, which had been advanced by those two states on behalf of their subjects. RIAA IX, 351 (Great 
Britain); RIAA X, 359 (Germany). 
95 RIAA IV, 12.  
96 RIAA IV, 780 (US). 
97 RIAA IV, 780 (US); RIAA V, 8 (Great Britain). 
98 RIAA V, 314, 318 (France), 568 (Germany).  
99 Aroa Mines, 444. 
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The Germany-Venezuela Commission in Kummerow, while accepting the application of 
the principles of international law,102 also recognized the function of national law in the 
determination of property rights: 
This right of property or title must be decided by municipal or local law, because it is derived from and is 
conferred by that law. One does not derive his title to property in any country through international law, 
but through the local law of the country. That law confers, permeates, and restricts his title.103  
This meant that title to property was subject to ‘any and all the qualifications and 
limitations’ stemming from national law at the time of its acquisition.104 
The Mexico-US General Claims Commission had to apply international law.105 In 
North American Dredging Company, it considered whether a Calvo Clause in the relevant 
contract was consistent with international law.106 The Commission noted that it was clear 
at the time ‘as it was in the day of the Geneva Arbitration that international law is 
paramount to decrees of nations and to municipal law’.107 But, importantly, the 
Commission added that its task was to determine whether a conflict between international 
law and national legislative or contractual provisions actually existed.108 Regarding 
national law before the Commission, US Commissioner Nielsen described national law’s 
role in a manner not dissimilar to the Germany-Venezuela Commission’s views in 
Kummerow. In Cook, he posited that before an international tribunal the nature of 
contractual and property rights was ‘determined by the local law that governs the legal 
                                                             
102 Kummerow, 400. 
103 Ibid, 399. 
104 Ibid, 399. 
105 RIAA IV, 12.  
106 North American Dredging Company, 28.  
107 Ibid. The reference here is to the Alabama Claims arbitration, which is typically cited in support of the 
primacy of international law over national law. See Alabama Claims, 131. For an earlier decision upholding 
the principle see Award rendered by Senate of the Free City of Hamburg, 65.  
108 North American Dredging Company, 28. Although the decision was rendered in 1926, the Commission 
denied ‘that the rules of international public law apply only to nations and that individuals can not under 
any circumstances have a personal standing under it.’ Ibid.   
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effects of the contract or other form of instrument creating such rights’.109 Yet state 
responsibility was exclusively determined by international law.110 
To distil relevant principles on the admissibility of investment claims, an 
exhaustive analysis of the applicable law before the Venezuelan and Mexican 
Commissions is not necessary. The applicable law is usually dependent on the provisions 
of the treaty governing each commission or arbitral tribunal. The Commissions operated 
in a field of frequent and complex interaction between treaties and general international 
law and between international law and national law. In Fehr’s words relating to the US-
Mexico Commission, certain decisions showed there were ‘questions of domestic law 
with which an international tribunal must deal before it can ultimately determine 
responsibility on the part of a nation under international law’.111 Importantly for present 
purposes, the Commissions often recognized that national law had a significant and 
sometimes even indispensable function112 to fulfil before these Commissions.113   
II SHAREHOLDER STANDING, CAUSES OF ACTION, AND DAMAGES BEFORE CLAIMS 
COMMISSIONS 
Claims commissions frequently discussed matters relevant to this thesis, including 
shareholder standing to claim for harm suffered by the company and the coexistence of 
related national and international claims. To a certain extent, the discussions were 
determined by the applicable treaty frameworks, which differ in several respects from 
IIAs. However, some of the ideas discussed by claims commissions have influenced 
modern international investment law, such as the idea of the ‘fundamental basis of the 
                                                             
109 Cook, 215. In Cook II, Nielsen stated: ‘Any rights Cook has under the contract are therefore determined 
by Mexican law. If he had no rights, it is of course unnecessary to proceed to the question whether in the 
light of any principle or rule of international law such rights were infringed.’ Cook II, 508. Other arbitral 
tribunals of the first decades of the 20th century also recognized the pertinence of national law, as an 
‘incidental’ matter, for determining the existence of property rights. See Affaire des forêts du Rhodope 
central (Fond), 1419. See also Fehr (1928) 313. 
110 Cook, 215. 
111 Fehr (1928) 315. 
112 In Orinoco Steamship Company, the US-Venezuela Commission’s Umpire stated that the provision that 
all claims would be decided ‘upon a basis of absolute equity, without regard to objections of a technical 
nature, or of the provisions of local legislation’ meant that ‘the provisions of local legislation should not be 
taken into regard when there were objections against the rules of absolute equity’. Orinoco Steamship 
Company, 200. But as to issues such as nationality, national law had to be considered since otherwise ‘the 
fulfilling of the task of this Commission [was] an impossibility’. Ibid.  
113 Prior commissions often appeared less open to considering national law. See Pacific Mail Steamship 
Company, 118 (‘purely municipal question[s]’ had to be decided by national tribunals). 
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claim’. Yet other concepts common among contemporary investment tribunals, such as 
the ‘independence’ of treaty claims, did not emerge in the decisions of claims 
commissions. The commissions did not regard international law claims as ‘independent’ 
from local claims by the affected company or from third party interests potentially 
involved. This approach is preferable to investment tribunals’ views on the supposed 
independence of IIA claims, which often fail to acknowledge both that shareholder 
indirect claims involve damages suffered by the company and the consequences related 
to claim duplication.  
A Shareholder claims 
1 Early arbitral decisions 
A good number of arbitral decisions involved the issue of shareholder standing in respect 
of measures against the company in which they hold shares. Several of the early decisions 
were rendered at the beginning of the 20th century. In the LaRocque case before the 
Brazilian-Bolivian Arbitral Tribunal, a surviving partner tried to pursue the firm’s 
claim.114 The tribunal rejected the claim because the claimant had not explained ‘why he 
in his own behalf sued for an indemnity which, if it were due, would accrue to the firm’.115 
More influential were the decisions in Delagoa Bay116 and El Triunfo,117 although 
Delagoa Bay accepted shareholder standing based on the arbitration agreement and El 
Triunfo simply relied on Delagoa Bay. Yet in resolving the substance of the claims, 
Delagoa Bay considered third party interests and El Triunfo the lack of an effective 
remedy available to the company.  
Delagoa Bay concerned the termination of a railway concession and the seizure 
of the railway company by Portugal.118 Under the arbitral agreement concluded among 
Portugal, the US, and Great Britain, the arbitral tribunal was to fix the damages owed by 
the Portuguese government in respect of nationals of the other two countries.119 The 
                                                             
114 Ralston (1926) 140. 
115 Ibid, 141 (footnote omitted). 
116 Clay stated that Delagoa Bay ‘appear[ed] to be the first clear case involving shareholder interests of an 
American national where the Government officially intervened’. Clay (1956) 6. 
117 For an investment tribunal decision citing El Triunfo on shareholder standing see Pan American [215]. 
118 Delagoa Bay, 397-398. 
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concessionaire was a Portuguese company,120 as required by the concession contract, but 
almost all of its shares were held by a British company.121 The tribunal found that the 
termination of the concession and the seizure of the concessionaire company by Portugal 
had not been in conformity with the concession contract.122 
It is doubtful that the decision in Delagoa Bay lends support to the proposition 
that shareholders have standing before international tribunals to complain of measures 
taken vis-à-vis the company.123 In fact, the tribunal observed that, in strict accordance 
with the law, only the concessionaire had the right to claim from the Portuguese 
government.124 The tribunal noted, however, Portugal’s declaration that it would not raise 
any objection based on the fact that the person who really had standing was not a party to 
the proceedings and, moreover, the parties’ agreement to substitute the British company 
for the Portuguese concessionaire.125 As the shareholder standing question had been 
settled by the arbitral agreement, this deprives the decision of precedential value in that 
regard.126 Importantly for present purposes, however, the tribunal stated that 
compensation would be granted to the British company only on the condition that it would 
use the sum to pay its creditors.127   
 The case of El Triunfo concerned a concession granted by El Salvador for the right 
of steam navigation of the port of El Triunfo, which was ‘subsequently duly acquired 
under the laws of Salvador’ by the El Triunfo Company.128 The latter was a Salvadorian 
company,129 but its main shareholders were US nationals.130 The dispute between the US 
                                                             
120 This meant that the applicable law was Portuguese law. Ibid, 399. However, this was only of theoretical 
significance since ‘Portuguese law [did] not contain on the decisive and pertinent points any provision that 
would depart from the general principles of civil law of modern nations’. Ibid. Author’s translation (original 
French). 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid, 402. 
123 See Affaire des réparations allemandes, 509. See also Hyde (1945) 905; Jones (1949) 243. 
124 Delagoa Bay, 409. 
125 Ibid. The tribunal then added that the Delagoa Bay Company had in fact assumed the task incumbent 
upon the Portuguese concessionaire and become the owner of almost all the latter’s shares. Ibid. See 
Jiménez de Aréchaga (1965) 84. 
126 Diez de Velasco (1974) 133. 
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and El Salvador related to the loss sustained by these shareholders by reason of a series 
of actions resulting in the concession being destroyed.131 These actions included a 
‘fraudulent conspiracy’ within the company that ended with its bankruptcy.132 Precisely 
when the ‘American investors’ were going to take action to undo the acts of the 
conspirators, El Salvador closed the port of El Triunfo to all imports.133 Thus, the efforts 
of the US shareholders to undo the conspiracy’s effects on the company were thwarted.134 
With respect to standing, the tribunal simply observed: 
We have not discussed the question of the right of the United States under international law to make 
reclamation for these shareholders in El Triunfo Company, a domestic corporation of Salvador, for the 
reason that the question of such right is fully settled by the conclusions reached in the frequently cited and 
well-understood Delagoa Bay Railway Arbitration.135 
However, the statement that diplomatic protection of shareholders for measures taken 
against the local company was ‘fully settled’ in the Delagoa Bay case is questionable.136 
Of relevance here is the tribunal’s response to El Salvador’s objection that the US 
citizens should have first resorted to the Salvadorian courts and that only if they were 
denied justice was diplomatic protection warranted.137 The tribunal accepted this ‘general 
proposition of international law’, but rejected the objection because a complaint to the 
Salvadorian courts would have been futile.138 The tribunal had previously found there had 
been a conspiracy against the concession ‘to appropriate it and the entire investment of 
the American shareholders for the benefit of the conspirators’.139 The tribunal 
acknowledged that, in principle, it was the corporation itself that had to look for an 
                                                             
131 Ibid, 476; Douglas (2009) 425. 
132 El Triunfo, 475-476. 
133 Ibid, 476. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid, 479.  
136 See Hyde (1945) 906; Bagge (1958) 173. 
137 El Triunfo, 476. In Alsop, Chile also argued that since the directly affected company was Chilean, the 
grievances should have been referred to Chilean courts. Alsop, 359. This was rejected as inconsistent with 
the ‘terms of the reference’ to the amiable compositeur and as an ineffective remedy. Ibid, 360. See Bagge 
(1958) 174; Jiménez de Aréchaga (1965) 89. Further, while the US was exercising diplomatic protection in 
relation to the Chilean firm’s partners–the firm being in liquidation at the time of the decision–the 
compensation was awarded to ‘the representatives of the firm of Alsop and Company’. Alsop, 359, 375. 
138 El Triunfo, 476-477. 
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appropriate remedy.140 It dismissed this course of action, however, because when the 
corporation could have sued in the Salvadorian courts, El Salvador had aided the 
conspirators and ‘destroyed the only thing of value worth retrieving through the courts’.141 
Thus, the tribunal found that ‘the proper remedy’ was for the corporation to seek redress, 
but that it was not applicable in the circumstances of the case.142 
2 The Venezuelan Commissions 
The Venezuelan Commissions considered the issue of claims by shareholders or members 
of other collective bodies, even though their constitutive treaties contained no specific 
provisions on such claims. In Kunhardt, the US-Venezuela Commission dealt with two 
claims by Kunhardt & Co., a US copartnership.143 One of the claims arose from 
Venezuela’s annulment of a concession owned by a Venezuelan company, in which 
Kunhardt & Co. owned three-fourths of the shares.144 While both the US and Venezuelan 
Commissioners found this claim could not be allowed,145 the latter took a stricter view. 
He noted that shareholders do not co-own the company’s property and are only entitled 
to the profits or to proportional parts of such property in case of adjudication by the 
company or the latter’s dissolution or liquidation.146 Kunhardt & Co. had thus no standing 
before the Commission to claim damages for breach of a contract between Venezuela and 
the Venezuelan company.147  
 The opinion by the US Commissioner is more relevant here. Writing for the 
Commission, he also stated that as a matter of principle ‘the property of a corporation in 
esse belongs not to the stockholders individually or collectivity, but to the corporation 
                                                             
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid. For Jiménez de Aréchaga, El Triunfo was not germane to the question of ‘protection of shareholders 
for acts affecting the company’ because the act giving rise to El Salvador’s responsibility ‘was an act 
directly aimed at the shareholders as such’. Jiménez de Aréchaga (1965) 86.   
142 See Müller (2015) 173. Referring to Delagoa Bay and El Triunfo, Borchard observed that ‘that the 
foreign corporations in both cases were practically defunct, and the equitable interest of the stockholders 
could with some justice be supported, as it was, by their government’. Borchard (1915) 626. 
143 Kunhardt & Co., 172. 
144 Ibid, 173. 
145 As to the other claim–relating to damage caused by Venezuelan troops to an estate owned by Kunhardt 
& Co. –both Commissioners agreed that it should be allowed. Ibid, 176-178, 180.    
146 Ibid, 179. While the Venezuelan Commissioner relied in part on Venezuelan law for these findings, this 
law was also important in the American Commissioner’s reasoning. See ibid, 174.  
147 Ibid, 180. He added that the decisions in Delagoa Bay and El Triunfo ‘[had] been carefully examined, 
and [did] not present any likeness to the present claim’. Ibid.  
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itself’.148 He nonetheless held that Kunhardt & Co. had standing to claim ‘for such losses 
as they may prove they [had] sustained by reason of the wrongful annulment of the 
concession’.149 For him, ‘the real interest of Kunhardt & Co. [was] an equitable right to 
their proportionate share of the corporate property after the creditors of the corporation 
[had] been paid’.150 Since no evidence had been furnished of the corporate debts, ‘an 
essential element of proof to determine the actual measure of the claimant’s loss [was] 
entirely wanting’ and thus the claim had to be disallowed.151 
 The fact that creditors had priority in case of liquidation did not mean, however, 
that they had a direct right over a bankrupt party’s assets. In Bance, also before the US-
Venezuela Commission, the receiver in bankruptcy of a Venezuelan individual had 
brought a claim on behalf of two US creditors.152 The creditors were claiming a 
proportionate share of a credit held by this individual against Venezuela.153 The claim 
was rejected on the grounds that bankruptcy ‘deprives the bankrupt party of the 
administration of his property, which then goes to his creditors’, but this only upon 
agreement or final liquidation.154 Pending the bankruptcy proceedings, however, a credit 
of the bankrupt party could not be considered the property of any of its creditors.155 The 
same view but as regards members of an association was adopted by the Germany-
Venezuela Commission in Brewer, Moller and Co. One of the claims referred to a credit 
the association had against Venezuela.156 Under Venezuelan law, only one of the 
associates, who was not among the claimants, was the owner of the association’s 
property.157 Jurisdiction was thus lacking, since the German associates were not the 
owners nor had any interest over debt owned by the association.158 
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 Regarding claims owned by a firm and its members’ interests over these claims, 
a decision of the Netherlands-Venezuela Commission deserves special mention. 
Claimants in the Baasch and Römer case were respectively the successors and liquidators 
of two firms, both composed of a majority of Dutch subjects.159 One of the claims related 
to the destruction, attributed to Venezuela, of a plant owned by a Venezuelan corporation 
in which the firms held shares.160 The corporation’s bankruptcy had followed and the 
claim referred to all the shareholding.161 This claim was rejected because the injured 
property was owned by the corporation. 162 As a Venezuelan entity, the latter had no 
standing before the Commission.163 Part of the Commission’s reasoning regarding the 
rest of the claims is, however, of more interest here. These claims derived from unsettled 
debts of the Venezuelan government relating to supplies and money furnished by the two 
firms.164 In allowing these claims–which the successors and liquidators of the firms put 
forward–the Umpire stated that  
the two firms being extinct the claims [could] be allowed in proportion to the stated interest of the Dutch 
members thereof… [T]here seem[ed] to be no question about the indebtedness of the National Government, 
and it at most mean[t] a payment in this way instead of some other and [would] be a cancellation of its 
indebtedness pro tanto, which indebtedness it [had to] discharge in some manner. No inequity or injustice 
[was] therefore done, even if a technical mistake ha[d] been made.165 
With respect to creditors’ interests over their debtor’s claims, in Turini a claim before the 
US-Venezuela Commission was ‘allowed to the administratrix and heirs at law of 
Giovanni Turini, deceased’.166 Being US citizens, two creditors who had entered into 
contracts with Turini in relation to the works performed by him for Venezuela appeared 
as intervenors in the case.167 In allowing the claim, the Umpire also found that the two 
                                                             
159 Baasch and Römer, 723-724. 
160 Ibid, 726. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. The Commission added: ‘The shareholders being Dutch does not affect the question. The 
nationality of the corporation is the sole matter to be considered.’ Ibid. 
164 Ibid, 724-726. 
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creditors ‘should be protected to the extent of their proportionate interest in the 
distribution of the award herein made to the estate of Giovanni Turini’.168 
 Despite the absence of guidance from the applicable treaties, the Venezuelan 
Commissions discussed certain basic notions relevant to shareholder claims. The 
principle that shareholders do not have either direct or indirect rights over corporate assets 
was upheld. These assets included property and contractual rights, debts, and generally 
claims against third parties. The rule was that only the company–and not its shareholders 
or creditors–could exercise its rights, at least as long as the company’s legal existence had 
not been terminated. Some decisions, however, appeared to recognize a right of 
shareholders to bring claims for losses they had suffered as a result of measures taken 
against company assets. Yet in this case the Commission generally considered the 
position of the company’s creditors, given their priority over shareholders, before the 
shareholder claim could be allowed. 
The source of these notions in terms of the applicable law was not always clear. 
The Venezuelan Commissions were international jurisdictions formed by the same 
treaties that also created the causes of action. Thus, application of international law was 
inevitable. Still, the Commissions also acknowledged a role for national law in claims 
involving the relationship between shareholder and company rights, even if its application 
was not expressly foreseen in the relevant treaties. National law was relevant in 
determining who the owner of the assets was, what rights (if any) other parties had over 
them, and the scope and qualifications of the rights in question. The Commissions also 
often took into account whether their decisions regarding potentially overlapping claims 
over the same assets could lead to inequity or injustice. As noted above, however, this did 
have a basis in the applicable treaty provisions.  
3 The Mexican Commissions 
Unlike the Venezuelan Commissions, the constitutive instruments of the Mexican 
Commissions did contain special provisions on claims by corporations and by nationals 
of the parties for losses suffered by corporations in which they had an interest.169 As 
regards standing, claims by corporations were uncontroversial. The Commissions 
adopted the criteria of the place of incorporation to determine the corporations’ 
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nationality.170 With respect to claims for losses by persons having an interest in an injured 
corporation or other collective entities, Article I of the Mexico-US General Claims 
Convention specifically provided for the Commission’s jurisdiction over the following 
category of cases: 
[A]ll claims for losses or damages suffered by citizens of either country by reason of losses or damages 
suffered by any corporation, company, association or partnership in which such citizens have or have had 
a substantial and bona fide interest, provided an allotment to the claimant by the corporation, company, 
association or partnership of his proportion of the loss or damage suffered is presented by the claimant to 
the Commission hereinafter referred to…171 
Of relevance here is the condition on which these claims were allowed, i.e., an ‘allotment’ 
to the claimant.172 The precise meaning of the term ‘allotment’ in this context–or, for that 
matter, of the four other terms in other languages used in the different Conventions to 
convey the same idea–is not straightforward.173 Its purpose, however, was clearly to avoid 
double compensation for the same damage.174 The Mexico-Great Britain Commission, 
for example, could ‘find for the provision requiring such allotment no other ground than 
a justifiable desire that Mexico should not, after once having been obligated to pay 
compensation to British subjects, whose interest in a non-British Company, Partnership 
or Association exceeded fifty per cent, be again confronted by an integral claim on the 
part of the Company, Partnership or Association itself’.175  
                                                             
170 See Feller (1935) 115 (also referring to the only case–Rep. Alemana (Mexico Plantagen, G.m.b.H.) v. 
Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Decision No. 27 (unpublished)–where the problem of corporate nationality 
appears to have been discussed by the Mexican Commissions). In the case of a claim by a company, for 
jurisdictional purposes ‘the nationality of the creditors’ and ‘that of the stockholders in case of a solvent 
company’ was regarded as immaterial by the Mexico-US General Claims Commission. See Greenstreet, 
463; Phillips (1933) 234. 
171 RIAA IV, 11. The Convention creating the Mexico-US Special Claims Commission contained similar 
language. See RIAA IV, 779. The Conventions with European countries allowed these claims but using a 
more precise threshold. Instead of requiring a ‘substantial and bona fide interest’, these Conventions 
required ‘an interest exceeding fifty per cent of the total capital’. RIAA V, 8 (Great Britain). See also RIAA 
V, 314 (France), 568 (Germany); Feller (1935) 117.  
172 The Panama-US Claims Convention of 1926, which created a General Claims Commission, also 
provided for an ‘allotment’ to the claimant in identical terms as the Mexico-US Commissions. See RIAA 
VI, 301. 
173 Feller (1935) 118-119. 
174 Ibid, 118. Diez de Velasco criticized this interpretation by Feller and other authors as not considering 
‘one of the most serious problems that may arise once we recognize the admissibility of claims both for 
indirect damages and for indirect damages of a secondary degree: the possibility of overlapping claims’. 
Diez de Velasco (1974) 136. Author’s translation (original French). 
175 Frederick Adams, 217. The Commission added that to ‘safeguard the respondent Government against 
this eventuality, the Convention stipulates that the joint interest be reduced, by means of an allotment, by 
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 But although the ‘allotment’ provision may have been effective in preventing a 
subsequent claim by the company for the same losses, it did not address all the possible 
implications of shareholder claims for damages suffered by the company. These 
implications included the situation of the company’s creditors, who could be unfairly 
prejudiced if the allotment allowed the shareholder to claim for a proportionate share of 
the losses without accounting for the company’s debts. In fact, provided the allotment 
covered the damages suffered, the Commission had jurisdiction, yet 
the question of the amount of damages still remain[ed] when the case [came] up for decision on the merits. 
If the corporation [was] insolvent, then an award to the shareholder of a proportionate share of the damage 
caused to the corporation [would] unquestionably operate in defraud of creditors.176  
Feller further called for the Commissions to exercise caution vis-à-vis shareholder claims 
whenever there was a ‘prima facie showing’ that the corporation could be insolvent.177 In 
those cases, the Commission should require the production of a balance sheet.178 If the 
company was insolvent, the Commission had to grant a ‘small award’ commensurate with 
what it believed was the real value of the shareholder’s interest.179  
Thus, even in light of a provision expressly granting jurisdiction over shareholder 
claims for losses or damages ‘by reason of losses or damages suffered’ by the corporation, 
double payment by the respondent state of the same damage had to be avoided. The 
provision requiring the presentation of an ‘allotment’ by the affected entity to the 
claimant, which pertained to the admissibility of the claim,180 addressed this problem. The 
commission hearing the shareholder claim could also consider the situation of the 
company’s creditors, although it was not always clear whether this consideration 
concerned the admissibility or the merits of the claim.181  
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4 Decisions of the commissions and tribunals after World Wars I and II 
In parallel and subsequent to the Mexican Commissions, claims commissions and 
tribunals constituted following the First and Second World Wars adopted decisions 
germane to the issue of shareholder claims. One should be cautious, however, in drawing 
general conclusions from these decisions as regards international tribunals’ jurisdiction. 
Aside from allowing for the specific provisions of the relevant treaties, the latter were 
adopted with special circumstances and goals in mind.182 With these caveats in mind, the 
decisions generally did not accept shareholder claims for losses suffered by the company 
absent a treaty provision authorizing this type of claims. In The Deutsche Amerikanische 
Petroleum Gesellschaft case of 1926, the tribunal observed that ‘the highest courts of 
most countries continue[d] to hold that neither the shareholders nor their creditors have 
any right to the corporate assets, other than to receive, during the existence of the 
company, a share of the profits, the distribution of which has been decided by a majority 
of the shareholders, and, after its winding up, a proportional share of the assets’.183 Nor 
did the shareholders have a property right over the profits generated by the company’s 
operation, except and to the extent they were distributed.184 
 In terms of the admissibility of shareholder claims the Standard Oil case, also 
decided in 1926–by a Germany-US Claims Commission–is relevant. The claim referred 
to the sinking by Germany during the First World War of seven ships, owned by British 
corporations.185 Claimants were US nationals and shareholders in the corporations and 
claimed they had been ‘indirectly damaged’.186 The Commission found that the Germany-
US Peace Treaty entitled these shareholders to be compensated for such indirect damages 
and gave them ‘the right, through espousal by their Government, to assert their claims 
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against Germany before this Commission’.187 But the Commission also stated that the 
claimants had the burden ‘to prove that the British corporations [had] suffered damages 
through the act of Germany and the amount thereof and the extent to which such damages 
ha[d] fallen, on the claimants as stockholders of such corporations, and that as such 
stockholders they ha[d] not already been indirectly compensated therefor through 
payment to the corporations’.188 And since Great Britain had already paid the British 
corporations the value of the vessels,189 the US shareholders of the British corporations 
owning these ships had failed to establish that Germany had caused them any loss or 
damage.190   
B Contract claims and treaty claims 
1 The distinction before Woodruff 
The historical origin of the contract claims/treaty claims distinction in modern investment 
arbitration is found in the Woodruff case decided by the 1903 US-Venezuela 
Commission.191 Before Woodruff, however, certain decisions already referred to some 
kind of distinction between contractual obligations and obligations under international 
law.192 In Dennison, for example, the Mexico-US 1868 Mixed Commission’s Umpire 
found that no authority had been granted to conclude the contract in question on behalf 
of the Mexican Government.193 Notwithstanding this, the Umpire added that the other 
party to the contract, a US national, had entered into the contract voluntarily and ‘it was 
not therefore one the fulfillment of which by the Mexican Government that of the United 
States was called on to enforce’.194 
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 A state’s ‘responsibility for wrongs and injuries or torts’ vis-à-vis foreigners was 
generally seen as a proper object of international reclamation.195 But international 
adjudicative bodies have long treated claims for breach of contract as a special 
category.196 As regards contract claims, as the 1885 US-Venezuela Claims Commission 
noted in Garrison, both Great Britain and the US had followed a practice of generally 
refusing to intervene before a foreign state that had a contract with one of their 
nationals.197 However, the Commission, relying on Hall, observed it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to assign a good reason why, on principles of abstract right and justice, an injury 
to a citizen arising out of a refusal of a foreign power to keep its contractual engagements, did not impose 
an obligation upon the government of his allegiance to seek redress from the offending country, quite as 
binding as its recognized duty to interfere in cases involving wrongs to person and property.198  
The Commission decided it was bound to pass on a claim for damages based on ‘a breach 
of private contract between a citizen of one state and the government of another’.199 It 
affirmed its jurisdiction over contract claims based not on any issue of principle but on 
the provisions of its constitutive treaty.200  
The exercise of international jurisdiction over claims for breach of contract had 
been common since the first decades of the 19th century, whenever the applicable treaties 
were interpreted as conferring jurisdiction over such claims.201 Still, the special character 
of contract claims was generally upheld. However, the distinction between contract 
claims and claims for ‘wrongs to person and property’, as drawn in Garrison, suggests 
that the special treatment accorded to contract claims did not emanate from the (national) 
law applicable to them. Aside from the policy and other reasons behind state practice 
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sustaining the distinction,202 Borchard discussed several reasons why states were ‘less 
zealous’ in pursuing contract claims than other claims related to harm suffered by one of 
its nationals in a foreign country.203 These reasons included that ‘by going abroad, [the 
foreign investor] submits impliedly to the local law and the local judicial system. The 
contract or the law provides remedies for breach of contract’.204   
2 Woodruff and other relevant decisions of the Venezuelan Commissions 
Woodruff concerned a claim for the payment of bonds issued through, and secured by 
assets of, a company whose rights and duties were eventually transferred to Venezuela.205 
Venezuela had granted the company rights over movable and immovable property 
through a contract that also provided for the construction of a railroad.206 For the Umpire, 
Venezuela’s liability for the bonds hinged on the company’s original contractual rights 
and duties.207 The contract contained a clause submitting disputes under the agreement to 
‘the common laws and ordinary tribunals of Venezuela’; the disputes could under no 
circumstance be ‘the subject of international reclamation’.208 The interpretation of this 
provision determined the outcome of the case. 
 The decision noted that ‘a contract between a sovereign and a citizen of a foreign 
country can never impede the right of the Government of that citizen to make international 
reclamation, wherever according to international law it has the right or even the duty to 
do so, as its rights and obligations can not be affected by any precedent agreement to 
which it is not a party’.209 This, however, did not ‘interfere with the right of a citizen to 
pledge to any other party that he, the contractor, in disputes upon certain matters [would] 
never appeal to other judges than to those designated by the agreement’.210 But his 
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government’s rights under international law could not be affected.211 In light of the forum 
selection provision in the contract and the claimant’s lack of appeal to Venezuelan courts, 
the Umpire found that ‘by the very agreement that is the fundamental basis of the claim, 
it was withdrawn from the jurisdiction of this Commission’.212 
 Two points are relevant here. First, the decision seems to recognize the 
Commission’s a priori jurisdiction over the claim, since it was ‘a claim against the 
Venezuelan Government, owned by an American citizen, being a claim that [was] entitled 
to be brought before this Commission’.213 The choice of forum provision, however, 
provided a reason for jurisdiction not to be exercised over this particular claim, even if 
the claim was being put forward by the state, who was not a party to the contract. But the 
decision that ‘the claimant by his own voluntary waiver ha[d] disabled himself from 
invoking the jurisdiction of this Commission’ was ‘without prejudice on its merits, when 
presented to the proper judges’.214 Second, in Woodruff there was a need to distinguish 
between the rights of the private party to the contract, on the one hand, and those of the 
two states concerned,215 on the other. Yet, nowadays, investment tribunals use the 
‘fundamental basis of the claim’ concept to distinguish between different types of claims 
that may be brought by the same party or both by it and a related entity.  
 The concept of ‘fundamental basis’ or ‘fundamental ground’ of the claim also 
featured in Selwyn.216 Here, the Great Britain-Venezuela Commission disregarded not 
only local proceedings referring to the same contract, but also a contractual forum 
selection provision since the claim before it was ‘fundamentally different’ from a contract 
claim.217 The Commission noted that ‘[t]he fundamental ground of this claim as presented 
[was] that the claimant [had been] deprived of valuable rights, of moneys, properties, 
property, and rights of property by an act of the Government’.218 Because of this finding, 
the Commission found it unnecessary to decide whether its jurisdiction under the relevant 
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treaty included contractual matters.219 Yet the idea of ‘fundamental feature of the claim’ 
was applied exclusively to decide jurisdiction, without ‘pass[ing] at all upon the merits 
of the claimant’s case’. The truth about the facts ‘remain[ed] to be determined upon the 
full proofs, which [were] in no sense prejudiced or predetermined by this opinion’.220  
 The Venezuelan Commissions generally affirmed their jurisdiction over contract 
claims. In Miliani, the Italy-Venezuela Commission observed that ‘commissions have 
and exercise jurisdiction over contract claims, while the diplomatic branch of 
government, although usually reserving the right, rarely presses matters of this nature’.221 
In La Guaira, the US-Venezuela Commission stated that ‘when the Government itself 
has violated a contract to which it is a party’, the Commission’s jurisdiction under its 
constitutive treaty was clear.222 When the contract had been concluded with a state 
instrumentality, however, the Commission’s jurisdiction turned on whether the 
instrumentality had acted in its ‘governmental, legislative, or public’ character, or in its 
‘proprietary or private’ one.223 In the former case, the same principle as when the 
‘Government itself’ is a party applied; the latter case, however, was subject to the same 
rule as when a foreigner concluded a contract with a private party in the latter’s country: 
he was ‘ordinarily remitted’ to the available local remedies.224  
This distinction relying on the character of the state’s conduct225 has similarities 
to the one employed by some investment tribunals to distinguish between contract and 
treaty claims.226 However, no clear criteria to distinguish between contract claims and 
claims involving a contract but having a non-contractual nature emerged from the 
Venezuelan Commissions’ decisions. In La Guaira, the distinction depended on the 
character in which the contract had been entered into by the municipality.227 If concluded 
in a private capacity, ‘the municipality [was] to be regarded as neither more nor less than 
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a private corporation and as such could sue or be sued in respect thereof’.228 Other 
authorities focused on the character in which the contract was allegedly breached. 
International law protection would be available only if the government exceeded the role 
of private contractor and took action not available to the private party, ‘to escape its 
obligations under the contract, [thus] upset[ting] the contractual basis’.229 Yet, on the one 
hand, because no single criterion was adopted regarding the relevance of whether the state 
acted in a sovereign capacity, this factor does not necessarily provide clear answers, even 
as a matter of principle. On the other hand, the reference to the attempt to escape from 
the contractual framework suggests that ultimately what matters is whether the state 
measures are within the scope of the obligations in question (be they contractual or 
international law obligations).     
3 Contract claims before the Mexican Commissions 
The issue of international jurisdiction over contract claims came squarely before the 
Mexican Commissions. In Davies, the Mexico-US General Claims Commission 
overruled a Mexican motion to dismiss, which was based on the contractual nature of the 
claims.230 The Commission noted that ‘[a]lthough the allegation of nonperformance of 
contractual obligations is apparent on the face of the record, it does not necessarily follow 
as a legal conclusion that the claim does not fall within the General Claims 
Convention’.231 It was in Illinois Central Railroad Company, however, that the issue was 
considered in some detail (Mexico having filed the same motion).232 The claim was for 
sums due to the company in relation to locomotive engines sold to the Mexican 
Government Railway Administration.233 
For the Commission, the issue hinged on the interpretation of the Mexico-US 
General Claims Convention, which defined the scope of its jurisdiction.234 No general 
principle on jurisdiction over contract claims could be discerned from international 
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decisions.235 There was no rule ‘according to which mere nonperformance of contractual 
obligations by a government in its civil capacity withholds jurisdiction, whereas it grants 
jurisdiction when the nonperformance is accompanied by some feature of the public 
capacity of the Government as an authority’.236 The Commission further saw no reason 
not to submit contract claims to an international tribunal’s jurisdiction.237 The 
Convention’s terms included contract claims,238 despite the provision that claims be 
decided, inter alia, according to ‘principles of international law’.239 International law 
could be applied for the resolution of contract claims,240 although they did not entail state 
responsibility under international law.241   
As the Venezuelan Commissions, the Mexican Commissions did not develop a 
conceptual framework to distinguish contract claims from other related claims. There 
were, of course, situations in which–notwithstanding the existence of a contract–the claim 
could not be described as contractual. In Douglas, the claim before the Great-Britain-
Mexico Commission referred to a requisition by the Constitutionalist Army of, inter alia, 
passenger and freight cars.242 The claimant alleged to be the owner of a system of 
tramways, which he had purchased from the party to which a local government had 
granted the concession.243 Here, the fact that the Mexican government was not a party to 
the contract did not foreclose the claim since it was ‘for losses outside any contractual 
relation’.244  
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The position was less clear, however, when the claim was for breach of contract. 
The issue was addressed by the US Commissioner, Nielsen, in several individual 
opinions. In American Bottle Company, where the claim derived from a balance due for 
delivered bottles, Nielsen stated: 
In giving application to the principles of international law governing a claim growing out of contractual 
obligations an international tribunal is not concerned with a suit on a contract. There is no law of contracts 
in international law. In rendering an award in a case of this kind I think we must proceed on the theory that 
there has been a violation of property rights in the nature of a confiscation…245 
In Cook II he observed that an international tribunal could properly regard a mere failure 
by the government to pay moneys owed under a contract as a confiscation in breach of 
international law.246 In International Fisheries Company, he added that international law 
did not concern itself with contractual provisions.247 International law was concerned with 
government actions in respect of contractual rights,248 which could entail a 
confiscation.249 
 Nielsen’s influence over the views of the Mexican Commissions on issues such 
as the minimum standard is notable.250 Yet, on contract claims, although he stated that 
‘an international tribunal is not concerned with a suit on a contract’, his view was that any 
breach of contract by a government vis-à-vis a private party amounts to a confiscation 
under international law. He did not propose a criterion to distinguish between contract 
claims and claims under international law.251 It is not clear, moreover, whether for Nielsen 
there were certain types of contract breaches that could not–through lack of seriousness, 
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the character in which the government acted, or any other reason–be considered as a 
confiscation under international law.252  
By contrast, for the Mexico-US General Claims Commission the principle was 
that there was no international responsibility when the relations between the defendant 
state and the foreigner were ‘of a contractual nature’.253 Exceptions to the principle were 
often suggested in cases of denial of justice or of ‘confiscatory’ breaches of contract, 
where the state had allegedly acted outside its role as a contracting party.254 These 
exceptions reflected diplomatic practice preceding the Mexican Commissions.255 
Confiscatory or discriminatory breaches of contract or otherwise involving a denial of 
justice justified an international claim.256 On the one hand, this view accorded some 
distinctive substance to the relevant international law obligations, while, in the final 
analysis, Nielsen’s view conflated contract breaches with violations of international law. 
On the other hand, it was recognized that even in cases involving ‘confiscatory’ breaches 
of contract or the like, the substance of the claim would still be related to the contract.257 
4 Choice of Forum Clauses 
The Venezuelan and Mexican Commissions on several occasions considered the import 
of forum selection clauses, including prominently different versions of the so-called 
Calvo Clause. The focus here is on the Commissions’ views on the effect of forum 
selection clauses on their jurisdiction and the outcome of the case, rather than the 
controversy surrounding the validity of such clause under international law. The 
Venezuelan Commissions were more deferential vis-à-vis these clauses than current 
investment tribunals.258 In Woodruff, the US-Venezuela Commission refused to exercise 
jurisdiction in application of a choice of forum clause.259 In Orinoco Steamship Company, 
the Commission’s Umpire concluded that the relevant forum selection clause 
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disable[d] the contracting parties to base a claim on this contract before any other tribunal than that which 
they have freely and deliberately chosen, and to parties in such a contract must be applied the words of the 
Hon. Mr. Finley. United States Commissioner in the Claims Commission of 1889: “So they have made 
their bed and so they must lie in it.”260 
Finley’s opinion had been expressed in the Flannagan case. Speaking for the majority of 
the Commission, he had also observed that the insertion by Venezuela of a choice of 
forum clause showed ‘how solicitous she was to withdraw the concession and the 
questions which might arise under it from every possible cognizance and jurisdiction 
except her own. This she certainly had a right to do’.261 
In Rudloff, one of Venezuela’s jurisdictional objections was based on a provision 
in the contract submitting all disputes arising thereunder to the tribunals and laws of 
Venezuela.262 The US Commissioner opined that this provision applied to ‘questions 
affecting the interpretation of the contract, to questions whether it was being or had been 
complied with, and the like’.263 It did not, however, prevent the private party’s state from 
intervening if the state party to the contract had, on policy grounds, abrogated the contract 
and destroyed the private party’s property rights.264 The Umpire, while concurring in 
affirming jurisdiction, adopted a different approach. He observed that since it was a claim 
by US nationals, which had not been settled and had been duly presented, there was 
jurisdiction under the relevant treaty.265 But non-compliance with the forum selection 
provision–which by itself did not negate the Commission’s jurisdiction–was still relevant. 
The Commission was supposed to consider whether, after a detailed examination of the 
claim, the choice of forum provision did not ‘forb[id] the Commission in absolute equity 
to give claimants the benefit of this jurisdiction as to the decision’.266 
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 Regarding the Mexican Commissions, the leading case on the Calvo Clause is 
North American Dredging Company. Here, the US-Mexican Commission unanimously 
upheld the ‘lawfulness of the Calvo Clause’ provided it did not affect the right by the 
private contracting party’s state to intervene in case of breaches of international law.267 
The clause could be applied only to a claim related to the interpretation or fulfillment of 
the contract and did not prevent an incidental interpretation of the contract in a claim 
under international law.268 The Commission intimated that the decision whether to assert 
jurisdiction in light of a Calvo Clause would be taken after consideration of the merits of 
the claims.269 International Fisheries Company confirmed the holding in North American 
Dredging Company.270 The Presiding Commissioner even suggested that a shareholder 
of the private party to the contract was bound by a Calvo Clause included in the 
contract.271 
 The Great Britain-Venezuela Commission also endorsed North American 
Dredging Company in several decisions, including Mexican Union Railway,272 The 
Interoceanic Railway,273 El Oro Mining,274 and The Veracruz Railways.275 The reason 
why Calvo Clauses could not apply to claims under international law was that these 
claims involved a ‘principle higher’ than mere ‘private interests’ and that for the private 
party’s state the contract was res inter alios acta.276 The British Commissioner’s 
dissenting opinion in Mexican Union Railway is noteworthy. While in agreement with 
the principles expounded in North American Dredging Company,277 he found that the 
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claim at hand was based on breaches of international law.278 Therefore, the British 
Government had standing to bring it and the Commission jurisdiction to determine it.279 
He added, however, an important condition: ‘provided the losses claimed do not arise 
solely from the fulfilment or interpretation of the contract or the execution of the work 
thereunder’.280 
 On balance, the Venezuelan and Mexican Commissions generally sought to 
respect the contractual parties’ choice of forum. On the one hand, the state party had the 
right to insist on having disputes under the contract submitted to local courts. On the other 
hand, the private party having accepted this condition, it was not supposed to walk away 
from it when a dispute erupted. The contract had to be applied in the terms concluded by 
the parties, including as regards the jurisdictional arrangements. Choice of forum clauses, 
however, did not prevent international claims related to the contract by the private party’s 
state, in case of breach of international law. Nor was the international Commissions’ 
jurisdiction affected, provided nationality and other requirements were present. But even 
in this case, forum selection provisions were not completely left out of the analysis when 
considering the international claim’s merits. Before the Commission, the claimant state 
was typically not a party to the contract and thus had itself not consented to the contractual 
forum choice. Yet to some extent, in the Commissions’ views, exercising jurisdiction over 
a case related to the contract entailed a deviation from the contractual parties’ agreement. 
This had to be taken into account in looking at the claim’s equities. Finally, the issue of 
the damages claimed was a relevant consideration in determining the effect of contractual 
provisions on the international claim. In particular, whether the claim involved nothing 
but damages arising from the non-application of the contract.      
C Damages corollaries 
Since the first decisions of modern international arbitration it has been recognized that 
‘[i]n every inquiry in respect to such a subject as value, an uncertainty necessarily exists 
as to the correctness of any particular determination’.281 Further, it was the case at the 
time of the Venezuelan and Mexican Commissions (and it largely remains the case today) 
                                                             
278 Ibid, 128. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Ibid. 
281 Moore I, 261 (Hudson’s Bay Company Claims, US Commissioner’s Opinion). 
96 
  
that international law grants considerable liberty to arbitrators in assessing damages.282 
Yet despite the fact-specific character of damages determinations and the wide discretion 
accorded to arbitrators, two concepts will be discussed as relevant for present purposes. 
First, the relationship between the losses suffered by the private person and the 
international claim put forward by its state. Second, antecedents of the principle against 
double recovery. 
1 Private losses and international claims  
As we have seen above, the Venezuelan and Mexican Commissions often distinguished 
between contract claims and claims under international law. Nevertheless, they did not 
develop clear distinguishing criteria or consistently explain the distinction’s 
consequences. The need to distinguish often responded to the presence of a Calvo Clause: 
contract claims, where damages could only be granted by the forum selected in the 
contract, had to be differentiated from an international law claim by the relevant state to 
be disposed of by the international commission. But even in this context neither the 
Venezuelan nor the Mexican Commissions suggested that the losses in a contract claim 
differed necessarily from those that could be the object of a claim under international law. 
In claims for breach of contract, ‘the plaintiff’s loss [was] measured by the benefit to him 
of having the contract performed’.283 No obvious differences could be discerned as 
regards international claims involving contract breaches. Not least because the function 
of damages assessment for a violation of international law was, in all cases, regarded as 
merely compensatory of the loss or injury sustained.284  
Admittedly, both Commissions’ reasoning on damages was sparse at best.285 Yet, 
for example, the Italy-Venezuela Commission seemed to recognize a direct relationship 
between the underlying private damages claims and the national state’s rights before the 
international commission with respect to these claims.286 In Fabiani, the Umpire of the 
French-Venezuela Commission cited older authorities for the proposition that ‘[a] 
                                                             
282 Borchard (1915) 413; Rusoro [642]. 
283 De Garmendía, 124. 
284 Dunn (1932) 172. 
285 Feller observed that ‘[n]o part of the law of international claims is more fragmentary or confused than 
that relating to the measure of damages’. Feller (1935) 290. He added that ‘the decisions [gave] only the 
barest hints of the reasons why damages were fixed at the particular figure. Indeed, in most cases, even this 
hint [was] lacking.’ Ibid, 292. See also Eagleton (1929-1930) 52. 
286 See Miliani, 591.  
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settlement by the Governments of the ground of international controversy between them, 
ipso facto, settles any claims of individuals arising under such controversies against the 
Government of the other country, unless they are especially excepted’.287 
That the losses invoked by the states before the Commissions were those suffered 
by the named claimants and not other losses–that is, there was only one damage, 
regardless of who the party in the international proceedings was–can be seen from the 
provisions of the relevant treaties.288 The Venezuelan Protocols spoke of ‘claims owned 
by citizens of [the ten States contracting with Venezuela]’,289 while the parties to the 
Mexican Conventions made reference to ‘claims of their respective citizens… for their 
losses or damages’.290 Article IX of the Mexico-US General Claims Commission is 
germane here as well, although it was never actually applied. This provision provided for 
the Commission’s power to order restitution, in which case the respondent state could still 
elect to pay the value of the property or right rather than ‘restore the property or right to 
the claimant’.291 
It was recognized that the losses invoked in an international law claim could be 
the same as those arising from a contract breach.292 In Cook I, Nielsen distinguished 
between claims under national law and claims concerning ‘whether or not there is proof 
of conduct which is wrongful under international law and which therefore entails 
responsibility upon a respondent government’.293 But even though the claim in question–
which referred to the failure by the Mexican authorities to pay some money orders–was 
seen as an international law claim, recovery would be based simply on the loss caused by 
                                                             
287 Fabiani, 132. 
288 Cf the position under the general international law of diplomatic protection: ‘Rights or interests of an 
individual the violation of which rights causes damage are always in a different plane to rights belonging 
to a State, which rights may also be infringed by the same act. The damage suffered by an individual is 
never therefore identical in kind with that which will be suffered by a State; it can only afford a convenient 
scale for the calculation of the reparation due to the State.’ Chorzów Factory (Merits), 28. On the position 
before the Mexican Commissions see Feller (1935) 150 (‘the measure of reparation is determined by the 
injury to the individual’). 
289 See e.g. RIAA IX, 115 (US-Venezuela Protocol). 
290 See e.g. RIAA IV, 13 (US-Mexico General Claims Convention). See also Feller (1935) 308. 
291 RIAA IV, 14. 
292 Although the international claim could also include other concepts, such as the ‘loss of prestige and 
moral injury’ to the claimant state. Dickson, 669. 
293 Cook I, 215-216. 
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the non-payment.294 The Presiding Commissioner, who apparently concurred that the 
claim was a proper international reclamation, also agreed on Nielsen’s proposed damages 
award.295 
The distinction between contract claims and international law claims, even if in a 
rudimentary stage, had a clear jurisdictional function. It allowed international 
commissions to exercise jurisdiction, notwithstanding the presence of forum selection 
clauses submitting disputes under the relevant contracts to national courts. Still, there was 
no suggestion that the losses involved in the international claims were different in kind 
from those that could be claimed through contractual causes of action in national courts. 
Further, the losses invoked in the claims before the Commissions were those suffered by 
the private party, even though its state was the claimant. If the damages in international 
claims relating to a contract could be the same as those that could be claimed before the 
contractual forum, albeit by a different party under a different cause of action, this raised 
the prospect of double recovery. 
2 Double recovery 
In the well-known Alabama claims arbitration–decided three decades before the 
Venezuelan Commissions were set up–the tribunal noted that ‘in order to arrive at an 
equitable compensation for the damages which have been sustained, it is necessary to set 
aside all double claims for the same losses’.296 The arbitral tribunal in Affaire du Guano 
adopted the same approach, stating that ‘Peru is not exposed to pay twice’.297 The Italy-
Venezuelan Commission in Martini took for granted the notion that double recovery is 
not allowed. The Commission found it could dismiss ‘with a word’ several complaints 
that had been the object of a settlement.298 Under this settlement, the claimant had 
received certain concessions in exchange for withdrawing the same claims it was now 
advancing before the Commission.299 
                                                             
294 Ibid, 216. 
295 Ibid, 217. 
296 Alabama claims, 133. 
297 Affaire du Guano, 117. Author’s translation (original French). 
298 Martini, 661. 
299 Ibid. 
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 As to the Mexican Commissions, as already noted, the rationale behind requiring 
an ‘allotment’ by the company in the case of claims for losses by persons having an 
interest in the company was precisely preventing double recovery by the same party 
and/or double payment for the same loss.300 In the words of the France-Venezuela 
Commission in Esclangon, ‘[t]he evident goal of this provision [was] to avoid that the 
legal person of mixed composition may claim more than 100% of the indemnity before 
two different fora’.301 That is, regardless of who was claiming and before which tribunal, 
national or international, all the claims could not amount to more than 100% of the 
damage. For the France-Venezuela Commission, this was an issue of admissibility 
(recevabilité) to be distinguished from issues pertaining to the merits, such as the amount 
of damages to which each interested party was entitled or the method to calculate 
damages.302  
III CONCLUSION 
Despite their international character and even though treaties created the causes of action, 
the Venezuelan and Mexican Commissions recognized the reality of an underlying 
private interest in the claims that the states presented to them. Thus, they acknowledged 
potential overlaps between international claims and parallel claims before national 
jurisdictions. Further, and unlike investment tribunals, the Commissions did not develop 
the idea of the ‘independence’ of claims under international law. This idea, which hinders 
the integration of applicable international and national/contractual regimes in the 
resolution of investment treaty claims, is not supported by the Commissions’ decisions. 
Investment tribunals should take these structural considerations into account when 
borrowing concepts from these decisions. 
 Both the Venezuelan and Mexican Commissions asserted their power to examine 
standing and cause of action after having affirmed their jurisdiction and in analysing the 
merits of the claims. They often regarded issues such as the impact of forum selection 
clauses303 and of local suits overlapping with the international proceedings as not 
                                                             
300 Frederick Adams, 217; Esclangon, 552. In David Roy, the Mexico-US Commission stated that, in fixing 
any damages award, it would consider amounts already received by the claimant. See Feller (1935) 147. 
301 Esclangon, 552. 
302 Ibid. 
303 The practice of Great Britain and the US considered that forum selection clauses, while not affecting 
their right to exercise diplomatic protection, were a factor that could be taken into account in deciding 
whether to intervene. Miles (2013) 51. 
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affecting the tribunal’s jurisdiction, but of potential relevance for determinations on the 
merits (even if the claimant state before the Commission was typically not party to the 
relevant contract). In addition, the Commissions sometimes considered the impact of 
contractual provisions on the international claim in light of the specific damages being 
claimed (i.e., whether the losses invoked were simply those resulting from contractual 
breaches).  
 The Venezuelan and Mexican Commissions were less inclined to accept claims 
by shareholders for damages suffered by the company than modern investment tribunals. 
Although this may be partly because of the effect of certain IIA provisions, the 
Commissions’ decisions are still instructive.304 The Commissions that did exercise 
jurisdiction over claims concerning shareholders’ indirect damages considered the 
situation of the company at the time of the award, whether shareholders had already been 
compensated even indirectly through the company, the real extent of shareholder losses 
considering for example the company’s debts, the interests of other stakeholders such as 
creditors, and similar aspects. Only one damage was involved, regardless of whether it 
was the shareholders or the company claiming compensation. 
 The Commissions distinguished between contract claims and claims under 
international law, applying the idea of ‘fundamental basis of the claim (which, however, 
was deemed not to affect the claims’ ultimate merits). The context in which they 
distinguished between contract and international law claims differed from today’s legal 
setting. Before the Venezuelan and Mexican Commissions only the states could bring 
claims. Yet, the Commissions were less reluctant to recognize a role for national law than 
their modern counterparts. National law was deemed as determining certain fundamental 
points in international claims, such as title to property or restrictions and qualifications 
over it. This approach was adopted even though the treaties creating the Commissions 
generally did not expressly require the application of national law.      
 For the Commissions, the contract claims/international claims distinction was 
useful in determining whether the case would be heard despite the presence of a forum 
selection clause, but it did not predetermine either the applicable law or the issue of 
damages. There was no necessary distinction as regards the damages claimed depending 
                                                             
304 Cf Webb Yackee (2016) 459-462 (on the modern significance of the largely forgotten The Suez Canal 
Company v Egypt 1864 arbitration). 
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on whether it was a contract or an international claim. Further, the Commissions were 
determined to avoid double recovery. Even if claimed in the context of a ‘genuine’ 
international claim, those losses that had already been compensated–even if indirectly 
through an entity other than the claimant and in local proceedings–could not be invoked 
before the Commissions. This concern went to the claims’ admissibility. 
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4 Admissibility and Shareholder Standing 
 
No international tribunals will allow municipal legal fictions of this sort to prevent 
them doing strict justice.1 
 
A number of arbitral decisions, especially since the early 2000s, have discussed 
jurisdiction over shareholder claims in respect of measures affecting the assets of the local 
company. Tribunals almost unanimously find that they enjoy jurisdiction over such 
claims,2 but their reasoning differs. While some of the differences are probably essentially 
terminological,3 the decisions also reveal differences as to issues of substance, with an 
impact beyond jurisdiction. An international tribunal’s jurisdiction over shareholder 
claims depends on the terms of the applicable legal provisions.4 Whatever the position 
under general international law, states may by treaty grant international tribunals 
jurisdiction to hear all sorts of shareholder claims. States may also confer all sorts of 
rights on shareholders under international law5 or make the application of a treaty depend 
on the nationality or some other characteristic of the shareholders, as the ‘real 
beneficiaries’, rather than on the company’s position.6 Indeed, arbitral decisions on 
shareholder standing have often turned on the interpretation of specific treaty provisions. 
The aim of this chapter is to consider to what extent shareholder rights under IIAs 
are ‘independent’ or different in substance from the local company’s rights. Its purpose 
                                                             
1 Shufeldt, 1098. 
2 Alexandrov (2005) 45; Wu (2010) 134. 
3 In Continental, the tribunal averred that since shareholders invoke their own rights under IIAs the claims 
‘cannot therefore be defined as indirect claims (or “derivative” claims), as if [the shareholder] was claiming 
on behalf or in lieu of [the company] in respect of rights granted to the latter by [national law]’. Continental 
(Jurisdiction) [87]. See also Teinver (Jurisdiction) [212]; Total (Jurisdiction) [81]; Yukos (Jurisdiction) 
[372]. Other tribunals concluded that the same type of claims were in fact ‘derivative’, because the investor 
was not claiming that ‘the measures were specifically directed against its shareholding’, but that they ‘had 
a negative impact on the activities of [the company] and, hence, on the value of [the investor’s] 
shareholding’. BG [190]. See also Gami [23]. 
4 These will basically be treaty provisions and, to a lesser extent, customary international law. But they may 
also include national law provisions. See Chapter 7. 
5 Cf Reply of the United States in ELSI, 380. 
6 See Mavrommatis (Jerusalem Concessions), 31-32. 
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is not, however, to discuss whether the tribunals’ interpretations of the relevant provisions 
were correct and whether, therefore, jurisdiction should have been upheld. In the decision 
on preliminary objections in Barcelona Traction, the ICJ referred to Spain’s objection 
that the acts complained of had affected a company registered in Canada and not the 
Belgian shareholding interests in the company that were being invoked.7 The Court 
observed that this objection, while having a ‘preliminary character or aspect’, could also  
be put in another way, which does not directly raise the question of the Applicant Government's jus standi 
– or does so only at one remove. It can be asked whether international law recognizes for the shareholders 
in a company a separate and independent right or interest in respect of damage done to the company by a 
foreign government; and if so to what extent and in what circumstances and, in particular, whether those 
circumstances (if they exist) would include those of the present case.8  
In considering shareholders’ position in international investment law, IIA provisions take 
centre stage. Yet if and how general international law and IIAs grant shareholders ‘a 
separate and independent right or interest in respect of damage done to the company’ 
remains a relevant debate. Discussing Barcelona Traction, Higgins observed that ‘[t]he 
relevant question [was] what person or entity has a cause of action in regard to damages 
sustained by shareholders, resulting from illicit treatment of the company’.9 A more 
pressing question today is how to reconcile different causes of action, often held by 
different persons, with respect to the same damages.  
This chapter argues that while it may on occasion be necessary to protect the ‘real 
interests’ behind the local company through IIAs, current concepts of independence of 
shareholder IIA rights should not be applied to the point of obscuring the interrelationship 
between those rights and the company’s rights. These two groups of rights have different 
legal bases, i.e., IIAs and national law respectively. Yet, in international investment law, 
shareholder and company rights may apply to the same assets and be thus invoked in 
relation to the same losses.10 In order to deal with overlaps between shareholder and 
company rights, not only IIA provisions but also principles recognized by general 
international law and national law must be taken into account. Relevant principles include 
                                                             
7 Barcelona Traction (Preliminary Objections), 44. 
8 Ibid. Briggs asserted that the reference to the merits here was ‘ambiguous’ and that the Court could later 
‘decide the issue of substantive law relating to protection of shareholders without prejudging the merits’. 
Briggs (1971) 331. See also Mann (1973) 260. 
9 Higgins (1971) 330. 
10 Cremades and Cairns (2005) 14. 
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the company’s legal personality distinct from that of its shareholders and the fact that 
shareholder rights in relation to the company’s assets remain limited (as a corollary of 
shareholders’ limited liability). These principles are grounded in important legal 
considerations, including the need to avoid affecting legally protected interests of the 
company and third parties. The extent of overlap between IIA shareholder rights and the 
company’s rights, and what consequences should follow from such overlap, does not 
pertain to investment tribunals’ jurisdiction but to admissibility11 or the merits.  
 Section I discusses the cases in which the ICJ was called upon to consider the 
issue of shareholder rights under international law and treaty provisions, namely 
Barcelona Traction, Elettronica Sicula (ELSI), and Diallo. Section II analyses the 
relevant decisions of investment tribunals,12 the most influential among these being the 
three substantive decisions in CMS v Argentina. Section III concludes.  
I. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS AND THE ICJ   
The ICJ has had to consider the scope of shareholder rights and their relationship with the 
local company’s rights in three cases. Taken together, Barcelona Traction, ELSI, and 
Diallo required analyses under general international law, national law, and treaty law. 
This section identifies relevant principles recognized in the decisions and considers to 
what extent they are applicable to the admissibility of shareholder IIA claims. 
A Barcelona Traction 
1 The Barcelona Traction case 
Belgium’s original claim in Barcelona Traction related to a series of measures adopted 
by Spanish authorities vis-à-vis the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, 
Limited (Barcelona Traction), a company incorporated in Canada.13 These measures had 
                                                             
11 See Chapter 1. In South West Africa, the ICJ suggested that considering a claim ‘from the point of view 
of the capacity of the Applicants to advance their present claim’ is a question of admissibility. South West 
Africa [76]. 
12 Shareholder standing is analysed here from the perspective of general international law, the relevant 
decisions of the ICJ, and investment tribunals’ decisions. There are other international courts and tribunals 
who have also dealt with the issue. For a discussion under the ECHR see the decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights in Agrotexim [64-66]; Olczak [59]; Géniteau [21-23]. Pertinent decisions of the 
Iran-US Claims Tribunal have generally been taken under article VII.2 of the Claims Settlement 
Declaration of 19 January 1981 (1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 9-12). This provision provides for claims owned 
‘indirectly’ by US nationals ‘in the sense that they owned non-American corporations that, in turn, owned 
property allegedly expropriated by Iran or had contractual claims against Iran’. Aldrich (1996) 88. 
13 Belgium’s Requête (1958), 3. Belgium’s 1962 new application, while still referring to conduct in breach 
of international law taken vis-à-vis Barcelona Traction, stated that the claim’s object was the reparation of 
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allegedly resulted in the company’s bankruptcy and liquidation, to the benefit of a Spanish 
national.14 Despite the company’s place of incorporation, Belgium argued that more than 
88% of Barcelona Traction’s shares were in Belgian hands.15 This preponderance of 
Belgian interests allegedly gave Belgium the right to protect the company as a whole.16 
Belgium complained that in the bankruptcy proceedings the Spanish courts had at times 
ignored the separate legal personality of the companies controlled by Barcelona 
Traction.17 This had been done in order to seize the controlled companies’ assets.18 The 
Belgian application requested the re-establishment of Barcelona Traction in all its rights 
and interests, plus damages for all other injuries resulting from the bankruptcy and related 
proceedings.19 
 From the beginning of the dispute20 and as an admissibility matter,21 Spain 
objected to Belgium’s jus standi to exercise diplomatic protection with respect to 
Barcelona Traction.22 The latter having Canadian nationality, Belgium did not have the 
right under international law to intervene on the company’s behalf.23 As to the Belgian 
shareholding interests in Barcelona Traction, aside from strongly contesting the extent to 
which they had been proved, in Spain’s view they were irrelevant to the admissibility of 
the claim.24 Even if Belgium had submitted sufficient evidence of these interests, this 
would have had no impact on Barcelona Traction’s Canadian nationality.25 Paradoxically 
given its strong reliance on Barcelona Traction’s separate legal personality to object to 
                                                             
the harm suffered by the Belgian shareholders. Belgium’s Requête (1962), 2. See Briggs (1971) 328-329; 
Diez de Velasco (1974) 152.     
14 Belgium’s Requête (1958), 3. 
15 Belgium’s Memorial (1959), 39. 
16 Ibid, 127. 
17 Belgium’s Requête (1958), 9, 18. Belgium argued that even if all the shares of a company belong to the 
same person, this does not make the company’s legal personality disappear. Belgium’s Memorial (1959), 
116. See also Belgium’s Memorial (1962), 43 (referring to a failure to recognize the separate legal 
personality of the various companies in the claims against Barcelona Traction before Spanish courts). 
18 Belgium’s Requête (1958), 9, 18. 
19 Ibid, 19. 
20 See Belgium’s Memorial (1959), 110. 
21 Briggs (1971) 328, 332. 
22 Spain’s Preliminary Objections (1960), 303. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid, e.g. 207, 304, 317, 347. 
25 Ibid, 347. 
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Belgium’s jus standi,26 Spain referred to this company and its sixteen controlled entities 
as ‘formally’ being separate and autonomous persons.27 However, since Barcelona 
Traction completely dominated the others, they were ‘in reality’ only one enterprise.28 
This did not mean that the controlled entities’ legal personality disappeared.29 Yet, for 
example, their independence could not be invoked to prevent the adoption, in Barcelona 
Traction’s bankruptcy proceedings, of measures against the controlled entities’ assets.30 
 The ICJ rendered two judgments in the case, following Belgium’s new application 
in 1962.31 The 1964 judgment rejected the two preliminary objections raised by Spain in 
relation to the Court’s jurisdiction.32 The remaining two objections—relating to 
Belgium’s standing to claim ‘on behalf of Belgian interests in a Canadian company’ and 
to the exhaustion of local remedies—33were characterized by Spain34 and by the Court35 
as going to the admissibility of the claim. These two objections were joined to the 
merits.36 In the 1970 judgment, the Court accepted Spain’s objection based on Belgium’s 
lack of jus standi and rejected the claim without thus ‘pronounc[ing] upon any other 
aspect of the case’.37 
 As to the jus standi objection, the ICJ noted that Belgium sought ‘reparation for 
damage allegedly caused to these persons by the conduct, said to be contrary to 
international law, of various organs of the Spanish State towards [Barcelona Traction] 
and various other companies in the same group’.38 The question was thus whether 
Belgium had the right to exercise diplomatic protection of the Belgian shareholders in the 
                                                             
26 Ibid, 386. 
27 Spain’s Counter-Memorial (1965), 30. 
28 Ibid. Author’s translation (original French). 
29 Ibid, 292. 
30 Ibid. 
31 The case relating to Belgium’s 1958 Application was removed from the ICJ’s list of cases following a 
request by Belgium not opposed by Spain. Order of 10 April 1961, 10.  
32 Barcelona Traction (Preliminary Objections), 16-26, 26-40.  
33 Ibid, 16. 
34 Ibid, 12. 
35 Ibid, 41. 
36 Ibid, 46. 
37 Barcelona Traction (Second Phase) [102].  
38 Ibid [28]. 
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Barcelona Traction company, incorporated in Canada, when the challenged measures had 
been taken vis-à-vis the company itself and not any Belgian national.39 The answer 
depended on whether ‘a right of Belgium [had] been violated on account of its nationals’ 
having suffered infringement of their rights as shareholders in a Company not of Belgian 
nationality’.40 It was necessary to consider the position in national law concerning ‘the 
rights of the corporate entity and its shareholders’ and ‘the nature and interrelation of 
those rights’, as to which ‘international law ha[d] not established its own rules’.41 The 
Court further stated:  
Notwithstanding the separate corporate personality, a wrong done to the company frequently causes 
prejudice to its shareholders. But the mere fact that damage is sustained by both company and shareholder 
does not imply that both are entitled to claim compensation.42  
It was only when the shareholder’s ‘direct rights’, such as ‘the right to any declared 
dividend, the right to attend and vote at general meetings, the right to share in the residual 
assets of the company on liquidation’, had been affected that the shareholder had ‘an 
independent right of action’.43 Otherwise, only the national state of the company was 
authorized to claim under international law.44  
2 Corporate personality and shareholders’ rights 
Any discussion of the relationship between shareholder and company rights and more 
particularly of shareholders’ ability to bring claims in relation to measures taken against 
company assets, cannot be wholly divorced from the idea of the independent personality 
of corporate entities. The company’s separate personality entails independence of its 
                                                             
39 Ibid [32]. 
40 Ibid [35]. 
41 Ibid [38]. Higgins argued that ‘[t]o assume that because a municipal law creation, a company, is 
concerned, municipal law necessarily has to be applied where there presently are gaps in international law, 
is both to deny any law-developing role to the Court and to assume that the functions of international law 
are the same as those of municipal law’. Higgins (1971) 331. See also Lillich (1971) 524, 529; Mann (1973) 
273. Kubiatowski criticized Barcelona Traction because it ‘unnecessarily limited its inquiry to principles 
of municipal law, rather than fashioning a new rule for shareholder claims based on international law’. 
Kubiatowski (1991) 225. The reference to ‘fashioning a new rule’ but ‘based on international law’ is 
ambiguous. Further, the source of the ICJ’s power to fashion new rules rather than apply existing ones is 
not indicated. See South West Africa [89].  
42 Barcelona Traction (Second Phase) [44]. 
43 Ibid [47]. 
44 Ibid [88].  
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rights vis-à-vis shareholders’ rights.45 If such personality does not prevent shareholder 
claims for measures affecting company assets, how independent really are the rights of 
the company and shareholders? In his concurring opinion in Barcelona Traction, Judge 
Tanaka advanced that  
[t]he concept of juridical personality mainly governs private law relationships. It cannot be made an 
obstacle to diplomatic protection of shareholders. Concerning diplomatic protection, international law looks 
into the substance of matters instead of the legal form or technique; it pays more consideration to 
ascertaining where real interest exists, disregarding legal concepts.46  
Yet in Barcelona Traction the ICJ and, importantly, both parties adopted a different 
position on ‘the concept of juridical personality’. 
 Although Belgium sought to protect the shareholders, it nonetheless emphasized 
each company’s separate personality.47 The separation was recognized by the legal 
systems of all states.48 Further, the companies’ right to preserve their legal individuality, 
even where they were members of the same group, was ‘unanimously recognized’, 
independently of ‘economic reality’.49 The separation extended to each company’s assets 
and was respected even in the event of bankruptcy.50 Shareholders did not have property 
rights over the company’s assets.51 Nor could they act as if they were parties to contracts 
concluded by the company or exercise actions belonging to these parties under the 
contracts.52 This did not alter Belgium’s conclusion that a breach of international law 
affecting the company constituted an illegal act vis-à-vis both the latter’s state and the 
shareholders’ given the purely technical nature of legal personality and the ‘solidarity of 
interests’ between shareholders and the company.53 But this conclusion presented a 
                                                             
45 Diallo (Jurisdiction), 605; Barcelona Traction (Second Phase), 235 (Sep Op, Morelli). 
46 Barcelona Traction (Second Phase), 127 (Sep Op, Tanaka). See also Barcelona Traction (Preliminary 
Objections), 62-63 (Sep Op, Wellington Koo).  
47 Belgium’s Reply (1967), 23. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid, 147. Author’s translation (original French). 
50 Ibid, 151, 373. 
51 Ibid, 644. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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‘difficulty’ of a ‘practical order’ that international tribunals had to find the way to avoid, 
namely the respondent state paying twice for the damage caused.54  
 Spain contested Belgium’s submission. Intervention in favour of shareholders was 
justified only where a breach of international law had been inflicted on them.55 It was not 
enough that shareholders may have suffered an indirect damage to their interests as a 
result of treatment to the company.56 Shareholders’ rights must have been affected, since 
the company’s rights and duties were different from those of its shareholders.57 An 
abusive taking of one of the company’s assets or the illegal breaking of one of its contracts 
or concessions affected its rights, not the shareholders’.58 The separation between the 
company’s and the shareholders’ assets was the other side of the coin, both of 
shareholders’ limited liability and of the fact that the company’s assets were the only 
guarantee of the company’s debts.59 If compensation due to injury to the company was 
collected by the shareholders, the company’s assets, which were used first to cover the 
company’s debts, would not be re-established.60 
 In its judgment, the Court considered the issue of shareholders’ rights material. It 
was necessary to determine whether the prejudice allegedly suffered by the Belgian 
shareholders resulted from the breach of obligations of which ‘they were the 
beneficiaries’.61 The ICJ noted that  
[t]he concept and structure of the company are founded on and determined by a firm distinction between 
the separate entity of the company and that of the shareholder, each with a distinct set of rights. The 
separation of property rights as between company and shareholder is an important manifestation of this 
distinction. So long as the company is in existence the shareholder has no right to the corporate assets.62  
                                                             
54 Ibid, 655 (citing to Reparation for Injuries, 186). In Belgium’s view, although the two available claims 
would be brought by different states, the damage was the same and was not payable twice. Relatedly, 
Belgium observed that Barcelona Traction’s Belgian shareholders had ‘separate and independent rights and 
interests to assert’, ‘in the absence of reparation to the Company for the damage inflicted on it, from which 
they would have benefited at the same time as itself’. Barcelona Traction (Second Phase), 26.  
55 Spain’s Preliminary Objections (1960), 386. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Spain’s Counter-Memorial (1965), 642. 
59 Ibid, 650. 
60 Ibid, 652. 
61 Barcelona Traction (Second Phase), 26.  
62 Ibid, 34. 
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Indeed, shareholder rights in relation to the company and its assets remained limited, this 
being a corollary of their limited liability.63  
Thus, Barcelona Traction stands clearly for the proposition that ‘international law 
acknowledges the general separateness of corporate entities at the national level’.64 Both 
Belgium and Spain recognized and invoked this principle of national law,65 albeit for 
different purposes. Despite the existence of dissenting opinions, the principle was also 
recognized by all of the judges.66 And even writers generally disapproving Barcelona 
Traction’s approach as to the scope of shareholders’ rights, have conceded companies’ 
separate personality.67 The ICJ also referred to certain corollaries of the separation 
principle, such as the notion that ordinarily the shareholder has no right to the corporate 
assets. The separation between the company and its shareholders underscored in 
Barcelona Traction68 is related to important legal considerations. First, to the notion that 
limitations on shareholder rights are ‘a corollary of the limited nature of their liability’. 
Second, to the need to compensate the company rather than the shareholders in case of 
injury to the former, because of the company assets being the only guarantee of its debts 
(which in turn involves the rights of third parties).  
Shareholders may have the right under IIAs to claim for harm to the corporate 
entities’ assets, but ‘the fact of those entities (and any associated liabilities) cannot be 
entirely disregarded’.69 To the extent IIAs are construed as bypassing the separation 
between companies and shareholders for purposes of jurisdiction over shareholder 
indirect claims,70 the interests protected by corporate law principles connected to such 
separation, also recognized by customary international law, need to be considered. 
Alternatively, tribunals could consider them when assessing damages.71  
                                                             
63 Ibid, 35. 
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111 
  
This thesis proposes to take these interests into account at the admissibility stage 
to prevent potential double recovery and injury to third-party rights.72 Under this 
approach, not all shareholder indirect claims are inadmissible. Barcelona Traction itself 
notes that ‘the independent existence of the legal entity cannot be treated as an absolute’.73 
Yet the tension between the company’s rights over its assets and shareholder claims 
seeking damages for losses to those same assets must be recognized. And it must be dealt 
with applying recognized legal principles found both in international and national law. 
3 Piercing of the veil and equitable considerations 
Investment tribunals have routinely ‘lifted the veil’ in the interest of shareholders, mostly 
on the basis of the wide definition of the term investment in IIAs.74 The decisions do not 
expressly apply the lifting of the veil concept, but arrive at one of its possible outcomes 
by allowing shareholders to bring claims against measures taken vis-à-vis the company’s 
assets. By contrast, the ICJ in Barcelona Traction stated that the lifting of the veil in the 
interest of shareholders could be justified in international law but, just like in national 
legal systems, ‘only in exceptional circumstances’.75  
Although both Belgium and Spain acknowledged companies’ independent legal 
personality in Barcelona Traction, neither argued that corporate separateness was 
absolute. This was clear in Belgium’s main case, which, it was argued, always had the 
protection of the Belgian shareholding interests in mind.76 The real issue was not the 
protection of the company itself but of the legal and natural persons that had invested in 
it and had suffered losses as shareholders because of measures taken against the 
company.77 It was necessary to look at ‘the real party in interest’78 and distinguish the 
company from its constitutive parts, international law in this field being essentially 
inspired by principles of equity.79 
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 To justify certain judicial measures taken in Barcelona Traction’s bankruptcy 
proceedings with respect to assets of the company’s subsidiaries, Spain argued that the 
interposition of these subsidiaries’ legal personality was part of a fraud.80 To the extent 
that the subsidiaries’ assets were controlled entirely by Barcelona Traction, such assets 
had to be used to repay the debts incurred by the latter in the exercise of its power.81 
Respect for legal personality found an exception when it was necessary to protect the 
rights of third parties.82 It could not be used to conceal attacks ‘against the general interest, 
justify what is illegal, protect fraud or defend crime’.83 Barcelona Traction having abused 
its legal personality by interposing a group of subsidiaries between it and what really were 
its own assets,84 ‘technical considerations [could] not prevent substantial justice from 
being done’.85 
 Referring to municipal law, the Court found that ‘the process of “lifting the 
corporate veil” or “disregarding the legal entity” [had] been found justified and equitable 
in certain circumstances or for certain purposes’.86 The company’s legal personality could 
be disregarded when it was necessary to ‘provide protective measures and remedies in 
the interests of those within the corporate entity as well as of those outside who have 
dealings with it’.87 The ICJ mentioned creditors and persons having contractual ties with 
the company as third parties who could need protection against the misuse of the legal 
personality.88 Lifting the veil could perform a similar function in international law.89 
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Relevantly, the ICJ mentioned the case where remedies through the company were not 
available.90  
By contrast, investment tribunals have considered the availability of other 
remedies to be irrelevant for purposes of assessing jurisdiction over shareholder indirect 
claims, due to the independence of treaty claims from national law remedies.91 For non-
jurisdictional purposes, however, the idea that shareholder IIA rights are autonomous is, 
as discussed below, questionable. The availability of corporate remedies is a relevant 
admissibility consideration, first, because of double recovery risks. Second, because to 
the extent shareholder IIA claims affect the possibilities of recovery in subsequent claims 
by the local company, the rights of third parties with claims against the latter may be 
harmed. 
The reasoning justifying shareholder indirect claims under IIAs is often similar to 
Belgium’s appeal in Barcelona Traction to protect ‘the real party in interest’.92 This has 
been achieved. But investment tribunals rarely consider the rights and interests of persons 
having dealings with the company,93 including the third parties who the Court mentioned 
specifically, such as creditors.94 Similarly, investment tribunals do not consider the 
company’s interests. Yet shareholder claims’ potential implications for the company and 
third parties are relevant legal considerations stemming from national and international 
law. These implications could also be seen as considerations of ‘equity’ or ‘substantial 
justice’, concepts to which both parties and the Court referred in Barcelona Traction95 
and that ‘stress the need for a less inelastic treatment of certain of the issues of 
admissibility involved’.96 Further, in international investment law the veil is lifted only 
in favour of shareholders, since they are not made responsible for the company’s 
liabilities.97 When this entails that legitimate claims of third parties may not be satisfied, 
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for example because the local company is in liquidation, investment tribunals should 
decide, as an admissibility matter, whether granting shareholders all the compensation (in 
proportion to their shareholdings) for injury to the company’s assets is justified. 
B ELSI, Diallo, and the Barcelona Traction principles 
1 Overview of the decisions 
(a) ELSI 
In ELSI, the US argued that Italy had ‘violated the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation between the United States and the Republic of Italy and the supplementary 
agreement to that treaty, through Italy’s actions with respect to an Italian company wholly 
owned by two United States corporations’.98 The dispute derived from the Italian 
government’s requisition of the plant and related assets of Elettronica Sicula S.P.A., an 
Italian company wholly owned by the US corporations.99 The claim advanced that the 
requisition ‘was intended to, and did in fact, prevent [the US corporations] from 
proceeding with their decision to conduct an orderly liquidation of ELSI’.100 This had 
caused significant losses101 and thus the US requested full compensation for the damages 
suffered by the US corporations as a result of the requisition and other actions and 
omissions of Italy.102 
 Italy ‘fully recognize[d] the Court’s jurisdiction over the dispute in so far as it 
relate[d] to the interpretation and application of the 1948 Treaty and the 1951 
Supplementary Agreement’ and otherwise refrained from raising jurisdictional 
objections.103 It did argue, however, that the claim was inadmissible because the two US 
corporations had not exhausted local remedies as required by international law.104 
Further, on the merits, Italy denied any wrongdoing on the part of Italian authorities.105 
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The ICJ’s Chamber deciding the case was not convinced, in a case where ‘there ha[d] in 
fact been much resort to the municipal courts’, that any remedy remained to be exhausted 
and thus rejected Italy’s admissibility objection.106 
 The Chamber proceeded to consider the merits of a claim invoking damages to 
the shareholders due to measures taken vis-à-vis the company. The suggestion, however, 
that ELSI was part of ‘a fundamental change of the applicable concepts under 
international law and State practice’ is incorrect.107 A better explanation is that the claim 
in ELSI involved shareholder rights under Barcelona Traction’s exposition of the law.108 
In fact, in ELSI the ‘essence of the Applicant’s claim’ throughout was that the US 
corporations had been ‘by the requisition deprived of the right, and of the practical 
possibility, of conducting an orderly liquidation of ELSI’s assets’.109 The US’s case was 
premised on a breach of shareholders’ rights and was thus consistent with Barcelona 
Traction.110 Further, it is not clear why the ELSI case would reflect a change in the general 
international law principles recognized in Barcelona Traction given that the Chamber’s 
decision hinged on the interpretation of specific provisions of an FCN Treaty.111 
(b) Ahmadou Sadio Diallo 
The Diallo case involved claims by the Republic of Guinea against the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). The claims arose out of the arbitrary arrest, expulsion, and 
other degrading treatment of Mr Diallo, a Guinean national.112 It was also alleged that Mr 
Diallo had been deprived of rights of ownership and management in two Congolese 
companies he had founded. This had prevented him from pursuing recovery of debts owed 
to him and to his companies. Non-payment by the DRC of its own debts to Mr Diallo and 
his companies was also advanced.113 The DRC challenged the admissibility of the case, 
arguing that Guinea lacked standing because it was seeking to protect rights that belonged 
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to the Congolese companies, Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire, not to Mr Diallo.114 
The Court accepted the admissibility of the case as it concerned ‘Mr. Diallo’s rights as an 
individual’115 and as ‘associé of the two companies’,116 but not ‘as it relate[d] to the 
exercise of diplomatic protection with respect to Mr. Diallo “by substitution” for the 
Congolese companies and in defence of their rights’.117 The Court confirmed the basic 
principles of the Barcelona Traction decision,118 finding that 
[w]hat matters, from the point of view of international law, is to determine whether or not [the different 
forms of legal entity] have a legal personality independent of their members. Conferring independent 
corporate personality on a company implies granting it rights over its own property, rights which it alone 
is capable of protecting.119   
It thus pronounced that the position in general international law on shareholder rights had 
not changed 40 years after Barcelona Traction. In the meantime, thousands of IIAs 
expressly protecting shareholders had been signed. And it occurred in a case involving 
companies incorporated in the respondent state, even though the Court in Barcelona 
Traction had hinted that a special rule could apply in that case.120 Further, the evolution 
that may be noted from Barcelona Traction to Diallo is a more precise identification of 
the relevant national law for distinguishing between shareholder and company rights 
(Barcelona Traction having been criticized for relying on national law rules). In this light, 
the outcome in Diallo is a strong indication of the continued vitality of the company’s 
independent existence in international law.  
2 Relevance of Barcelona Traction for international investment law 
In recent years, it has been argued that the totality of the practice demonstrates that the 
notions adopted in Barcelona Traction are no longer applicable in international law.121 
And, more particularly, that after the conclusion of a high number of IIAs the decision in 
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Barcelona Traction no longer reflected international law.122 This position appears 
difficult to maintain after the 2007 and 2010 ICJ decisions in Diallo.123 A more subtle 
view contends that, BITs being the lex specialis on shareholder rights in international 
investment law, Barcelona Traction has been rendered largely irrelevant or inapposite in 
this latter field.124 A strong version of this view was asserted by the arbitral tribunal in 
Suez I:   
… Barcelona Traction is not controlling in the present case. That decision, which has been criticized by 
scholars over the years, concerned diplomatic protection of its nationals by a State, an issue that is in no 
way relevant to the current case. Unlike the present case, Barcelona Traction did not involve a bilateral 
treaty which specifically provides that shareholders are investors and as such are entitled to have recourse 
to international arbitration to protect their shares from host country actions that violate the treaty.125 
This view is often complemented with the idea that Barcelona Traction ‘was concerned 
only with the exercise of diplomatic protection’ and in a ‘particular triangular setting’ 
(i.e., involving the company’s state of incorporation, the shareholders’ state of nationality, 
and the host state).126 This particular setting presented a ‘significantly different factual 
scenario’ from one where the claim is brought directly by a foreign investor against the 
host state.127 Further, states’ right to exercise diplomatic protection under general 
international law is different from the rights IIAs confer to investors, including 
shareholders.128 
 It is no doubt true that Barcelona Traction involved an exercise of diplomatic 
protection.129 However, in its first judgment in the case the ICJ noted that ‘the question 
of the jus standi of a government to protect the interests of shareholders as such, is itself 
merely a reflection, or consequence, of the antecedent question of what is the juridical 
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situation in respect of shareholding interests, as recognized by international law’.130 The 
Court added that, since Belgium was not merely exercising diplomatic protection but 
making a claim before an international tribunal, determining whether international law 
conferred to shareholders the rights in question was ‘of the essence of the matter’.131 In 
this regard, the Teinver tribunal correctly noted that ‘to determine whether Belgium had 
a right to bring its case, the Court had to first address the scope of the Belgian nationals’ 
rights as shareholders’.132 The ‘antecedent question’ of shareholder rights in international 
law was different from the conditions applicable to standing in diplomatic protection.133   
 Whether states, for jurisdictional purposes, intend to ‘deviate from Barcelona 
Traction’ depends on the construction of the applicable treaty’s provisions.134 Investment 
tribunals have often found, basing themselves on the definition of ‘investment’ in the 
relevant treaty, that IIAs allow ‘shareholders to bring claims for harms to their 
investments in locally incorporated companies’.135 But the fact that shares are a protected 
investment in BITs and that this or other similar factors suffice to affirm jurisdiction, does 
not warrant the conclusion that ‘the juridical situation in respect of shareholding interests’ 
under general international law is otherwise irrelevant for international investment law. 
The ICJ’s views on the legal position of shareholders, as expounded in Barcelona 
Traction, ELSI, and Diallo, remain relevant, not least for the purposes of admissibility 
and the ‘ultimate merits’ of the claim. 
First, Barcelona Traction treated such shareholders’ ‘juridical situation’ not as a 
jurisdictional point and not even ‘one simply of the admissibility of the claim, but of 
substantive legal rights pertaining to the merits’.136 Second, to the extent that IIAs are lex 
specialis vis-à-vis customary law as regards shareholder rights, this does not mean that 
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the two cannot coexist, at least as long as there is no ‘actual inconsistency between them, 
or else a discernible intention that one provision is to exclude the other’.137 Although the 
extent to which general rules are displaced depends on the interpretation of the applicable 
treaty as the lex specialis,138 the inclusion of shares as a protected investment or of 
shareholders as protected investors does not justify the complete displacement of the 
general international law dealing with shareholders. Third, it is uncontroversial that 
customary international law may be of ‘particular relevance to the interpretation of a 
treaty’.139 Investment tribunals routinely apply rules of general international law, both for 
jurisdictional and merits purposes.140 Furthermore, IIAs generally include international 
law in any provision on the law applicable to investor-state disputes. In light of this 
express reference, relying on shares’ protected status under IIAs to disregard international 
law principles appears even less justified. 
Thus, investment tribunals cannot brush aside the analysis in Barcelona Traction 
just because it was a diplomatic protection case.141 As a general matter, it is true that in 
international investment law diplomatic protection has been replaced by investor-state 
arbitration and other dispute settlement mechanisms.142 However, just because the 
affected entity–rather than its national state–can now bring an international claim directly 
does not make Barcelona Traction’s treatment of the underlying shareholder and 
company rights irrelevant to investment arbitration.143 The interrelation of those rights 
remains a relevant question because IIAs, general international law, and national law may 
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grant rights and causes of action to the company and its shareholders over the same assets 
and losses. Although for jurisdictional purposes the impact of IIAs on shareholder 
standing is undeniable, there is no evidence that IIAs otherwise seek to derogate from all 
international and national law principles bearing on the position of shareholders and 
companies.144 On the contrary, these two legal systems are generally part of the applicable 
law in investment treaty arbitration.145 In HICEE the tribunal took a strong stance on the 
impact of the applicable IIA asserting that 
the admissibility of shareholder claims depends upon the provisions of the investment protection treaty in 
question, and [IIAs] very frequently make provision to allow for shareholder claims, either explicitly or by 
necessary implication. The position, in other words, is controlled by the treaty.146 
Yet in deciding that position and while acknowledging ‘investment treaty jurisprudence’ 
on shareholder standing, the HICEE tribunal, with reference to Barcelona Traction and 
Diallo, also took into account ‘the default position in international law that the corporate 
form is recognized as legally distinct from the shareholders, and confers on the corporate 
entity the capacity to assert claims for damage suffered to it or its property’.147  
Douglas argued, however, that a distinction should be made between diplomatic 
protection and investment treaty arbitration.148 The latter involves an investor bringing ‘a 
cause of action based upon the vindication of its own rights rather than those of its national 
state’.149 In contradistinction, in diplomatic protection the state ‘is not an agent of its 
national who has a legally protected interest at the international level; the state is rather 
seeking redress for the breach of an obligation owed to itself’.150 But although IIA rights 
are held by the investor directly, it does not follow that international law principles 
recognized in the diplomatic protection context are irrelevant in investment treaty 
arbitration. The traditional position was that in diplomatic protection ‘a State is in reality 
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asserting its own rights – its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the 
rules of international law’.151 This view has not escaped criticism in recent years.152 
While some of the rules applicable in the diplomatic protection field may not be 
amenable to application outside a state-state relationship, there is no reason to conclude 
that this is true in all cases. And the fact that IIAs have 
substituted for diplomatic protection and may even prohibit its exercise by the States that are parties to 
them, does not mean that the basic principles have also been automatically derogated as it is rather the 
means for materializing an international claim that have changed but not in all aspects its substantive 
requirements.153 
Nothing in the nature of the general international law rules on the position of shareholders 
prevents, as a matter of principle, their application in an investor-state dispute under an 
IIA. Nor does the shareholders’ right to directly sue the host state under IIAs completely 
exclude the relevance of the general international law on the scope of companies’ and 
shareholders’ substantive rights.154   
3 Shareholder rights and overlapping claims in ELSI 
(a) Overview 
For admissibility purposes, on the one hand, the Chamber in ELSI discussed the 
relationship between the international claim, brought on behalf of shareholders, and local 
claims filed by ELSI or on its behalf. On the other hand, for merits purposes, the Chamber 
had to consider the scope of shareholder rights under an FCN, generally considered as 
predecessors of modern BITs.155 Both aspects are relevant here. First, regarding the 
relevant criteria to acknowledge overlaps between international and national law claims 
and the potential impact of such overlaps on international proceedings. Second, as to the 
Chamber’s approach to shareholders’ treaty-protected interests over assets owned by the 
local company under national law. 
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With respect to admissibility, in order to reject the objection on the alleged failure 
by the US corporations to exhaust local remedies, the Chamber relied on proceedings 
brought by ELSI and by the trustee in bankruptcy on the latter’s behalf.156 Since the loss 
claimed in the international proceedings resulted from measures affecting ‘the manner of 
disposing of ELSI’s assets’, it was for ELSI–and after the bankruptcy, for the trustee–to 
pursue any available local remedy.157 This meant that when comparing the claim before 
the Chamber with the Italian proceedings ‘of course, the parties were different’.158 What 
was relevant, however, was that the claims for damages before Italian courts related to 
the ‘causal link between the requisition order and the company’s bankruptcy’.159 Hence, 
the ‘substance of the claim’ was ‘essentially’ the same as that of the claim before the 
Chamber,160 
for both claims turn[ed] on the allegation that the requisition, by frustrating the orderly liquidation, triggered 
the bankruptcy, and so caused the alleged losses.161 
Thus, although apparently the US corporations had brought no proceedings before Italian 
courts,162 no local remedy remained which these entities ‘independently of ELSI, and of 
ELSI’s trustee in bankruptcy, ought to have pursued and exhausted’.163 
Regarding the merits, in construing the FCN provisions on takings the Chamber 
observed it was doubtful whether they ‘could be extended to include even a “taking” of 
an Italian corporation in Italy, of which, strictly speaking, [the US corporations] only held 
the shares’.164 However, the language extending the protection to ‘interests held directly 
or indirectly’ was intended to resolve these doubts in that shareholders’ interests ‘in the 
assets of a company, and in their residuary value on liquidation, would appear to fall in 
the category of the “interests” to be protected’ under the FCN.165 As to a provision 
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‘principally concerned with ensuring the right “to acquire, own and dispose of immovable 
property or interests therein…”’,166 the Chamber was sympathetic to the US’s contention 
‘that “immovable property or interests therein” is a phrase sufficiently broad to include 
indirect ownership of property rights held through a subsidiary that is not a United States 
corporation’.167 This interpretation was more consistent with the FCN treaty’s purpose.168 
(b) The significance of the Chamber’s findings in investment arbitration 
The Chamber’s observations on the scope of shareholder rights under the FCN provisions 
are consistent with the approach of investment tribunals to similar IIA provisions.169 In 
particular, the idea that the protection of indirectly held interests–common in modern 
IIAs–may mean that shareholder interests over the company’s assets are also protected is 
noteworthy.170 But in ELSI the ICJ rejected all claims on the merits.171 Thus, the potential 
need to consider how to reconcile overlapping claims of the company and of its 
shareholders over the same assets did not arise.172 In this respect, however, the Court’s 
‘substantive’ rather than formalistic approach to Italy’s admissibility objection is 
relevant. Despite differences in the persons involved and the applicable law, the Chamber 
found that certain Italian proceedings involved ‘in substance, essentially the same claim 
brought before the Chamber by the United States’.173 In disposing of an admissibility 
objection relating to parallel claims, the Chamber took into account the substance of the 
claims. The fact that one was a national law claim involving the local company and the 
other an international claim referring to the shareholders174 did not alter the Chamber’s 
conclusion. 
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 As a rule, international law does not exclude simultaneous proceedings involving 
similar claims, provided there are ‘separate bases of protection, each of which is valid’.175 
When the ICJ observed that this was the position, it referred to two international law 
claims by the same person. Arguably, the same applies to an international law claim by 
one person and a national law claim by another (even if the two persons are related). Yet, 
parallel litigation over the same facts (even if the parties are not formally identical) 
increases the time and cost of litigation and may lead to inconsistencies and unfairness.176 
While these problems are generally recognized, it is more complex to identify the 
solutions available to international tribunals.177 Here, the decision in ELSI is important 
because to establish the impact of parallel proceedings on admissibility, it focused on the 
substance of the claims (consisting of the damages claimed) rather than on the applicable 
law or the parties to each claim. This approach allows, first, to identify double recovery 
risks notwithstanding formal differences in the claims, and second, to grapple with such 
risks without necessarily deciding the ultimate merits of the claims. 
Regardless of the jurisdictional position, considering admissibility or merits to 
maintain a strict separation of overlapping claims because the ‘parties are different’ is 
less justified.178 The emphasis on the ‘substance of the claim’ was adopted in what was, 
after all, a diplomatic protection case, albeit involving the application of an FCN treaty.179 
Since diplomatic protection is subject to the exhaustion of local remedies rule and to 
standing requirements probably more stringent than those applicable in the BIT context, 
issues such as double recovery and inconsistent results180 are more likely in investment 
arbitration.181 One may add the current network of about 3,300 IIAs182 and over 100,000 
multinational enterprises controlling at least one million foreign affiliates.183 This, 
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coupled with investment tribunals’ view that any entity in a corporate structure–provided 
it is protected by an IIA–may claim for damages suffered by the local company,184 also 
increases the possibilities of overlapping claims. Thus, for admissibility purposes, 
acknowledging overlaps between claims by different entities, adopting a substantive 
rather than formalistic approach as in ELSI, is at least as justified in international 
investment law.    
4 The role of general international law and national law 
The rights of the local company and those of its foreign shareholders are potentially 
subject to national and international law. A relevant question here is what the law 
applicable to the interrelation between those rights is. In its 2010 judgment in Diallo the 
ICJ observed that ‘international law has repeatedly acknowledged the principle of 
domestic law that a company has a legal personality distinct from that of its 
shareholders’.185 This has important consequences, including that ‘the rights and assets 
of a company must be distinguished from the rights and assets of an associé’ and ‘that the 
liabilities of the company are not the liabilities of the shareholder’.186 In particular, ‘debts 
receivable from third parties’ also belong to the company and are not owned by the 
shareholders or associés.187 The Court had already affirmed these principles in its 2007 
judgment on preliminary objections.188 
 As in Barcelona Traction, the Court in Diallo considered the separate personality 
of companies as a principle recognized by international law.189 The distinction between 
the rights, assets, and liabilities of the company and those of the shareholders was also 
acknowledged.190 The Court observed, nonetheless, that ‘[i]n determining whether a 
company possesses independent and distinct legal personality, international law looks to 
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the rules of the relevant domestic law’.191 To ‘establish the precise legal nature’ of the 
legal entities it is necessary to refer to national law.192 The rights of both the shareholders 
and the company are determined by the law of the company’s national state.193 Thus, the 
Court in Diallo upheld Barcelona Traction’s reliance on domestic rules.194 Instead of the 
reference in Barcelona Traction to ‘rules generally accepted by municipal legal 
systems’,195 however, the ICJ identified the state of nationality of the company as the 
applicable national law.196 This law must be applied to ‘define the precise nature, content 
and limits’ of the rights of the shareholders or associés of the company, and of the latter’s 
organs.197 The definition of such rights was made at the merits stage,198 through a detailed 
analysis of the relevant provisions of Congolese law.199 
The Court’s discussion in Diallo of Congolese law to distinguish between the 
rights of the company and those of its members is preferable to Barcelona Traction’s 
reference to generally accepted municipal rules. Still, national law rules related to the 
company’s independent legal personality should not be transposed to international law 
‘lock, stock and barrel’.200 A fortiori in considering legal grounds that could affect 
investment claims’ admissibility, such rules should ‘serve as indications of principle and 
not as rigid injunctions in the international domain’.201 Müller criticized the ICJ’s reliance 
in Diallo on the company’s independent legal personality as recognized by the relevant 
national law.202 He argued that the reference to national law does not elevate companies’ 
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domestic legal regime and all their rights and obligations to the international plane.203 
Such reference is intended to establish the existence of the national law rights protected 
by international law and the identity of the rights’ owner.204 Yet, the scope of the 
independent corporate personality is determined by international law and its reference to 
national law.205 Here, Müller’s position appears circular, in that he admits international 
law’s reliance on national law as to the company’s autonomous existence.206  
Is the position different in international investment law? When an IIA is 
applicable, is recourse to municipal law principles to determine ‘the nature and 
interrelation’ of the rights of the company and its shareholders excluded? To the extent 
that IIAs establish their own rules on shareholder rights, it could be argued that recourse 
to national law is not necessary. The Teinver tribunal asserted that ‘there is no reason to 
resort to municipal law when the treaty instrument provides the source of the rights 
asserted’.207 Müller argued that, while being close to property rights established by 
national law, the notion of investment is autonomous.208 IIAs may, according to their own 
criteria, grant independent rights over the same asset to persons other than its owner, not 
least shareholder rights over the company’s assets.209  
On the contrary, this thesis argues that IIAs can hardly be described as ‘a self-
contained closed legal system’ isolated from ‘certain supplementary rules, whether of 
international law character or of domestic law nature’.210 Accordingly, national law is 
frequently a necessary complement to IIAs, whose provisions on shareholder matters 
generally do not go much further than including shares as protected investments. In the 
absence of detailed regulation in IIAs on the relationship between shareholder and 
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company rights, ‘a tribunal should in principle be guided by the more detailed 
prescriptions of the applicable municipal law’.211 
 The ICJ’s approach to applicable law in Diallo has been criticized. If national law 
determines shareholder rights in general international law, the upshot is ‘a permanent and 
universal Calvo clause for shareholders’, leaving the standard of shareholder protection 
‘to the whim of those responsible for deciding the content of domestic law’.212 But 
applying national law in conjunction with the IIA provisions in determining the scope of 
shareholder rights, including vis-à-vis the company’s rights, does not mean that the 
application of international law is excluded. Neither Barcelona Traction nor Diallo 
suggest that the position of shareholders in national law is definitive before an 
international tribunal. All relevant rules of international law will also be applicable, 
notwithstanding their frequent lack of specificity in the field of protection of foreign 
property. And in case of conflict, including cases in which national law has been modified 
in a manner contrary to international law, international law prevails.    
 The application of general international law in investment arbitration is 
uncontroversial, but has received surprisingly little attention until recently.213 For present 
purposes, most tribunals overlook the customary international law rule of the company’s 
independent legal personality vis-à-vis its shareholders. The same applies to international 
law’s reliance on national law to ‘define the precise nature, content and limits’ of 
shareholders’ rights.214 There is no apparent justification for the failure to recognize these 
notions in international investment law. The ICJ in Diallo conducted a detailed analysis 
of the interrelation between company and shareholder rights. It applied international and 
national law principles when it dealt with the substance of the claims, rather than at the 
jurisdictional phase. This makes the alleged dichotomy between the diplomatic protection 
and non-diplomatic protection contexts less relevant. Investment tribunals dealing with 
shareholder claims must also determine what rights shareholders hold, albeit in light of 
the provisions of the applicable IIA. A fortiori when the claim relates to losses inflicted 
on the company’s assets, the omission to consider relevant international and national law 
principles for admissibility and merits purposes is not justified in terms of the applicable 
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law. It may also ‘invite serious legal difficulties’,215 including double recovery risks, and 
impact the rights and legitimate interests of third parties. 
 II SHAREHOLDER STANDING BEFORE INVESTMENT TRIBUNALS   
Discussion of shareholder rights in international investment law, as was the case in 
ELSI,216 has essentially revolved around the scope of treaty provisions. In Diallo, the ICJ 
noted the current central role of IIAs in the recognition of shareholders’ and companies’ 
rights in international law and in the resolution of related disputes.217 This section 
discusses investment tribunals’ views on the relevance of national and general 
international law principles on corporate and shareholder rights given the applicability of 
IIAs. It also considers to what extent there is a substantive overlap between shareholder 
treaty rights and companies’ (mostly national law) rights. This overlap refers to coexisting 
rights of shareholders and companies over the same assets and is intimately related to the 
idea of substantively overlapping claims, i.e., claims deriving from the same host state 
measures and involving the same damages.     
A Development of the prevailing concepts 
Investment arbitration has witnessed the consolidation of the idea that shareholders are 
entitled to bring claims under IIAs for measures affecting the company in which they hold 
shares. This idea was already present in some investment tribunals’ decisions preceding 
the cases brought against Argentina since 2001.218 Yet before the 2003 jurisdictional 
decision in CMS, investment tribunals did not completely marginalize national law 
principles related to shareholder and company rights. Further, despite recognizing 
shareholders’ jus standi, pre-CMS decisions often acknowledged a close relationship 
between shareholder IIA claims and the local company’s claims. The position on the role 
of national law in shareholder treaty claims and on the relationship between these claims 
and the company’s claims, however, changed fundamentally after CMS.219 
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 The decision on jurisdiction in CMS found that the company’s independent legal 
personality and other related national law concepts are irrelevant in treaty claims, at least 
at the jurisdictional phase, and that they may interfere with IIAs’ ultimate aim of 
protecting the real interests behind the company. Further, given shareholders’ 
‘independent right of action’ under IIAs, whether the shareholder claimant is a party to 
the contract and other similar contractual/national law considerations are also irrelevant. 
The problem is that these notions, whatever their merits for jurisdictional purposes, have 
coloured how tribunals evaluate the substance of the claims. However, the concept of 
‘independent right of action’ risks concealing the substantive links between related 
claims. These links potentially affect investment claims’ admissibility to the extent they 
involve risks of double recovery or prejudice to third-party interests. 
1 The position before the Argentine cases 
Before the cases brought against Argentina beginning in 2001, there were few decisions 
of modern investment tribunals discussing shareholder standing. Moreover, to the extent 
a couple of decisions referred to the legal basis of shareholder indirect claims, the analysis 
was limited. There are several reasons for this. First, publicly available decisions by 
investment tribunals were not numerous even up to the mid-2000s. Second, some of the 
early cases potentially involving the issue included both claims referring to shareholders’ 
indirect interests in the company’s assets and to shareholders’ direct rights.220 To a certain 
extent, this made it unnecessary to deal expressly with shareholder standing. Third, the 
boom in the number of shareholder indirect claims–i.e., claims relating exclusively or 
primarily to injury to the company’s assets–is directly related to the inclusion of shares 
as protected investments and related provisions in IIAs. In turn, the entry into force of a 
high number of IIAs is a relatively recent phenomenon.221 
 One of the first modern investment cases to deal with a shareholder indirect claim 
was AAPL. The claim referred to the destruction, by the security forces of Sri Lanka, of 
a farm owned by a local company in which the claimant, a Hong Kong corporation, held 
equity capital.222 Sri Lanka did not challenge the claimant’s standing to claim 
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compensation ‘for its proportionate ownership’.223 While the tribunal clearly concluded 
that the claimant’s shares were a protected investment under the applicable BIT, this 
provided ‘no direct coverage’ as regards any of the company’s assets.224 Protection under 
international law referred only to the value of the shares owned by the foreign investor.225 
For damages purposes, however, all of the company’s assets had to be considered to 
establish the market price of the investor’s shares.226 In essence, therefore, the 
shareholder’s compensation was directly based on the harm to the company’s assets, after 
deducting the latter’s debts.227  
 During the 1990s, a few other decisions by investment tribunals affirmed 
jurisdiction over shareholder indirect claims, essentially invoking shares’ and companies’ 
protected status as investments under the relevant treaties.228 This allowed the tribunal in 
Goetz to observe, at the end of the decade, that  
the preceding jurisprudence of ICSID does not grant standing only to the sole legal persons directly affected 
by the contested measures but it extends it also to the shareholders of these persons, who are the real 
investors.229 
The Goetz tribunal concluded, however, that to respect its international obligations 
Burundi had to either pay compensation to the local company, the addressee of the state’s 
measures,230 or reinstate the company’s rights affected by such measures.231 Burundi had 
four months to comply. Otherwise, the tribunal would fix a compensation payable to the 
claimants,232 who held 999 of the 1000 shares of the company.233 
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Irrespective of whether the Goetz tribunal’s reading of ICSID precedents was 
correct, the decision clearly supports investment tribunals’ jurisdiction over shareholder 
indirect claims. Yet, despite being a case brought under an IIA,234 the tribunal recognized, 
first, that the ‘internationalization of investment relationships’ provoked by IIAs did not 
‘lead to a radical “denationalization” of the legal relationships arising from the foreign 
investment, to the point that the national law of the host state would be deprived of any 
pertinence or application giving way to an exclusive role to international law’.235 Second, 
the decision’s conclusions on compensation entail that in the tribunal’s view the 
shareholders’ and the company’s claims substantively overlapped–i.e., referred to the 
same damages–to the extent that compensating the company would extinguish the 
shareholders’ treaty claims. In fact, in execution of the arbitral tribunal’s decision, a 
settlement agreement was concluded between the company–not its shareholders–and 
Burundi.236 
2 The corporate entity in the jurisdictional decision in CMS 
The first jurisdictional decision rendered in the cases arising from Argentina’s 2001 
collapse is also the most influential as regards shareholder standing.237 CMS Gas 
Transmission Company (CMS) was a minority shareholder in an Argentine natural gas 
transportation licensee (TGN).238 The dispute referred to alleged breaches of the 
Argentina-US BIT as a result of measures taken by Argentina in respect of the licensee’s 
tariffs.239 The measures related to the serious crisis affecting the country reaching its apex 
in late 2001 and early 2002, which led to the adoption of changes in the country’s 
macroeconomic policies.240 As an admissibility objection, Argentina advanced that CMS 
did not ‘hold the rights upon which it base[d] its claim ‒ to wit, TGN being the licensee, 
and CMS only a minority shareholder in this company, only TGN could claim for any 
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damage suffered’.241 Argentina further argued that the licensee did ‘not qualify as a 
foreign investor under the BIT nor [was] the License a foreign investment’ and that CMS 
was claiming for indirect damages resulting from its minority shareholding in the local 
company and not for direct damages.242   
One of the main issues the tribunal identified for decision was ‘whether a 
shareholder can claim for its rights in a foreign company independently from the latter’s 
rights and, if so, whether these rights refer only to its status as shareholder or also to 
substantive rights connected with the legal and economic performance of its 
investment’.243 Argentina had invoked the rule under Argentine law–shared with many 
other legal systems–that ‘the corporate legal personality is distinct and separate from that 
of the shareholders’.244 The tribunal observed that, regardless of its merits, the distinction 
was not dispositive in the case, essentially because national law was not relevant for 
jurisdictional purposes.245 As to general international law, the tribunal considered the 
ICJ’s treatment of shareholder rights in Barcelona Traction as pertaining only to the 
specific context of diplomatic protection and thus not germane.246 In Barcelona Traction, 
moreover, the ICJ had viewed the legal relationships in question as linked to national 
law.247 The CMS tribunal’s conclusion was that it found ‘no bar in current international 
law to the concept of allowing claims by shareholders independently from those of the 
corporation concerned’.248 
With respect to the ICSID Convention, the tribunal noted the lack of a definition 
of the term investment, but recalled that shares were one of the examples of investment 
specifically mentioned in the drafting history.249 Under the Convention, moreover, the 
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concept of investment is not restricted to controlling or majority shareholdings.250 Article 
25(2)(b) in fine’s reference to ‘foreign control’ is meant to ‘facilitate agreement between 
the parties, so as not to have the corporate personality interfering with the protection of 
the real interests associated with the investment’.251 However, the same outcome may be 
realized through BIT provisions including non-controlling or minority shareholders 
within the scope of the consent to arbitral jurisdiction.252 Further, ‘[w]hether the protected 
investor is in addition a party to a concession agreement or a license agreement with the 
host State is immaterial for the purpose of finding jurisdiction under those treaty 
provisions, since there is a direct right of action of shareholders’.253 
Argentina, however, did not seem to dispute shareholders’ ‘independent right of 
action’.254 Rather, in the tribunal’s words, Argentina ‘asserted that an investment in shares 
is indeed a protected investment under the Treaty, but this would only allow claims for 
measures affecting the shares as such’ and not for claims referring to losses suffered by 
the company.255 The tribunal did not discuss this specific issue in the decision on 
jurisdiction. Perhaps more problematic, it did not address it in its award either. In the end, 
the CMS tribunal found that national law was largely irrelevant as regards jurisdiction and 
saw the company’s corporate personality as potentially ‘interfering with the protection of 
the real interests associated with the investment’.256 It also regarded as immaterial 
whether the claimant in an investment treaty claim is a party to the contract to which the 
claim relates.257  
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Yet it is increasingly accepted that national law is relevant in investment treaty 
arbitration even for certain jurisdictional matters.258 Specifically in the field of 
shareholder standing, it has been argued that the provisions of the relevant national law 
on shareholder rights should not be treated as a fact and should be applied together with 
international law.259 The principles of corporate personality and its legal corollaries,260 as 
well as that of privity of contract, are generally recognized both by national and general 
international law. The CMS tribunal may have been right in asserting that these notions 
do not affect an international tribunal’s jurisdiction granted by an IIA. But a similar 
conclusion is not justified with respect to decisions on the admissibility or merits of 
shareholder treaty claims.261 Such principles may be relevant in determining to what 
extent shareholder claims relating to a contract concluded by the company are, in 
substantive terms, compatible with the company’s rights and those of third parties. And 
if so, whether in any event respect for such rights requires, in the circumstances of the 
case, that limits to the admissibility of the shareholder claim be acknowledged. 
3 The object of shareholders’ claims 
Investment tribunals have accepted shareholder standing mainly based on the wide 
definition of the term investment in IIAs. Shares–and often the companies themselves–
are generally expressly included within the definition, which means that shareholders 
hold a protected investment. The effect of this is that shareholders hold rights that may 
be asserted independently from the company’s rights and ‘a separate cause of action under 
the Treaty in connection with the protected investment’.262 The shareholder’s separate 
cause of action concept is often linked, in CMS263 and in the decisions that followed it 
such as LG&E,264 to the distinction between contract and treaty claims. Since 
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shareholders have a protected investment under IIAs, they have jus standi to invoke a 
treaty cause of action notwithstanding other causes of action that may exist under 
contracts or other (generally national law) instruments.265   
 Differences have emerged, however, wherever the decisions have provided 
reasons beyond the general concept that investors protected by a treaty may have a treaty 
cause of action: in particular, as to the legal basis of shareholder rights over the company’s 
assets. In Azurix, the claimant had incorporated and indirectly owned 90% of the 
shareholding of a local company, which was party to a concession contract for the 
provision of water and wastewater services in Argentina.266 The tribunal observed that 
shares, companies, and rights under contracts qualified as investments under the 
Argentina-US BIT.267 Accordingly, ‘[p]rovided the direct or indirect ownership or control 
is established, rights under a contract held by a local company constitute an investment 
protected by the BIT’.268 Thus, a shareholder who has demonstrated control can invoke 
the company’s contractual rights as its own investment.269 
 Similarly, also applying the Argentina-US BIT, the tribunal in Continental stated 
that in the case of an acquisition of the entire capital of a company ‘the treaty protection 
is not limited to the free enjoyment of the shares’ and extends ‘to the operation of the 
local company that represents the investment’.270 Other investment tribunals have also 
concluded that the protection BITs grant to shareholders extends to the investments’ 
‘substance’, i.e., the assets owned by the company, but without requiring that the latter be 
controlled, let alone wholly-owned, by the foreign shareholder.271 Regardless of whether 
control is required, these cases stand for the proposition that a shareholder may invoke 
the local company’s rights, provided it does so in the context of a treaty claim. 
The tribunal in El Paso, again under the Argentina-US BIT, took a different view. 
But this view was spelled out only in the award. In the jurisdictional decision, in order to 
reject Argentina’s objection that the claimant as an indirect minority shareholder had no 
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jus standi,272 the tribunal simply quoted the LG&E tribunal’s opinion that shares in local 
companies were a protected investment under the Argentina-US BIT, regardless of 
whether it was a majority or minority shareholding.273 In the award, however, the tribunal 
stated that the contention that the BIT’s broad definition of investment encompassed both 
the claimant’s shareholdings and the rights of the local companies274  
appear[ed] contradictory: either the domestic companies enjoy an independent legal existence, in which 
case it is they who own said legal and contractual rights, this meaning that the foreign investors’ losses can 
be measured only by the diminished value of their shares in the companies.  Or the domestic companies’ 
legal existence is but a fiction, at least on the international level, and can therefore be disregarded, which 
would mean that the investment can practically be characterised as a direct one, the consequence being that 
the foreign investor may claim, as the owner of the local companies, the legal and contractual rights in 
question, but not its losses as a shareholder.275 
The tribunal saw these two views as ‘irreconcilable’ and involving claiming twice for the 
same damage.276 The local companies were not protected investors and thus their rights 
could not be considered protected investments.277 Further, the claimant’s investment was 
limited to its shares in the local companies.278  
The decisions considered above differ with respect to investment tribunals’ 
approaches to important aspects of shareholder standing. The differences include the 
extent to which (and if so in what circumstances) the company’s contractual rights may 
be considered an investment of its shareholders under IIAs. These divergences cannot be 
explained away by referring to the text of the different treaties. For example, the 
Argentina-US BIT includes investments ‘owned or controlled directly or indirectly’ by 
protected investors.279 Still, in applying the treaty, the tribunals in Azurix, Continental, 
and El Paso arrived at different conclusions on whether the shareholder claimant could 
claim for harm to the company’s assets. When rights under a contract concluded by the 
local company are considered as investments over which foreign shareholders have 
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(directly or indirectly) rights or interests, the overlap between the company’s contract 
rights and shareholders’ treaty rights is undeniable. Aside from jurisdictional and 
applicable law implications, the underlying contract rights that may be claimed both by 
the company and its shareholders (typically before national and international fora, 
respectively) are the same.  
The fact that both the company in national law claims and shareholders in treaty 
claims can claim for the same assets is not necessarily contradictory. Arguably, the 
protection in IIAs of shareholders’ indirect interests in assets has precisely that effect.280 
Yet the possibility of multiple recovery for the same damage is clear. Preventing the 
shareholder from claiming both for harm to the company’s assets and for the diminution 
in the value of the shares resulting from the same measures, as asserted by the El Paso 
decision, prevents instances of double recovery within the same proceeding. But, at the 
same time, the approach in El Paso entails acknowledging that shareholder claims for 
reduction in the share value may involve the same damage as a claim for the local 
company’s rights. No criterion was offered as to how to reconcile such shareholder claims 
with the company’s claims for its rights. 
B The merits of the claims 
The distinction between shareholder treaty rights and the company’s rights has been 
articulated in jurisdictional terms by investment tribunals, without a discussion of the 
merits. Yet when the substance of the claims is considered, the overlap between the two 
sets of rights becomes apparent (although even merits decisions generally bypass it). IIAs 
may have created new holders of protected interests and additional causes of action 
available to shareholders, but the underlying assets remain those of the local company. 
They are owned by a person different from the shareholder.  
In the case of contracts, the lack of privity should not be neglected for purposes 
of treaty claims’ admissibility. However, if in the circumstances of the case such lack is 
not deemed as an absolute bar to admissibility, the equilibrium between contractual rights 
and obligations should then be considered. For example, is it admissible for the 
shareholder to recover the full value of contract rights when some or all of the local 
company’s contractual obligations remain outstanding (and will perhaps never be 
fulfilled)? Or should shareholder recovery be, where appropriate, limited to account for 
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how the local company has complied (or failed to comply) with its obligations under the 
contract? The answer to the last question should be in the affirmative. Privity of contract 
cannot be ignored in allowing shareholder treaty claims and at the same time work as a 
shield for the shareholder in respect of contractual obligations. If the shareholder is, in 
substance, enforcing contractual rights (through treaty claims), it must be held 
accountable for contractual obligations, at least in terms of limiting recovery where 
appropriate.  
1 Distinguishing between shareholder and company rights 
Several arbitral decisions have stressed the notion that shareholder claims involve rights 
different from the company’s rights. This and similar ideas are related to the contract 
claims/treaty claims distinction. They frequently also appear connected to the distinction 
between national and international law. In the Telefónica case, which involved the 
Argentina-Spain BIT, the tribunal noted that since 
the assets and rights that Telefónica claim[ed had] been injured in breach of the BIT [fell] under the 
definition of investments under the BIT, it [was] immaterial that title to some of them [was] in [the local 
company] in accordance with the law of Argentina. Telefónica assert[ed] its own treaty rights for their 
protection, regardless of any right, contractual or non-contractual, that [the local company] might assert in 
respect of such assets and rights under local law.281  
In the jurisdictional decision, the tribunal in Urbaser (involving the same BIT) stressed 
that what was crucial was that the claimants were exercising their own treaty rights as 
investors in shares of a local company, which were ‘different from any rights attached to 
their shares under domestic law’.282 
While the decisions in Telefónica and Urbaser were rendered in the jurisdictional 
phase, the issue of distinguishing between the company’s and the shareholders’ rights 
came up again in CMS in the merits award. In the case, it was not CMS as a shareholder 
but the local company who held the licence that (together with other national law 
provisions) had been affected by the contested measures.283 In the award, the tribunal 
noted that Argentina had ‘again raised certain jurisdictional issues that [had been] 
addressed in the jurisdictional phase of the case, such as the jus standi of the Claimant’, 
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which would not be reopened.284 Argentina had argued that the provisions of the national 
regulatory framework invoked in the claim granted rights to the local company but not to 
the foreign shareholder.285 
In the decision on jurisdiction, however, while the tribunal had clearly affirmed 
CMS’s right to claim independently from the company,286 it had not specified which 
rights CMS could claim for. After defining the applicable law and confirming the scope 
of the tribunal’s jurisdiction,287 the award posed and answered the following questions: 
‘Did the Claimant have a Right to a Tariff Calculated in US Dollars?’, ‘Did the Claimant 
have a Right to Adjustment of Tariffs in Accordance with the US PPI?’, and ‘Did the 
Claimant have a Right to Stabilization Mechanisms under the License?’.288 None of these 
rights were provided for in the applicable treaty but, if anything, in specific provisions of 
the local company’s license and the applicable regulatory framework.289 Nonetheless, 
because such rights were ‘no longer present in the regime governing the business 
operations of the Claimant’, the tribunal found a breach of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard.290 
CMS had also brought a claim under the Argentina-US BIT provision requiring 
each party to ‘observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments’ 
(the ‘umbrella clause’).291 Confronted with Argentina’s argument that CMS derived no 
rights from the local company’s license because it was not a party to it,292 the tribunal 
again refused to discuss allegedly jurisdictional aspects that it had considered in the 
jurisdictional phase.293 A violation of the umbrella clause was found ‘to the extent that 
legal and contractual obligations pertinent to the investment have been breached and [had] 
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285 Ibid [148]. See also ibid [132]. 
286 CMS (Jurisdiction) [48]. 
287 CMS (Award) [115-126]. 
288 Ibid [127-151]. 
289 Ibid. See also Charanne [545] (stating that the CMS case involved the breach of contractual 
commitments). 
290 CMS (Award) [275-281]. 
291 Ibid [296]. 
292 Ibid [298]. 
293 Ibid [299]. 
141 
  
resulted in the violation of the standards of protection under the Treaty’.294 This finding 
was annulled by an ad hoc committee for failure to state reasons.295 The committee was 
troubled with the idea that ‘[a]lthough CMS was not entitled as a minority shareholder to 
invoke those obligations of Argentina under Argentine law (not being the obligee), the 
effect of [the umbrella clause] was to give it standing to invoke them under the BIT’.296 
State obligations covered by umbrella clauses 
will often be a bilateral obligation, or will be intrinsically linked to obligations of the investment company. 
Yet a shareholder, though apparently entitled to enforce the company’s rights in its own interest, will not 
be bound by the company’s obligations, e.g. as to dispute settlement.297 
The committee could not understand, based on the award, how the tribunal had concluded 
that CMS could enforce obligations that Argentina owed to another party.298 
In considering the merits of shareholder claims, other investment tribunals have 
drawn a clearer distinction between the company’s rights and those of the shareholders. 
For example, the tribunals in the Suez cases, while simply noting in the jurisdictional 
decisions that under the applicable BITs shareholders had standing to protect their shares 
through an arbitration,299 clarified in the merits phase that the local companies, as the 
concessionaires, owned the contractual rights under the concessions.300 Shareholders only 
have ‘an indirect interest in those same rights’,301 although their protected investment, the 
shares, would be directly affected by any harm to the company’s assets.302 Investment 
tribunals have also affirmed that ‘shareholders do not have claims arising from or rights 
in the assets of the companies in which they hold shares’.303 
In the decisions discussed above dealing with the merits of the claims, 
shareholders were treated either as directly holding (or being entitled to directly invoke) 
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certain contractual and other rights that under domestic law were owned by the local 
company, as in CMS, or as having an ‘indirect interest’ in these rights, as in Suez. In both 
cases, nonetheless, the holding of shares as a protected investment allowed shareholders 
to bring claims vis-à-vis measures affecting the company’s assets.304 The distinction 
between rights and ‘an indirect interest in those same rights’ is reminiscent of a similar 
distinction drawn in Barcelona Traction.305 Unlike the default position under general 
international law described in Barcelona Traction and Diallo, IIAs often expressly protect 
both the rights and interests of investors.306 This would confer on shareholders a treaty 
cause of action in respect of assets over which, strictly speaking, they do not hold property 
rights.307  
Yet even if conceptualized as treaty-protected interests (or rights),308 such 
interests are held over the same assets that are owned by the local company under the 
applicable national law. Thus, both the company and IIA protected shareholders may have 
the right to claim in respect of the same injury to the company’s assets, albeit probably 
under different legal systems. Further, juridical persons appearing as claimants in 
investment arbitration are often part of a network of related companies.309 Between a 
foreign shareholder and a subsidiary company incorporated in the investment’s host state, 
there may be any given number of intermediary legal entities. The point was noted by 
Jones, who observed that ‘shareholders are not infrequently corporations themselves, and 
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the process of identifying individual shareholders might be prolonged ad infinitum’.310 
Thus, indirect shareholdings in the local company affected by host state measures may be 
held by many entities.311 While the high number of potential claimants may be regarded 
simply as a byproduct of IIAs’ jurisdictional provisions, for admissibility purposes the 
fact that in substance the same claim is involved is a material fact.   
2 Obligations without privity? 
Investment tribunals have generally underscored that shareholder claims involve the 
latter’s rights, not those of the company. Shareholder treaty claims involve not only 
different persons but also different causes of action than ‘national’ claims by the local 
company. Under this theory, any settlement or waiver by the local entity of such national 
claims does not directly affect shareholder treaty claims. The El Paso tribunal 
underscored the distinction between the shareholder as a protected investor under the BIT 
and the company where the shareholder had an interest, which was subject to the national 
regulatory framework.312 On this basis, the tribunal concluded that the contention that the 
claimant had accepted the contested measures     
by not objecting to the signing by [the local companies] of a number of agreements with the Government 
may not be shared. El Paso may not, in fact, be equated to the companies in which it was only a minority, 
non-controlling shareholder.313 
The foreign shareholder was claiming under the BIT in its own right.314 The local 
companies’ dealings with the government did not in any way affect the claimant’s treaty 
rights, whose alleged breach constituted the cause of action in the case.315 
 Other investment tribunals, however, have attributed effects to acts of the local 
company on the international claim. In the first jurisdictional decision, the Saur tribunal 
emphasized that the shareholder claimant was not a party to the relevant concession 
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contract and could thus not exercise rights under it.316 This had a concrete jurisdictional 
impact, in that the claimant was deemed not bound by the forum selection clause.317 The 
tribunal asserted that the claimant was not advancing contract but treaty claims.318 Since 
the claimant had concluded no contract with a public entity, the possibility of presenting 
a contract claim was ab initio excluded.319 
 In the merits decision, however, the Saur tribunal had to consider the effect of a 
renegotiation of the concession contract agreed to by the local company.320 Invoking a 
provision of Argentine law, which was part of the applicable law,321 the tribunal observed 
that under this provision settlement agreements had a res judicata effect binding on the 
parties.322 But it then added that the res judicata effect extended also to the claimant who, 
as the controlling shareholder, could not regard measures that its own subsidiary had 
accepted as expropriatory.323 The statement was not based on the Argentine law 
provision, which mentioned only the parties. Still, the claimant was ‘bound by the acts of 
its subsidiary’.324 In fact, the tribunal rejected all the expropriation claims under the treaty 
that were based on measures covered by the renegotiation agreement.325 However, other 
than suggesting that a settlement by the company prevents the controlling shareholder 
from reopening the settled claims,326 the tribunal did not elaborate on the circumstances 
under which a settlement concluded by the local company may put an end to a BIT claim 
by one of its shareholders.327 
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Whenever a contract is involved, privity of contract needs to be considered, even 
in a treaty claim.328 Contracts are based on the idea that parties have liberty to decide how 
to regulate their relations,329 which includes selecting with whom to contract, the 
applicable law, the scope of the obligations, and so on. This does not mean that privity of 
contract should affect investment tribunals’ jurisdiction over treaty claims, in which the 
claimant invokes its own treaty rights.330 But when an IIA claim is premised substantively 
on breaches of a contractual framework, both parties to the investment arbitration should 
be able to invoke the contractual obligations against each other, even if such parties are 
not the same as the parties to the contract.331 Otherwise, if privity of contract is 
disregarded only in favour of investors but not in favour of the respondent state, the 
balance achieved in the contract underlying the treaty claim is disrupted. Further, 
notwithstanding the contract claims/treaty claims distinction, it is recognized that both 
types of claims may involve the same damages.332 That the claimants in the various claims 
may be different does not allay double recovery concerns. Thus, if despite the absence of 
privity shareholders can claim damages for measures affecting the company’s contracts 
via treaty claims, the settlement by the company of its contract claims involving the same 
damages should weigh on the admissibility of such treaty claims.333       
III. CONCLUSION   
International tribunals have discussed the position of shareholders in international law in 
different contexts. Complexities arise from potential overlaps between shareholders’ 
rights, interests, and claims and those of the company and from the amalgam of national 
and international law provisions to which these rights, interests, and claims are subject. 
In Barcelona Traction, the ICJ drew a distinction between the rights of the company and 
those of the shareholders under general international law,334 which it ‘rigorously’ 
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endorsed in the Diallo case.335 But this distinction, while fundamental in Barcelona 
Traction336 and still applicable even in the specialized context of international investment 
law, does not have fixed boundaries. International law may grant shareholders new rights 
whose object may coincide, totally or partially, with some of the company’s rights. For 
example, IIAs’ protection of indirect interests or control over assets may effectively grant 
shareholders international law entitlements over the company’s assets. 
There is little reflection, for purposes other than jurisdiction, of the relationship 
between shareholder treaty claims and the company’s non-international claims. 
Prevailing views on shareholder claims have been based on IIAs as lex specialis. 
Investment tribunals have consistently affirmed their jurisdiction over claims by 
shareholders regarding measures taken vis-à-vis the company. The thrust of these arbitral 
decisions is that shareholders assert their own rights in treaty claims, to be distinguished 
from the company’s rights that may be asserted in contract or national law claims. 
However, the relevant rationales are often based merely on shares’ status as a protected 
investment. But such status does not establish precisely which rights shareholders have,337 
nor does it justify an abandonment of the separation between the company and its 
shareholders338 through the prevailing idea of the independence of shareholder treaty 
claims. Shareholder IIA claims for harm to the company’s assets are substantively less 
independent from the company’s claims than shareholder direct claims as described by 
the ICJ in Barcelona Traction (if only because they generally involve the same damage). 
 This chapter argued that there is a substantive overlap between shareholder treaty 
rights and company rights under contracts and national law, notwithstanding prevailing 
theories on shareholders’ ‘independent right of action’–which Barcelona Traction itself 
acknowledged. This overlap may have little or no relevance for jurisdictional 
determinations, which hinge on the existence of consent to international jurisdiction. But 
it cannot be ignored for the admissibility and merits of investment claims. Important 
principles of international law (even if developed in the context of diplomatic protection) 
and national law relative to the position of companies and shareholders apply. These 
principles include the company’s independent personality; the distinction between the 
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assets and rights of the company and those of the shareholders; the need to take a 
substantive rather than formalistic view of the nature of shareholder and company claims; 
and the importance of considering not only the rights and interests of the shareholder but 
also those of the corporate entity and the third parties who have dealings with it. 
 The position in international investment law that shareholders in indirect claims 
invoke only their own treaty rights, which are independent from the company’s ‘local’ 
rights, is artificial. Shareholders exercise both their own treaty rights as well as 
contractual and national law rights belonging to the company, which often entails 
disregarding privity of contract. When this is deemed justified in the circumstances, it 
should work both ways. That the shareholder is not a party to the contract should not 
prevent the respondent state from invoking the contract against a treaty claim for 
admissibility or merits purposes. Further, to the extent local courts are supposed to take 
into account the result of the IIA claim to avoid double recovery, the local company may 
be deprived of its own rights as a result of the treaty claim. Investment tribunals should 
consider whether shareholder protection requires this potential deprivation and, if so, 
whether the interests of third parties, including the company’s creditors, are adequately 
protected. 
One of the reasons behind the virtually complete lack of consideration of these 
aspects is that current approaches to shareholder standing focus almost exclusively on 
jurisdictional aspects. Yet jurisdictional decisions do not contain a discussion as to how 
to distinguish the substance of shareholder and company rights, even when the claims 
clearly referred to alleged injury to corporate assets. This discussion is generally not 
present in merits decisions either. Further, investment tribunals often consider that their 
jurisdiction hinges almost exclusively on a few specific provisions of the applicable IIA. 
Thus, substantive principles of general international law have had a limited role in 
jurisdictional determinations concerning shareholder standing; and national law 
principles almost none. However, serious consideration of national and general 
international law rules on the interrelation between shareholder and company rights may 
contribute to avoiding undesirable consequences of shareholder treaty claims, including 
the prosecution of overlapping claims by different entities and prejudice to the rights of 
third parties.  
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5     Damages in Shareholder Treaty Claims 
[T]he Tribunal will remain vigilant about the possibility of double recovery that might 
result from any intersection between the treaty claims and the contract claims.1 
Admissibility includes circumstances that lead a tribunal not to hear a claim or to reject 
it after hearing the evidence but without deciding the ultimate merits. By contrast, a 
decision on the merits is a precondition for the granting of damages. Damages are the 
ultimate goal of almost all investment claims and are thus fundamental in determining the 
substance of the claims. They allow to identify the claim’s core, no matter how the claim 
is otherwise characterized or what conceptual distinctions are used to distinguish it from 
other claims. Nor do standing or cause of action alter such core. When the losses involved 
are the same, any alleged independence between the relevant claims for admissibility or 
merits purposes collapses. By considering the damages sought, one can compare the 
substance of the different claims. 
Investment tribunals have considered overlaps between contract and treaty claims 
at the quantum phase.2 The CME tribunal stated that even if local and international 
proceedings have the same object, i.e., compensation for injury to the investment, the 
jurisdiction of neither forum is affected.3 It considered such overlaps as irrelevant also for 
merits purposes, although decisions in overlapping proceedings could impact the 
quantum of the damages.4 Further, commentators argue that the applicable rules allow 
parallel proceedings that are ‘identical or highly similar in economic and factual terms’.5 
Accordingly, any coordination between them must ‘take place on the level of remedies 
and compensation’.6 In international investment law, thus, given the differences in the 
causes of action (contract/treaty) and subjects involved (company/shareholders), possible 
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overlaps between contract and treaty claims appear largely irrelevant, except for quantum 
purposes.7  
The reason for allowing consideration of the consequences of substantive overlaps 
between related claims only at the damages phase (if at all) is unclear. On the one hand, 
in discussing jurisdiction over claims on account of shareholder ‘derivative prejudice’, 
the tribunal in Gami stressed that uncertainty as to whether there is ‘sufficient directness’ 
between a host state measure and damage to the shareholder’s investment ‘is not an 
obstacle to jurisdiction’.8 Whether the shareholder can prove damage to its investment 
and to what extent such damage is different from one suffered by the company should not 
deprive the shareholder of its day in court. On the other hand, when considering damages, 
investment tribunals have generally described the avoidance of double recovery as being 
prohibited by a ‘well-established principle’.9 The Venezuela Holdings tribunal related this 
prohibition to unjust enrichment.10 Arguably, avoiding double recovery and/or double 
payment seems to require a ‘substantive’ approach to the subject matter of investment 
claims. If claimants could circumvent the prohibition on double recovery simply by 
pointing to differences in the causes of action or the identity of the claimants, little would 
be left of this well-established principle.11  
Substantive overlaps between claims affect admissibility more generally, even if 
the claims were brought by different entities and invoke different causes of action.12 The 
damages claimed in each case are of the essence, since they are the main element that 
determines whether the substance of the claims is the same. Actual or potential overlaps 
in the damages require revisiting the idea of independence of shareholder rights and treaty 
claims in relation to standing and cause of action. If the damages being claimed are the 
same, notwithstanding the jurisdictional position, are there reasons to conclude that all or 
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part of the damages should go to someone different from the IIA claimant (with the result 
that all or part of the IIA claim is inadmissible)? Further, should an investment tribunal 
defer to another tribunal (e.g. the contractual forum) for adjudicating all or part of the 
damages in question under a different legal basis? The relevance of these questions, 
however, depends on the answer to an antecedent question: are the damages generally 
claimed in shareholder treaty claims the same as those that may be claimed in contract 
claims?  
Part I of this chapter discusses damages in relation to shareholders’ IIA rights. It 
compares shareholder claims involving injury to the company’s assets with claims for 
diminution in the share value. The potential impact on admissibility of the corporate 
structure’s characteristics and third-party interests is also considered. Part II refers to the 
relationship between the cause of action and the damages claimed. It discusses whether 
‘contract’ and ‘treaty’ damages are different and considers the related issues of 
overlapping entitlements over the same assets and of claims for the same damage before 
different jurisdictions. The chapter concludes by arguing that the damage involved in 
shareholder indirect claims under IIAs and in related contract claims is quintessentially 
the same. Based on this substantive overlap, investment tribunals should assess the 
admissibility of shareholder claims considering, first, that not only the local company, as 
the contractual party, but also third parties may have rights/interests in relation to the 
same losses, and second, the well-established need to avoid, directly or indirectly, 
multiple compensation. 
I. DAMAGES AND SHAREHOLDER STANDING 
A Overview 
The general acceptance of shareholder indirect claims, as a jurisdictional matter, rests 
upon the notion that shareholders invoke their own rights–granted by IIAs–rather than the 
company’s rights. A different matter, however, is precisely what damages they are 
claiming. What is the relationship between shareholders’ ‘treaty’ rights and their damages 
claims? What international law requires is a breach of a shareholder’s right by a measure 
that has a ‘sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus’13 with an injury suffered by this 
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shareholder.14 Further, the tribunal in Siemens observed, referring to shareholder indirect 
claims, that the damage suffered by the company must ‘have a detrimental effect on the 
investment’, which is ‘the cause of the State’s responsibility under the Treaty.’15 
 Yet the requirements that a right of the shareholder must have been breached and 
that there must be a detrimental effect on its investment–and not just on the company in 
which it holds shares16–do not resolve the complexities of overlapping shareholder and 
company claims. First, given the breadth of IIA standards of treatment, requiring that a 
shareholder right must have been violated and that the shareholder is thus the person 
affected by the breach,17 does not say much as to the losses for which shareholders may 
be compensated. For example, if the right under the fair and equitable treatment standard 
is simply that the investment be treated fairly and equitably, the possibilities for a 
shareholder to argue that this right has been breached are considerable (notwithstanding 
any property rights other people may hold over the relevant assets). Second, assuming a 
shareholder establishes that its IIA rights have been breached, can it directly claim to be 
compensated for the offending measure’s impact on the company’s assets? If so, does this 
simply mean that IIAs add an international cause of action to the one available to the local 
company? If shareholders can only claim for the impact on the value of their shares, is 
this damage different from the one suffered by the company as a result of the same 
measure? These questions are considered in the next three sections.    
1 Injury to the company’s assets  
As a matter of principle, international investment law acknowledges the ‘separation of 
property rights as between company and shareholder’,18 including in damages 
calculations.19 The separation is recognized by national legal systems as ‘an important 
manifestation’ of the ‘firm distinction between the separate entity of the company and 
                                                             
14 To be able to claim reparation, the shareholder must be the person who suffered the damage. Müller 
(2015) 30. 
15 Siemens (Jurisdiction) [138]. 
16 Ripinsky and Williams state that, according to investment tribunals, ‘compensation to the claimant-
shareholder must be measured by reference to the impact of the State conduct on the claimant’s financial 
position as a shareholder’. Ripinsky and Williams (2008) 157. 
17 Müller (2015) 34. 
18 Barcelona Traction (Second Phase) [41].  
19 Ripinsky and Williams (2008) 161. 
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that of the shareholder, each with a distinct set of rights’.20 By contrast, some investment 
tribunals have advanced that it is immaterial whether the assets and rights forming the 
investment protected by the IIA belong not to the shareholders but to local companies 
under national law.21 In their damages claims, shareholders assert their ‘own treaty rights 
for their protection, regardless of any right, contractual or non-contractual that [local 
companies] might assert in respect of such assets and rights under local law’.22 Other 
tribunals have stated that, provided the company’s rights and assets are themselves 
protected investments under the applicable IIA, shareholders have ‘an indirect interest in 
those same rights’.23 
Despite recognizing indirect treaty interests or rights over the company’s assets, 
investment tribunals have often refrained from expressly asserting shareholders’ right to 
directly claim for harms to such rights and assets.24 The award in El Paso dealt with 
claims involving contractual and legal rights of local companies under the electricity and 
hydrocarbons regulatory frameworks.25 The tribunal suggested that to the extent the local 
companies themselves were not protected investments,26 shareholders could not claim for 
the companies’ rights.27 The tribunal in Poštová Banka, referring to Greek government 
bonds owned by a local entity,28 concluded that a shareholder of a company incorporated 
in the host state had ‘no standing to pursue claims directly over the assets of the local 
company, as it has no legal right to such assets’.29  Along the same lines, shareholder 
claims for debts owed to the company have been generally rejected.30 
Yet the tribunal in El Paso contended that when the investment is in shares of a 
company whose agreements have been affected by the state measure, ‘the damage to that 
                                                             
20 Ibid.  
21 Total (Jurisdiction) [80]. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Suez ARB/03/17 (Liability) [119]; Suez ARB/03/19 (Liability) [130]. 
24 At most, tribunals refer to the possibility under IIAs of shareholders ‘bring[ing] claims for harms to their 
investments in locally incorporated companies’. Daimler [91]. 
25 El Paso (Award) [155-156, 178].   
26 IIAs sometimes include companies and other legal entities themselves–not only shares in companies–as 
protected investments. See e.g. Argentina-US BIT, Art I.1 a) ii); Canada-Cameroon BIT, Art 1. 
27 El Paso (Award) [188].  
28 Poštová Banka [44, 228].  
29 Ibid [245]. 
30 Azurix (Award) [431]. 
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investment caused by the breach of the BIT must obviously be calculated by taking into 
account any benefits accruing from the agreements in question or from the Government’s 
measures’.31 This tribunal had previously found, however, that because the claimant had 
signed no contract with the government it held ‘no contractual rights to be protected’.32 
Thus, in principle ‘any benefits accruing from the agreements’ would seem to belong to 
the company, not the shareholders. Similarly, in the award in Suez II the tribunal noted 
that shareholders’ 
investments were not fixed, physical assets, such as a factory or a pipeline, whose valuation usually may 
be made relatively easily. Instead, what the Claimants lost in these cases at the time of the measures taken 
in violation of the applicable treaties was the stream of revenue, often referred to as a ‘cash flow,’ expected 
to be received over the remaining term of the Concession Contract.33  
In this case, however, it was also the local company that had the ‘legal right to receive a 
stream of revenue’ under the contract.34  
Hence, for the tribunal in El Paso shareholders cannot claim directly for the 
company’s contractual rights, but any benefits under the contracts may be taken into 
account in assessing shareholder compensation. For the Suez II tribunal the justification 
for compensating shareholders was their ‘indirect interest’ over the company’s 
contractual rights.35 Kantor argued that when a breach of contract is involved, an investor 
in an IIA case ‘may present a traditional “breach of contract/lost profit” computation’.36 
Yet, whatever the legal justification, the contractual ‘stream of revenue’ that is taken into 
account by IIA tribunals is the same contractual cash flow over which the local company 
has direct contract rights. The state measure affecting the contract may have 
simultaneously breached distinct treaty rights of the shareholder and contract rights of the 
local company, but the loss caused by the measure is in principle the same. Here, there is 
no independence between the damage to the shareholder and the damage to the company.  
                                                             
31 El Paso (Award) [550]. 
32 Ibid [189]. 
33 Suez II (Award) [29]. 
34 Ibid [130]. 
35 Ibid. See also Lowe (2010) 1015. 
36 Kantor (2008) 43. 
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2 Injury to the share value  
In Barcelona Traction, the ICJ observed that a violation of the company’s rights 
frequently prejudices its shareholders.37 Although this did not mean that both had the right 
to be compensated, it was clear that the same measure could simultaneously injure several 
persons.38 Belgium’s claim on behalf of Belgian shareholders was premised on the loss 
suffered by the company, in proportion to the shares held by them.39 Spain acknowledged 
there was a relationship between the value of the company’s assets and that of its shares, 
in that an injury to the company’s affairs would cause a fall in the value of these shares.40 
Yet Spain stressed the difference between the damage suffered by the company and that 
suffered by its shareholders.41 A compensation for shareholders calculated on the basis of 
the reduction in the value of their shares was unobjectionable.42 But calculating 
shareholder compensation taking into account the injury to the company’s assets was 
abusive.43 
For the tribunal in El Paso, the claimant could not claim ‘once for the taking of 
the rights of the [local] companies and once for the diminution in value of the shares of 
those companies’.44 Here, the loss of value of the claimant’s shares was found to be 
related to measures affecting the local companies’ rights under contracts and national 
law.45 Allowing claims ‘for the loss of value of its shares in the companies and for the 
prejudice suffered by the latter, would [have amounted] to compensating the Claimant 
twice’.46 While endorsing the views adopted in El Paso,47 the tribunal in Poštová Banka 
went a step further and postulated a general principle (albeit obiter dictum, since the case 
was rejected on jurisdictional grounds). It accepted that shareholders may assert claims 
referring to measures causing prejudice to the ‘local company’s contracts and assets’, but 
                                                             
37 Barcelona Traction (Second Phase) [44].  
38 Ibid. See also Diallo (Merits), 689. 
39 Belgium’s Reply (1967), 635. 
40 Spain’s Counter-Memorial (1965), 398. 
41 Ibid, 649; Spain’s Rejoinder (1968), 861. 
42 Spain’s Rejoinder (1968), 863. 
43 Ibid. 
44 El Paso (Award) [175]. 
45 Ibid [204]. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Poštová Banka [236]. 
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‘only to the extent that those claims are related to the effects that the measures taken 
against the company’s assets have on the value of the claimant’s shares in such 
company’.48 
Whether shareholders can claim for measures affecting the value of their shares 
through the treatment of the company’s assets may be thought of in terms of strictly what 
rights shareholders hold. In Barcelona Traction, Fitzmaurice posited shareholders do not 
have a ‘legal right’ that shares ‘shall have or be maintained at, any particular market 
value’.49 More recently, however, it has been suggested that shareholders’ property rights 
include the value of their shares.50 Under modern IIAs, shares–even if held through 
intermediary companies–are generally a protected investment51 and certain investor rights 
are broadly defined. Thus, a case that a shareholder treaty right has been breached and 
that the damage consists in the reduction in the value of the shareholder’s investment is 
often not hard to make (leaving aside causation between the breach and the damage, 
which depends on the relevant facts).52 More relevant here, however, is to what extent 
damage calculated on the basis of the share value differs from damage stemming from a 
measure’s impact on the company’s assets. The point is discussed below. 
3 Protection of value? 
Do IIAs protect the value of investments? Douglas is right in affirming that for a state to 
be liable under an IIA the diminution or even the destruction of the value of an investment 
is not enough; a treaty obligation must have been breached.53 But he also observes that 
whatever the investment invoked, the rights constituting the investment ‘are converted 
into units of value when it comes to the assessment of damages’.54 In principle, a 
                                                             
48 Ibid [232]. See also Gas Natural [35]; Enkev [232]. 
49 Barcelona Traction (Second Phase), 68 (Sep Op, Fitzmaurice). See also Müller (2015) 298-299. 
50 Gami [129]; CME (Partial Award) [392]; Yukos (Jurisdiction) [372]; Isolux [834]. But see Saur 
(Jurisdiction 2006) [79]. 
51 Bentolila argues that because IIAs ‘protect property holders (investors) against loss suffered on their 
property (investment)… a loss incurred on the value of the share should grant the shareholder a right to 
claim reparation’. Bentolila (2010) 97. However, the host state does not breach a shareholder treaty right 
merely by adopting a measure that reduces the value of the shares. 
52 See e.g. EDF (Jurisdiction) [207]. The Encana tribunal required that the affected rights exist under 
national law for an expropriation to be possible. Encana (Award) [184]. But under other standards 
investment tribunals have not generally required the existence of a right recognized by national law for a 
breach of the IIA to be possible.   
53 Douglas (2014) 403. 
54 Ibid. 
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shareholder can claim for the diminution in the value of its shares caused by an act 
infringing its rights under an IIA. Assuming causality is demonstrated,55 it is a loss 
suffered by the shareholder caused by an illegal act. Yet it is necessary to consider how 
the value of shares is generally calculated in investment arbitration, in order to determine 
whether it is different from the value considered in other types of claims. 
(a) Standards of compensation and equity valuation 
Among the three forms of reparation recognized under international law–restitution, 
compensation, and satisfaction56–compensation and in particular monetary compensation 
is by far the most commonly used.57 As a matter of principle, compensation ‘shall cover 
any financially assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established’.58 
Investment tribunals often refer to a distinction between compensation for lawful 
expropriation, on the one hand, and compensation for unlawful expropriation59 and 
breaches of other standards of treatment, on the other. The requirement of compensation 
is part of the primary rule in the case of lawful expropriations, while paying compensation 
or damages60 is a legal consequence flowing from the internationally wrongful act in the 
case of unlawful expropriations.61  
As regards lawful expropriations, while the terms of the relevant provisions vary, 
IIAs generally require that the expropriating state pay a ‘just’62 or ‘adequate’63 
compensation. This compensation is defined, in more or less similar terms, as the 
‘equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment’.64 With respect to 
                                                             
55 The legal and valuation complexities involved in linking a diminution in share value to a specific state 
measure may be significant. 
56 ILC Commentaries, 95. 
57 Ripinsky and Williams (2008) 49. 
58 ILC Commentaries, 98. 
59 See Hepburn (2017) 91. The relevance of the distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriations has 
been questioned, however. See Paulsson (2005-III) 789; Ratner (2017). 
60 The LG&E tribunal noted that ‘there may be a difference between “compensation” as the consequence 
of a legal act and “damages” as the consequence of the committing of a wrongful act’. LG&E (Award), 
para 38. The distinction is not widely, let alone consistently, made in international law. For example, the 
ILC Articles on State Responsibility did not adopt it. Ibid. But see Burgstaller and Ketcheson (2017) 198. 
Unless otherwise stated, the terms compensation and damages are used interchangeably in this thesis.  
61 Burgstaller and Ketcheson (2017) 198. 
62 See e.g. Cyprus-Hungary BIT, Art 4.1(c). 
63 See e.g. Argentina-US BIT, Art IV.1 
64 Ibid. It has been argued that fair market value is also the rule under general international law. AIG, 106. 
Fair market value is generally defined as ‘[t]he price, expressed in terms of cash equivalents, at which 
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unlawful expropriations65 and breaches of other IIA standards, application of the Chorzów 
Factory principle of full reparation is the general rule.66 Yet even in this latter context, 
the ‘fair market value’ standard of compensation is frequently relevant.67 First, because 
in the case of illegal expropriations this value is often taken into account at least as a 
starting point to which other damages may be added or the figure be then otherwise 
adjusted.68 Second, several investment tribunals have applied the fair market value 
standard to breaches of standards of treatment other than expropriation, not least the fair 
and equitable treatment standard.69 
Fair market value may be calculated through a variety of valuation methods.70 
Among the ‘income-based methods’,71 discounted cash flow (DCF) has become the most 
popular among investment tribunals.72 According to the World Bank Guidelines on the 
Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, DCF ‘means the cash receipts realistically 
expected from the enterprise in each future year of its economic life as reasonably 
projected minus that year’s expected cash expenditure, after discounting this net cash 
flow for each year by a factor which reflects the time value of money, expected inflation, 
and the risk associated with such cash flow under realistic circumstances’.73 In finance, 
DCF approaches are preferred ‘because they are the epitome of how we describe value: 
that is, the present value of expected cash flows’.74 
                                                             
property would change hands between a hypothetical willing and able buyer and a hypothetical willing and 
able seller, acting at arm’s length in an open and unrestricted market, when neither is under compulsion to 
buy or sell and when both have reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts’. ASA Standards, 27.  
65 Marboe notes that according to investment tribunals’ prevailing view, ‘the payment of no or only little 
compensation does not render the underlying taking ipso facto wrongful’. Marboe (2015) 1061. 
66 Burgstaller and Ketcheson (2017) 202; ADC [483-490]; British Caribbean Bank [288]; Rusoro [640].   
67 Ripinsky and Williams (2008) 79. 
68 See e.g. ADC [499]. 
69 See CMS (Award) [410]; Azurix (Award) [424]. But see LG&E (Award) [35]. 
70 Marboe (2015) 1067. See also Walck (2015) 1046-1047 (referring to ‘(a) cost- or asset-based methods, 
(b) market- or transactions-based methods and (c) income-based methods’).  
71 The idea that underlies these methods is that ‘the value of income-producing capital assets or enterprise 
to its present owner or to a potential private purchaser is a function of the cash that the asset or enterprise 
is expected to generate in the future.’ Lieblich (1991) 61. 
72 Kinnear (2010) 563; OI European Group [658]; Tidewater [156]; Rusoro [758]. 
73 World Bank Guidelines, IV.6. 
74 Reilly and Brown (2004) 378. See also Friedland and Wong (1991) 407; Damodaran (2012) 11 (DCF is 
‘the foundation on which all other valuation approaches are built’). 
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There are several variants of the DCF method for purposes of valuing companies 
and stocks. These variants depend basically on how the cash flows to be considered are 
defined. In dividend discount models, the dividends are the cash flows used to value 
equity.75 More widely used in investment arbitration, however, is the ‘free cash flow 
model’. This model focuses on the part of the company’s cash flow from operations that 
is ‘free’, in that it does not need to be reinvested or used to acquire new assets.76 Equity 
may be valued considering the free cash flow to the firm (FCFF). This cash flow is the 
one generated by the company’s operations, from which capital expenditures are deducted 
(these expenditures being the reinvestment required to keep the company as a going 
concern).77 Here, the value of equity ‘is the present value of expected future FCFF—the 
total value of the company—minus the market value of outstanding debt’.78 Otherwise, 
the free cash flow to equity (FCFE) may be considered. The FCFE also consists of the 
cash flow generated by the company’s operations minus capital expenditures, but with 
the further deduction of debt payments in each relevant period as such payments become 
due.79 Here the equity value is simply the present value of the expected cash flow to 
equity,80 since debt is deducted from future cash flows before discounting them back to 
the valuation date. In both cases, discounting is done to express the aggregate value of 
cash flows at the valuation date, factoring in the time value of money, inflation, and risk. 
Under the FCFF method, future cash flows are discounted at the weighted average cost 
of capital (WACC)–i.e., the cost of equity and the cost of debt–, because such cash flows 
still include the debt. Under the FCFE method, cash flows, from which debt has already 
been deducted, are discounted at the cost of equity.81 
                                                             
75 Damodaran (2012) 20.  
76 Stowe, Robinson, Pinto, and McLeavey (2007) 45. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 CMS (Award) [430]. 
159 
  
(b) Damage valuation under IIAs 
All valuation techniques seek to determine value.82 In the case of companies, value lies 
in the cash flows that the company’s assets are expected to generate in the future.83 As a 
rule, this expectation is what markets take into account to value companies and stocks.84 
Investment tribunals generally use a similar concept of value, which coincides with 
‘market value’, i.e., ‘what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller’.85 Valuation 
techniques, however, are not concerned with legal considerations relating to standing and 
cause of action. After all, they have been developed in non-legal contexts, for purposes 
other than calculating damages in legal disputes.86 Still, in the practice of investment 
tribunals the diminution in value of an investment frequently determines the amount of 
compensation.87 Thus, while the application of valuation techniques is often necessary in 
investment arbitration, any limits to the admissibility of damages claims, including those 
related to standing and cause of action aspects, must be based on legal considerations. 
In corporate finance, the cash flows used for valuation purposes can be defined in 
different ways (cash flows to the firm, cash flows to equity, dividends, etc.), depending 
on the method to be applied. However, this thesis argues that in a shareholder claim in 
respect of a state measure taken vis-à-vis the company, the cash flow impacted by the 
measure is in principle always the same, i.e., the company’s cash flows. The different 
valuation methodologies seek to i) determine the damage caused by the challenged 
measures, excluding other factors, by comparing the real scenario (which may include 
estimations in respect of future periods) and a hypothetical scenario in which these 
measures are not present, and ii) calculate what portion of the damage corresponds to the 
shareholder claimant. Yet even if calculated as the diminution of the value of the 
claimant’s shareholding–by somehow deducting the debt, etc.–the damage caused by the 
measures is always the same.88 At best it may be said, in financial terms, that the damage 
                                                             
82 Although the term value may be defined in many ways. See Pratt, Reilly, and Schweihs (2000) 28. 
83 Or, more precisely, ‘the level of, uncertainty about and expected growth in these cashflows’. Damodaran 
(2012) 1. 
84 Copeland, Koller, and Murrin (1994) 70. 
85 Suez I (Award) [87]; Ripinsky and Williams (2008) 182-183. 
86 The ILC has observed that ‘[a]lthough developed as a tool for assessing commercial value, [the DCF 
method] can also be useful in the context of calculating value for compensation purposes’. ILC 
Commentaries, 103. 
87 Ripinsky and Williams (2008) 262. 
88 See Diallo (Damages), 391-392 (Dec, Greenwood); El Paso (Award), [174-175]. 
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is calculated either at the level of the firm or at the level of the shareholders after 
subtracting the debt. 
Both from the perspective of investment tribunals and of some of the most 
commonly used valuation techniques, the cash flows to the firm are a fundamental 
element. Thus, on the one hand, tribunals have referred to the ‘benefits accruing from the 
[company’s] agreements’,89 the ‘stream of revenue’ expected under a contract to which 
the company is a party,90 and similar concepts in determining shareholder compensation. 
On the other hand, the two free cash flow models, FCFF and FCFE, consider the 
company’s cash flow but differ in the discount rate to be applied and in how debt is 
accounted for in the calculations. These differences are relevant in terms of the valuation 
processes to be followed,91 but not in legal terms. In the final analysis, after often complex 
calculations, in both cases the shareholder’s value will consist of the company’s expected 
cash flows minus the debt. And even the dividend discount model assumes and relies on 
the existence of a cash flow to the firm, which will eventually allow the payment of 
dividends in accordance with any assumed dividend policy.  
As to the notion that shareholders may claim only for the effects that measures 
taken vis-à-vis the company’s assets have on the share value, the Poštová Banka tribunal 
based this proposition on CMS and El Paso.92 In CMS, the tribunal adopted fair market 
value as the standard of compensation and discounted cash flow as the valuation 
method.93 Consistent with accepted theory, while the tribunal took into account the cash 
flows to equity to calculate damages, these cash flows were defined as ‘cash flows from 
operations, minus interest and debt repayments’.94 ‘Cash flows from operations’ were the 
local company’s cash flows. The El Paso tribunal also adopted fair market value as the 
compensation standard as well as DCF as the valuation method.95 DCF allows measuring 
the companies’ capacity ‘to generate returns’.96 This tribunal argued, moreover, that the 
                                                             
89 El Paso (Award) [550]. 
90 Suez II (Award) [29]. 
91 In theory, however, both models should yield the same result. Damodaran (2012) 17-18. 
92 Poštová Banka [237-245]. 
93 CMS (Award) [409-411]. 
94 Ibid [430-433]. 
95 El Paso (Award) [700-712].  
96 Ibid [712]. 
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DCF method applied in the case considered only the loss of value of the claimant’s 
investment, i.e., shares in local companies.97 Yet here again, the cash flows used to apply 
the DCF were built on ‘sales volumes and costs’ of the local companies.98  
Here, since the reduction in the value of the IIA claimant’s shareholding is calculated 
based on the impact on the company’s cash flows, there is only one damage caused by 
the relevant measure.99 This conclusion is not affected by the claimant invoking its own 
treaty rights as a shareholder, rather than the company claiming for its own rights. It may 
be argued, however, that by somehow arriving at the damage caused to the equity–rather 
than to the firm–one is calculating the actual damage to the shareholder. Further, equity 
value must reflect shareholders’ share of the company’s assets, even though shareholders 
have no direct claim to these assets.100 By protecting shares, IIAs allow shareholders to 
bring claims in respect of any reduction in equity value caused by a state measure in 
breach of the treaty, even if under national law the affected asset belongs to the company 
and not to the shareholders. The shareholder claims ‘for his own right and his own loss - 
inflicted on his own assets (shares) and not on the assets of the company’.101 
However, it is one thing to accept investment tribunals’ jurisdiction over shareholder 
claims against measures affecting the company’s assets in light of IIA provisions. A 
different matter is whether these tribunals should ignore, in considering the substance of 
the claims, that: i) it is the company in the first instance that suffers the damage and it is 
this same damage the one invoked by the shareholder in the treaty claim (even if described 
as the shareholder’s own ‘indirect’ loss102); and ii) most valuation techniques–not least 
DCF methods–make a series of assumptions including that, absent the measures, 
dividends and debts would have been paid (even if the creditors have, in fact, not been 
paid anything as of the valuation date). Whether it is necessary and reasonable to make 
these assumptions from a valuation perspective depends on the requirements of each 
valuation method, the circumstances of the company or equity being valued, etc. Purely 
                                                             
97 Ibid [685-687]. 
98 Ibid [715]. See also Hochtief (Liability) [315-316]. 
99 See Orascom [498]; Ampal (Liability) [268]. 
100 Damodaran (2012) 221. 
101 Bentolila (2010) 98 (emphasis in the original).  
102 Ibid, 99. 
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for valuation purposes, what is important is whether these assumptions are sound from 
the standpoint of hypothetical parties to a hypothetical market transaction.103 
Admissibility of claims, however, is subject to different considerations. Even if IIAs 
are seen as ultimately protecting the investment’s value against unlawful interferences, 
indirect shareholder claims involve the same assets on which the company and sometimes 
third parties also have rights under national law, irrespective of the valuation technique. 
Valuation techniques should not obscure the potential for double recovery and prejudice 
to third-party rights stemming from overlapping entitlements over the same assets. 
B Recovery and the corporate structure 
Shareholder indirect claims involve compensation for a diminution in the value of assets 
that typically coincides with that which may be claimed by the company under local law 
(after certain adjustments related to the extent of the shareholding, the debt, etc.). 
According to investment tribunals, this same diminution in value or damage may be 
claimed by any entity with a shareholding interest in the local company, no matter how 
indirect.104 After analysing arbitral decisions in cases in which ‘the claimant is not the 
immediate shareholder of the affected company’,105 Schreuer concluded that  
indirect shareholding by way of an intermediate company does not deprive the beneficial owner of its right 
to pursue claims for damage done to the company by the host State.106 
Indirect shareholdings or, more generally, indirectly owned or controlled investments, are 
often expressly protected in IIAs.107 Even when this is not the case, investment tribunals 
have allowed indirect shareholders to bring claims vis-à-vis measures taken against the 
                                                             
103 In a free cash flow to equity valuation, one is ‘assuming that stockholders are entitled to these cash 
flows, even if managers do not choose to pay them out’. Damodaran (2012) 228. 
104 An entity of the corporate structure must be able to point to an IIA under which it is protected and to a 
breach of the treaty in order to bring an investment claim. Yet these are not very demanding requirements, 
given the ubiquity of IIAs, the broadness of standards of protection, and the possibility of ‘treaty planning’. 
Valasek and Dumberry argue that ‘the incorporation of a corporation in a jurisdiction having a wide network 
of investment treaties with other States’ in order to ensure treaty protection is ‘perfectly legitimate’. Valasek 
and Dumberry (2011) 59. See also Dolzer and Schreuer (2008) 54; Baumgartner (2016) 8. But see Philip 
Morris v Australia [535-588].  
105 Schreuer (2005) 10-15.  
106 Ibid, 15. Doubts have been expressed, however, in cases where final control of the investment is in the 
hands of a national of the host state. See Tokios Tokelés (Jurisdiction, Diss Op Weil). 
107 See e.g. CAFTA, Art 10.28. 
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company based on the broad definition of investment in IIAs.108 Thus, the number of 
prospective claimants with respect to the same damage may be high.109  
In light of investment tribunals’ interpretations of their jurisdiction, which allows 
a plurality of claimants to sue states party to IIAs for the same damage,110 the concept of 
admissibility must be applied in case of actual or potential overlapping damages claims. 
Investment tribunals must then decide whether a person different from the IIA claimant, 
not least within the same corporate structure, should be preferred for part or all of the 
compensation, thus rendering the claim inadmissible. Further, if for example the 
shareholder IIA claim is found inadmissible due to a parallel claim by the company, to 
the extent the latter is compensated, ‘all of the companies higher up in the corporate chain, 
including the [shareholder IIA claimant], would have been made whole as well’.111 
However, the reverse is not true, i.e., if a shareholder is compensated, in principle the 
company (or, for that matter, any intermediary shareholder between the compensated 
shareholder and the company) is not made whole.112    
1 The Enron and Sempra cases 
In Enron, claimants held indirect shareholdings in an Argentine gas transportation 
company through several layers of intermediary companies.113 The ownership structure 
was made even more complex through arrangements under which the claimants assigned 
parts of their participations both to related subsidiaries and third parties.114 The Enron 
tribunal observed that ‘if minority shareholders can claim independently from the affected 
corporation, this could trigger an endless chain of claims, as any shareholder making an 
investment in a company that makes an investment in another company, and so on, could 
invoke a direct right of action for measures affecting a corporation at the end of the 
                                                             
108 See e.g. Cemex [149-158]; EDF (Jurisdiction) [161]; Chapter 4. 
109 Well-known instances of treaty claims by shareholders at different levels of the corporate structure in 
respect of the same damage are the Lauder and CME cases. See Lauder [143, 165, 172-173]; CME [5-7]. 
110 Wälde and Sabahi (2008) 1102. 
111 Orascom [498]. 
112 Müller (2015) 82-83. 
113 The published decisions do not specify the number of intermediary companies. As regards part of the 
shareholdings, however, there were at least three intermediary layers between the claimants and the local 
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chain’.115 Similarly, in the Sempra case, which also involved indirect shareholdings albeit 
through only one layer of intermediary companies,116 the tribunal acknowledged it was 
‘theoretically correct’ that the current position on shareholder claims ‘could lead to an 
unlimited chain of claims’.117 
 As to the possibility of multiple claims for the same damage by different entities 
of the same corporate network, the Enron tribunal referred to ‘a need to establish a cut-
off point beyond which claims would not be permissible as they would have only a remote 
connection to the affected company’.118 This was ‘in essence a question of admissibility 
of claims’, which required ‘establishing the extent of the consent to arbitration of the host 
State’.119 On the facts of the case, the Enron tribunal concluded that because the 
claimants’ investment had been ‘specifically sought’, the claimants were ‘included within 
the consent to arbitration’.120  
Both the Enron and Sempra tribunals referred again to the possibility of multiple 
compensation in their merits decisions. The Enron tribunal appeared to recognize that if 
any member of the corporate network is compensated, that is the ‘end of the matter’ as 
far as claims against the host state are concerned, whatever the position of the 
compensated entity in the corporate chain.121 These merits decisions had to deal with the 
issue of potential double recovery resulting from tariff negotiations between the local 
company and the host government, on the one hand, and arbitral claims by foreign 
shareholders against measures affecting such tariffs, on the other.122 Both tribunals were 
confident that ‘able government negotiators or regulators would make sure that no such 
double recovery or effects occur’.123 
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2 Determining who should recover 
Two phenomena combine to increase the chances of multiple recovery. First, the 
prevailing view in investment arbitration is that any entity within a corporate chain has 
standing to sue in respect of measures taken against the local subsidiary, provided the 
entity that brings the claim qualifies for IIA protection.124 Neither the overall size of the 
corporate structure nor the number of entities between the claimant and the company 
affected by the measure pose a jurisdictional hurdle, at least in principle. Second, while 
compensation is frequently said to be calculated based on the measure’s impact on the 
value of the shares held by the claimant, many modern valuation techniques are in fact 
premised on the impact on the affected local company’s cash flow. From this starting 
point, the damage ‘suffered’ by any related entity up the corporate chain is calculated. 
This calculation is not based on how the prices of the relevant stocks evolved (often the 
intermediary companies’ shares are not listed on a stock exchange). It is a matter of 
reflecting, in terms of equity value and at the claimant’s level in the corporate structure, 
the reduction suffered by the local company’s cash flow, no matter how far apart in the 
structure the claimant is from this company.  
 For purposes of determining compensation for the consequences of an unlawful 
act, in principle only the damage suffered by the owner of the ‘property, rights and 
interests’ that has ‘been affected’ may be taken into account.125 Yet this notion does not 
do much in terms of preventing potentially overlapping claims. All shareholders–both 
direct and indirect–forming a corporate network are probably able to argue that the value 
of their shareholdings has been affected by the same host state measure, not least by 
applying the valuation methods described above. The possibility of more than one 
recovery for the same damage126 is not the only dimension, however. If many (generally 
related) legal entities can bring claims for the same damage–including the local company 
under national law–are there any reasons to prefer one entity over the other (either for all 
or part of the recovery)? Or is it just a matter of preferring the first claim that is ripe for 
resolution and brought to arbitration, as suggested by several investment tribunals? 
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 Although international investment law does not condone double recovery, no 
discernible body of rules has emerged to decide who should recover and how much,127 
especially in circumstances in which several related corporate entities are entitled to claim 
with respect to the same measure. The ‘cut-off’ point proposed in Enron, which hinges 
on the extent of the state’s consent to arbitration and whether the investor may be deemed 
to be included in it, has generally not been applied.128 Schreuer observed this solution is 
not generally applicable and ‘lacks a legal foundation’, since state consent to arbitration 
‘through a treaty or national legislation does not depend on personal contact with a 
particular investor’.129 He proposed to achieve coordination of related proceedings 
through ‘consolidation, pro rata awards, a flexible application of lis pendens and res 
judicata as well as other methods’.130 However, no notable developments in this line may 
be observed in investment tribunals’ jurisprudence. Lowe has in fact referred to the 
‘primitive state of international legal doctrine on matters such as res judicata and lis 
pendens in the context of arbitration’.131 For him, the answer lies in the interpretation of 
the relevant treaties.132 But legal theory as to how IIA provisions–which have greatly 
expanded the possibilities for bringing claims133–may be applied to bring some certainty 
in this field appears in a primitive state as well.134   
 Paradoxically, however, positions like the ones expressed in Enron and Sempra–
including the hope that ‘able government negotiators’ will deal with any negative 
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consequences, including double recovery, after the investment tribunal has rendered its 
decision135–acknowledge implicitly that there is only one damage (even when the claim 
was brought by the shareholder invoking its own treaty rights rather than the company 
invoking contract rights). Or, by the same token, that the damage is the same whether the 
claim was brought by shareholder A under the IIA between the host country and home 
country X, or by shareholder B under the IIA between the host country and home country 
Y.136  
With this in mind, investment tribunals can better reflect on questions that should 
be weighed up in considering IIA claims’ admissibility. Aside from double recovery, if 
compensation is granted to the shareholder claimant, are the legitimate interests of the 
directly affected local company preserved? If not, is this fair in the circumstances? Is it 
irrelevant for all shareholders which entity in the corporate chain is compensated? Will 
third parties’ legitimate interests be affected because of the fact that the claimant will be 
compensated, which in turn may affect the ability of the local company or other entities 
at different levels in the corporate chain to put forward a damages claim? 
 No general answers can be given, yet recognition that they may affect 
admissibility is crucial. Under the interpretation of existing IIAs adopted by investment 
tribunals, including the notions of independence of shareholder rights and treaty claims, 
in principle such questions do not affect jurisdiction. The few treaty provisions that 
address overlapping claims remain largely untested.137 Further, such provisions fail to 
address some of the roots of the problem. For example, CETA requires waivers of both 
the claimant and the ‘locally established enterprise’, when the claim is for loss or damage 
to the latter or an interest in it.138 But shareholders typically argue that they claim for their 
own losses, not those of the company.139  
The admissibility question arises because IIAs may beget several entitlements 
over the same damage. The ‘cut-off’ concept as proposed by the Enron tribunal is not 
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particularly useful, in particular because under IIAs consent to arbitral jurisdiction is not 
necessarily affected by the claimant’s position in the relevant corporate structure. Yet 
proximity in the structure between the claimant and the entity whose assets were affected 
is a relevant admissibility consideration. As the number of intermediary entities between 
the claimant and the directly affected company increases, the likelihood of affecting third 
parties, who may have claims against or interests in such entities, also increases. On the 
other hand, the absence of legitimate interests that could be prejudiced by the IIA claim, 
including those of the local company, is also relevant to admissibility. It is only in this 
case where investment tribunals’ apparently preferred criteria, i.e., whether they are the 
first tribunal to rule on overlapping claims, should be allowed to play a significant role.  
C Third party interests 
Investment tribunals have recognised the principle that certain third parties have priority 
vis-à-vis shareholders over the company’s assets and that third-party interests may be 
affected by shareholder claims.140 But these acknowledgements have had little practical 
impact. The Hochtief tribunal, for example, stated it could not assume that the shareholder 
in an IIA claim has ‘an unencumbered right to a share of the reparation due’, since ‘[o]ther 
shareholders and creditors of [the company] may have claims on sums paid by way of 
reparation’.141 However, this was a matter between the claimant and persons not party to 
the proceedings.142 Thus, it was not within its ‘responsibilities and its powers’ to address 
it.143 On this party-centric view of arbitration, arbitrators cannot take measures in the 
interest of third parties.144 Another view regards investment arbitration as ‘a structure of 
global governance’, with ‘important effects going beyond those who appear before them 
in individual disputes’.145 Here, the situation of non-parties is relevant because investment 
arbitration’s legitimacy depends on the impact of the arbitral decisions on the parties as 
well as on such non-parties.146  
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Yet investment tribunals are not prevented from taking into account legitimate 
interests of third parties, for instance over the relevant assets, in deciding investment 
disputes.147 The fact that the potential impact on third-party interests may be considered 
does not mean that the third parties would be bound by the award. Nor would the merits 
of third-party claims be the focus of these kinds of considerations. Rather, the possible 
prejudice to third parties may be factored in as an admissibility ground, not least to the 
extent the third parties’ rights or interests are protected by provisions of the law applicable 
to the dispute. This admissibility determination would not concern jurisdiction or the 
ultimate merits of the claim.148 Investment tribunals have declared damages claims 
inadmissible on a wide variety of grounds, including that the same damages had been 
claimed in a parallel arbitration or that it was not the claimant but another entity in the 
same corporate structure that had incurred the alleged losses.149  
1 The company’s creditors 
In CMS, the tribunal observed that ‘in the real world, creditors would require to be paid 
first, one way or the other, at the expense of the shareholders’.150 It further noted that, as 
compared to debtholders, ‘shareholders bear a significantly larger risk, because their 
claims are residual’.151 Similarly, the Hochtief tribunal referred to ‘the normal priority of 
creditors over shareholders’.152 This is, moreover, consistent with basic financial theory:  
The most revolutionary and counter intuitive idea behind firm valuation is the notion that equity investors 
and lenders to a firm are ultimately partners who supply capital to the firm and share in its success. The 
primary difference between equity and debt holders in firm valuation models lies in the nature of their cash 
flow claims – lenders get prior claims to fixed cash flows and equity investors get residual claims to 
remaining cash flows.153 
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Here shareholders and creditors are seen as partners, albeit bearing different risks given 
that creditors’ claims over the company’s cash flows are to be satisfied first. 
Shareholder indirect claims involve the same assets over which third parties, such as 
the company’s creditors, may also have rights or at least legitimate interests if the 
company’s debts are not paid. Valuation methodologies deduct the company’s debts to 
calculate the shareholder’s share of the damages, yet shareholders are paid first. In Suez 
I, which involved a shareholder claim for measures in respect of the local company’s 
public utility contract, the tribunal recognized that debts are satisfied first and then 
payments to equity are made with any remaining funds.154 On the other hand, it stated 
there was no double recovery problem. The local courts not having granted any recovery 
to the local company, if it  
should award damages in this case, it [was] certain that the Argentine government would make the relevant 
court aware of that fact as well as the waivers that the Claimants [had] expressed as part of the record.155 
Yet if to avoid double recovery the local court has to deduct from any compensation going 
to the company amounts already received by shareholders, the company’s assets will be 
reduced accordingly. If the company is unable to satisfy all its debts,156 the distribution 
of risks entailed by creditors’ priority vis-à-vis shareholders is upset.157  
Further, while valuation methods arrive at an equity value after deducting 
expected debt payments (sometimes including payments that should occur years after the 
valuation date), this is a hypothetical exercise. When adopted by the arbitral award, the 
result of the exercise determines the amount of the shareholder’s compensation. However, 
debts are subtracted only in theory but are not actually paid. This may not be particularly 
relevant for market valuations (often applying the same methods as in investment 
arbitration). For example, if such valuations assume that all the company’s debts will be 
paid and this does not eventuate, the prejudice to creditors will not result from anything 
the valuator did but from some other factor. But for investment tribunals, that the 
shareholder may be compensated first and third parties will not only have to wait for other 
proceedings but may even be prejudiced by the outcome of the investment claim matters; 
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not least since creditors’ and other third parties’ priority over shareholders is often 
recognised by the national law the investment tribunal must apply. There is no evidence 
that IIAs intended to derogate from this important principle simply by including shares 
among protected investments or by protecting indirect interests.   
2 Other potentially affected third parties 
Aside from creditors, other persons not involved in the arbitration may also be affected 
by the shareholder indirect IIA claim. First, the company who directly owns the assets 
harmed by the measures in question is itself generally a third party to the investment 
arbitration. As discussed above, the upshot of the shareholder receiving compensation is 
that the company may not be able to be fully compensated through its own claims, given 
the common assumption by investment tribunals as to related claims to be decided after 
the shareholder IIA claim. Second, and relatedly, shareholders other than the IIA claimant 
are also affected when the company is unable to fully repair its losses.158 Such 
shareholders’ interests are prejudiced to the extent that the outcome of the IIA claim 
prevents the company from obtaining full reparation. Third, employees and commercial 
partners may also be affected whenever all or part of the compensation for harm to the 
company is not received by it but by its shareholders.159 
 In assessing admissibility, distinctions between the potentially affected third 
parties may be necessary. The relevance of the impact on the company itself (apart from 
other third parties) varies depending on the extent of the IIA claimant’s interest in it. For 
example, if the local company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the claimant’s group of 
companies, any potential prejudice to the company stemming from the IIA claim would 
be less relevant for admissibility purposes. Further, from a legal perspective, the position 
of shareholders other than the IIA claimant should be considered but cannot be equated 
to that of creditors.160 Creditors’ priority over shareholders referred to above is not 
applicable to the relationship between shareholder IIA claims and other claims by 
different shareholders. Finally, some third parties such as the company’s employees may, 
broadly speaking, be categorized as creditors. But their situation under the applicable laws 
is not the same as that of other third parties, such as the company’s commercial lenders 
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and suppliers. When third parties may be affected, investment tribunals should take these 
differences into account, which often respond to important societal values. Thus, negative 
effects on entities related to the claimant in the shareholder IIA claim are less relevant to 
admissibility than potential prejudice to third parties whose rights may be especially 
protected under the applicable law such as, for example, workers.161 
II. DAMAGES AND THE CAUSE OF ACTION 
A Contract damages and treaty damages? 
The concepts of contract claims and treaty claims have become terms of art in investment 
arbitration.162 And the distinction between them is often regarded as ‘essential’, denoting 
‘different causes of action arising in distinct legal systems’.163 Yet the consequences of 
the distinction in terms of damages are underexplored. This is probably related to the 
uncertainties as to its impact on the substance of investment claims more generally. This 
thesis argues that differences in the causes of action are irrelevant for purposes of 
weighing the admissibility consequences of overlapping claims. What matters is whether 
the IIA claim involves the same loss as other actual or potential (national or international) 
claims.164 Further, although the contract/treaty distinction is largely based on the law 
under which the claims arise or that is applicable to them165–i.e., international law to 
treaty claims and national law to contract claims–national law usually plays at least some 
role in the resolution of treaty claims. This role includes sometimes being the source of 
rights invoked by investors, either directly or indirectly through the concept of legitimate 
expectations or similar ideas.166 
 But as to quantum, what is the relationship between the contract/treaty distinction, 
on the one hand, and the damages that may be claimed under each head, on the other? In 
the Reparation for Injuries advisory opinion, the ICJ considered the case of parallel 
claims for the same damage but on different bases. The General Assembly asked, first, 
about the United Nations’ capacity to bring an international claim in the event one of its 
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agents suffered injury while performing her functions.167 Second, if this capacity was 
found to exist, then the question was how was ‘action by the United Nations to be 
reconciled with such rights as may be possessed by the State of which the victim is a 
national’.168 The Court answered the first question in the affirmative.169 As to the second 
question, the ICJ observed that ‘competition between the State’s right of diplomatic 
protection and the Organization’s right of functional protection might arise’, there being 
‘no rule of law which assigns priority to the one or to the other’.170 The Court suggested, 
nonetheless, this competition could be resolved through the ‘good will and common 
sense’ of the parties concerned and eventually by a general convention or ad hoc 
agreements.171 The ICJ also stated:  
Although the bases of the two claims are different, that does not mean that the defendant State can be 
compelled to pay the reparation due in respect of the damage twice over. International tribunals are already 
familiar with the problem of a claim in which two or more national States are interested, and they know 
how to protect the defendant State in such a case.172 
The Court appeared to treat the necessary ‘reconciling’ of overlapping rights as going to 
the ‘admissibility of the claim’.173 This is consistent with the approach proposed in this 
thesis, although it has so far not been generally adopted in investment arbitration.174 
 In preliminary decisions, investment tribunals have recognized the possibility of 
overlaps between damages claimed in contract and treaty claims, albeit generally 
observing jurisdiction is not affected.175 In Azurix, the tribunal appreciated the concern 
that a foreign shareholder may be able to recover twice, through an investment arbitration 
and through national proceedings brought by the local subsidiary.176 It noted, however, 
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that ‘any compensation awarded must be based on the actual loss a claimant is able to 
show’.177  
In EDF, the tribunal noted in its jurisdictional decision that ‘a loss engendered by 
a treaty breach may overlap with the damages caused by the contract violation’.178 And 
that to the extent local judicial processes result in the claimants being compensated for 
their loss, recovery under IIAs ‘would likely be barred’.179 Local judicial proceedings had 
been brought by the local company under a contract.180 Several of these national claims, 
which referred to measures also involved in the treaty arbitration, were eventually settled 
by the company through an agreement with the local government.181 In the award, the 
tribunal acknowledged ‘possible overlaps’ but concluded that they did not constitute 
double recovery.182 The relevant reasoning includes a reference to the damages being 
granted in the arbitration for ‘treaty breach’.183 But the tribunal based its conclusion on 
its understanding that any benefits resulting from the settlement agreement had either 
been received after the claimants had sold their investment or already been deducted from 
the damages calculations.184  
 In other cases, however, the contract/treaty distinction had a more significant 
impact on the approach to damages. In the Bayindir case, which concerned a contract for 
the construction of a motorway,185 the tribunal posited that ‘when the investor has a right 
under both the contract and the treaty, it has a self-standing right to pursue the remedy 
accorded by the treaty’.186 Even when ‘the amount claimed under the treaty is the same 
as the amount that could be claimed (or was claimed) under the contract’, this ‘self-
standing right’ is not affected.187 Likewise, the tribunal in Alemanni asserted that although 
in treaty claims ‘remedies appropriate to a breach of treaty’ apply, that the remedy the 
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claimant seeks is in the respondent’s view one ‘of the same kind as that which [the 
claimant] might seek in a domestic court under a contract claim, is neither here nor 
there’.188 These statements were made at the jurisdictional stage. Yet, the tribunal in Saur 
adopted a similar approach at the quantum phase. It found that a claim related to a 
management fee for the technical operation of a concession contract was not a contract 
claim, but rather a claim for compensation for the injury caused to the investment (which 
included the rights as technical operator).189 Thus, it was a treaty claim. Still, the damages 
in respect of this claim were found to be ‘equivalent to the value of the benefits’ that the 
claimant was ‘prevented from obtaining under the [contract]’.190 
Calculating damages relating to a contract based on the benefits the claimant 
would have received under the contract but for the challenged measure is uncontroversial. 
The Iran-US Claims Tribunal in the Phillips Petroleum case observed that the 
determination of the fair market value of revenue-producing assets, including contract 
rights, ‘must involve a careful and realistic appraisal of the revenue producing potential 
of the asset over the duration of its term’.191 As regards contracts, the ILC also observed 
‘it is the future income stream which is compensated, up to the time when the legal 
recognition of entitlement ends’.192 The ILC itself, however, referred in particular to ‘the 
risk of double-counting which arises from the relationship between the capital value of 
an enterprise and its contractually based profits’.193 If properly applied, valuation methods 
should not yield this result. As explained above, equity or firm valuation is based on the 
cash flows expected under the company’s contracts, but these flows will not be counted 
twice. Yet the ILC’s warning highlights that the valuation of a company or of shareholder 
equity, on the one hand, and of a contract, on the other, will frequently involve the same 
asset (i.e., the cash flows under the contract). 
 This overlap as to damages arises because treaty claims are often substantively 
based on contractual rights.194 Damages for the two types of claims frequently overlap. 
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Certain modern valuation techniques, such as the DCF method described above, have 
contributed to this overlap or at least made it less visible, to the extent they are based on 
the cash flows an asset may generate rather than on the asset’s book value or similar 
concepts. While the position is not always clear,195 some investment tribunals have not 
only acknowledged the risk of double recovery between contract and treaty claims196 but 
also adopted measures attempting to avoid this risk.197 The tribunal of Venezuela 
Holdings had to deal with a related arbitration under the arbitral rules of the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The ICC arbitration concerned ‘the liability of different 
parties under different normative regimes’, i.e., it was a contractual dispute that did not 
refer to Venezuela’s responsibility under international law.198 Still, the tribunal 
recognized a certain degree of overlap between the ICSID and the ICC proceedings,199 
including in particular some of the questioned measures.200 Thus, the tribunal adopted 
dispositions to seek to avoid both inconsistent outcomes and double recovery, including 
deducting from the IIA compensation sums that had already been received under the ICC 
award.201 This way of proceeding is often fraught with difficulties stemming, for example, 
from privity issues, in that the party who was compensated in the non-IIA claim may be 
related but not be the same as the IIA claimant. Yet these difficulties should not prevent 
investment tribunals from recognizing that contract and treaty claims–whatever the 
distinction’s virtues–often involve the same damages.   
B Claims for the same damage before different jurisdictions 
Essentially because of the contract-treaty distinction and the wide definition of 
investments and investors in IIAs, the same damages may be involved in parallel claims 
before a contract and a treaty jurisdiction or before different treaty jurisdictions.202 
However, despite calls for a ‘flexible application of lis pendens and res judicata’,203 
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investment tribunals have been strict in the application of these concepts. In the CME and 
Lauder cases against the Czech Republic, notorious for arriving at conflicting findings on 
factually overlapping claims,204 both tribunals took similar views on these ideas. In 
discussing the issue of the same remedies before different fora, the Lauder tribunal 
deemed the lis pendens principle inapplicable because the related proceedings did not 
involve the same parties and causes of action.205 That such other proceedings involved 
claimants related to the claimant in Lauder and the same facts (albeit claims under another 
BIT or national law) did not change the analysis.206 The CME tribunal observed that for 
res judicata purposes the same dispute is involved only when there is identity in terms of 
the parties, subject matter, and cause of action.207 Thus, the principle of res judicata could 
not apply to the Lauder award in spite of the claimant’s ultimate parent company being 
controlled by Mr Lauder.208 
Both tribunals strongly relied on formal differences as to the identity of the parties 
and the causes of action in the different proceedings. The Lauder tribunal advanced that 
seeking the same remedies before different tribunals did not affect jurisdiction.209 Yet 
both tribunals also appeared to acknowledge the risk of double recovery and suggested 
the same solution. While denying the risk of contradictory decisions in the facts of the 
case, the award in Lauder concluded that the only remaining risk was that ‘damages be 
concurrently granted by more than one court or arbitral tribunal, in which case the amount 
of damages granted by the second deciding court or arbitral tribunal could take this fact 
into consideration when assessing the final damage’.210 In CME, the tribunal noted that 
the national proceedings had not yet provided any relief to the claimant and the prospects 
of the local claimants being compensated were low.211 Less forcefully than the Lauder 
tribunal, however, the CME tribunal observed that, when resolving the dispute between 
                                                             
204 Söderlund (2005) 318. 
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207 CME (Final Award) [435]. 
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209 Lauder [175]. 
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the parties to the national proceedings, the local courts ‘may or may not consider 
payments’ by the host state pursuant to an arbitral award.212 
Several investment tribunals have endorsed the idea that any risk of double 
recovery arising from an investment arbitration and local proceedings, involving similar 
facts, can be resolved by the tribunal deciding later. The tribunal in Impregilo opined that 
‘[t]he question of double compensation being granted would seem to the Arbitral Tribunal 
to be a theoretical rather than a real practical problem’.213 If compensation were granted 
to the company at the domestic level, treaty claims by the foreign investor would be 
affected and vice versa.214 With reference to the same local proceedings, in the 
jurisdictional decision the Urbaser tribunal cited this finding in Impregilo with approval, 
adding that the issue would, if necessary, be considered at the merits phase.215 Thus, 
investment tribunals believe that the risk of double compensation does not affect their 
jurisdiction and pertains to the quantum debate.216 The issue here generally refers to the 
possibility of compensation being granted by a national court after the arbitration is over. 
The Saur tribunal asserted that if the claimant were to be compensated in local 
proceedings–in the case, the local company’s liquidation proceedings–before the award 
was issued, any amount received ‘should be deducted from the compensation owed under 
this proceeding, to avoid an unjust enrichment’.217 
The tribunal in Gami, however, appeared less enthusiastic about the prospects of 
coordination between investment tribunals and local courts as to overlapping claims. It 
stated there was ‘no procedural basis on which such coordination could take place’218 and 
no rationale on which payment to the foreign investor could be reduced to account for the 
payment of compensation to the local company in national proceedings.219 In contrast 
with other investment tribunals, moreover, the Gami tribunal expressed doubts as to the 
national courts’ ability to reduce the local company’s recovery because of the payment 
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received by a shareholder in an investment arbitration.220 The local company, as the owner 
of the affected asset, and its creditors would have priority vis-à-vis the shareholder 
bringing the treaty claim, in respect of any compensation. Further, the rest of the local 
company’s shareholders had ‘an equal right to the distribution’.221 In the end, for the Gami 
tribunal ‘[t]he overwhelming implausibility of a simultaneous resolution of the problem 
by national and international jurisdictions impels consideration of the practically certain 
scenario of unsynchronised resolution’.222 
The often-recognized potential for double compensation between contract and 
treaty proceedings, or between proceedings under different IIAs, implies acknowledging 
that the same loss may be involved in two or more proceedings,223 despite differences in 
the identity of the claimants or in the causes of action. Yet, investment tribunals have 
limited themselves to observing that the court deciding after them (alluding to a national 
court) could consider whatever compensation is granted under the IIA. Hence, the risk of 
double compensation is supposed to disappear. In practice, this has meant that investment 
tribunals have largely ignored the problem.224   
This outcome is problematic. As noted by the Gami tribunal, there may be legal 
obstacles for the local court to deduct the compensation ordered in the treaty proceeding 
from any payment to which the local company is entitled. The obstacles, which may relate 
not only to the company’s rights but also to third-party rights, mostly depend on the 
contents of the host state’s law. Investment tribunals should, first, seek to determine the 
real ability of national courts under the relevant national law to deduct the compensation 
already received by the shareholder (which apparently has never been done), not least 
because the host state’s law is often part of the applicable law. Second, having determined 
whether local courts will be able to factor in any compensation granted to the shareholder 
and whether doing so may affect legitimate interests, they should decide the shareholder 
indirect claim’s admissibility. Simply observing that compensation has not been paid yet 
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224 It is only as regards separate proceedings under different IIAs involving the same damage that a few 
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is insufficient, in part because whether the compensation goes to the shareholders or to 
the company affects third parties. While shareholders are often able to choose which 
proceeding will finish first (and perhaps later abandon or even not pursue one or more of 
the possible claims), other parties typically do not have that choice.  
It is not suggested here that the prospects of recovery before local courts, for 
instance, is irrelevant. But given the importance of other interests that may be at play, the 
conclusion that local courts will not grant adequate reparation should not be reached 
lightly. Other potential solutions, such as waivers by the treaty claimant of other claims, 
should also be weighed carefully, including realistically assessing their possible effect 
under national law before local courts. Further, the prospects of recovery before other 
fora should not be the only consideration. There are other rational bases on which the 
admissibility of treaty claims overlapping with other claims may be considered, including 
some of the ones identified by the Gami tribunal such as creditors’ priority.225 
III. CONCLUSION 
In the field of damages, investment tribunals have sometimes taken a more flexible 
approach towards the substance of the claims than when dealing with jurisdictional or 
liability aspects. In particular, several decisions suggest that possible overlaps between 
national and international claims (or between claims under different IIAs), while 
otherwise largely irrelevant due to the different parties and causes of action involved, may 
be taken into account in the quantum phase. The overriding consideration has been 
avoiding double recovery for the same damage. Yet the impact on damages of the 
distinctions between shareholder standing and that of the company, and between contract 
and treaty claims, remains somewhat unclear.  
Most tribunals have refrained from asserting that shareholders can claim directly 
for losses caused to the company’s assets (although some have allowed shareholders to 
claim in relation to ‘an indirect interest’ in the company’s rights).226 But even those 
tribunals expressly denying this possibility have upheld shareholder claims in respect of 
treatment of the company’s assets, ‘to the extent that those claims are related to the effects 
                                                             
225 The Gami tribunal attributed the complexities involved in parallel national and international proceedings 
to the ‘derivative nature’ of the claim and concluded it was ‘necessary to revert to basic propositions’. Ibid 
[121]. The problems deriving from ‘unsynchronized resolution’ between national and international 
jurisdictions were thus left for another day. 
226 Suez ARB/03/17 (Liability) [119]; Suez ARB/03/19 (Liability) [130]. 
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that the measures taken against the company’s assets have on the value of the claimant’s 
shares in such company’.227  
This may be a distinction without a difference, however. Indeed, the effect on the 
value of the claimant’s shares is nowadays often calculated based on the challenged 
measure’s impact on what is often the company’s most valuable asset, i.e., its future cash 
flows. Further, investment tribunals seem to admit that the conceptual distinction between 
contract and treaty claims does not exclude possible double recovery in the event the two 
types of claims are being pursued before different fora. Still, these tribunals have not only 
failed to adequately engage with this possibility, leaving it for a subsequent tribunal to 
resolve, but have also omitted consideration of other implications of shareholder claims 
under IIAs.   
Neither firmly entrenched ideas on shareholders’ ‘independent right of action’ and 
the treaty nature of most investment claims nor the application of modern valuation 
techniques can obscure that there is often only one damage involved. This is so even if, 
apart from the local company directly affected, there are many legal entities of the same 
corporate chain with standing to sue (under the same or different IIAs). And, relatedly, 
that there may be only one affected asset–no matter how many persons may have IIA 
protected rights/interests over it.  
The position of third parties may be affected by whether compensation is received 
by the company or a shareholder. Their claims against the company, even if theoretically 
accounted for in the damages calculations, may not be paid before the shareholder is 
compensated. In addition, if the damage is the same under related treaty and contract 
claims, the impact of contractual forum selection clauses–largely ignored for assessing 
jurisdiction over treaty claims–may have to be revisited at the quantum phase. It may be 
one among several relevant factors that the parties to the contract agreed that the damages 
in question would be considered by the contractual forum.228   
 These considerations concerning standing and cause of action do not pertain to 
the merits of damages claims but rather to their admissibility (in whole or in part).229 
International tribunals such as the Iran-US Claims Tribunal have repeatedly recognized 
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that damages determinations ‘must take into account all relevant circumstances, including 
equitable considerations’.230 Investment tribunals have endorsed ideas that they enjoy ‘a 
high level of discretion’231 in setting compensation and that ‘general equitable principles’ 
may be considered.232  
Relevant here is that in the exercise of this discretion several tribunals have 
ordered the transfer of investment assets to the respondent state conditional on payment 
of the award, mainly to avoid double recovery risks.233 This and other possible solutions 
may not solve all the problems of shareholder indirect claims under IIAs. Yet they evince 
a recognition of one of the main causes of these problems, i.e., that often the same damage 
is involved in parallel contract and treaty claims (or between parallel treaty claims, for 
that matter). Admissibility allows investment tribunals to effectively address duplication 
of damages claims, rather than simply hoping that someone will solve the problem later. 
At the same time, admissibility avoids a decision on (if not the trial of) the ultimate merits 
of inadmissible claims. This is desirable in terms of judicial economy and preventing 
inconsistent decisions. 
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6     The Contract-Treaty Distinction 
[I]n the face of absolute equity the trick of making the same contract a chain for one party 
and a screw press for the other never can have success…1 
 
International tribunals have struggled for well over a century to describe the relationship 
between international law and contracts. Aside from the mixed claims commissions cases, 
more recent instances of this debate include the big oil arbitrations of the 1950s, 60s and 
70s. A recurrent theme in these arbitrations was what the law applicable to contracts 
concluded by the state with a foreign entity was. Since Lord Asquith in Petroleum 
Development identified the law of Abu Dhabi as potentially relevant but notoriously 
failed to apply it,2 some of these ad hoc international tribunals regarded national law as 
the law governing such contracts,3 albeit generally in conjunction with general principles 
of law or international law.4 The applicability of the law of the contracting state resulted 
from express choice of law provisions in the contracts and general notions of private 
international law.5 As to general principles of law and international law, their application 
also stemmed from different choice of law provisions or even from alleged implied 
agreements by the contractual parties relating to the need to protect the private contractor 
from adverse changes in the relevant national law.6 However, a general theory on the 
interaction between national and international law in the context of contracts between 
states and foreign companies did not emerge from these cases.7 
                                                             
1 Orinoco Steamship Company (Barge, Umpire), 199. 
2 Petroleum Development (Abu Dhabi), 149 (‘If any municipal system of law were applicable, it would 
prima facie be that of Abu Dhabi. But no such law can reasonably be said to exist’). This view was based 
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4 See e.g. Aramco, 165, 169; Aminoil [10]; Texaco, 438. 
5 Leben (2003) 221-232.  
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Certain salient features of the arbitrations referred to in the previous paragraph 
may be contrasted with present-day investment arbitration. First, the jurisdiction of the 
former derived either directly from the contract from which the dispute arose or from an 
arbitration agreement concluded between the foreign company and the state in question.8 
While there are still a number of cases in modern investment arbitration where jurisdiction 
is based on a contract,9 nowadays investment tribunals’ jurisdiction is frequently treaty-
based.10 Second, the ad hoc tribunals of the 1950s-70s often described the agreements in 
question as ‘international contracts’,11 ‘international development contracts’,12 or having 
a ‘quasi-international character’,13 due to the presence of one or more international 
elements in the contract (such as a foreign party, a choice of law provision calling 
expressly or impliedly for the application of international law, or an international 
arbitration clause).14 Although contracts containing express international features are 
sometimes involved in investment arbitration, modern cases discussing the contract-treaty 
distinction often involve a contract that has, at least formally, a ‘national’ character.15 
Finally, while the big oil arbitrations were mostly concerned with the relationship 
between contracts and general principles of international law,16 investment tribunals more 
often deal with the interaction between contractual provisions and a specific treaty or 
treaties. 
The contract claims/treaty claims distinction relates not only to the relationship 
between contracts and treaties; more specifically, it seeks to distinguish between 
contractual and treaty causes of action, to delimit the scope of the ‘treaty’ tribunal’s 
                                                             
8 Petroleum Development (Abu Dhabi), 145; Ruler of Qatar, 534; Aramco, 130; Sapphire, 140-142; BP, 
302; Texaco, 397; Liamco, 73-76; Aminoil, xxiv.   
9 In the case of ICSID arbitration, the basis of consent is an ‘Investment Contract between the Investor and 
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jurisdiction vis-à-vis that of the ‘contract’ tribunal. The position of contract-based causes 
of action in international law is complex. In 1961, Jennings referred to ‘the absence in 
international law of what might be called a “form of action” in contract’.17 The 
complexities involved are illustrated by some of the debates that surfaced in the big oil 
arbitrations: what is the status of contracts in international law? What is the law applicable 
to a contract claim before an international tribunal? How do the potentially applicable 
sources of law combine? The jurisdictional position, however, appears settled at least in 
one respect. The fact that the jurisdiction of an international tribunal may–depending on 
the relevant provisions–extend to merely contractual disputes is ‘accepted as axiomatic 
in the literature’.18 
This chapter argues that notwithstanding the distinction between contract and 
treaty claims, the two kinds of claims often overlap both substantively and substantially. 
Thus, the idea of independence of treaty claims is by and large misleading beyond purely 
jurisdictional determinations. The overlap may affect the admissibility of treaty claims 
(as well as the merits) to the extent they involve the same damages as related contract 
claims. Risks of double recovery for the same loss arising from overlapping national 
proceedings were traditionally taken into account by international tribunals, even if the 
latter saw themselves as having primacy over local courts.19 On the other hand, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, if recovery through a treaty claim prevents or reduces recovery in 
the contract claims, third parties may be harmed. Neither the application of the contract 
claims/treaty claims distinction and related ideas nor that of treaty provisions, such as 
umbrella clauses, should obscure these risks.  Further, when treaty claims derive in whole 
or in part from contractual breaches, not only the IIA provisions but also all the provisions 
of the contract, including forum selection provisions, and the conduct of both parties to 
the contract have to be considered in addressing such risks. 
This chapter first considers the cause of action in modern investment law, 
including the distinction between contract and treaty breaches and the idea of the 
‘fundamental basis of the claim’. It then discusses aspects of the jurisdiction/admissibility 
                                                             
17 Jennings (1961) 164. He added, however, that this ‘[did] not necessarily mean that there [was] no remedy 
which relate[ed] directly to the terms of the contract’. Ibid. 
18 SGS v Philippines, 10. But see Sinclair (2013) 90. 
19 See Voss (2011) 303-305; Chapter 3. 
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distinction relevant to the contract/treaty dichotomy. Finally, it analyses specific instances 
of interaction between treaties and contracts in investment arbitration.  
I THE CAUSE OF ACTION IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
Which ‘philosopher’s stone’ turns a contract breach by a state into a treaty breach? The 
traditional position that a ‘mere’ contract breach is not enough and that something more 
is required20 has prevailed in investment arbitration. But beyond this basic point the 
position is less clear, not least as to what are the precise criteria to distinguish between 
contract and treaty breaches. The distinction is the basis for another fundamental 
distinction in international investment law, i.e., that between contract and treaty claims. 
The distinctions between contract and treaty breach and contract and treaty claims are 
intimately related. This section will analyse both distinctions in turn. They have evolved 
separately in international law and have similar but not identical rationales. The main 
interest here lies in the substantive links between contract claims and treaty claims arising 
from contract breaches. 
A Breach of contract and breach of treaty 
The discussion as to whether the breach by a state of a contract which it has concluded, 
either directly or through an agent, with a foreigner constitutes a breach of international 
law has a long history.21 Schwebel described two extreme positions. On the one hand, the 
position advanced for example by Greece in Ambatielos and by Switzerland in Losinger 
& Co. that a state breach of a contract with a foreigner is without more a breach of 
international law.22 On the other hand is the position that such breach does not contravene 
international law, ‘at any rate if the contract is governed by the law of the contracting 
State’.23 Finally, there is a ‘median position’, which Schwebel attributes to the British 
Government and to Fitzmaurice.24 Fitzmaurice explained that, absent a denial of justice, 
                                                             
20 Weil (1961) 133. Weil described the majority view as stating that ‘the contractual responsibility of the 
State derives from elements that are external to the contract, which themselves constitute international 
delicts’. Ibid. Author’s translation (original French). See also Schwebel (1987-II) 111; McLachlan (2008) 
417; Voss (2011) 174; von Walter (2015) 84; Siwy (2017) 212. 
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22 Ibid, 403. 
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there could be no breach of international law arising from a breach of a contract between 
a national and a foreigner.25 He added: 
It may be slightly less obvious that there is no breach of international law arising from the breach of contract 
per se, where the contract is between the local government and a foreigner, and where a breach on the part 
of the government is alleged; but, […] ‘[i]t is generally accepted that, so long as it affords remedies in its 
Courts, a State is only directly responsible, on the international plane, for acts involving breaches of 
contract, where the breach is not a simple breach […] but involves an obviously arbitrary or tortious 
element, e.g. a confiscatory breach of contract-where the true basis of the international claim is the 
confiscation, rather than the breach per se.’26 
According to Schwebel, the median position was the most authoritative27 because a 
contract between a state and a foreigner was not an international law instrument and did 
not create international law obligations.28 However, ‘the use of the sovereign authority of 
a State, contrary to the expectations of the parties, to abrogate or violate a contract with 
an alien, [was] a violation of international law’.29 
The idea that a breach of contract does not ipso facto constitute a breach of 
international law has been accepted by most investment tribunals. For the tribunal in 
Noble Ventures, the rule is well established.30 It ‘derives from the clear distinction 
between municipal law on the one hand and international law on the other, two separate 
legal systems (or orders)’.31 The Noble Ventures tribunal observed further that 
inasmuch as a breach of contract at the municipal level creates at the same time the violation of one of the 
principles existing either in customary international law or in treaty law applicable between the host State 
and the State of the nationality of the investor, it will give rise to the international responsibility of the host 
State.  But that responsibility will co-exist with the responsibility created in municipal law and each of them 
will remain valid independently of the other.32 
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26 Ibid. 
27 Schwebel (1987-II) 111. 
28 Schwebel (1987) 406. See also Fifth report on State responsibility (Ago) [15].   
29 Schwebel (1987) 409. See also Siwy (2017) 212.   
30 Noble Ventures [53]. See also ADF [190]; SGS v Pakistan [167]; SGS v Philippines [122]; Consortium 
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32 Ibid. 
188 
  
For the concept of independence between breach of contract and breach of treaty, the 
tribunal relied on article 3 of the ILC Articles33 as well as on Schwebel’s position.34 
Similarly, according to McLachlan the starting-point in distinguishing the two kinds of 
breaches is that ‘rights created by treaty exist on the plane of international law’.35 
 Yet even leaving aside here the special position of national law in investment 
arbitration, it should be noted that the ILC’s commentaries to article 3 do not exclude the 
possibility that a breach of national law may be relevant for determining whether a breach 
of international law has occurred. In this respect, the ILC quotes the decision in ELSI 
where the Chamber, while recognizing the general principle that unlawfulness under 
international law ‘does not necessarily mean’ unlawfulness under national law, also noted 
that ‘[a] finding of the local courts that an act was unlawful may well be relevant to an 
argument that it was also arbitrary [under international law]’.36 The qualification given to 
an act under national law may be ‘a valuable indication’ for international law.37 Further, 
the ILC noted that compliance with internal law may be ‘relevant to the question of 
international responsibility’, although this is so whenever ‘the rule of international law 
makes it relevant’.38 
 That national law may be relevant to international responsibility appears as true 
in investment arbitration as it is in general international law, as recognized by the first 
Vivendi annulment committee.39 In international investment law, examples of this are IIA 
provisions requiring conformity with the host state law for purposes of the definition of 
protected investments or the application of treaty standards of protection.40 Thus, a breach 
of contract may not be wholly independent from a breach of treaty in international 
investment law,41 at least in the sense that establishing the former breach may be relevant 
                                                             
33 Article 3 states: “The characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by 
international law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by 
internal law.” ILC Articles, 36. 
34 Noble Ventures [53]. 
35 McLachlan (2008) 389. See also Cremades and Cairns (2005) 12. 
36 ELSI [124]. 
37 Ibid. 
38 ILC Commentaries, 38. 
39 Vivendi I Annulment [101].  
40 See e.g. Fraport (Award) [281-283]. 
41 But see Sinclair (2013) 13. 
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in establishing the latter.42 Investment tribunals acknowledge that contract matters may 
be a necessary element in treaty claims.43 Further, Jennings observed that whether a 
breach of contract amounts to a violation of international law may depend on several 
factors, including ‘the nature of the contract itself and the terms in which it is drafted’.44 
If the contract terms could be relevant in international claims even at a time when ‘the 
protecting State’–who was not a party to the contract–was ‘a necessary element in the 
law’,45 this applies even more so in investment arbitration where, first, the party to the 
contract or a related entity directly brings the international claim. Second, regarding the 
breach of IIA standards of protection, not least under the fair and equitable treatment 
standard, investment tribunals often rely on the contract’s terms as reflecting the 
claimant’s expectations.46 Here, the contract terms form the investor’s legitimate 
expectations and thus a breach of the former amounts to a breach of the latter. In turn, 
investment tribunals regard legitimate expectations as tied to the fair and equitable 
treatment standard.47 In cases applying this or similar rationales, while conceptually a 
distinction between contract and treaty breach can still be maintained, there is a 
substantive link between the breach of the contract terms and those of the treaty.  
B The distinction between contract and treaty claims 
There is no dispute that the annulment decision in the first Vivendi case laid the modern 
foundations of what became one of the most important conceptual tools in investment 
arbitration: the distinction between contract and treaty claims.48 This decision annulled 
what were the main merits findings of the preceding award. It would be misguided, 
however, to disregard the findings of the first Vivendi tribunal since they include relevant 
ideas for investment claims’ admissibility. In particular, that the parties’ agreement to 
submit disputes under the contract to a forum different from the investment treaty 
tribunal, while in principle not ousting the latter’s jurisdiction, should not be completely 
disregarded in considering the substance of treaty claims.  
                                                             
42 See Consortium RFCC (Award) [48]; Ampal (Jurisdiction) [255].  
43 Bayindir (Award) [135]. 
44 Jennings (1961) 177. 
45 Ibid, 182. 
46 Bayindir (Award) [197]. 
47 Saluka [302]. 
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1 The modern foundations of the distinction  
(a) The Vivendi I award 
The Vivendi case involved a concession for the operation of water and sewage facilities 
in Tucumán, an Argentine province.49 The contract contained a clause submitting disputes 
over the interpretation and application of the contract to the provincial courts.50 For the 
first Vivendi tribunal, the core issue ‘concern[ed] the legal significance that [was] to be 
attributed to this forum-selection provision of the Concession Contract in light of the 
remedial provisions in the BIT and the ICSID Convention’.51 The tribunal observed that 
this question had a bearing not only on the jurisdictional aspects, but also on the merits 
of the dispute.52 
 The Vivendi I tribunal did find it had jurisdiction over the case. This finding was 
based on the distinction between contract and treaty claims,53 although the tribunal did 
not fully spell out the contours of the distinction. It stated that ‘[a]s formulated’, the claims 
against Argentina were ‘not subject to the jurisdiction of the contentious administrative 
tribunals of Tucumán, if only because, ex hypothesi, those claims [were] not based on the 
Concession Contract but allege[d] a cause of action under the BIT’.54 The choice of forum 
clause in the contract did not affect the tribunal’s jurisdiction because it did not and could 
not constitute a waiver of the right to bring treaty claims.55 Yet as a merits issue pertaining 
to Argentina’s responsibility under the BIT, the tribunal held that 
because of the crucial connection in this case between the terms of the Concession Contract and these 
alleged violations of the BIT, the Argentine Republic cannot be held liable unless and until Claimants have, 
as Article 16.4 of the Concession Contract requires, asserted their rights in proceedings before the 
contentious administrative courts of Tucumán and have been denied their rights, either procedurally or 
substantively.56 
On the facts of the case, to determine whether the contested measures were an exercise 
of sovereign authority or merely of contractual rights the tribunal had to ‘undertake a 
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50 Ibid [27]. 
51 Ibid, 2. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Haersolte-Van Hof and Hoffmann (2008) 965; Aguas del Tunari [114]. 
54 Vivendi I [53]. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid [78]. 
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detailed interpretation and application of the Concession Contract’, a task the contractual 
parties had left exclusively to the local courts.57 The tribunal could not ‘separate the 
breach of contract issues from violations of the BIT, considering that the parties to the 
Concession Contract [had] agreed to an exclusive remedy in the Tucumán courts for the 
determination of the disputed contractual issues which [were] not governed by the BIT’.58  
The outcome resembles the SGS v Philippines tribunal’s admissibility 
determination (discussed below), which while deciding that jurisdiction was present 
referred the parties to the domestic courts for the assessment of the amount due.59 
However, unlike in SGS v Philippines, the Vivendi I tribunal concluded it was not possible 
for it to decide certain claims.60 The impossibility was neither jurisdictional nor purely 
factual, but rather resulted from the combined effect of the subject matter of the claims 
plus the contractual parties’ decision to submit their disputes to local courts. While this 
impossibility did not pass muster with the first Vivendi annulment committee, a ‘crucial 
connection’ between the terms of a contract and treaty claims is not rare in investment 
arbitration. For example, an investment tribunal may be required to decide a contractual 
issue, such as whether the contract is valid or the scope of rights under the contract, before 
deciding on the treaty claim.61 The fact that the investment consists of contractual rights 
does not mean that the only remedies available are those of the contract.62 Yet a ‘crucial 
connection’ between treaty and contract matters, coupled for instance with a contractual 
forum selection provision,63 may be relevant admissibility considerations vis-à-vis treaty 
claims. In particular, when there are other legal grounds militating against admissibility.64  
(b) The Vivendi I annulment decision 
In the first annulment decision in Vivendi, the ad hoc committee considered the 
relationship between Argentina’s international responsibility under the BIT and the rights 
                                                             
57 Ibid [79]. 
58 Ibid, fn 20. 
59 Schreuer (2006) 162. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ampal (Liability) [259]. 
62 Venezuela Holdings (Annulment) [169].  
63 See Parkerings [316]. 
64 See Chapter 2. 
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and obligations of the parties to the contract in question.65 The committee observed that 
contracts and treaties set independent standards–which may lead to independent 
breaches–relying on the principle of Article 3 of the ILC Articles.66 Under this principle 
whether there has been a breach of the BIT and whether there has been a breach of contract are different 
questions. Each of these claims will be determined by reference to its own proper or applicable law—in the 
case of the BIT, by international law; in the case of the Concession Contract, by the proper law of the 
contract.67 
The distinction between breach of contract and breach of treaty related thus to the 
‘distinction between the role of international and municipal law in matters of international 
responsibility’.68  
The committee next introduced the concept of ‘essential’ or ‘fundamental basis of 
the claim’, without however defining what the concept meant or giving any detail as to 
its proper scope. The committee, however, clearly stated that when the essential basis of 
the claim is a breach of contract the international tribunal will respect ‘any valid choice 
of forum clause in the contract’.69 The claim will be dismissed ‘without prejudice on its 
merits, when presented to the proper judges’, as stated by the commission in Woodruff.70 
But where ‘“the fundamental basis of the claim” is a treaty laying down an independent 
standard by which the conduct of the parties is to be judged, the existence of an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause in a contract between the claimant and the respondent state or one of 
its subdivisions cannot operate as a bar to the application of the treaty standard’.71 In the 
case of a treaty claim, the analysis is governed by international law and ‘is neither in 
principle determined, nor precluded, by any issue of municipal law, including any 
municipal law agreement of the parties’.72 
An international tribunal with jurisdiction should not fail to pass judgment over a 
treaty claim on the ground that the claim should have been decided by local courts or in 
                                                             
65 Vivendi I Annulment [94].  
66 Ibid [95]. 
67 Ibid [96]. 
68 Ibid [97]. 
69 Ibid [98]. 
70 Ibid [100]. 
71 Ibid [101]. 
72 Ibid [102]. 
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application of a contract clause submitting disputes to a different forum.73 The committee 
deemed unacceptable that when there has been a breach of international law an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause in a contract would prevent ‘its characterisation as such’.74 It was 
precisely the failure by the tribunal to determine whether the conduct of the Province’s 
authorities, as opposed to that of the federal authorities, amounted to a breach of the BIT 
that led to annulment.75 Having concluded that it had jurisdiction, the tribunal was 
required to assess the case against the treaty provisions’ requirements, which the tribunal 
had failed to do with respect to a material part of the claimants’ case.76 
In examining the leading case on the contract claims/treaty claims distinction,77 it 
is important to bear in mind that it concerned an annulment decision not an award. The 
committee itself noted the limited character of its jurisdiction, observing that it was not 
its function to decide whether BIT breaches had taken place.78 Further, the committee 
adopted a clear stance as to the lack of effect of contractual choice of forum provisions 
and local proceedings on the assertion of international jurisdiction. However, it suggested 
that these kinds of issues are relevant more generally. First, an exclusive jurisdiction 
clause in a contract ‘might be relevant—as municipal law will often be relevant—in 
assessing whether there has been a breach of the treaty’.79 Second, in light of a BIT 
provision empowering the tribunal to apply private agreements concluded in relation to 
the investment, the committee affirmed that ‘the Tribunal had jurisdiction to base its 
decision upon the Concession Contract, at least so far as necessary in order to determine 
whether there had been a breach of the substantive standards of the BIT’.80 Finally, the 
committee observed that while not dispositive and not precluding a tribunal from 
considering the merits, the presence of ready, able, and independent local courts could be 
relevant in a liability determination under international law.81  
                                                             
73 Ibid [102-103]. 
74 Ibid [103]. 
75 Ibid [111-115]. 
76 Ibid [112]. 
77 Schreuer (2005) 281. 
78 Vivendi I Annulment [112].  
79 Ibid [101]. 
80 Ibid [110]. 
81 Vivendi I Annulment [113]. 
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For the Vivendi I committee, although the contract itself–including any choice of 
forum clause–and local proceedings should not prevent the treaty tribunal from 
considering the merits of the case, they may be relevant ‘in assessing whether there has 
been a breach of the treaty’. The contract/treaty distinction does not, therefore, exclude 
the relevance of contractual terms, among other contractual/national law aspects, in a 
treaty liability determination. This is a fortiori applicable to admissibility, which is not 
concerned with whether the contract or the treaty has been breached but rather with 
whether such determination, over all or part of the treaty claim,82 should be made. 
Although the contract may not displace treaty obligations, it may be relevant ‘for the 
ascertainment of the content and consequences of those obligations’.83 Thus, contractual 
aspects may also be relevant in deciding the admissibility of treaty claims, in combination 
with legal grounds recognized by international law. Further, the Vivendi I annulment 
committee’s observation that in treaty claims the tribunal may, to the extent necessary, 
‘base its decision upon’ the contract, discredits attempts to isolate claims under IIAs from 
the underlying contractual framework. On the contrary, it is an indication of substantive 
interconnectedness between contract and treaty claims. 
2 The fundamental basis and the substance of the claim 
(a) Definition 
After the annulment decision in Vivendi I, the ‘fundamental’ or ‘essential’ basis of the 
claim idea has become one of the central tenets of the cause of action in investment 
arbitration. Yet the decisions that have applied the concept have generally not defined it 
or otherwise contributed to its elucidation. In Vivendi I it featured closely linked both to 
the jurisdictional determination of the competent forum and to the applicable law: when 
the fundamental basis of the claim is a treaty, international law applies; when it is a 
contract, the law of the contract (generally national law) governs the claim. But even at 
the level of general principle the separation is hardly complete,84 in that national law may 
be relevant in adjudicating treaty claims as advanced by the Vivendi I annulment 
committee itself. Moreover, the very idea of ‘fundamental basis’ appears to indicate that 
investment treaty tribunals may be dealing with claims that are not purely treaty-based. 
                                                             
82 See Siwy (2017) 222 (admissibility allows investment tribunals to decide that ‘contractual aspects of a 
treaty-dispute [are] best to be decided by the contractually agreed forum’).  
83 Venezuela Holdings (Annulment) [180]. 
84 Arato (2016) 29. 
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Thus, both contract and treaty aspects constitute the claims’ basis although, at least for 
jurisdictional purposes, only one of these bases defines each claim’s legal 
characterization. 
In international investment law, the fundamental basis refers to the predominant 
legal basis of the claim; the legal arguments that imbue the claim and prevail, in terms of 
the formulation of the case, over other peripheral legal arguments that the claimant may 
have also advanced. The legal basis of the claim, however, is connected both to normative 
elements–i.e., the provisions being invoked–and to the facts involved in each claim. For 
example, a claim may involve the direct expropriation of a plant, a matter par excellence 
covered by IIAs, and also instances of non-compliance by governmental entities with 
contractual arrangements.85 The fundamental basis is constituted by the most relevant 
legal provisions for purposes of resolving the case, in light of the most important facts of 
the claim. This requires a determination, generally under some sort of prima facie test, of 
first, the scope, object, and purpose of the provisions and legal instruments involved, and 
second the relative importance of the different facts in question. This depends on case-
specific factors, such as which are the facts that had the greatest impact on the operation 
of the investment and/or the evolution of the dispute, considered under a holistic approach 
rather than isolating the claim’s different parts. 
(b) Distinguishing between contract and treaty bases 
Despite the apparent general acceptance of the ‘fundamental basis of the claim’ idea, there 
seems to be less consensus as to important connected notions.86 In particular, the main 
factor(s) in determining whether the fundamental basis of the claim is a contract or a 
treaty are unclear. Thus, as to the character in which the state acted when adopting the 
relevant measure, the Vivendi I committee criticized the preceding tribunal’s observation 
that it could not establish which of the state measures in question had been taken 
exercising sovereign authority and which in the exercise of the relevant authority’s rights 
as contractual party.87 For the committee, this observation implied that conduct ‘carried 
                                                             
85 See Impregilo (Award) [183-189] (while some of the claims concerned ‘mere contractual issues’, others 
advanced that the investment had been ‘expropriated and [had been] subject to unfair treatment, these being 
clearly issues under the BIT and not exclusively contractual claims’). 
86 Kaufmann-Kohler argued ‘[t]here is consistency on the distinction between treaty and contract claims’. 
Kaufmann-Kohler (2008) 138. This is correct only in the sense that investment tribunals recognize the 
existence of the distinction. Cf Crawford (2008) 97; Arato (2016) 28. 
87 See Vivendi I [79]. 
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out in the purported exercise of its rights as a party to the Concession Contract could not, 
a priori, have breached the BIT’.88 However, ‘whether particular conduct involves a 
breach of a treaty is not determined by asking whether the conduct purportedly involves 
an exercise of contractual rights’.89  
The distinction between sovereign and other types of breaches relating to 
contracts, nonetheless, was already present, for example, in Professor Dunn’s 1932 
work.90 It was also adopted by Schwebel, who asserted that a state’s violation of a contract 
with an alien breaches international law when it is a breach ‘for governmental rather than 
commercial reasons’.91 More recently, the Impregilo v Pakistan tribunal observed:   
In order that the alleged breach of contract may constitute a violation of the BIT, it must be the result of 
behaviour going beyond that which an ordinary contracting party could adopt. Only the State in the exercise 
of its sovereign authority (“puissance publique”), and not as a contracting party, may breach the obligations 
assumed under the BIT.92 
The Abaclat tribunal’s focus was similar yet somewhat broader. A claim cannot be 
considered a ‘pure’ contract claim if the state’s behaviour or the ‘circumstances’ appear 
to involve an ‘exercise of sovereign State power’.93  
 In the jurisdictional decision in Bayindir, the tribunal stated that the ‘puissance 
publique’ test is only relevant where the claimant relies on a contractual breach to assert 
a treaty claim.94 But even if a contract is involved in the dispute, when a treaty breach is 
invoked the alleged violation is ‘by definition an act of “puissance publique”’.95 Without 
explanation, the tribunal restricted this statement to cases where the host state is not party 
to the contract.96 It left for the merits, however, the decision on whether the measures in 
question were sovereign acts.97 The merits award noted that ‘because a treaty breach is 
                                                             
88 Vivendi I Annulment [110].  
89 Ibid. 
90 Dunn (1932) 165. See also Hyde (1945) 991. Mann, however, described Hyde’s statement that in certain 
circumstances a breach of contract through the use of sovereign power may violate international law ‘a 
singularly bare and unconvincing assertion’.  Mann (1960) 579. 
91 Schwebel (1987) 412; see also Schwebel (1987-II) 113. 
92 Impregilo v Pakistan [260] (footnote omitted). 
93 Abaclat [318].  
94 Bayindir (Jurisdiction) [183]. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
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different from a contract violation’, the claimant had to establish a breach ‘different in 
nature from a simple contract violation’, which is one committed by the state ‘in the 
exercise of its sovereign power’.98  
The statements in the Bayindir decisions that a treaty breach is by definition a 
sovereign act,99 on the one hand, and that there is a treaty breach only when an exercise 
of sovereign power is involved, on the other, are not persuasive. Nor is it clear in what 
way the rule changes when the host state is directly party to the contract. Further, the 
reference in this context to the character in which the government acted when committing 
the alleged breach, although currently supported not only by arbitral tribunals100 but also 
by commentators,101 has been criticized.102 Citing the ILC’s work on state responsibility, 
Crawford noted that, in general, a violation of international law ‘does not depend on the 
characterisation of the conduct in question as “governmental”, or as involving the exercise 
of sovereign authority’.103 What matters is the content of the international obligation.104 
The emphasis on what the international obligation requires, rather than on general 
notions about the state’s act’s ‘nature’, clarifies the general position. A treaty claim is one 
that derives from the breach of obligations contained in treaty provisions.105 States are 
free to shape the scope of treaty obligations they are willing to assume and an evolution 
in the contents of common standards of protection is readily apparent in recent IIAs.106 
Unless the treaty provides otherwise, whether there has been a breach of such standards 
does not depend on whether the state acted in a sovereign capacity.107 For example, a state 
                                                             
98 Bayindir (Award) [180]. See also ibid [377, 461] (on fair and equitable treatment and expropriation). 
99 See Martinez and Bray (2006) 4 (the jurisdictional decision in Bayindir ‘reflects an increasing 
receptiveness on the part of ICSID tribunals to contract-linked claims of foreign investors under a BIT’). 
100 See e.g. Consortium RFCC (Award) [65]; Joy Mining [72]; Salini (Jurisdiction) [155]; Azurix (Award) 
[53, 315]; El Paso (Jurisdiction) [79]; Panamerican & BP [108]; Suez ARB/03/17 (Liability) [142]; Suez 
ARB/03/19 (Liability) [153]; Saur (Jurisdiction and Liability 2012) [444]; Hamester [328]. 
101 See McLachlan (2008) 390; Voss (2011) 173, 216; Siwy (2017) 212-215. 
102 Ho Qing Ying (2014) 136. 
103 Crawford (2008) 356. See also Sasson (2010) 156. 
104 Crawford (2008) 356. 
105 The degree of deference that should be accorded to the claimant’s characterization of the claims, 
however, concerns the standard of review at the jurisdictional phase, not what a treaty claim is. 
106 See e.g. CETA, Art 8.10 (containing a detailed regulation of the obligation of fair and equitable 
treatment). 
107 Certain authors have also referred to the character in which the state acted when concluding the contract. 
See Weil (1961) 207; Siwy (2017) 210. However, this aspect says even less about the treaty or contract 
basis of the claim than the sovereign or private character of the act that gives rise to the claim.  
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may act in an unfair or arbitrary way while breaching contractual provisions as an 
‘ordinary contracting party’. This means that treaty and contractual liability may overlap, 
at least in the sense that they may derive from the same acts.108 But this does not warrant 
making the application of IIA obligations depend on whether the state acted in a sovereign 
capacity when this is not required by the treaty provisions.109  
Further, concepts developed in the field of state immunity before national courts–
such as the distinction between acts iure gestionis and iure imperii–should not be directly 
applied to distinguish between contract and treaty claims before international tribunals.110 
State immunity’s traditional foundations relate to the principle that one state cannot 
exercise jurisdiction over another one because they are equals.111 The movement to 
confine immunity to acts iure imperii, starting at the end of the 19th century, derived from 
states’ increased commercial activities and the need to hold them accountable for ordinary 
business transactions.112 The contract/treaty distinction is not concerned with 
jurisdictional relationships between states. Rather, it seeks to determine, in claims 
potentially involving treaty and contract liability, which of the two prevails in any specific 
claim, and the implications for the jurisdiction and the law applicable to the claim.  
However, the observation that all depends on the applicable obligation’s contents 
begs the question as to what these contents in international investment law are. While this 
ultimately hinges on the scope of each standard of treatment in each IIA, investment treaty 
protection is concerned with the treatment by sovereigns of private actors. Admittedly, 
not all acts by sovereigns constitute sovereign acts, in the sense of acts involving the 
exercise of state powers that non-state actors cannot engage in. Yet, one of IIAs’ main 
functions is to control state power113 when ordinary remedies are not readily available.114 
                                                             
108 Cf Cremades and Cairns (2005) 17. But see Gaffney and Loftis (2007) 27. 
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In this light, the character in which the state acted may play a role in the contract/treaty 
distinction. For example, if a state party to a contract adopts a legislative measure 
modifying the contractual terms without the consent of the other party, this may be 
important to determine whether the measure gives rise to a treaty or a contract claim. 
Here, however, the crucial question is still not whether the state acted as a sovereign, 
which it did, but whether it acted in an unfair and inequitable, discriminatory, or arbitrary 
way or otherwise in breach of an IIA obligation. 
(c) The claims’ substance 
Aside from the debate regarding whether a treaty claim related to a contract requires the 
existence of a sovereign act, on some other points there seems to be consensus. 
Investment tribunals agree that contract and treaty claims are ‘juridically’115 and 
‘analytically distinct’,116 subject to different ‘legal standards’.117 The two kinds of claims 
are ‘different things, responding to different tests, subject to different rules’.118 The 
Bayindir tribunal even asserted ‘the principle of the independence of treaty claims and 
contract claims’.119 At the same time, tribunals often acknowledge that treaty and contract 
claims may ‘perfectly coincide’,120 that they may ‘arise out of the same facts’,121 or at 
least that ‘the factual basis of the two types of claims may to a large extent coincide’.122 
For the EDF tribunal, however, ‘[t]here is nothing mysterious about the fact that the same 
acts may constitute both a contractual breach and a violation of relevant treaty 
obligations’.123 
 Yet treaty and contract claims that coincide as to the factual basis are interrelated. 
While underscoring the different legal bases of the claims, the Vivendi I committee never 
advanced the ‘independence’ of treaty claims. Nor did it suggest an exclusive application 
of international law in treaty claims related to contractual breaches, to the exclusion of 
                                                             
115 Bayindir (Jurisdiction) [148]. 
116 Impregilo v Pakistan [258]. See also Gaffney and Loftis (2007) 27. 
117 EDF (Award) [1135]. 
118 Duke v Ecuador [342]. Cf Charles I’s 1649 speech: ‘A Subject and a Sovereign are clean different 
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119 Bayindir (Jurisdiction) [166]. 
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the law of the contract, which would be unrealistic124 and undesirable.125 Further, the 
object of the claims may be substantially the same. For example, in Philip Morris v 
Uruguay the tribunal noted that the granting of a remedy sought in a local claim ‘would 
have answered the Claimants’ claims, under both domestic and international law, 
including the BIT’.126 The ICJ’s Chamber in ELSI recognized that the Italian proceedings’ 
substance was the same as that of the case before it, even if the parties and the applicable 
law were different.127 The Teinver tribunal adopted a similar reasoning vis-à-vis a local 
expropriation claim and the investment arbitration. The subject matter of both 
proceedings was not identical, one concerning the valuation of the expropriated assets 
and the other whether the expropriation had breached IIA standards of treatment.128 Yet, 
substantively, both proceedings had the same goal: make the foreign investors and their 
local subsidiary whole for the loss caused by the expropriation.129 
Leaving aside jurisdictional decisions, which focus on the provisions containing 
consent to international jurisdiction, reliance on the supposed ‘independence’ between 
contract and treaty claims is particularly problematic in admissibility or merits decisions. 
If there are considerable overlaps as to the facts giving rise to the claim and perhaps the 
applicable law (let alone the damages claimed), the substance–or to borrow the words of 
the parties in the Ambatielos case before the ICJ, the ‘substantive foundation’130–of the 
‘contract’ and the ‘treaty’ dispute may be the same.131 If so, treaty and contract rights and 
obligations should not be independently considered and remedies independently granted. 
More generally, the law applicable to treaty claims, which often includes national law, is 
                                                             
124 Even Weil, one of the early defenders of the ‘internationalization of contracts’, argued that the 
application of international law ‘could not but be partial, and certain aspects of the contractual relationships 
would remain in any case subject to the national law of the contracting state’. Weil (1961) 188. Author’s 
translation (original French). 
125 Arato (2016) 8. 
126 Philip Morris v Uruguay (Jurisdiction) [112]. 
127 ELSI, 46. In fact, it appears that the relevant treaties were not even mentioned in the Italian proceedings. 
Ibid. 
128 Teinver (Jurisdiction) [132]. 
129 Ibid. See also SGS v Philippines [149]. 
130 Ambatielos (Merits), 13, 16. 
131 Schreuer observed that ‘[t]he idea that contract claims and BIT claims are conceptually separate and are 
subject to different standards is intellectually attractive’, but ‘essentially the same legal dispute’–‘more 
semantics than reality’–may really be what is at issue. Schreuer (2006) 162, 171. 
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not isolated from the one applicable to contract claims.132 The alleged strict independence 
must also be considered against the backdrop of the continuing difficulty in distinguishing 
contract and treaty claims.133 Further, even taking the distinction based on the character 
of the state act at face value, the substance of contract and treaty breaches may still 
coincide if only because nothing prevents a sovereign act from breaching a treaty and a 
contract at the same time.134  
3 From contract to treaty 
A contract breach by a state is per se not considered a breach of international law.135 
Something more is required.136 The point here is whether it is difficult for a contract 
breach to transform into a treaty breach, because the difference between the two is 
significant or for some other reason, and how this relates to the alleged independence 
between contract and treaty claims for admissibility purposes. This thesis argues, first, 
that the concepts used to describe the additional element are often less demanding than in 
the past, plus the fact that a denial of justice is no longer required. Second, investment 
tribunals frequently equate a breach of contract to a frustration of the investor’s legitimate 
expectations (and thus to a breach of fair and equitable treatment). The result is an easy 
transmutation of contract breaches into treaty breaches. The two kinds of breaches have 
got considerably closer, to the point of sometimes becoming substantively 
indistinguishable. Third, this outcome is incompatible with maintaining a strict 
independence of treaty claims vis-à-vis the contract, not least in admissibility and merits 
determinations.  
                                                             
132 See Chapter 7. 
133 Cremades (2005) 7. 
134 See Kreindler (2005) 192. As the alleged treaty breach is, on the facts of the case, farther removed from 
any issue of interpretation or application of the contract in question, the overlap in terms of the substance 
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by a state of a contract with a foreigner could suffice for international law to be infringed, was still being 
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that when the contract is with a foreigner ‘the State incurs a direct responsibility on breach of the contract’. 
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Norwegian Loans referred generally to a ‘modification of the substance of the international contracts’, an 
‘arbitrary breach’ or ‘taking’ of the contract. See Mann (1960) 578. 
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Traditionally, different propositions were made as to such additional element 
including, for example, the references by the United Kingdom (‘UK’) in Ambatielos to 
breaches of contract involving ‘an obviously arbitrary or tortious element’,137 by the US 
in the Shufeldt case to ‘arbitrary cancellation’ of the contract,138 and in the 1961 Harvard 
Draft Convention to ‘a clear and discriminatory departure from the proper law of the 
contract’.139 A denial of justice of some sort was sometimes required. For De Visscher, 
international responsibility could arise 
in connection with an undertaking contained in a contract under municipal law, if there is a denial of 
justice to the foreign concessionary through default of the ordinary courts or through a refusal to 
submit the dispute to any arbitral procedure that may have been substituted for internal jurisdiction.140 
Similarly, Hyde contended that a breach of contract did not involve a violation of 
international law, unless there was either a failure to adjudicate the contract claims locally 
or, ‘following an adjudication, to heed the adverse decision of a domestic court’.141 
 While the idea that an additional element is necessary to turn a contract breach 
into a treaty breach is nowadays largely accepted in investment arbitration, different 
concepts are used to define such additional element. It is contended that treaty protection 
is likely to be available in cases of ‘significant interference’ with the investor’s 
contractual rights,142 an ‘outright repudiation of the transaction’,143 an ‘arbitrary 
intervention’,144 or a ‘serious repudiation’.145 Reference is no longer made to a need for a 
denial of justice before the contractual forum, although ‘the availability of local remedies 
to an investor faced with contractual breaches’ is sometimes considered relevant in 
determining whether the state has breached certain IIA standards.146 
                                                             
137 Fitzmaurice (1961) 64. 
138 Schwebel (1987) 409. 
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 Aside from the lack of a requirement of denial of justice, the interpretation given 
to treaty standards of protection must be taken into account. Alexandrov argued that a 
breach of contract is often also a violation of IIA obligations.147 With respect to the fair 
and equitable treatment standard, the tribunal in Sempra first quoted the finding in 
Tecmed that foreign investments shall be treated in such a way that it does not affect the 
foreign investor’s basic expectations when making the investment.148 It then added that 
under this standard 
[w]hat counts is that in the end the stability of the law and the observance of legal obligations are assured, 
thereby safeguarding the very object and purpose of the protection sought by the treaty.149 
Investors’ legitimate expectations have been described as the ‘dominant element’ of the 
fair and equitable treatment standard, under which states may not frustrate such 
expectations.150 
 Contemporary ideas of ‘serious repudiation’ or ‘significant interference’ do not 
set a higher threshold than prior references to ‘an obviously arbitrary or tortious element’ 
or ‘clear and discriminatory departure’ from the contract. Admittedly, much depends on 
how investment tribunals interpret these broad concepts embodying the additional 
element, including the alleged requirement that the breach involve the exercise of 
sovereign power. The CMS tribunal seemed to endorse this latter requirement by noting 
that ‘[p]urely commercial aspects of a contract might not be protected by the treaty in 
some situations’.151 IIA protection will be triggered only ‘when there is a specific breach 
of treaty rights and obligations or a violation of contract rights protected under the 
treaty’.152 However, given that contract rights are usually protected under IIAs, this 
conception does not exclude much in terms of contractual breaches. 
Thus, the ‘additional element’ is not extremely exacting, especially when the 
interpretation given to certain standards of treatment is factored in. Indeed, the passage 
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from contract to treaty breach is nowadays not particularly difficult.153 The upshot may 
be seen by some as a natural (and even healthy) evolution of international law, as well as 
the result of what states bargained for in IIAs. After all, Jennings was probably right when 
observing, decades before the BIT generation, that there is nothing intrinsic to the national 
and international legal structures ‘that inhibits the sanctioning of contractual obligations 
by international law’.154 The ease with which a breach of contract may acquire the 
standing of a breach of treaty155 has allowed a notable expansion of investment tribunals’ 
jurisdiction. However, this easy passage from contract to treaty claims–along with the 
referred to overlaps as to the facts and applicable law–does not sit well with maintaining 
a strong ‘juridical’ and ‘analytical’ ‘independence’ of both types of claims. When little is 
required to assert treaty jurisdiction over a contract breach, resolving the treaty claim in 
relative isolation from factors said to pertain to the contract claim, such as limits to 
recovery stemming from the contract, becomes problematic. Under the guise of the 
‘independence’ of treaty rights, the proper law of the contract is ignored156 and the 
substantive relationship between treaty and contract claims obscured.157 
II. FROM JURISDICTION TO ADMISSIBILITY 
Investment tribunals have often discussed the relationship between treaties and contracts 
in decisions on jurisdiction. For this purpose, affirming a supposed independence of treaty 
claims is unnecessary. The idea of ‘fundamental basis’ provides an adequate, if rather 
general, conceptual framework. For admissibility (or merits) determinations, however, 
the same idea of independence provides an unpersuasive basis for the analysis. 
Distinguishing between contract and treaty claims is often necessary in jurisdictional 
decisions, in particular when the investment tribunal only has jurisdiction over treaty 
claims. Here the contract/treaty distinction is useful, especially because the claim’s 
‘fundamental basis’ may often be determined through a prima facie analysis (which 
assumes the claimant’s case to be true for certain purposes and thus allows for a 
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jurisdictional decision before hearing the merits).158 Once the substance of the treaty 
claim has been fully analysed, however, overlaps between treaty and contract claims raise 
admissibility concerns. Whether each claim’s ‘fundamental basis’ is treaty or contract 
may still be relevant to admissibility, but along with other factors, such as the existence 
of a forum selection clause or local proceedings, the availability of the contractual forum, 
possible prejudice to third parties, overlaps in the damages claims, double recovery risks, 
etc. For the admissibility analysis, neither the contract/treaty distinction nor the fact that 
it is generally the shareholders who pursue the treaty claims and the local company the 
contract claims, should conceal the substantive links between contract and treaty claims 
and their potential implications.  
This section first considers how concepts related to the contract/treaty distinction 
have developed at the jurisdictional stage and whether they should be maintained for 
admissibility purposes. It then analyses to what extent contractual forum selection clauses 
and parallel local proceedings raise admissibility rather than jurisdictional objections.  
A Decisions on jurisdiction and the fundamental basis of the claim 
Arbitral decisions that discuss at some length the distinction between contract and treaty 
claims frequently do not deal with the merits. After the Vivendi I annulment proceeding, 
these decisions were often preliminary decisions ruling on jurisdictional or admissibility 
objections. With respect to the applicable standard of review for determining jurisdiction–
in particular to determine the ‘treaty’ nature of the claim–the leading case is Impregilo v 
Pakistan. In its preliminary jurisdictional ruling, the tribunal observed it did not have to 
rule on the merits of treaty claims, which had not been heard, but only to satisfy itself it 
had ‘jurisdiction over the dispute, as presented by the Claimant’.159 It endorsed the ICJ’s 
statement in Oil Platforms to the effect that the Court had to ascertain whether the 
advanced treaty violations did or did not ‘fall within the provisions of the Treaty and 
whether, as a consequence, the dispute [was] one which the Court [had] jurisdiction 
ratione materiae to entertain’.160 Accordingly, the Impregilo v Pakistan tribunal assessed 
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whether the facts as alleged by the claimant ‘if established, [were] capable of coming 
within those provisions of the BIT which [had] been invoked’.161   
 For preliminary decisions having to distinguish between contract and treaty 
claims, this test, in principle,162 has generally met no serious objections.163 Otherwise, 
tribunals would have to decide on the claims’ merits at preliminary stages of the 
arbitrations.164 The point of interest here is, however, to what extent current concepts as 
to the independence of claims under treaties vis-à-vis claims under contracts have been 
developed in circumstances in which tribunals had still not heard the claims’ merits.165 
And to what extent investment tribunals, after taking the claimant’s claims at face value 
for purposes of a preliminary decision, revisited the issue whether the alleged treaty 
claims were really different from related contract claims. The Enron case illustrates this 
point.  
 In Enron, the tribunal issued two preliminary decisions on jurisdiction, one 
dealing with certain tax assessments by Argentine provinces166 and the other with tariff 
measures adopted by Argentina in the early 2000s.167 In the first decision, the tribunal 
noted that the claimants had ‘a separate cause of action under the Treaty’, which could be 
‘asserted independently’ from the rights of the local companies.168 In the second one, it 
relied on the annulment decision in Vivendi I and the jurisdictional decision in CMS for 
the proposition that contract and treaty claims are different.169 While neither of the Enron 
preliminary decisions analysed the merits of the claims, the tribunal noted that ‘although 
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there [were] no doubt questions concerning the Contract between the parties, the essence 
of the claims, [in both cases], relate[d] to alleged violations of the Treaty rights’.170   
 In the award, the tribunal asserted that the main claim concerned an ‘alleged right 
to calculate tariffs in US dollars’.171 In the claimants’ case, this right and other ‘key tariff-
related guarantees’ resulted not from any treaty or otherwise international instrument, but 
entirely from contractual and national law provisions.172 The tribunal was persuaded that 
such right existed–primarily on the basis of ‘the examination of the legal and regulatory 
framework’–173 and that, as a matter of Argentine law, had not been respected.174 
Regarding the treaty obligations, the tribunal concluded that ‘a key element of fair and 
equitable treatment is the requirement of a “stable framework for the investment”’.175 
Since such ‘legal and business framework’–on which the investors had relied to make 
their investments–had been ‘substantially changed’ and ‘dismantled’ by the challenged 
measures, there was an ‘objective breach’ of the fair and equitable standard.176 
 The links between contractual issues and the findings of treaty breach are clear 
here. The Enron tribunal’s finding of treaty breach hinged to a large extent on the 
‘substantial’ modification and ‘dismantling’ of contract and other national law provisions. 
Despite this, the ideas of independence, separability, and difference between contract and 
treaty rights and claims–affirmed on a prima facie basis without an analysis of the 
substance in the preliminary decisions–were not revisited in the award. As rightly noted 
by Arato in reference to the decisions in CMS, Enron, and Sempra, what was not 
discussed in any of the cases is the relationship between the fair and equitable treatment 
standard ‘and the underlying contracts, and the extent to which the tribunals’ 
interpretations of the standard affects the contractual arrangement’.177 It may be argued 
that this poses no jurisdictional problem, since investment tribunals may uphold 
jurisdiction to address contract breaches that at the same time constitute treaty 
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violations.178 As long as the tribunal finds the fundamental basis of the claim is the treaty, 
nothing more needs to be considered in terms of how to reconcile potentially overlapping 
rights and claims. Indeed, for strictly jurisdictional purposes this may be acceptable. 
 The Vivendi I annulment committee, which introduced the ‘fundamental basis’ 
concept in modern investment arbitration,179 did not consider the merits of the case (given 
its limited jurisdiction). The concept is often useful in deciding whether a ‘treaty’ tribunal 
has jurisdiction ratione materiae, in particular when the claim has a mixed contract/treaty 
character. For example, a case may involve both discriminatory legislation evidently 
harming the investment, a treaty issue, and mere delays by a government agency in 
settling certain bills, a contract issue. Determining the claim’s fundamental basis, in 
application of a prima facie standard of review, allows investment tribunals to determine 
whether there is treaty jurisdiction without hearing the merits. It is not, however, a matter 
of ‘whether the claim truly does have an autonomous existence outside the contract’,180 
but of determining the claim’s predominant legal basis, considering the provisions and 
facts invoked. Full discussion of the facts may disclose substantive and substantial 
overlaps between contract and treaty claims, particularly as to the damages claimed. On 
the one hand, this realization does not necessarily affect the conclusion that the claim’s 
fundamental basis is a treaty for strictly jurisdictional purposes, i.e., that the claim, as 
formulated by the claimant, is one that may be heard by the treaty tribunal. On the other 
hand, in those circumstances the ‘fundamental basis’ notion does not warrant strictly 
separating contract and treaty beyond jurisdictional determinations.181  
B The impact of contractual forum selection clauses on admissibility 
In Chapter 2, this thesis included forum selection clauses among admissibility 
considerations applicable to shareholder indirect claims under IIAs. Many tribunals have 
                                                             
178 Enron (Jurisdiction I) [91]. Voss argues that contract and treaty claims may derive from the same facts 
but still belong to different categories under the ‘principle of possible coincidence of treaty claims and 
contract claims’. Voss (2011) 166.  
179 Pantechniki [61]. 
180 Ibid [64]. For the Pantechniki tribunal, to distinguish between treaty and contract claims it is necessary 
to ‘determine whether claimed entitlements have the same normative source’. But ‘[t]he frontiers between 
claimed entitlements are not always distinct’. Ibid [62]. See also Kjos (2013) 108 (whether the cause of 
action is contractual or non-contractual ‘is determined by the source of the right (and corresponding 
obligation) relied upon by the claimant’). These references appear accurate, yet they leave open the 
possibility that there may be more than one entitlement under different normative sources over the same 
assets. 
181 But see SGS v Philippines [156]. 
209 
  
considered the issue of what effect, if any, such clauses have on international 
jurisdictions.182 Investment tribunals have been consistent here. Since the fundamental 
basis of the claim is a treaty, contractual forum selection clauses do not bar jurisdiction 
in respect of treaty breaches.183 The point is often accompanied by lack of privity 
arguments (i.e., because it is not a party to the contract but only a shareholder of one of 
the parties, the claimant is not bound by any contractual provision).184 And also by the 
application of prima facie tests, which basically entail accepting the validity of the 
claimant’s arguments for the jurisdictional aspects of interest here,185 with the effect that 
forum choice provisions in contracts are generally bypassed in preliminary decisions. 
Nonetheless, particularly when jurisdictional issues are joined to the merits, certain 
tribunals have upheld jurisdictional objections based on the claims’ contractual nature 
and the application of contractual forum selection provisions.186 But even here the role of 
these provisions in defining treaty tribunals’ jurisdiction has been limited and generally 
not affected the nub of the claim. 
 Despite these broadly consistent outcomes, SGS v Philippines inaugurated a 
different approach to choice-of-forum clauses. The tribunal was confronted with a 
provision submitting contractual disputes to the courts and the law of the Philippines.187 
The claimant submitted that, having missed payments under the contract, Philippines was 
in breach of the umbrella clause in the Philippines-Switzerland BIT,188 which in turn 
attracted BIT jurisdiction.189 The tribunal was concerned that a broad interpretation of the 
umbrella clause could ‘override dispute settlement clauses negotiated in particular 
contracts’.190 It concluded that under these clauses the proper law of the contract was not 
affected.191 In particular as regards forum selection clauses, the tribunal found that 
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general provisions of BITs should not, unless clearly expressed to do so, override specific and exclusive 
dispute settlement arrangements made in the investment contract itself.192 
Further, a tribunal should respect a binding exclusive jurisdiction clause in a case between 
the parties to the contract, unless the tribunal is ‘bound ab exteriore, i.e., by some other 
law, not to do so’.193 
 As the applicable forum selection clause affected the ‘substance’ of the claimant’s 
claim, the question was whether this went to the tribunal’s jurisdiction or the claim’s 
admissibility.194 After quoting the Vivendi I annulment committee for the proposition that 
claims whose ‘essential basis’ is contractual are subject to any valid forum selection 
clause in the contract, the tribunal stated that ‘this principle is one concerning the 
admissibility of the claim, not jurisdiction in the strict sense’.195 The central reason for 
this conclusion was that ‘treaty jurisdiction is not abrogated by contract’.196 But, at the 
same time, a party should not be allowed–absent exceptional circumstances–to advance 
contractual claims before a forum different from the one exclusively provided for by the 
contract.197 The tribunal relied on ‘the principle that a party to a contract cannot claim on 
that contract without itself complying with it, [which] is more naturally considered as a 
matter of admissibility than jurisdiction’.198 
 These observations referred to the relationship between exclusive jurisdiction 
clauses and contract claims–rather than treaty claims–albeit before an investment 
tribunal.199 The tribunal affirmed its jurisdiction over both contract and treaty claims. The 
contract claims were inadmissible, however, because a decision would have been 
premature until the ‘scope or extent’ of the payment obligation had been clarified by the 
contractual forum.200 Further, the treaty claims under the umbrella clause and fair and 
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equitable treatment provisions were also inadmissible. Without clarification from the 
contractual forum on the outstanding amount, ‘to decide on the claim in isolation from a 
decision by the chosen forum under [the contract was] inappropriate and premature’.201  
In Bureau Veritas, which involved a contract for the provision of pre-shipment 
inspection of imports into Paraguay,202 the tribunal upheld its jurisdiction over the fair 
and equitable treatment claim.203 Here, it saw no admissibility problem deriving from the 
existence of an agreed contractual forum, essentially because the ‘fundamental basis’ of 
the claim was that treaty standard.204 As regards the umbrella clause claim, however, 
while it also affirmed jurisdiction,205 the tribunal observed that the provision imported 
into the BIT all contractual obligations, including those relating to the competent forum 
under the contract. This raised an admissibility issue.206 To allow parties to a contract to 
invoke certain provisions of the contract and ignore others would contravene the 
‘fundamental principle that the autonomy and will of the parties is to be respected’.207 
Thus, the tribunal found this claim to be inadmissible based on the exclusive jurisdiction 
clause in the contract, which was not overridden by the umbrella clause.208  
 The reasoning in SGS v Pakistan was different. The case involved a contract to 
provide pre-shipment inspection services over goods to be imported into Pakistan.209 Any 
dispute arising under the contract was subject to arbitration under the law of Pakistan.210 
Based on this forum selection in the contract, Pakistan objected to the ICSID tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.211 The tribunal concluded it had exclusive jurisdiction over treaty claims, the 
nature of the claims hinging–at the jurisdictional phase–on how the claimant had 
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characterized them.212 However, it found it had no jurisdiction over contract claims which 
did not also constitute treaty breaches, not even under the umbrella clause.213 One of the 
reasons to reject a broad reading of the umbrella clause, i.e., one that would ‘elevate’ all 
contract breaches to treaty violations, was that ‘the benefits of the dispute settlement 
provisions of a contract with a State also a party to a BIT, would flow only to the investor’, 
who could at will negate the effect of such provisions.214 
 In principle, distinguishing between contract and treaty claims for purposes of 
determining the impact of a forum selection clause is a jurisdictional issue.215 To the 
extent that consent to arbitration in the applicable treaty provisions refers to treaty claims, 
interpreting the scope of such consent–including any conditions attached to it–vis-à-vis a 
competing provision of another instrument, is a decision on the jurisdiction of the tribunal 
rather than on the admissibility of the claim.216 It is not a matter of treaty jurisdiction 
being potentially ‘abrogated by contract’, but simply of determining the tribunal’s ratione 
materiae jurisdiction under the treaty.217 For this jurisdictional determination, the 
approach followed by the majority of investment tribunals–i.e., whether the ‘fundamental 
basis of the claim’ is a contract or a treaty–is acceptable.218 However, when the substance 
of the treaty claim coincides with that of underlying contract claims, the idea that a party 
‘should not be able to approbate and reprobate in respect of the same contract’219 becomes 
applicable for admissibility purposes.220 
  The solution adopted in SGS v Philippines has been criticized. Seeking to respect 
both the contractual forum selection clause and the treaty dispute settlement provision, 
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by affirming jurisdiction but referring the claimant to the local courts, ‘attempts to render 
compatible two contradictory intentions’.221 However, first, respect for the ‘contractually-
agreed process’222 is a relevant consideration for international tribunals, not least when a 
competing forum has been conferred exclusive jurisdiction.223 Investment tribunals have 
weighed similar reasons when dealing with the substance of treaty claims.224 Second and 
relatedly, admissibility covers a wide range of possibilities,225 albeit different from 
jurisdiction and the merits.226 As confirmed by the decisions in SGS v Philippines and 
Bureau Veritas, admissibility allows investment tribunals to consider the exercise of their 
jurisdiction when treaty claims overlap with contract claims covered by a contractual 
choice of forum. This rationale relates not only to the two main concerns of this thesis, 
i.e., risks of multiple recovery and prejudice to third parties, but also to the need to respect 
the balance agreed by the parties to the relevant contract.  
The tribunal in Aramco endorsed similar notions when referring to the 
‘interdependence’ of contractual obligations.227 It was indisputable ‘that one of the parties 
must not benefit from the performance of the contract by his partner while evading his 
own obligations’.228 Whether the way to factor in contractual forum selection clauses in 
treaty claims is to stay the proceedings or otherwise take these clauses into account when 
deciding on admissibility or the merits, depends on the circumstances of each case.229 
Once jurisdiction over a treaty claim has been upheld, the impact of forum selection 
clauses appears connected to ‘elementary notions of equity’230–including allowing both 
parties, not only the claimant, to rely on provisions of the contract and ‘that a party to a 
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contract cannot claim on that contract without itself complying with it’.231 Neither the fact 
that the claimant is not the party to the contract nor the contract/treaty distinction should 
prevent the consideration of basic notions of party autonomy and interdependence of 
obligations, particularly whenever the treaty claim derives from the same facts or involves 
the same damages as claims under the contract.  
C Competing claims 
The thesis also puts forward the existence of overlapping non-IIA claims as an 
admissibility factor.232 As in the case of forum selection clauses and essentially for the 
same reasons, investment tribunals have given short shrift to local proceedings, whether 
potential or ongoing, dealing with the same facts as the international proceedings. 
Investment tribunals have required that suits before national courts be identical in certain 
respects to the international proceeding for arbitral jurisdiction to be affected. For 
instance, Benvenuti & Bonfant was not concerned with the contract/treaty distinction 
because ICSID jurisdiction was based on a contractual provision.233 Yet in deciding 
whether to refer the case to a local court, the tribunal stated that ‘the pendency of a case 
was in order only in the event of the identity of the parties, of the subject matter, and of 
the cause of the suits pending before the two tribunals’.234 The fact that the parties in the 
local and international proceedings–although related–were not the same, sufficed to 
conclude that the conditions were not fulfilled.235 
 Subsequent decisions have referred to similar ideas of (lack of) identity between 
local and international proceedings. As noted, even the Vivendi I tribunal relied on the 
distinction between contract and treaty claims for jurisdictional purposes. The claimants 
had advanced that, had any domestic suit been brought, the respondent could have argued 
they had elected the local avenue and were thus precluded from pursuing international 
arbitration because of the ‘fork in the road’ provision.236 The tribunal simply noted that a 
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contract claim by the claimant before local courts would not have foreclosed a treaty 
claim.237 Similarly, also dealing with a ‘fork in the road’ argument, the Enron tribunal 
noted that any recourse to local courts for breach of contract would not have prevented 
an ICSID arbitration for treaty breaches and, moreover, ‘any situation of lis pendens 
would require identity of the parties’.238 In a second jurisdictional ruling, the tribunal 
added that the contract claims/treaty claims distinction had ‘relied in part on the test of 
the triple identity’.239 However, the tribunal suggested that, although apparently by 
definition contract and treaty claims involve different causes of action, there may be 
instances in which it is ‘virtually impossible’ to separate them.240 
 Arguments as to the lack of identity of the parties involved and the applicable law 
frequently reinforce the difference between local and international proceedings in terms 
of the cause of action, i.e., contract and treaty respectively. Indeed, in the local 
proceedings one of the parties may be the locally-incorporated entity–not the foreign 
shareholder, as in the arbitration–and the other party may be the public entity or territorial 
subdivision who concluded the contract, not the national state.241 And, it is argued, while 
national courts will apply national law, international tribunals will decide based on the 
BIT and international law.242 For the EDF tribunal, this ‘notable absence of the requisite 
parity relating to the parties, cause of action, and applicable legal standards’ between 
contract and treaty claims ‘precludes satisfaction of the identity requirement in res 
judicata or lis pendens’.243 
 As a rule, investment tribunals’ approach conforms with the PCIJ’s position under 
general international law in Certain German Interests. Poland had argued that the PCIJ 
could not entertain Germany’s application until the Germano-Polish Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal had given judgment in a case brought by a company claiming restitution of the 
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same factory as the one involved in the case before the PCIJ.244 The PCIJ observed that 
if ‘the plea were to be examined in accordance with the principles generally accepted in 
regard to litispendance’, it would have to be rejected.245 After noting that the existence of 
the ‘doctrine of litispendance’ in international law was disputed,246 it concluded that the 
‘essential elements’ of litispendence were not present: 
There is no question of two identical actions : the action still pending before the Germano-Polish Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal at Paris seeks the restitution to a private Company of the factory of which the latter claims 
to have been wrongfully deprived; on the other hand, the Permanent Court of International Justice is asked 
to give an interpretation of certain clauses of the Geneva Convention. The Parties are not the same, and, 
finally, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals and the Permanent Court of International Justice are not courts of the 
same character... 
Thus, the two parallel claims were not identical as to the object, the parties, and the courts 
involved. 
 Yet in the Chorzów Factory case, the PCIJ revisited the issue in light of Poland’s 
argument that there were other tribunals before which the companies affected by the 
taking of the factory situated at Chorzów could claim compensation.247 Poland argued 
that ‘by substituting itself for these companies’, Germany would upset the ‘jurisdictional 
system’ created by the treaties establishing such tribunals.248 To resolve whether it was 
prevented from exercising its own jurisdiction because of the jurisdiction granted to the 
other tribunals mentioned by Poland, i.e., an admissibility question, the PCIJ observed 
that some of the reasons given in Certain German Interests still applied, in particular that 
the parties in the different proceedings diverged.249 However, in Certain German 
Interests Germany only asked the Court for a declaratory judgment between states, while 
in Chorzów Factory it sought compensation ‘not necessarily different’ from that which 
the affected companies could obtain from another tribunal.250 Here, the PCIJ did not 
content itself with observing that the claim before it was not identical to the claims that 
could be brought before other tribunals, under the criteria applied in Certain German 
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Interests. Rather, the PCIJ examined in some detail the jurisdictional heads involved and 
concluded that the provisions in question were addressed to different kinds of acts.251 
 Thus, confronted with a concrete claim for indemnity the PCIJ undertook a more 
substantive comparison between potentially overlapping claims before asserting its 
jurisdiction. And the damages aspect was expressly considered for purposes of such 
comparison vis-à-vis claims before national courts.252 Similarly, in ELSI the defining 
factor in determining whether the substance of the national proceedings was the same as 
that of the international proceeding were the measures and losses invoked, regardless of 
who the formal parties were or what the applicable law in each forum was.253 Investment 
tribunals have not generally adopted this reasoning. Rather, they have focused on whether 
the claim’s fundamental basis is a contract or a treaty and on whether the parties are 
formally identical.254  
However, a substantive approach especially vis-à-vis the requirement that the 
parties be identical, which had been favoured by commentators as regards parallel treaty 
arbitrations,255 is discernible in recent decisions dealing with shareholder indirect claims. 
This approach is consistent with the application of admissibility advanced in this thesis. 
For example, the Ampal case involved five related contractual and investment arbitrations 
with the same factual matrix.256 In the decision on jurisdiction, the tribunal stated that, 
while as a ‘jurisdictional matter’ treaty and contract claims were different,257 it was 
abusive for related parties to pursue the substance (i.e., the damages) of the same claim 
before two tribunals once the jurisdiction of each tribunal is confirmed.258 The liability 
decision found that because IIAs allow shareholders to claim for losses to investments 
held indirectly through an investment company, the shareholder should be ‘treated as a 
privy to the investment company for the purposes of the rule of res judicata’.259 
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Shareholders should not benefit from ‘an extended right of direct action—looking 
through the investment company’, while at the same time not bearing ‘the burden of being 
bound by any finding arising out of a claim by the investment company itself on the same 
facts’.260    
In assessing the impact of parallel proceedings, most investment tribunals look to 
the formal identity of claims.261 This may be justified for strictly jurisdictional 
determinations, which are often taken before hearing the merits. Further, the duty of an 
international tribunal to exercise its jurisdiction should not be overlooked. But for 
admissibility decisions, an approach that focuses on the contract or treaty cause of action 
or the identity of the persons involved in the different claims is not warranted. In 
particular, when at least some investment tribunals have recognized that the subject matter 
of treaty and local claims may be the same even if the parties and applicable law differ.262 
IIAs potentially give standing to multiple persons with respect to the same measures and 
the same loss. If it is to have any meaning, an assessment of the similarities between 
related claims must concentrate on the two latter factors, regardless of whether the 
parallelism is between IIA claims or between an IIA claim and a national law claim. 
III. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN TREATIES AND CONTRACTS 
Traditionally, international tribunals have examined contracts as ‘any other instrument 
open to judicial construction’.263 Yet several decisions of investment tribunals have been 
influenced by conceptions advancing that ‘[c]ontract and treaty claims raise categorically 
different legal questions and require distinct factual analysis’.264 As this thesis has 
emphasized, this view is often misguided, not least when contract and treaty claims refer 
to the same measures and damages. The legal questions are similar, given the applicability 
of both national and international law in investment arbitration and the interpretation of 
certain standards of treatment.265 The factual analysis is also often similar, if not identical, 
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since it is generally recognized that both types of claims may arise from the same facts.266 
This section argues that treaty claims that include arguments of breaches of contractual 
provisions have in fact a mixed basis, i.e., contract and treaty, even if their fundamental 
basis is an IIA. 
A The role of contracts in treaty claims 
In treaty claims, investment tribunals interpret contracts, even those expressly subject to 
a different jurisdiction and some national law, as an incidental matter in deciding 
allegations of treaty breach.267 However, when the treaty claim derives in whole or in part 
from contract breaches, describing the contract’s role as ‘incidental’ results in minimizing 
its role and applying it selectively, ultimately affecting the correct resolution of the 
dispute. For example, in Urbaser, which involved the termination by the grantor of a 
public concession, the tribunal stated that because the claims were based on a BIT the 
termination’s validity under the contract was of incidental relevance only.268 However, 
the tribunal had previously observed that it had to examine whether the termination was 
justified under the contract because, otherwise, ‘the declaration of termination itself 
[could not] constitute, in this respect, a breach of an obligation under the BIT’.269   
Under general international law, in the decision on preliminary objections in 
Certain German Interests, the PCIJ addressed a Polish argument that the Geneva 
Convention granting jurisdiction to the Court was inapplicable by virtue of the provisions 
of the Treaty of Versailles.270 Before affirming jurisdiction, the PCIJ observed that the 
Geneva Convention could not be applied without interpreting other international 
provisions.271 Still, ‘the interpretation of other international agreements [was] 
indisputably within the competence of the Court if such interpretation must be regarded 
as incidental to a decision on a point in regard to which it has jurisdiction’.272 In the merits 
decision, the PCIJ applied a similar notion as regards national law. It examined German 
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law ‘as an incidental or preliminary point’273 to determine whether Poland had 
expropriated the rights, derived from certain contracts, two companies had in relation to 
a factory at Chorzów.274 
 With respect to international investment law, the Vivendi I tribunal stated that 
much of the evidence presented by the parties involved detailed contractual issues.275 
Hence, to determine whether the Province in question had acted as a sovereign or merely 
as a contracting party ‘a detailed interpretation and application of the Concession 
Contract’ was called for. This task, however, had been left by the parties to the local 
courts.276 By contrast, the annulment committee asserted that exercising contractual 
jurisdiction is different from considering ‘the terms of a contract in determining whether 
there has been a breach of a distinct standard of international law’.277 Before the decisions 
in Vivendi I, in Klöckner–where ICSID jurisdiction derived from a contract–the ad hoc 
committee referred to the powers of a tribunal vis-à-vis a contract different from the one 
granting jurisdiction. The Klöckner committee distinguished between applying the 
contract not containing the ICSID clause, which was beyond the tribunal’s jurisdiction, 
and taking that contract into account for interpreting and applying the contract that did 
contain the ICSID clause and otherwise understanding the dispute’s context.278 The latter 
was permissible, even if the tribunal did not have jurisdiction in respect of the contract 
not providing for ICSID jurisdiction.279 
 Consistently with the views of the committees in Klöckner and Vivendi I, 
subsequent investment tribunals exercising treaty jurisdiction have affirmed their power 
to take into account relevant contracts ‘as an incidental matter’.280 The Total tribunal 
observed that the treaty nature of the claims would not prevent, in the merits phase, an 
incidental examination of whether there had been breaches of the contractual framework 
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if this was relevant to ascertain alleged treaty breaches.281 The Bayindir tribunal, while 
observing that its jurisdiction covered only treaty claims, added that it could, however,     
consider contract matters. It can and must do so to the extent necessary to rule on the treaty claims. It takes 
contract matters, including the contract’s governing municipal law, into account as facts as far as they are 
relevant to the outcome of the treaty claims. Doing so, it exercises treaty not contract jurisdiction.282 
An investment tribunal should not exercise contractual jurisdiction absent consent of the 
parties, but the contract’s terms may be taken into account ‘in determining whether there 
has been a breach of a distinct standard of international law’.283 
 To what extent is there a difference between taking into account a contract’s terms 
and exercising contractual jurisdiction when the damages are calculated on the basis of 
the income that would have resulted from the application of the contract’s provisions, but 
for the measure in breach of the treaty? Admittedly, investment ‘treaty’ tribunals consider 
not only the contract terms but also the IIA. Alexandrov argued that in certain cases a 
tribunal formed under an IIA may have to first decide whether ‘the underlying contract 
has been breached’, before ruling on the treaty claims.284 While the tribunal may have to 
perform ‘a detailed and elaborate review of the contract and the rights and obligations 
arising from it’, such exercise would be ‘consistent with the long-established practice of 
international tribunals of interpreting contracts and national law when necessary to 
determine whether there has been a breach of international law’.285 However, a finding of 
treaty breach premised on a prior finding of contract breach, in turn based on a ‘detailed 
and elaborate review of the contract’, is not truly independent. 
 Treaty tribunals should not necessarily refrain from considering the contract 
because it is subject to a different forum. It is impossible to decide whether there has been 
an interference with a contract in breach of international law ‘without looking at the actual 
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terms of the contract’.286 Further, one can still conceptualize a ‘detailed and elaborate’ 
interpretation of the contract and even a finding of breach of contract not as an exercise 
of contractual jurisdiction but as an ‘incidental’ consideration of the contract necessary 
for the exercise of treaty jurisdiction.287 But when a finding of contract breach is material 
in concluding that the treaty has also been breached–let alone if the damages are also 
based on the contract provisions–the contract/treaty distinction should not be used to deny 
the fundamental role of contracts in treaty claims. In these circumstances of considerable 
overlap between contract and treaty claims, treaty claims cannot be decided without 
comprehensively considering all the contract terms, including their application by the 
parties, and the law applicable to the contract.288  
Siwy argues that treaty-based tribunals do not have jurisdiction to decide on a 
breach of contract, but may only ‘determine its existence as a preliminary step for a breach 
of treaty’.289 Thus, they can only grant remedies for treaty breaches.290 It is correct that a 
tribunal exercising treaty jurisdiction may only grant a remedy connected to a treaty 
violation. But, as Jennings observed regarding general international law, remedies in 
investment treaty arbitration are often ‘in substance partly contractual’,291 at least in that 
damages granted by the treaty tribunal may be indistinguishable from the ones that may 
be granted by the contractual forum. This fundamental point applies even if the latter can 
grant certain remedies that may not be available to the treaty tribunal, such as punitive 
damages.292 Remedies overlap between contract and treaty claims may not be complete. 
Still, what matters is whether the treaty tribunal is compensating all or part of the losses 
that may also be recovered through the contractual dispute resolution process.  
Further, when the object of treaty claims refers substantively to remedies that 
correspond to contract breaches, treaty tribunals should not ignore agreed changes in the 
contractual relationship–even if they occur after the challenged measures–on the basis 
that they are contract issues or because the foreign investor was not directly involved. In 
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Sempra, the tribunal stated in the jurisdictional decision that the claim was ‘founded on 
both the contract and the Treaty’.293 But it rejected a jurisdictional objection based on the 
existence of a renegotiation process between the local companies and the government.294 
Further, the award deemed an agreement on new contractual terms resulting from that 
process as not binding the shareholder claimant and not affecting the admissibility of the 
treaty claim, the issue of damages notwithstanding.295 The tribunal’s approach to 
admissibility was in error. When the claim relies both on the treaty and the contract, either 
expressly or substantively, a finding of breach of contract may be a necessary 
precondition of a finding of treaty breach. Here the treaty tribunal in effect acts as a judge 
of both the treaty and the contract.296 Thus, an agreed renegotiation of the contract affects 
the admissibility or the merits of the mixed contract/treaty dispute, even though the 
foreign investor is not party to the contract (nor, for that matter, to the renegotiation 
process).    
B Umbrella clauses 
Umbrella clauses remain one of the most contested issues in investment arbitration. That 
they are interpreted differently is not surprising, since there is not one single umbrella 
clause but different provisions in different IIAs, sometimes disclosing considerable 
textual differences.297 The interest here, however, is not in discussing which interpretative 
approach to umbrella clauses is preferable. The focus is on concepts that have emerged 
from the umbrella clause debates that are relevant for the contract/treaty distinction. These 
debates are fertile ground for present purposes, since umbrella clauses generally involve 
consideration of relations between contract and treaty rights and obligations.298 The 
argument here is that, even if they transform contract claims into treaty claims, umbrella 
clauses should not have the effect of isolating the relevant claims from the contractual 
framework. Contractual obligations need to be interpreted and enforced in light not only 
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of the proper law of the contract, but also of the extent to which both parties have 
complied with such obligations. The impact of umbrella clauses claims on contractual 
reciprocity and third parties must be considered. 
 Aside from the general reference by the tribunal in Fedax–which stated that under 
the umbrella clause in question Venezuela was obliged to ‘honor precisely the terms and 
conditions governing [the] investment’299–debates on the umbrella clause started with 
SGS v Pakistan. The tribunal asked itself whether the umbrella clause of the Pakistan-
Switzerland BIT–which required each party to ‘constantly guarantee the observance of 
the commitments it has entered into with respect to the investments of the investors of the 
other Contracting Party’–‘transform[ed] purely contractual claims into BIT claims’.300 
The claimant had ‘characterized this clause as an “elevator” or “mirror effect” clause that 
takes breaches of contract under municipal law and elevates them immediately to the level 
of a breach of an international treaty’.301 The tribunal was not convinced that this 
interpretation was sound.302 The reasons included the text of the umbrella clause itself 
and that the legal consequences of such interpretation were ‘so burdensome in their 
potential impact’ that ‘clear and convincing evidence’ should have been adduced that that 
was the intention of the parties.303 The umbrella clause had to ‘be read in such a way as 
to enhance mutuality and balance of benefits in the inter-relation of different agreements 
located in differing legal orders’.304 
 The SGS v Philippines tribunal disagreed with the position taken in SGS v 
Pakistan.305 For the SGS v Philippines tribunal, ‘if commitments made by the State 
towards specific investments do involve binding obligations or commitments under the 
applicable law, it seems entirely consistent with the object and purpose of the BIT to hold 
that they are incorporated and brought within the framework of the BIT by [the umbrella 
                                                             
299 Fedax (Award) [29]. 
300 SGS v Pakistan, 361. 
301 Ibid [163]. 
302 Admittedly, while the SGS v Pakistan tribunal raised valid concerns as to an overly broad interpretation 
of the umbrella clause, it did not fully spell out what was, in its view, the correct interpretation. See 
generally Sinclair (2013) 224. 
303 Ibid [166-167]. 
304 Ibid [168]. 
305 SGS v Philippines [115]. 
225 
  
clause]’.306 This did not involve a ‘full-scale internationalisation of domestic contracts’, 
since the umbrella clause does not address the scope of the commitments but rather ‘the 
performance of these obligations, once they are ascertained’.307 The law applicable to the 
contract is not changed308 and the extent of the contractual obligations is determined by 
the terms of the contract.309 
 More recent decisions have followed either the approach of SGS v Pakistan or that 
of SGS v Philippines. The tribunal in Eureko found the latter persuasive.310 But while the 
forum selection clause in the contract had a decisive impact in SGS v Philippines, it had 
no impact in Eureko. The tribunal rejected an admissibility objection relying on the 
contractual forum selection clause,311 essentially because treaty claims had to be heard by 
the treaty tribunal.312 The El Paso tribunal criticized the idea that under the umbrella 
clause contract claims are transformed into treaty claims, but that the ‘extent or content’ 
of the obligations are still to be assessed according to the law of the contract.313 This 
tribunal could not understand why ‘a treaty claim should not be analysed according to 
treaty standards’.314 The CMS annulment committee raised the issue of standing in this 
context. Under an umbrella clause not only the obligation’s content and proper law are 
not affected, but also ‘the parties to the obligation (i.e., the persons bound by it and 
entitled to rely on it) are likewise not changed’.315  
In the end, the different positions adopted by investment tribunals on umbrella 
clauses disclose a theoretical disagreement as to how ‘independent’ umbrella clause 
claims are from the underlying obligation’s legal regime. Claims under umbrella clauses 
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are treaty claims.316 Yet the substance of the umbrella clause claim, i.e., the facts and 
losses invoked, may be the same or substantially the same as that of a claim under the 
relevant contract. On the one hand, this acknowledgement should weigh against the 
admissibility of umbrella clause claims together with other factors.317 Identifying 
substantive overlaps between claims is a sine qua non to ‘enhance mutuality and balance 
of benefits in the inter-relation of different agreements located in differing legal 
orders’.318 On the other hand, when the ‘elevated’ obligation mirrors an obligation in the 
underlying contract the SGS v Philippines tribunal’s assertion that an umbrella clause 
‘does not convert questions of contract law into questions of treaty law’319 is persuasive. 
It is one thing to elevate a contractual obligation to treaty level (or at least compliance 
thereof320); it is another to also isolate it from the legal regime in which it was created and 
was meant to operate. Not only the elevated obligation but also the rest of the contractual 
provisions–including compliance with them by both parties–and the contract’s proper law 
must remain relevant in a treaty claim based on an umbrella clause.321 
Investment tribunals recognize that the claimant must be privy to the contract to 
put forward a contract claim.322 Although the majority of tribunals also require contractual 
privity in umbrella clause claims relating to contractual obligations, here the position is 
less straightforward given the hybrid nature of these claims and the breadth of some 
umbrella clauses.323 Still, even if an umbrella clause is interpreted as allowing investors 
to invoke contractual obligations to which they are not privy, in that case a non-party 
exercises substantively the same rights as may be exercised by the party to the contract. 
This requires considering not only risks of double recovery and inconsistent outcomes, 
but also that a shareholder is enforcing the company’s rights while, in principle, not being 
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bound by the latter’s obligations.324 This is inconsistent with the contractual balance.325 
It may also affect third parties to the extent, for example, that the umbrella clause claim 
by a shareholder may prevent the company from enforcing the contract claims. If 
contractual rights are elevated through an umbrella clause, the analysis must elevate the 
rest of the provisions of the contract too. The admissibility or merits of an umbrella clause 
claim should be assessed considering the extent to which both parties to the contract have 
complied with their obligations and whether persons not involved in the IIA claim, 
including the parties to the ‘elevated’ contract, may be affected. 
C Privity without obligations? 
While certain investment treaty tribunals have expressly recognized that a contract lay ‘at 
the heart of th[e] dispute’,326 investment claims largely proceed on the theory that treaty 
rights and obligations ‘have an independent basis from rights and obligations deriving 
from the contract, and may as such – in principle – not be affected by contractual 
provisions dealing only with contractual rights and obligations.’327 But more often than 
not the argument that contract and treaty claims involving the same contract are 
substantively independent is incorrect. This raises the relationship between the contract’s 
rights and obligations. Even leaving aside umbrella clauses, for instance legitimate 
expectations can enable investors328 to substantively rely in a treaty claim on the 
provisions of a contract concluded by a local subsidiary. In that case, first, can the claim 
be resolved ignoring the private party’s obligations under the contract? Second, should 
the investor be allowed to escape from any counterclaim simply on the basis that the 
counterclaim sounds in contract and is therefore not a ‘treaty’ claim? 
Non-compliance by the foreign investor with contractual obligations, in the 
context of a treaty claim, was a central issue in Oxy II. The claimants relied both on the 
provisions of the Ecuador-US BIT and those of a contract concluded between one of the 
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claimants and Ecuador through its national oil company.329 Central to the case was 
whether Ecuador had validly terminated the contract under its terms and applicable 
Ecuadorian law.330 Any transfer of rights under the contract required prior authorization 
from the Ecuadorian authorities, with a non-authorized transfer being a ground for 
termination.331 The tribunal found that by transferring contractual rights without such 
authorization the relevant claimant had breached the contract and provisions of 
Ecuadorian law.332 But despite these findings that the foreign investor had breached the 
contract and the law333 and that the violation was expressly provided as a ground for 
rescission,334 the tribunal concluded that the termination of the contract was not in the 
circumstances ‘a proportionate response’ and was thus in breach of Ecuadorian law, 
customary international law, and the IIA.335 
 In Venezuela Holdings, which concerned two oil development projects in 
Venezuela involving joint venture agreements and related national law provisions,336 the 
tribunal stressed the need to carefully distinguish treaty from contract claims.337 Thus, a 
contractual provision limiting compensation was discarded as inapplicable to state 
liability by virtue of treaties.338 No limitations on contractual liability could be 
‘transmuted into limitations of the State’s responsibility under international law’.339 Yet 
at least some of the measures in question were found to violate the BIT simply because, 
by not respecting certain requirements of the contractual framework, ‘they were 
incompatible with the Claimants’ reasonable and legitimate expectations’ and had thus 
breached the fair and equitable treatment standard.340  
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A specific aspect involving treaty claims and contractual obligations refers to 
counterclaims. At the dawn of investment treaty arbitration, Paulsson observed that in 
this form of dispute resolution the lack of contractual privity was not an obstacle for 
claimants to sue, although it prevented defendant states from bringing arbitrations or even 
counterclaims.341 Investment treaty tribunals have so far generally not accepted 
counterclaims by states, often on jurisdictional grounds.342 To the extent the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction is based on the treaty and given that BITs normally contain obligations only 
for the host state, a counterclaim by the latter invoking contractual or national law 
provisions is considered inadmissible.343 Yet the solution depends on the interplay 
between, first, the IIA provision conferring jurisdiction to the tribunal.344 Broad 
provisions encompassing disputes related to the investment seem to allow counterclaims 
based on contract or national law, while with jurisdiction provisions including only IIA 
breaches the position is much more doubtful.345 Second, the contents of the applicable 
arbitration rules and whether they authorize counterclaims.346 And third, whether the 
investor claimant may be said to have consented to counterclaims, through its acceptance 
of the IIA’s arbitration offer or otherwise.347 
 Thus, ‘arbitration without privity’ resulting from IIAs routinely involves investors 
substantively relying to varying degrees on contractual rights348–whether or not they are 
parties to the contract–despite the treaty nature of the claims. The role of contractual 
obligations in treaty claims, however, is less clear. Even a serious repudiation by the 
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private party of a contractual requirement probably does not affect the treaty claim, 
although the host state could still be held liable based on the investor’s legitimate 
expectation that the contract be performed. Treaty claims relating to contractual breaches 
are admissible, but counterclaims referring to the same contract apparently not. In this 
respect, some commentators argue that IIAs’ substantive and jurisdictional provisions are 
intended to protect investors not states, the latter having other avenues to pursue their 
claims (including national courts).349  
The asymmetry is unsatisfactory, however. A claim may be characterized as 
having a treaty as its fundamental basis for jurisdictional purposes. But if the claim is in 
substance (at least partly) based on the host state’s (or one of its agencies) contractual 
obligations, the other side of the coin must be accorded equal weight. An investment 
tribunal must assess alleged breaches by the host state of the contractual framework 
simultaneously with potential breaches of the contract by the other party (regardless of 
whether the latter is the claimant in the treaty claim). Keeping separate the state’s 
obligations under the contract, as giving rise to treaty claims, and the private party’s 
obligations, as only allowing contract claims, is unsustainable. It entails a biased approach 
to the contract that is not warranted by the protection of contractual rights under IIAs. 
Interpreting IIAs as isolating the contract’s private party’s rights from its obligations 
results in the protection of a contract that the contractual parties did not agree to. 
Regarding counterclaims, in Harza the Iran-US Claims Tribunal had to consider 
‘whether a claimant that owns its claim indirectly is shielded jurisdictionally from 
counterclaims that could otherwise have been brought against the direct owner of the 
claim’.350 It held that it was not because while 
claims against a corporation ordinarily may not be asserted against its shareholders, it also is true that 
shareholders such as the Claimants ordinarily may not assert claims belonging to their corporation. To the 
extent that the Claims Settlement Declaration provides otherwise and permits shareholders to raise 
corporate claims, equity requires that they take such claims subject to the defenses and counterclaims that 
could have been raised as against the corporation.351 
                                                             
349 Dudas (2017) 385-386. 
350 Harza [85]. 
351 Ibid [86]. 
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The point in Harza was one of standing,352 yet the same rationale applies to cause of 
action questions. If shareholders are allowed to raise via treaty claims the substance of 
contract claims, equity requires that defences stemming from the contract be considered 
by the treaty tribunal. Even if the IIA jurisdiction clause only covers treaty claims, when 
the applicable law provision includes national law or agreements concluded in relation to 
the investment, it is too formalistic to say that the investment tribunal may not allow 
counterclaims based on national law or contractual provisions in resolving the investment 
dispute. Further, by lodging a treaty claim stemming from breaches of contract the 
investor may be said to have consented to counterclaims based on the same contract.353    
IV. CONCLUSION 
The observation that ‘whether there has been a breach of the BIT and whether there has 
been a breach of contract are different questions’ is, as a general matter, correct.354 After 
all, contracts and treaties are in principle independent instruments of a different ‘legal 
character’,355 generally subject to national and international law respectively, containing 
different provisions with dissimilar legal standards.356 But the point is to what extent the 
answers to these different questions overlap, not least in the context of treaty claims 
involving contracts. After the foundational annulment decision in Vivendi I, investment 
tribunals have clearly tended to see contract and treaty claims as ‘different things, 
responding to different tests, subject to different rules’, both for purposes of jurisdiction 
                                                             
352 See also Ampal (Liability) [266] (since shareholders are entitled to pursue claims for investments held 
through a corporation, they ‘must also be subject to defences that would be available against the 
corporation’). 
353 Consent to counterclaims generally is also present when the investor chooses to commence its claim 
under arbitration rules that provide for counterclaims. See Roussalis (Dec, Reisman); Kryvoi (2011) 10; 
Bravin and Kaplan (2012) 7.  
354 Vivendi I Annulment [96]. To the extent this idea relies on an allegedly clear separation of the law 
applicable to contract and treaty claims, however, it is questionable. 
355 SGS v Philippines [142]. 
356 Schreuer (2005) 295. 
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and merits.357 Only for damages purposes have some tribunals recognized substantive 
overlaps between contract and treaty claims.358 
Maintaining a strict conceptual separation between the two types of claims may 
not be particularly problematic for jurisdictional purposes. Here decisions will often be 
taken before considering the merits of the case, mainly based on (mostly international) 
instruments granting consent to jurisdiction, and having in mind the need for an 
international tribunal to exercise jurisdiction whenever warranted.359 However, the 
situation is different when it comes to admissibility or the merits. First, the alleged 
independence of treaty claims vis-à-vis contract claims largely depends on the concept of 
the ‘fundamental’ or ‘essential’ basis of the claim. But this is a fluid concept, which no 
tribunal has so far defined with any precision.360 While it is a useful notion for 
jurisdictional determinations, it does not sustain a complete conceptual independence 
beyond that. Second, whenever there is considerable overlap in terms of substance 
between contract and treaty claims, which is possible as investment tribunals recognize –
i.e., because the facts coincide, the state measures or the damages in question are the 
same, etc.–such conceptual independence appears even less warranted. Theoretical (and 
rather underdeveloped) concepts should not be applied to the point of obscuring such 
substantive overlaps. 
The approach taken by the Chamber of the ICJ in ELSI–i.e., while affirming 
jurisdiction, focusing on the substance of the claim for other purposes–is preferable. 
Otherwise, the theoretical foundations of some of the main concepts in investment 
arbitration appear questionable. Further, their application may lead to unfair outcomes. 
Thus, contracts function (directly or indirectly) as possible sources of rights but not of 
obligations for investors, an agreed forum selection clause in the contract has a bearing 
neither on jurisdiction nor on the merits, a renegotiation of the relevant contract following 
                                                             
357 Subsequent decisions may have read too much, in terms of independence between contract and treaty 
claims, into the annulment decision in Vivendi I. This decision was not dealing with the merits of the case, 
yet it suggested that certain contractual aspects might be relevant ‘in assessing whether there has been a 
breach of the treaty’. See Vivendi I Annulment [101, 110, 113]. 
358 Even at the damages stage this recognition remains relatively rare, unsystematic, and with elusive 
implications. And, by definition, it comes too late for purposes of assessing the state’s liability under 
international law.  
359 See Total (Jurisdiction) [83] (a contractual choice of forum cannot prevent the performance by an 
investment tribunal of its obligations in an IIA arbitration). 
360 To this one should add the lack of consensus as to the additional element that transforms a contract 
breach into a treaty violation. 
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the adoption of the impugned measures may have no significant impact on the claims, 
etc. All this being due to the treaty nature of the claims and their alleged autonomy vis-à-
vis contract claims.  
Acknowledgement of the (sometimes considerable) overlaps between the 
substance of contract and treaty claims should result in investment tribunals giving due 
weight to all the terms of the contract, rather than only to those conferring rights to the 
investor, and in considering to what extent both parties have complied with the contract. 
For purposes of the thesis, these overlaps determine to what extent factors such as the 
existence of parallel local proceedings, forum selection provisions in contracts, and 
settlements or waivers (even if not expressly applicable to treaty claims) may affect the 
admissibility of shareholder indirect claims under IIAs. When treaty claims have in fact 
a mixed basis–i.e., a treaty and contract basis, even if the former prevails–such factors are 
relevant to admissibility along with other considerations. 
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7     Applicable Law 
We are not embarrassed by any technicalities of municipal law.1 
 
Shareholder indirect claims under IIAs are based on assets that belong to the company 
under national law and that are subject to their own national legal regimes. Thus, both 
national and international law are necessarily relevant to the resolution of these claims. 
The applicable law in investment arbitration has been the subject of considerable 
scholarly and jurisprudential debates.2 To a large extent, discussions have focused on the 
interplay between national and international law. One of the most difficult issues in 
international investment law is precisely the function of national law.3 The latter is 
generally not a formal source of law4 for tribunals operating under general international 
law.5 In Certain German Interests, the PCIJ assessed the compatibility of a Polish law 
affecting property of German nationals or of companies controlled by them and a Geneva 
Convention of 1922 providing protection to such property.6 The Court observed that 
‘[f]rom the standpoint of International Law and of the Court which is its organ, municipal 
laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of States’.7  
Whether referring to national law as a fact adequately captures the different purposes 
it may serve under general international law,8 an international tribunal may conclude ‘that 
                                                             
1 Landreau, 367. 
2 See generally Sasson (2010); Kjos (2013); Ketcheson (2013); Ho Qing Ying (2014); Grisel (2014); 
Spiermann (2015); Sasson (2017); Hepburn (2017). 
3 The terms ‘national law’, ‘municipal law’, ‘internal law’, ‘local law’, and ‘domestic law’ are used 
interchangeably throughout this thesis. Terminology varies in this respect. For instance, the ILC Articles 
settled for the term ‘internal law’. ILC Commentaries 38. National law encompasses any legal norm 
emanating from any organ of the state, including the central government and any territorial unit. 
4 Sources refers here to ‘formal sources’, i.e., the procedures through which rules of international law are 
created. See Pellet (2006) 714; Grisel (2014) 215; Dupuy (2016).  
5 Pellet (2006) 717. National law contributes to the formation of ‘general principles of law’ in Article 
38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute, under one of the most widely accepted definitions referring to principles of law 
generally recognized by national legal systems. Daillier, Forteau, and Pellet (2009) 382. But when general 
principles of law are applied, it is these principles and not any national law per se the source of international 
law. 
6 Certain German Interests (Merits), 19-24, 34, 81. 
7 Ibid, 19. 
8 Regarding international investment law, Crawford argued that given that ‘the standard applicable law 
clause in BITs (however it may be formulated) mandates and may even require the tribunal to apply the 
law of the host state alongside international law… it cannot be argued that the law of the host state is a mere 
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it is necessary to apply the municipal law of a particular country’9 and that it may be 
‘bound to apply municipal law when circumstances so require’.10 For example, the ELSI 
case required consideration of national law both for admissibility and merits aspects. The 
ICJ’s Chamber observed that ‘a question of municipal law [may be] essential to the 
Court’s decision in a case’.11 The PCIJ case of Serbian Loans revolved around the 
‘monetary bases’ on which the principal and interest of certain loans issued by the 
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes should be paid.12 The PCIJ observed that the 
dispute was ‘exclusively concerned’ with relations subject to national law.13   
If these statements somehow reflect the position under general international law, they 
apply a fortiori in investment arbitration.14 Unlike other areas of international law where 
the relevance of national law is not always readily apparent, in international investment 
law ‘the relationship between the investor and the host State is governed in the first 
instance by national law’.15 The relevance of the law of the territory in which the 
investment is made is linked to the requirement in many IIAs that the investment be made 
in the territory of the host state.16 Further, national law is often expressly part of the 
applicable law chosen by the parties through IIA provisions. However, arbitral tribunals 
vary in how they give effect to national law in the resolution of investment disputes, both 
as to jurisdiction and the merits. Of particular interest here are the consequences in terms 
of the applicable law of substantive overlaps between treaty and contract/national law 
                                                             
matter of fact.’ Crawford (2008) 352-353. See also Grisel (2014) 222; Sasson (2017) 297-298; Hepburn 
(2017) 105-108; SPP (Jurisdiction II) [58]. But see AES Summit [7.6.6]; Electrabel [4.127-4.129].    
9 Brazilian Loans, 124. 
10 Ibid. In Serbian Loans and Brazilian Loans, the applicable law was ‘purely’ national because of the terms 
of the parties’ special agreements and the object of the disputes. See ibid, 94, 123. It is still noteworthy that 
the PCIJ, as an international court, ‘did not see fundamental obstacles to jurisdiction over debt instruments 
governed by municipal law’. Waibel (2011) 60, 62. As discussed below, the two aspects, i.e., the terms of 
the agreements to arbitrate and the object of investment disputes, also determine national law’s relevance 
in investment arbitration. 
11 Ibid, 47. The PCIJ observed that in Certain German Interests it found, ‘from the standpoint of municipal 
law’, that a right of ownership had been ‘validly acquired’, which constituted a ‘condition essential to the 
Court’s decision’. Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8, 20. 
12 Serbian Loans, 6. 
13 Ibid, 18. Pellet argues that when Serbian Loans was decided ‘the chapeau of Art. 38 did not include the 
phrase expressly defining the function of the Court as the application of international law’ and that the ICJ 
likely would have expressed a different reasoning as to the application of national law. Pellet (2006) 720. 
Yet he recognizes that there have been cases before the PCIJ and the ICJ ‘where domestic law issues were 
relevant’. Ibid. See also Bartels (2011) 134. 
14 See Hepburn (2017) 105. 
15 History ICSID Convention, II-1, 571. 
16 Knahr (2015) 590. See also Douglas (2014) 373. 
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claims. Both categories of claims often stem from the same facts and require 
consideration of whether the same national law instruments have been breached (although 
in the case of IIA claims the analysis does not stop there).  
This chapter examines the law applicable to IIA claims and ultimately to the 
admissibility of shareholder indirect claims. The latter are in substance mixed national 
law/international law claims that require a meaningful application of both legal systems. 
In their admissibility determinations, investment tribunals may consider legal reasons 
stemming from national and international provisions and proceedings. This is because, 
first, the applicable law in investment arbitration is not limited to the IIA but also includes 
general international law and national law. Second, the law of the state where the 
company is constituted is relevant to determine the scope of shareholder rights, along 
with the IIA and general international law.17 Third, given investment claims’ mixed cause 
of action,18 arbitral tribunals should not overlook the effects on the national plane. This 
will not only entail a more comprehensive consideration of all sources of international 
investment law, but also furnish safeguards against double recovery risks and prejudice 
to third parties.  
This chapter first analyses the applicable law in investment arbitration generally. 
Second, it surveys the role of national law in respect of investment tribunals’ jurisdiction 
and the substance of investment claims. Third, the chapter discusses the law applicable to 
the admissibility of shareholder claims under IIAs. 
I. APPLICABLE LAW IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
A The sources of international investment law 
1 Overview  
The law applicable for the resolution of disputes between foreign investors and host states 
often results from provisions in IIAs and international arbitral rules. However, IIAs 
themselves frequently do not contain a specific provision establishing the law that must 
be applied to resolve disputes covered by the treaty.19 Yet even in that case, first, the 
relevant arbitral rules may contain a default solution. This is the case of Article 42 of the 
                                                             
17 See Chapter 4. 
18 See Chapter 6. 
19 Banifatemi (2010) 197; Sasson (2017) 274. 
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ICSID Convention. Second, the applicable law will also result, alone or in combination 
with the applicable law provision, from the IIA’s jurisdiction clause establishing the kinds 
of disputes that may be submitted to investor-state arbitration.20 A jurisdiction clause 
establishing arbitral jurisdiction over disputes under the IIA provisions calls for the 
application of, at least, the treaty and general international law.21 Broader jurisdiction 
provisions may require the application of additional legal systems.22 For example, IIA 
provisions establishing jurisdiction generally over ‘investment disputes’ in principle 
empower the tribunal to apply international and national law.23 Finally, the application of 
international law and national law may derive from IIA provisions other than jurisdiction 
and choice of law ones. These include provisions referring to national law to determine 
who may be considered nationals of the IIA’s parties24 or in the definition of the protected 
investments,25 and to international law to define the scope of certain standards of 
treatment.26 
 Yet, while different IIA provisions may bear on the law investment tribunals must 
apply, claims can only be based on norms included in the jurisdiction clause, not on those 
included only in an applicable law provision.27 This is a function of the type of disputes 
over which a tribunal may rule in accordance with its mandate.28 Further, an international 
tribunal’s ultimate findings may only be whether, under the norms in the jurisdiction 
clause, it has jurisdiction, the claims are admissible, and any breach of such norms has 
occurred (and what are the consequences thereof). In principle, the norms included only 
in the applicable law clause and not in the jurisdiction one may not be part of such 
findings.29 But they must be part of the stepping stones to get there. 
                                                             
20 Bartels (2011) 115. See also Bartels (2001) 502. 
21 MTD (Annulment) [61]. 
22 An ‘implicit agreement’ on the applicable law may ‘be deduced from the facts and circumstances of the 
relationship between the parties’. History ICSID Convention, II-1, 570. 
23 See Iberdrola (Award) [301-309, 349]. 
24 See Art 1(2)(a) Romania-Sweden BIT. 
25 See Art 1(2) Jamaica-Spain BIT; Grisel (2014) 223. 
26 See Art 1105(1) NAFTA. 
27 Bartels (2011) 124. 
28 See Application Genocide Convention I [147]. 
29 MOX Plant [19]; Eurotunnel [152].  
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2 Article 42 of the ICSID Convention  
Article 42, paragraph 1, of the ICSID Convention provides the law to be applied by an 
ICSID tribunal30 in the following terms: 
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. 
In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the 
dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be 
applicable.31 
No limits are established as to what the parties may agree.32 With respect to the first 
sentence, it has been noted that the reference to ‘rules of law’ gives the parties more 
flexibility and allows them to combine rules of different legal orders.33  
 Regarding the second sentence, the law of the state party to the dispute and 
international law together constitute the applicable law.34 Several negotiators of the 
ICSID Convention, as well as the first ICSID decisions, took the view that under this 
provision international law’s role was essentially to ‘fill the gaps in the applicable national 
law or to correct any inconsistencies between it and international law’.35 Different 
theories were advanced to try to conceptualize this role,36 although the ultimate primacy 
of international law was generally accepted.37 These theories, however, prompted 
criticisms. Weil challenged conceptions seeking to ‘minimize the scope of the explicit 
reference to international law’ in the ICSID Convention.38 These attempts served no 
purpose  
for no matter how domestic law and international law are combined, under the second sentence of Article 
42(1), international law always gains the upper hand and ultimately prevails. It prevails indirectly through 
                                                             
30 Spiermann argues that ‘Article 42 of the ICSID Convention has been designed for purposes of contract 
claims’. Spiermann (2015) 1378. The basis for this assertion is not clear. See Sasson (2017) 297. 
31 ICSID Convention, Art 42(1). 
32 See Crook (1989) 284. 
33 Shihata and Parra (1994) 189; Kreindler (2005) 172. 
34 Report of the Executive Directors [40]. 
35 Shihata and Parra (1994) 202. 
36 See e.g. the Klöckner annulment committee’s reference to the principles of international law’s ‘dual’ 
role, ‘complementary’, and ‘corrective’. Klöckner Annulment, 112. This categorization was somewhat 
criticized by the second arbitral tribunal in Amco, although as, the Klöckner committee, this tribunal also 
stressed that ICSID tribunals should apply first national law and then international law. Amco II (Award), 
580. See also Broches (1972) 390; Grisel (2014) 216; Aucoven (Award) [102].    
37 Broches (1972) 392. 
38 Weil (2000) 407. See also generally Gaillard and Banifatemi (2003).   
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the application of domestic law where the latter is deemed consistent with international law or incorporates 
it. It prevails directly where domestic law is deemed deficient or contrary to international law.39 
Weil advanced that Article 42(1)’s reference to national law, even when limited to 
ascertaining its compatibility with international law, was ‘a pointless exercise, the sole 
raison d’être of which is to avoid offending the sensibilities of the host State.’40 
 ICSID tribunals have not adopted Weil’s suggestion that the reference in Article 
42(1) to national law is irrelevant.41 Whatever the view on precisely how national and 
international law should combine in this context, the second sentence of this paragraph 
‘contains a clear decision in favour of the host State’s law’.42 There are no qualifications 
here as to the duty of ICSID tribunals to apply this–and not other43–national law.44 The 
alleged irrelevance of national law was partly based on the idea that international law ‘is 
sufficiently complete to provide a legal answer to every [investment] dispute’.45 But 
despite the development of international investment law, current views suggest that, 
particularly when a contract is involved, completely excluding the application of national 
law is ‘impractical’.46 On the other hand, ICSID tribunals are also required to apply ‘such 
rules of international law as may be applicable’. While the interpretation of these words 
may be debated, at the very least they grant tribunals some degree of appreciation as to 
which are the applicable international law rules.47  
 It is nowadays suggested that, in particular after the annulment decision in Wena, 
a ‘pragmatic’ approach should be adopted, ‘allowing for the application of both domestic 
law and international law if the specific facts of the dispute so justifies’.48 In Wena, the 
ad hoc committee advanced that under the second sentence of Article 42(1) both national 
                                                             
39 Weil (2000) 409. 
40 Ibid. 
41 But cf Santa Elena, [65]. 
42 Schreuer (2009) 595.  
43 The decision not to allow tribunals to choose any national law but to apply the host state’s law (ibid, 
616), indicates the importance the negotiators expected this law would have in ICSID arbitration.  
44 A failure to apply the applicable law is a ground for annulment under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. 
See e.g. MINE, 104. This is a further reason for ICSID tribunals not to say that the host state’s law is 
irrelevant under Article 42(1), second sentence.   
45 Weil (2000) 408.   
46 Schreuer (2009) 562. 
47 Cf Gaillard and Banifatemi (2003) 408. See also Kulick (2012) 17.   
48 CMS (Award) [116].  
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and international law were relevant.49 National law–in this context the law of the host 
state–‘can indeed be applied in conjunction with international law if this is justified’ and 
‘international law can be applied by itself if the appropriate rule is found in this other 
ambit’.50 The role of each legal order depends on the dispute’s nature and on which 
element of it is being considered,51 as the investment tribunal determines.52 This approach 
has been described simply as entailing a concurrent application of national and 
international law.53 Investment tribunals have abandoned prior attempts to conceptualize, 
not least in any refined way, the respective roles of national and international law under 
the second sentence of Article 42(1). The ‘pragmatic’ approach, moreover, seems to have 
found support with some commentators.54 
 Affirming generally the application of both national and international law gives 
less prominence to the host state’s law than the first ICSID decisions, which referred to 
the need to look first to national law and then to international law.55 This may be related 
to the growth in treaty disputes, rather than contractual ones. The role of international law 
is generally greater in disputes brought under treaties–even if also involving contracts–
than in purely contractual disputes.56 However, investment treaty tribunals have not, as 
noted, endorsed the position that essentially confined national law to irrelevance. Yet 
even if national law remains relevant and applicable in treaty disputes, the question is 
relevant for what? Is national law equally a potential source of rights and expectations for 
the investor as well as of obligations for the latter in treaty claims? If this is not the case, 
host states may be in a worse position than under Weil’s proposal–i.e., exclusive 
application of international law for the resolution of investment disputes–. Whether the 
applicable international law is more favourable for the investor or the host state depends 
on the circumstances of each case.57 But if the host cannot rely on its law as a source of 
obligations for the investor or as relevant in challenging the substance of treaty claims, 
                                                             
49 Wena (Annulment) [40]. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Azurix (Award) [66]; Teco [469]. 
52 Kulick (2012) 35.   
53 Schreuer (2009) 628. 
54 Gaillard and Banifatemi (2003) 404-411; Hepburn (2017) 107.   
55 See Broches (1972) 392. For a recent restatement of this position see Zhinvali [297]. 
56 Douglas (2010) 832-835; Sasson (2017) 299-300. 
57 Gaillard and Banifatemi (2003) 380-381. 
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only the investor stands to benefit from the continued relevance of national law in 
investment arbitration. This is because, either directly or through ideas such as the 
protection of ‘legitimate expectations’, investors have succeeded in basing their treaty 
claims substantively (in part) on national law.58 
3 Applicable law provisions in investment treaties 
As treaty provisions, IIA obligations are in principle governed by international law.59 Yet, 
IIAs sometimes contain provisions establishing a list of sources of law that must be 
applied for the resolution of disputes arising under them.60 Some provisions require the 
application of the law of the state party to the dispute along with the treaty itself and 
international law.61 Others simply demand the application of the provisions of the treaty, 
either alone or in conjunction with the principles or rules of international law62 or the 
terms of special agreements concluded in relation to the investment.63 The applicable law 
provisions, however, are usually silent on the precise role of each source in the resolution 
of the investment dispute and on the relationship between the different sources.  
An IIA provision establishing the applicable law constitutes an agreement between 
the parties to the dispute, which the investor accepts when expressing its consent to 
arbitrate.64 Respecting the terms of this agreement is the tribunal’s paramount 
consideration here, since ‘the parties’ agreement on applicable law forms part of their 
arbitration agreement’.65 When the treaty provision on applicable law requires the 
application of both national and international law, however, the upshot will not be very 
different from that under Article 42(1) in the absence of agreement.66 Under such a treaty 
provision, for example, the Saur tribunal referred to a principle under which each issue is 
                                                             
58 See Spiermann (2015) 1388 (‘in CMS v. Argentina the tribunal relied upon national law in deciding on 
key rights of the investor in relation to the investment’). 
59 Reparation for Injuries, 180. 
60 Banifatemi (2010) 197-198; Sasson (2017) 274. 
61 Schreuer (2009) 576; Voss (2011) 105. See The Netherlands-Venezuela BIT, Art 9(5). 
62 See France-Poland BIT, Art 8.3. 
63 See Gaillard and Banifatemi (2003) 377-378; Chile-Italy BIT, Art 9(5). 
64 Schreuer and Reinisch (2002) [146]; Sasson (2017) 274; Hepburn (2017) 106; EDF (Annulment) [219]; 
Venezuela Holdings (Annulment) [154]. 
65 MINE, 104. 
66 Schreuer (2009) 581. 
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governed by the rule that corresponds to the issue’s nature.67 But as with Article 42(1) 
second sentence, no theory on the effect of applicable law provisions in IIAs combining 
national and international law seems to have found general acceptance. Here too, a 
‘pragmatic’ approach appears to have prevailed, under which it will be ‘for the Tribunal 
to determine whether an issue is subject to national or international law’.68 
When the relevant provision requires the application of both legal systems, stating 
that both national and international law will be applied in accordance with each issue’s 
nature, as specifically determined by the tribunal, is acceptable as a general matter. But 
this says little about the complex interaction between national and international law in 
investment arbitration. All investment treaty tribunals have jurisdiction over disputes 
arising under at least some of the treaty’s substantive standards.69 Even in cases where 
the applicable law provision does not include the host state law and jurisdiction is limited 
to treaty claims, ‘an incidental application of domestic law is often called for’.70 The 
issues that are generally accepted to be subject to national law in treaty claims include 
whether an investment was legally acquired or a contract validly concluded.71 Application 
of national law will a fortiori be required either when arbitral jurisdiction covers 
contract/national law claims or when national law is one of the sources under the IIA’s 
applicable law provision.  
In terms of the dispute as a whole, it is the substance of the claims that determines the 
applicable law. When the substance is mixed, i.e., contract/treaty, national and 
international law are equally applicable. Here, the relationship between national and 
international law is one of interdependence. Both legal systems are relevant,72 even if 
national law provisions will be discarded by the investment tribunal in case of clear 
conflict with any international obligation.73 Regarding specific issues, in principle the law 
that created the right or obligation in question determines its existence, scope, and 
                                                             
67 Saur (Jurisdiction and Liability 2012) [327]. 
68 Venezuela Holdings [223]. See also Teco [469]; Iberdrola (Annulment) [102]; Oostergetel [140]. 
69 Investment tribunals’ jurisdiction may be more extensive, covering for example ‘any dispute arising from 
an investment’. Schreuer (2014) 24. Arguably, this language covers not only treaty disputes but also 
contract and national law disputes. Ibid, 7-8. 
70 Ibid, 17. 
71 Spiermann (2015) 1387. 
72 Venezuela Holdings (Annulment) [181]. 
73 Schreuer and Reinisch (2002) [93].  
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interrelation with other rights and obligations within the same legal system.74 National 
law’s precise role will depend, first, on whether national law provisions extensively 
regulate the relevant right or obligation.75 Second, on the content of the standard of 
treatment in question. For example, expropriation provisions in IIAs requiring respect for 
due process of law76 include compliance with the relevant national law procedures.77 And 
third, on whether the tribunal is dealing with jurisdiction or the substance of the dispute.     
B The role of national law before investment tribunals 
1 Jurisdiction  
Until recently, the conventional wisdom in investment treaty arbitration was that national 
law was not, at least as a general matter, applicable for jurisdictional purposes. In CMS, 
Argentina had opposed the claim on the basis of the Argentine law provision establishing 
the distinct and separate personality of companies vis-à-vis their shareholders.78 The 
tribunal countered that ‘the applicable jurisdictional provisions are only those of the 
Convention and the BIT, not those which might arise from national legislation’.79 This 
approach was confirmed by the ad hoc committee, who stated: ‘[t]he competence of the 
Tribunal is governed by the terms of the instruments expressing the parties’ consent to 
ICSID arbitration’, national law being ‘irrelevant in this respect’.80 Several investment 
tribunals have followed suit, stressing the need to distinguish between the law applicable 
to jurisdiction and the law applicable to the merits.81  
 Nonetheless, a minority of investment tribunals have recognized a role for the host 
state’s law in jurisdictional determinations.82 The Teinver tribunal acknowledged that 
                                                             
74 See US Amicus in Lone Pine [3] (relying on Higgins). 
75 Ibid (national law’s role in determining the scope of property rights is ‘particularly true when a person 
voluntarily enters a heavily regulated field’).  
76 See Energy Charter, Art 13. 
77 Kardassopoulos (Award) [394-396]; Newcombe and Paradell (2009) 376; Hepburn (2017) 46-58.  
78 CMS (Jurisdiction) [42]. 
79 Ibid. Obiter dictum, the tribunal nonetheless made reference to a provision of Argentine law on the 
piercing of the corporate veil. Ibid. 
80 CMS (Annulment) [68]. 
81 See Siemens (Jurisdiction) [31]; MCI (Annulment) [40]; Daimler [50]; Sempra (Jurisdiction) [27]. For 
jurisdictional purposes, however, the Sempra tribunal discussed the manner in which shareholders may 
exercise control over a company ‘from the standpoint of corporate law’. Ibid [47-49].  
82 Schreuer (2009) 552. 
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national law may be relevant to jurisdiction.83 It may not be used, however, to ‘define the 
basic jurisdictional requirements’, but to ‘determine whether a claimant has, as a matter 
of fact, satisfied the legal requirements for ICSID jurisdiction’ in the ICSID Convention 
and the applicable IIA.84 In Urbaser, Argentina’s jurisdictional objections included the 
argument that the applicable national and international law provisions did not provide for 
shareholder indirect claims.85 As to an applicable law provision in the relevant BIT calling 
for the application of the treaty itself, the host state’s law, and international law, the 
tribunal stated: ‘While this provision is primarily directed to the applicable law on the 
merits of the dispute, it may have a role to play in connection with certain specific issues 
to be examined concerning jurisdiction, e.g. where the operation of [certain provisions] 
of the BIT requires consulting of the Host State’s domestic law’.86 
 The application of national law to certain jurisdictional aspects of investment 
arbitration–often even key issues87–is persuasive. Schreuer has observed that ‘[s]ome 
questions that are relevant to a tribunal’s jurisdiction are governed by domestic law’, 
generally as a result of references to national law in the applicable IIA.88 In fact, the 
relevance of national law to certain issues directly related to jurisdiction–including the 
nationality of the investor89 or the legality of the investment at the time it was made90–is 
generally recognized.91 Additionally, independently from specific IIA provisions, to the 
extent it involves jurisdictional questions, determination by international tribunals of the 
existence and scope of property rights has long been accepted.92 Investment tribunals may 
                                                             
83 Teinver (Jurisdiction) [227]. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Urbaser (Jurisdiction) [43].  
86 Ibid [54]. 
87 Kjos (2013) 266. 
88 Schreuer (2014) 4. 
89 While the Abaclat tribunal suggested that the Argentina-Italy BIT’s applicable law provision applied to 
the merits, under the treaty the question of the investor’s nationality was ‘subject to the law of the 
Contracting State of which nationality is claimed’. Abaclat [285, 383]. IIAs often expressly refer to national 
law for purposes of determining the investor’s nationality, which in principle reflects the position under 
general international law. See Soufraki (Award) [55]; History ICSID Convention, II-1, 67. 
90 Schreuer (2014) 4-5. 
91 Whether Article 42 of the ICSID Convention is applicable to jurisdiction, regardless of whether ICSID 
tribunals may apply national law to jurisdictional questions under other provisions or principles, is less 
relevant here. See Shihata and Parra (1994) 184; Azurix (Jurisdiction) [48]. 
92 See e.g. Lipstein (1945) 138. 
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have to decide on any of these issues at the jurisdictional phase and thus apply national 
law, regardless of whether the claims in question are contract or treaty claims. 
The idea of the exclusive relevance of international law for jurisdictional purposes 
appears related to consent or, more precisely, to the instruments in which consent is 
contained. Since the state’s consent to jurisdiction in investment arbitration is frequently 
contained in a treaty, only international law is applicable at the jurisdictional stage.93 Yet, 
on the one hand, when consent to international arbitration is contained in a national law 
instrument, such as a foreign investment law, some consideration of national law is often 
inescapable. Interpretation of such an instrument applying exclusively international law 
rules, such as Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, would have no basis and may lead to 
incorrect results. Applying the same logic, however, international law also has a role in 
this case if only because international law instruments, i.e., at least the arbitral rules, have 
to be interpreted and applied as well.94 On the other hand, even when the consent invoked 
is present in a treaty, several of the conditions established in IIAs to which consent is 
typically subject–including the investor’s nationality95 and the (at least initial) legality of 
the investment96–are subject to national law. As to these issues, consideration of national 
law is necessary even for the specific purpose of determining whether consent to 
international jurisdiction is present. Therefore, there is no reason to generally deny the 
relevance of national law in jurisdictional discussions before investment tribunals. 
2 The substance of the claims 
The application of national law to the merits of investment disputes is generally accepted. 
Several applicable law provisions in IIAs expressly require the application of the host 
state’s law, including the default solution under the ICSID Convention in case of lack of 
agreement on the applicable law. Leaving aside the pertinence of these provisions for 
jurisdiction, their general applicability at the merits stage simply cannot be denied. Even 
as regards treaty claims and even if the provision on applicable law does not include 
national law, the application of the latter for certain merits issues is recognized.97 In the 
case of investment treaty arbitration, national law is applicable in conjunction with the 
                                                             
93 CMS (Jurisdiction) [88]; Azurix (Jurisdiction) [50]; Garanti Koza [21]. 
94 Brandes [81]; Cemex [89]; Tidewater (Jurisdiction) [81].  
95 See Pey Casado (Award) [260, 322]. 
96 See Ampal (Jurisdiction) [301]; Flüghafen Zurich A.G. [132]. 
97 Schreuer (2014) 17-20. 
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relevant treaty and general international law. A different matter, however, is precisely 
what role national law plays in decisions dealing with the substance of the claims. 
(a) Rights under national law 
International tribunals have traditionally recognized a role for national law in the context 
of international proceedings for purposes of defining the scope of certain rights, even 
though national law was not included among the sources of law to be applied. In 
Panevezys-Saldutiskis, the PCIJ observed that ‘[i]n principle, the property rights and the 
contractual rights of individuals depend in every State on municipal law and fall therefore 
more particularly within the jurisdiction of municipal tribunals’.98 International tribunals 
may have to analyse national law as an incidental or preliminary matter,99 not least in 
order to determine ‘the nature and extent of the rights and obligations’ arising under this 
law.100 As property and contractual rights generally have been created under a certain 
national law, it is this law which as an initial matter determines the characteristics of the 
property and rights in question.101 To the extent these rights may be relevant in an 
international proceeding,102 at least an incidental or preliminary consideration of the 
relevant national law is necessary.103 
 Some investment tribunals have adopted this reasoning.104 The role of national 
law in defining contractual and other property rights, however, has been less 
straightforward and prominent105 in investment arbitration–which is heavily influenced 
by the contract claims/treaty claims distinction–than in general international law. In 
Encana, the applicable law provision in the BIT provided for the application of the treaty 
                                                             
98 Panevezys-Saldutiskis, 18.  
99 Certain German Interests (Merits), 42. See also Mavrommatis (Jerusalem Concessions), 28-29; Affaire 
des forêts du Rhodope central (fond), 1419; Hepburn (2017) 41. 
100 German Settlers in Poland, 29. 
101 Higgins observed that for the meaning of property ‘[w]e necessarily draw on municipal law sources and 
on general principles of law’. Higgins (1982) 270. This includes defining the ‘bundle of rights’ that attach 
to a certain asset. Ibid. The concept was acknowledged by the investor in Total. See Total (Liability) [34].  
102 When to assess a measure’s compliance with an IIA it is necessary to determine whether a national law 
right has been breached, this determination is in principle one pertaining to the merits. But the relevance of 
national law may range from determining ownership over an asset, which typically raises jurisdictional 
questions (see ST-AD [284]), to damages aspects (see Total (Award) [206, 216]). 
103 See Diehl (2012) 255 (citing the Hoachoozo Palestine Land and Development case of the American-
Turkish Claims Commission).  
104 Suez I (Liability) [140]; Bayview [109-118]; Glamis [37]. 
105 See also Crook (1989) 280, 286, 310 (noting the Iran-US Claims Tribunal’s ‘reluctance to apply national 
law’). 
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and international law, but made no reference to the host state’s law. However, according 
to the tribunal  
for there to have been an expropriation of an investment or return (in a situation involving legal rights or 
claims as distinct from the seizure of physical assets) the rights affected must exist under the law which 
creates them, in this case, the law of Ecuador.106 
It is true, however, that national law is accorded a role here in the specific context of a 
claim of direct expropriation of ‘legal rights or claims as distinct from the seizure of 
physical assets’. 
 The partial dissenting opinion in Encana advanced that the host state’s law was 
applicable ‘in connection with rights in rem on property or regulations regarding real 
property rights because of the absence of public international law substantive rules 
dealing with the intricacies of such matters’.107 However, even though certain points in 
international claims had to be preliminarily decided applying national law, the investor’s 
legal entitlement or property ‘directly arising under and protected by the Treaty - and 
through the Treaty, by public international law - is the investor’s investment and 
investment returns’.108 The investor’s protected ownership includes its legitimate 
expectations because of their economic value; this ownership has direct treaty protection, 
which does not depend on the host state’s law.109  
 Several investment tribunals have affirmed the relevance of national law in treaty 
claims, not least when the claims involve contractual rights.110 Further, arbitral decisions 
often regard the binding nature of instruments emanating from the host state in attracting 
the investment as a matter for determination under national law.111 Douglas has referred 
to disputes in investment arbitration about the existence or extent of rights in rem said to 
constitute an investment, which    
must be decided in accordance with the municipal law of the host state for this is not a dispute about 
evidence (facts) but a dispute about legal entitlements. When the issue becomes the international validity 
                                                             
106 Encana (Award) [184]. 
107 Encana (Diss Op Grigera Naón) [10]. 
108 Ibid [16]. 
109 Ibid [20]. 
110 Bosh International [113]; Gold Reserve [533-534]. 
111 SGS v Philippines [117]. 
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of certain acts of the host state that have prejudiced the investor’s legal entitlements under municipal law, 
then international law applies exclusively.112 
Under this conception, the definitional function of national law is necessary given that 
neither general international law nor IIAs contain ‘substantive rules of property law’.113 
But while being important,114 the role of national law here does not go further, since the 
international validity of the host state’s acts is governed only by international law. 
 The distinction between defining the contents of certain rights and obligations, in 
particular under contracts, and the determination of international responsibility is 
common in investment tribunals’ jurisprudence. The tribunal in Azurix noted that in a 
treaty claim the inquiry is ‘governed by the ICSID Convention, by the BIT and by 
applicable international law’.115 In this context, national law should help in assessing 
alleged breaches of a contract subject to this law, ‘but it is only an element of the inquiry 
because of the treaty nature of the claims’.116 In the jurisdictional decision, the Total 
tribunal posited that when assets and rights constitute protected investments under a BIT, 
any national law rights over the same assets and rights are irrelevant.117 In the decision 
on liability, however, it asserted that national law does more than establish factual 
matters.118 The host state’s law determines the ‘content and the scope of [the investor’s] 
economic rights’.119 The El Paso tribunal advanced that national law determines the 
contents of the host state’s commitments and, relatedly, of the foreign investor’s rights.120 
But ‘whether a modification or cancellation of such rights, even if legally valid under 
[national] law, constitutes a violation of a protection guaranteed by the BIT is a matter to 
be decided solely on the basis of the BIT itself and the other applicable rules of 
international law’.121 
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 Investment tribunals accept that, at the merits phase, national law may have some 
role in the adjudication of treaty claims, not least in the definition of certain rights that 
are subject to this law.122 This refers to the law the international tribunal applies, 
regardless of jurisdictional/admissibility issues relating to the role of national courts with 
respect to such rights. It is suggested, however, that international law–through an IIA or 
otherwise–may confer direct protection to certain assets or interests, independent from 
any consideration of national law.123 From a conceptual point of view, this appears 
possible–whether international law provisions on property protection contain a sufficient 
degree of specificity to operate autonomously is a different matter. But for present 
purposes what is important is to what extent treaty claims whose substance relates to a 
breach of contract are independent from national law. The answer to this question does 
not depend on whether the investor claim has been characterized as a contract or treaty 
claim.124 The real issue is whether the treaty claim, substantively, requires consideration 
of national law rights (including contractual rights subject to national law125). If it does, 
consideration of the relevant national law is required.126 Moreover, the idea of 
independence of contract and treaty rights in dealing with the merits of investment claims 
becomes unsustainable.  
It is argued, however, that although national law is relevant to define property 
rights, liability127 under the IIA is exclusively governed by international law. Yet defining 
property rights involves not only establishing that the rights exist and resorting to national 
law to interpret relevant legal concepts, but also delimiting, at least preliminarily, ‘the 
nature and extent of the rights and obligations’128 over the assets in question. If this is 
what national law does, strictly separating the role of national and international law 
                                                             
122 There is also relevant state practice to the same effect. See e.g. CAFTA-DR, Art 10.28, fn 10. 
123 Gaillard and Banifatemi (2003) 388 (quoting Broches’ reference to when ‘the subject matter is directly 
regulated by international law’). Douglas argues that consideration of national law is necessary to ascertain 
whether expectations protected by IIAs are legitimate. Douglas (2014) 398. 
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becomes difficult. Of course, in investment treaty arbitration the effect of national laws 
on property protection must be considered together with that of the relevant IIA 
provisions. Further, the ‘final determination’129 of investor rights over assets generally 
depends on the scope of the IIA’s provisions. But in the end both national and 
international law define the rights whose breach may give rise to liability under the IIA’s 
standards of protection.130  
Thus, to say that IIA liability is independent from national law is generally wrong. 
For example, in a claim for breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard deriving 
from alleged breaches of contract, the tribunal may require that a serious breach or an 
arbitrary modification or dismantling of the contractual framework must have occurred 
for there to be a treaty breach. But any of these more serious violations of the contractual 
framework may not be found without also concluding that there have been one or more 
‘mere’ contract breaches. Further, in the case of certain rights the role of national law in 
treaty claims may be extensive. IIAs often include intellectual property rights among 
protected investments,131 but without otherwise establishing their contents. In national 
law, these rights typically involve detailed regulations defining their precise scope, 
conditions, temporal limits, etc. National regulations are important in determining not 
only the right’s existence,132 scope, and who owns it, but also the purposes of the 
legislation that created it. For example, whether the acts affecting intellectual property 
rights sought to guarantee access to a vital medicine at low prices. This may in turn bear 
on the measure’s fairness and thus on its validity under an IIA.    
(b) Breaches of national law 
Findings of breaches of national law are not infrequent in investment treaty arbitration. 
They may occur as part of the reasoning leading to a decision on the alleged treaty 
breaches or figure among the ultimate findings on liability together with the conclusions 
on treaty claims. Regarding the first possibility in Enron, although the dispositif contains 
findings exclusively on treaty breach,133 as part of the analysis of the contested measures 
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130 See Philip Morris v Uruguay (Award) [271]. 
131 See e.g. FTA Chile-US, Art 10.27. 
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the award analysed the claims ‘purely’ under Argentine law. Argentina had breached its 
obligations under a public utility licence and this was significant because the licence was   
subject to Argentine law in some key respects, without prejudice to the effect that these legal arrangements 
[had] under the Treaty and international law. Liability [was] thus the consequence of such breach and there 
[was] no legal excuse under the Argentine legislation which could justify the non-compliance, as the very 
conditions set out by this legislation and the decisions of courts [had] not been met.134   
The tribunal in Oxy II adopted findings of breach of Ecuadorian law together with its 
findings on treaty violations in the dispositive part of the award.135 
 An incidental finding of breach of national law as part of a tribunal’s ratio appears 
unproblematic, even in the context of a treaty claim and even if national law is not 
expressly included among the sources of law to be applied. Even if a tribunal has no 
jurisdiction over breaches of national law and the applicable law is restricted to 
international law, consideration of national law issues, including potential breaches, may 
be necessary. In particular, when the treaty claim somehow involves rights created by 
national law.136 However, a tribunal would exceed its powers if it were to include 
breaches of national law among its ultimate liability findings when its jurisdiction is 
limited to treaty claims, regardless of whether national law forms part of the applicable 
law.137 Jurisdiction may be limited to treaty claims as a result either of the provisions of 
the IIA granting jurisdiction or of the terms in which the claim has been presented by the 
claimant and jurisdiction affirmed by the tribunal.138 A finding of breach of contract or 
national law in the dispositive part of the award when the investment tribunal has 
jurisdiction over contractual or national law disputes or generally over ‘investment 
disputes’ (or similarly broadly worded jurisdiction provisions) is unobjectionable.     
                                                             
134 Ibid. 
135 Oxy II (Award) [876]. 
136 Schreuer (2014) 17. 
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C The law applicable to the admissibility of shareholder treaty claims 
Applicable law in investment arbitration includes international and national law as formal 
sources.139 The reasons for this include the terms of relevant provisions in IIAs and 
arbitral rules, surveyed above, the requirement that an investment be made in the territory 
of one of the IIA states parties for protection to be triggered, and the typical contents of 
investment claims involving national law elements.140 For similar reasons, and because 
their substance overlaps with related non-treaty claims, shareholder indirect claims’ 
admissibility may be assessed considering grounds relating to national and international 
law provisions and proceedings.141 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the difference between jurisdiction and admissibility 
is not always a bright-line distinction yet it is well-recognized in international 
adjudication. Jurisdiction is concerned with consent and the instruments said to contain 
such consent. In investment treaty arbitration, jurisdiction depends on the IIA provisions 
related to state consent to arbitration. However, as noted above, not only the IIA but also 
general international law and national law are relevant to jurisdictional determinations. 
This applies a fortiori to admissibility. The ICJ refers to admissibility as a ‘legal 
reason’142 or even more generally to ‘reasons’143 why it should decline to determine the 
merits of a claim. These concepts are broad enough to cover grounds stemming from any 
provision of the applicable law, as well as from circumstances such as, for example, the 
effect of parallel proceedings or of ‘the agreement of the parties to use another method of 
pacific settlement’.144   
 In particular regarding shareholder claims, the suggestion that jurisdiction and 
admissibility determinations concerning the corporate personality should only be based 
on international law provisions145 is erroneous. Here, consideration of ‘legal reasons’ 
                                                             
139 Grisel (2014) 233. 
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deriving from international law in admissibility decisions is uncontroversial.146 Yet, even 
leaving aside the effect of IIA provisions referring to national law, there is no reason in 
international investment law to depart from the position under general international law, 
i.e., that in corporate matters ‘international law looks to the rules of the relevant domestic 
law’.147 Companies are incorporated under a certain national law,148 which regulates 
aspects that are generally not governed by international law (or by IIAs, for that 
matter).149 National law is relevant to determine whether shareholder rights have been 
infringed under general international law.150 The same applies to the admissibility of 
shareholder IIA claims–in particular, given the peculiarities of the applicable law in this 
field–at least unless the IIA provides otherwise.  
Relevant admissibility considerations may also relate to provisions of a contract 
to which the company is a party and yet forms part of the basis of a shareholder indirect 
claim under an IIA. In Poštová Banka, the tribunal observed that the shareholder claimant 
had no ‘legal or contractual right’, under national or international law, to the company’s 
assets and could thus not bring a treaty claim ‘on the basis of an alleged impairment of 
such [assets]’.151 This joint analysis of national, contractual and international law rights, 
conducted exclusively for jurisdictional purposes,152 is also applicable to admissibility.153 
The tribunal in Hochtief found inadmissible a treaty claim relying on a contractual 
provision.154 There was ‘no legal reason why effect should not be given to an agreement 
between an investor and a host State either to limit the rights of the investor or to oblige 
the investor not to pursue any remedies, including its BIT remedies, in certain 
circumstances’.155 
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 It has been argued that treaty claims and rights exist on the international plane and 
thus provisions of national law cannot limit their scope.156 However, shareholder IIA 
claims and rights involve contractual/national law as well as international law aspects.157 
Their legal basis is thus mixed and, as discussed above, the effect of IIA provisions 
bearing on the applicable law is also a combination of national and international sources. 
A finding of inadmissibility based on the criteria discussed in Chapter 2 may involve an 
application of national and international law elements. But if investment tribunals 
exercise their inherent power to find certain shareholder indirect claims inadmissible, 
when necessary to avoid impinging on rights or principles recognized by the applicable 
law, there is no conflict with international law. The annulment committee in Venezuela 
Holdings considered a contractual agreement and a decision by the Venezuelan legislature 
and whether these provisions could limit the compensation due under the applicable 
IIA.158 The committee, while stressing that national law ‘may not be invoked to avoid 
international obligations’,159 also noted that to determine that the relevant national 
provisions  
[did] not displace Venezuela’s international obligations [was] not at all synonymous with determining that 
they [had] no relevance for the ascertainment of the content and consequences of those obligations.160 
The admissibility of shareholder indirect claims must be assessed applying the 
combination of laws referred to above.161 In certain circumstances, they may be found 
inadmissible precisely to enforce provisions of the different sources of the applicable law 
in investment arbitration. For instance, national and international provisions protecting 
the rights of persons not involved in the IIA claim. 
II. CONCLUSION 
The investment treaty regime has been characterized as ‘hybrid’, in that it involves 
treaties between states governed by public international law and private beneficiaries 
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often in the form of a corporate entity constituted under a national law.162 The cause of 
action in investment arbitration may also be described as hybrid, in the sense that it 
combines national and international law elements even when its ‘fundamental basis’ is a 
treaty. This is particularly the case with shareholder indirect claims, which by definition 
refer to measures harming the company’s assets. The national legal regimes to which 
these assets are subject are relevant in treaty claims, for jurisdictional, admissibility, and 
merits purposes. 
The reasons for this necessary application of national law, alongside relevant 
provisions of the IIA and general international law, relate not only to shareholder claims’ 
and rights’ mixed character, but also to the provisions bearing on the applicable law in 
investment arbitration. In Yukos, the tribunal affirmed that national law should not control 
the contents of international obligations.163 This conclusion derived from the separation 
between national and international law.164 Yet whenever an IIA provision incorporates 
national law to the treaty regime, it is incorrect to suggest that national law controls the 
international obligation’s content. Rather, it is a ‘title of international law’165 that confers 
certain effects on national law. Absent a clear conflict, discarding the relevance of 
national law based on ideas of the primacy or separation of international law fails–with 
no good reason–to address the complexities/equities of claims that are substantively based 
on both national and international law. 
Admissibility concerns reasons for a tribunal not to decide the merits. The relevant 
reasons here derive from the effects of substantive overlaps between shareholder IIA 
claims and related national law claims. International law and sometimes the IIAs 
themselves contain pertinent rules, such as those seeking to prevent double recovery. 
Other reasons may be recognized both by national and international law provisions. For 
example, investment tribunals have recently applied the concept of abuse of process vis-
à-vis different treaty claims involving the same damages.166 The same approach may be 
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adopted in respect of parallel shareholder treaty claims and national proceedings, 
particularly when the applicable national law recognizes similar principles.167   
 
 
                                                             
167 See Vodafone, 9 (filing separate treaty proceedings by companies of the same corporate group ‘amounts 
to abuse of process of law [under Indian law]’). 
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8 Conclusion 
This thesis focused on two foundational ideas of the modern international law of foreign 
investment, i.e., shareholders’ standing to claim for harm to the company’s assets and the 
contract/treaty claims distinction. These two ideas advance interrelated notions of 
independence: (i) independence of shareholder treaty rights in respect of the local 
company’s contractual/national law rights, and (ii) independence of treaty claims in 
respect of contract/national law claims. Investment arbitration’s quest for independence, 
not least vis-à-vis national law and institutions, has come at a cost however. 
 The thesis’ argument is twofold. First, because investment tribunals uncritically 
endorse shareholder standing in indirect claims and the distinctiveness of treaty claims, 
they have overlooked substantive overlaps between contract and treaty claims. Decisions 
contributing to this outcome have often dealt with jurisdictional objections. However, 
tribunals have not revisited the ‘separation’ between contract and treaty claims when 
resolving the merits of investment disputes. For strictly jurisdictional purposes, 
mainstream ideas on shareholder standing and the cause of action may, depending on the 
terms of the applicable IIA, be apt given: (i) the need to decide on jurisdiction generally 
before hearing the merits (through prima facie tests or the like); (ii) investment tribunals’ 
duty to exercise jurisdiction whenever all jurisdictional requirements are present; and (iii) 
the short list of conditions to which investment tribunals’ jurisdiction is typically subject 
under IIAs. When dealing with the substance of the claims, however, the failure to 
recognize overlaps between related national and international law claims is problematic. 
This thesis has demonstrated that it results in investment tribunals neglecting to deal with 
risks of multiple recovery and prejudice to third parties’ legitimate interests and to 
adequately consider all the sources of law in investment disputes.   
 Second, substantive overlaps between shareholder treaty claims and related 
contract/national law claims and the referred to ensuing risks potentially affect the 
admissibility of shareholder claims. Relevant admissibility considerations include (i) the 
extent to which damages claimed in the shareholder treaty claim coincide with those that 
may be claimed before a non-treaty forum; (ii) whether both the shareholder and the 
company may effectively claim for the damages in question; (iii) whether the shareholder 
or the company has filed non-IIA claims before commencing the investment arbitration; 
(iv) whether the IIA claims rely on a contract with a forum selection clause providing for 
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a jurisdiction different from the treaty tribunal; (v) whether the investment tribunal can 
adopt measures to effectively address risks connected to substantive overlaps; (vi) 
whether third parties, such as the company’s creditors, may be affected by the shareholder 
IIA claim; and (vii) whether non-IIA claims involving the same damages as the 
shareholder IIA claim have been waived or settled.  
However, none of these factors is, by itself, an absolute bar to admissibility. 
Rather, they are relevant considerations in an overall assessment of shareholder indirect 
claims’ admissibility. Given the specificities of IIA provisions bearing on the applicable 
law and the substantive coincidence of treaty and contract claims, the admissibility 
assessment requires an integrated approach to the sources of law in investment arbitration, 
where proper weight is given not only to the IIA provisions but also to general 
international law and national law.  
 This thesis was divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduced the problem of 
substantive overlaps between treaty and contract claims, demonstrating that the problem 
is compounded by ideas of independence of shareholder IIA rights and claims. This 
chapter also identified the two main problems deriving from the parallelism between 
shareholder indirect claims under IIAs and non-IIA claims, viz. risks of multiple recovery 
and prejudice to third parties. It demonstrated that admissibility constitutes an adequate 
approach to these problems, notwithstanding other (mostly complementary) alternatives, 
which were also discussed.  
Chapter 2 adopted a definition of admissibility. It also distinguished the concept 
from jurisdiction and the merits, demonstrating that the three concepts are often 
intertwined but are different. This Chapter also advanced criteria to assess the 
admissibility of shareholder indirect claims, considering the problems referred to above. 
Chapter 3 discussed some of the main antecedents of the relevant ideas of 
standing, cause of action, and damages, mainly through the decisions of the 1903 
Venezuelan Commissions and the 1923-1934 Mexican Commissions. These 
Commissions functioned in a context that differed in important respects from that of 
investment tribunals. The differences include the institutional and procedural 
arrangements and the position on background notions of international law such as the 
status of non-state actors. Yet their decisions hold lessons for admissibility determinations 
in modern investment disputes. These include the need to acknowledge overlaps between 
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international and non-international claims and be alert to the consequences of such 
overlaps, and to give proper weight to national law. 
Chapter 4 analysed the position of shareholder claims. Both general international 
law and international investment law protect shareholder rights, although IIAs have 
strengthened and expanded the protection. Investment tribunals have unanimously 
asserted jurisdiction over shareholder claims relating to measures taken against the 
company’s assets. But even if involving the exercise of an independent right of action 
under international law, the thesis argued that such shareholder indirect claims overlap 
substantively with claims of the company. Complementing IIA provisions, general 
international law and national law principles bearing on the interrelation between 
shareholder and company rights need to be considered in dealing with the consequences 
of such overlaps.   
Chapter 5 focused on damages. The analysis revealed that, notwithstanding 
differences in valuation methodologies, the damage involved in shareholder indirect 
claims is the harm suffered by the local company. Investment tribunals allow any entity 
that forms part of the same corporate structure as the local company to claim this damage. 
The only requirement is that the claiming entity be protected by an IIA, no matter how 
many intermediary entities there are between the claimant and the company that suffered 
the damage. Yet this thesis argued that there may be reasons to accord priority to the local 
company (or to another entity within the corporate structure) for recovery purposes, 
including multiple recovery risks and prejudice to legitimate third-party interests. 
Investment tribunals should take these reasons into account when exercising their 
discretion to assess damages.  
Chapter 6 examined the contract claims/treaty claims distinction and its impact on 
investment tribunals’ decisions. The analysis of the causes of action in IIA claims 
revealed considerable substantive overlaps between treaty claims involving underlying 
contractual relationships and contract claims. This required revisiting certain mainstream 
notions of independence of treaty claims and rights vis-à-vis contractual claims and rights. 
The conclusion was that the contract/treaty distinction and its main component, i.e., the 
‘fundamental basis of the claim’ concept, are useful, perhaps even necessary, tools for 
jurisdictional purposes. However, the mechanical application of the distinction beyond 
jurisdictional determinations has prevented consideration of the substantive links between 
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contract and treaty claims. Substantive overlaps must be acknowledged and their 
consequences analysed as potentially affecting the admissibility of claims.  
Chapter 7 examined the law applicable to investment claims. It posited the 
application of national law and general international law, along with the provisions of the 
relevant treaty, in all phases of investment treaty arbitrations and particularly to 
admissibility determinations of shareholder indirect claims. These claims involve 
elements of national and contract law. If such elements are isolated from their proper legal 
background, the upshot is an inadequate consideration of the applicable law. Conversely, 
national and international sources of law may contain relevant provisions to address risks 
generated by shareholder indirect claims. 
The overall purpose of this thesis was at the same time more modest and more 
ambitious than the important goal of coordinating parallel proceedings. It was more 
modest in that effective coordination ultimately depends on an evolution of international 
investment law’s architecture, where investment tribunals would operate under some kind 
of unified institutional framework, or at least on the adoption and application of 
procedural devices such as claim consolidation. An admissibility approach provides less 
definite responses to the complexities caused by overlapping claims and relies more on 
the responses of individual tribunals.  
Yet admissibility includes notions of fundamental importance, involving the very 
purpose and limits of the judicial function.1 Shareholder treaty claims that overlap with 
contract claims often raise problems that investment tribunals, under their ‘overriding 
legal and moral task of seeking the truth and dispensing justice according to law’,2 
seriously cannot ignore. The contribution of this thesis is, first, to acknowledge the 
existence of the problem and identify its causes. Second, to propose a solution that entails 
abandoning the idea of independence of treaty claims and embracing the tools that 
international and national law provide to deal with competing entitlements over the same 
rights. The goal is that international investment law, while delivering on the promise of 
investment protection, does not hurt the legitimate interests of those who are not its direct 
beneficiaries and ultimately the interests of justice.  
 
                                                             
1 Brownlie (1995) 113. 
2 Conoco (Reconsideration) (Diss Op, Abi-Saab) [66].  
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